Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#16

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 May 2014, 03:58

Mil-tech Bard wrote: You can see the radar/fighter direction lessons of the American fighter campaign in March thru July 1942 at Darwin Australia and New Guinea thru early 1943 with 1.5 meter height finding radars that show up in North Africa right through to Anzio. Then the triple shock of German radio guided missiles, active radar jamming and Window (AKA early Chaff) kicking the Allies to centimeter wave radar plus VHF fighter radio based fighter direction in early 1944 right in time for Normandy landing in June 1944.

Had the Germans waited six months between Operation Shingle/Anzio (January 22, 1944) and Normandy (June1944) to hit the Allies with that guided missile plus electronic warfare surprise, Normandy would have been a great deal more costly and protracted..
Sounds impressive. How many of the guided bombs & bombers would there have been by June 1944?

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#17

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 13 May 2014, 16:29

There were six guided weapon bomber squadrons in KG40 and KG100 using the Hs 293 and Fritz-X respectively.

The numbers of Hs 293 and Fritz-X would have been "several hundred" with far more Hs 293 than Fritz-X. The Fritz-X proved to make the carrier planes more vulnerable than the Hs 293 so by the time of Normandy KG100 was using the Hs 293 as well.

Wikipedia has a couple of good articles on both radio guided weapons, which I clipped from below --
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_X

The only Luftwaffe unit to deploy the Fritz-X was Gruppe III of Kampfgeschwader 100 Wiking (Viking), designated III./KG 100, the bomber wing itself evolved as the larger-sized descendent of the earlier Kampfgruppe 100 unit in mid-December of 1941. This unit employed the medium range Dornier Do 217K-2 bomber on almost all of its attack missions, though in a few cases toward the end of its deployment history, Dornier Do 217K-3 and M-11 variants were also used. Fritz-X had been initially tested with a Heinkel He 111 bomber, although it was never taken into combat by this aircraft. A few special variants of the troublesome Heinkel He 177A Greif long-range bomber were equipped with the Kehl transmitter and proper bombracks to carry Fritz-X and it is thought that this combination might have seen limited combat service, at least with the combinations known to have been involved in test drops.

and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_Hs_293

The Hs 293 was carried on Heinkel He 111, Heinkel He 177, Focke-Wulf Fw 200, and Dornier Do 217 planes. However, only the He 177 (of I./KG 40 and II./KG 40), certain variants of the FW 200 (of III./KG 40) and the Do 217 (of II./KG 100 and III./KG 100) used the Hs 293 operationally in combat.

The key issue of both the Hs 293 and Fritz-X effectiveness was Allied Radar directed fighter protection.

After Salerno, Allied radar directed fighter interception pretty much made impossible the use of these weapons as the German missile carrying bombers had to either fly straight and level (Hs 293 glide bomb) or Climb and slow down (Fritz-X vertical bomb) to keep their weapon's flares in line of sight.

The key word there is Radar.

At Anzio the Germans dropped dipole radar reflectors -- chaff in modern terms -- and actively jammed the 1.5 meter radar band which most Allied early warning and fire control radars were clustered around.

This gave them a couple of months of effective bombing capability in the Anzio campaign and let them bomb the heck out of the port and shipping because there was no air field at Anzio -- which was under observed artillery fire -- to park Allied fighters on nor any way to effectively direct fighter CAP sent from Southern Italy.

It was the arrival of the SCR-584 and SCR-545 microwave fire control radars that turned the tide in the air at Anzio as they could direct defending anti-aircraft artillery far better than an un-jammed SCR-268 searchlight/fire control radars (or its upgraded SCR-516 variant) and were perfectly capable of directing day and night fighters.

This Anzio "Radar shock" had major effects on US and UK Radar development. The US Signal Corps long wave SCR-627 ground control intercept radar (to replace both the Army/Marine SCR-527 and USAAF SCR-588) and SCR-636 air transportable medium range radar (to replace the Australian LW/AW radar for MacArthur) sets were cancelled and suffered truncated production respectively.

The SCR-602/AMES Type-6 1.5 meter light weight radar was very quickly developed into decimeter band radars AN/TPS-1 (25cm), AN/TPS-2 (75cm) and AN/TPS-3 (50cm).

The British AMES Type-11 (50CM) was placed on the three fighter directer tenders for the Normandy invasion fleet just in case the Germans jammed longer wave length radars.

The SCR-584 wound up in the American Fighter Wing radar units and TAC's in both Italy and Northwest Europe.

The Radiation Lab Microwave Early Warning (MEW or AN/CPS-1) radar got it's A-bomb level priority based on the Anzio radar shock that only just got it ready in time to control air traffic over Normandy.

Minus the "Anzio radar shock," the Allied ability to control the air over Normandy would have been heavily truncated and the ability of KG40 and KG100 to get at allied shipping greatly enhanced.


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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#18

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 23 May 2014, 02:59

Back to this one. Hope 'Mil' is monitoring.

Mil-tech Bard wrote:There were six guided weapon bomber squadrons in KG40 and KG100 using the Hs 293 and Fritz-X respectively.

The numbers of Hs 293 and Fritz-X would have been "several hundred" with far more Hs 293 than Fritz-X. The Fritz-X proved to make the carrier planes more vulnerable than the Hs 293 so by the time of Normandy KG100 was using the Hs 293 as well.

Wikipedia has a couple of good articles on both radio guided weapons, which I clipped from below --
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_X

The only Luftwaffe unit to deploy the Fritz-X was Gruppe III of Kampfgeschwader 100 Wiking (Viking), designated III./KG 100, ....
The wiki article identifies about thirty ships hit with at least slight damage over a time of approx seven months. does not indicate how many missiles were loaded/launched or how many sorties this involved. somehow we are always missing 2/3 of the most critical information. Need to poke around a bit more on this.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#19

Post by durb » 23 May 2014, 13:22

"As it was, it was the ability of the P-51 to wrest air supremacy from the Luftwaffe in 1944 that saved strategic bomber war." [/quote]

I think that P-47 D Razorback made the basic work in the attrition war during late 1943 and early 1944. It´s range was limited at the beginning, but improved with drop tanks. I have read that the highest scoring US fighter unit in Europe (56th Fighter Group of 8th USAAF) used the P 47 to the end of war. P 47 Bubbletop and P 51 D are more known than the Razorback, but they came later, when the air war was already won.

Also P 51 B was perhaps more important Mustang model than P 51 D, although the later was manufactured by greater numbers. I think that B-Mustang deserves more attention, as was used during the earlier critical period of war. Great numbers of P 51 D appeared, when the backbone of Luftwaffe was already broken.

It would be interesting to compare the fighter losses of 8th USAAF during 1943 and early 1944 with Luftwaffe dayfighter losses. Probably such comparison should include also RAF to get more precise picture of total Allied fighter losses vs. those Luftwaffe units, which fought against 8th USAAF and RAF units (operating from Britain). Combat loss records of both sides should give more reliable picture than comparing (over)claim records. When it comes to the losses per type, one should take in account the different numbers of certain type of aircraft employed in the combat during certain time. Maybe this kind of research has been already done?

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#20

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 27 May 2014, 13:16

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Back to this one. Hope 'Mil' is monitoring.

>snip<

The wiki article identifies about thirty ships hit with at least slight damage over a time of approx seven months. does not indicate how many missiles were loaded/launched or how many sorties this involved. somehow we are always missing 2/3 of the most critical information. Need to poke around a bit more on this.
1. Try this article--

The Dawn of the Smart Bomb
Technical Report APA-TR-2011-0302

by Dr Carlo Kopp, AFAIAA, SMIEEE, PEng
26th March, 2011
Updated April, 2012
Text © 2006, 2011 Carlo Kopp

http://www.ausairpower.net/WW2-PGMs.html

This is the Fritz-X number --
"Around 1400 Fritz-X rounds were build, with around half expended in trials and training."

2. The Kopp article also links to this piece:

Guided German air to ground weapons in WW2
On special German WW2 Air to ground weapons
Text by 1JMA founder Friis
http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaluftwaf ... eapons.htm

That states --
"During the entire Hs 293 development program about 1900 weapons were build purely for testing and modifications. Some of these were modified for active service later."

3. See also this link for warships hit by German guided weapons --

http://www.ausairpower.net/Warship-Hits.html


4. And finally, see William Wolf's "German Guided Missiles: Henschel Hs 293 and Ruhrstahl SD 1400X "Fritz X"" which is translated from the original German and offered as Merriam Press Military Monograph MM53 here:

http://www.merriam-press.com/germanguidedmissiles.aspx
This is the first account to be published in English of two relatively little-known "secret weapons" of the Luftwaffe.

The Hs 293 guided missile was used against Allied shipping and naval forces in the latter stages of the war with some success.

Covers development and operational history of the Hs 293 in considerable detail, as well as proposed variants and the tactics used against their targets.

Although not as well known as the Hs 293, the Fritz X guided missile could have dealt considerable havoc on Allied warships and merchant shipping during World War II, and did achieve some operational successes.

Covers development and operational history of the Fritz X in detail, and tactics used against their targets.

Contents
•Introduction
•Henschel Hs 293
•Ruhrstahl SD 1400X "Fritz X"
•Appendices
◦Allied Intelligence Report on the Henschel Hs 293
◦Allied Intelligence Report on the SD 1400X "Fritz X" Radio-Controlled Bomb
•Bibliography

Specifications

•Fourth edition (February 2006)
•88 – 6 × 9 inch pages

•Paperback: ISBN 978-1-57638-028-4 — $14.95
PDF file on disk by mail $1.99

•13 photos
•6 illustrations
•7 multi-view drawings
•2 cutaways
•3 camouflage/markings drawings
•7 side view drawings

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#21

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Jun 2014, 03:50

MB... thanks. (I need to monitor this thread more closely).

A quick glance does not tell me if the sortie/ship hit rate was any better or worse than with other bombing techniques. This looks like one that will have to be chewed on for a while. Fortunately I collected some data on aircraft vs ships a couple years ago so at least there is something to start with.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#22

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 05 Jun 2014, 05:10

Carl,

The USAAF VB-1 Azon had a 12% accuracy rate in combat. Both the Hs 293 and the Fritz X guided missiles were similarly radio data link manual command to line of sight systems.

I don't see them being significantly more accurate after the first few surprise engagements.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#23

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 Jun 2014, 12:45

The Azon bomb attacks were vs bridges. In some ways a tougher target than a anchored ship. I am guessing the 12% indicates a 'hit' which was judged to have caused critical damage to the structure.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#24

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 05 Jun 2014, 22:47

Carl,

Azon accuracy and effectiveness had a lot to do with the leadership of the numbered Air Force using it.

Azons had a much higher dispersion between bombs than normal bombs (approximately three times as much) and had to be used one at a time below 15,000 feet for best accuracy. And the close three dimensional "Javelin down" formation precluded effective mass controlled drops because those kind of drops required the VB-1 carrying planes to all be at the same altitude for a good overlapping patterns.

This last was not discovered until weapons testing in Florida during the summer of 1945.

The 15th Air Force was clueless and utterly oriented on the massed, close formation, high altitude bomber tactics. Those tactics precluded effective Azon use.

The 8th Air Force had many of the same issues, had the Crossbow anti-V-1 flying bomb campaign divert much of the Azon materials and team personnel into Project Aphroditie related "Double-Azon" Weary Willie B-17 flying bombs, and then finally had their priority bridge targets removed by the break out in Normandy.

The 9th Air Force tried one mission with B-26's, took flak losses without bombing, and never tried again.

The 10th Air Force, once they got their act together, used Azon to good effect in Burma due to a more permissive threat environment.

The following text scanned from the Chapter 5 of:

NEAR MISS
The Army Air Forces' Guided Bomb Program
in World War II
by Donald J. Hanle


On 8 May 1944, after two more Azon missions had been flown by the 30 1st
Bomb Group, the Army Air Force board prepared a more complete assessment
of the Azon project. Although the VB-1 clearly "required better weather than
ordinary bombs;' the board concluded that the VB-I had performed well. It
was noted that 58 of 108 bombs dropped operationally had operated successfully.

The small percentage of successful drops was ascribed to the use of theremainder
of an "experimental lot of bombs;' and it was suggested that the standardized
operational models currently being produced would perform much
better. The report claimed that of these fifty-eight successful Azon bombs,
88 percent had a deflection error of 50 feet or less and a circular error proba?
le ( CEP) of 261 feet. 42 (Circular error probable is defined as the size of a circle
m which SO percent of the bombs are expected to fall. The smaller the CEP, the
more accurate the bomb strike.) While this was considerably less accurate than
what had been achieved over the bombing ranges in Florida, this was still a remarkable
CEP-particularly when considering that during this same time
frame, B-17s of 15th Air Force were averaging a CEP as great as 1,050 feet from
15,000-feet altitude when dropping standard, unguided iron bombs.43

Later...

Since 15th Air Force decided to seed Azon bombers into conventional formations,
and since these conventional bombers dropped their entire bomb
load on a single run at the target, the Azon bombers had to do the same. Controlling
a single VB-1 from a single Azon bomber was out of the question unless
the whole formation was willing to stay together for repeated passes at
the target until every VB-1 was expended. It most certainly would have been
dtfficult to justify to the conventional bomber crews that they would have to
be repeatedly exposed to enemy fire after they had delivered their own bombs
simply to maintain formation integrity with the Azon bombers. Consequently,
the Azon bombardiers were required to drop their entire bomb load
at the same time as their conventional formation-mates.

It is here that the AAF's bias for mass comes into play. The "entire bomb
load" for an Azon bomber could have consisted of a single, well-aimed VB-1.
with six Azon bombers in each formation, this would permit 6,000 pounds of
guided bombs, each having a much higher probability of achieving a hit than
the strings of Iron bombs streaming from the bomb bays of the conventtional
bombers. But, each B-17G could carry up to six 1,000-pound bombs, and the
very tdea of having a heavy bomber carry only one bomb-regardless of how
accuratewas anathema to WWII AAF operational thinking. Instead of having
each Azon bomber drop only one carefully guided VB-1 on a given mission,
then, it was decided that each bomber should drop strings of three to six
Azons at a time .
Burma was utterly different than the Med or NW Europe with good clear dry season weather and much less intense heavy flak --

The first operational VB-1 mission was flown on 27 December I944. It was an
astounding success. The target was a three-span, steel railway bridge, 380 feet long, over
the Sittang River on the Rangoon to Mandalay rail line. Three B-24Js, each carrying
four VB-1 s and four standard M -65, I ,000-pound bombs attacked the target.
En route to the target, each bomber dropped one VB-I and an M-65 on
the tracks as a warm-up. Upon reaching the bridge, each B-24 made three
passes from 9,300-feet altitude, dropping one VB-I and one M-65 on each
run. The results were nine direct hits, with Azons causing the collapse of the
center span and severe damage to one of the other two. All of the conventional
M-65 bombs missed.69 In a foreshadowing of the events at Than Hoa
bridge in North Vietnam over two decades later, here was a bridge that had
been repeatedly attacked by conventional bombs for over two years, suddenly
dropped by guided munitions in a single mission.

Almost to prove this first mission was no fluke the 7th Bomb Group surpassed
themselves again in the second mission, on '30 December I944. On this
raid four B-24s, each carrying 7 YB-ls, were assigned to hit a 225-foot steel
road bridge, with two other bridges serving as alternate targets. The first
bridge was demolished in two passes, with a total of 8 VB-ls expended. The
bombers then flew to th_eir first alternate and destroyed it, too, with 8 VB-ls.
The second alternate quickly fell under the weight of 8 carefully guided I ,000-
pound Azon bombs. With 4 VB-ls remaining, the four B-24s turned to hit a
bridge that had been unsuccessfully attacked by a conventionally armed B-24
squadron earlier that same day, resulting in a fourth bridge falling to VB-ls in
a single afternoon. Without question, both the aircrews and operational planners
were elated. By 11 January 1945, five more Azon missions were flown, expending
a total of 154 VB-ls causing the confirmed destruction of fourteen
bridges.-0 In an estimate prepared in April 1945, O'Donnell, the NDRC Azon
technical representative to the 7th Bomb Group, concluded,
The overall economy of Azon bombing on these seven missions is somewhat
startling. At least 35 of the Azons were either direct hits or close enough to damage
the targets. This does not include the bombs that fell over or short of the
bridges and damaged roads or track(s). Conservatively, we can say that one out
of five Azons gave a damaging hit. I do not have available figures on standard
bombing of bridges in the [India/Burma) theater, but I should say that one damaging
hit out of fifty bombs would be an over-optimistic guess. On this basis,
conservative for Azon, optimistic of standard bombing, Azon is ten times as effective
against bridges as standard bombing . .. one Azon squadron is equivalent to
two and a half star1dard groups.-1 [italics added)
Note that "one in five" hit number the NDRC flack states above did not include the bombs that malfunctioned in flight.

Those malfunctions ran up to 50% in some Burma missions due to the environment, spares shortages, shipping issues, and theft of electronic maintenance equipment while in transit or in depot before the Azon missions kicked off.
Last edited by Mil-tech Bard on 05 Jun 2014, 23:13, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#25

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 05 Jun 2014, 23:09

Carl,

Alright, here is the pertinent passage from that summer 1945 test report on the problems with the "javelin down" formation --
...A nine aircraft formation, flying line-abreast elements, released five AZON and one
standard M-44 bomb (for spotting purposes) per aircraft. (See Inclosure No. 5.) In
line-abreast formation, the results obtained from multi-frequency control
are much superior to those obtained by single frequency control. In the
six ship javelin down formation, no improvement is obtained by multifrequency
control.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#26

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Jun 2014, 04:10

Mil-tech Bard wrote:The 9th Air Force tried one mission with B-26's, took flak losses without bombing, and never tried again.
Had I time to burn ferreting out that little bit of history would be amusing. The 9th AF had spent a fair amount of time trying to destroy bridges and worked at several techniques. The also wrestled with a number of other pinpoint type targets. Why the 9th AF commanders did not investigate the Azon further is a minor but intriguing question.

The 8th AF experience is a more important question. At the top you had folks like Dolittle & LeMay who were if nothing else were engineering oriented. Maybe they thought suffcient attention was given to the Azon, maybe there was something else going on.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#27

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 06 Jun 2014, 17:32

Carl,

Other folks have done that work.

See:

"A Case History of Azon. an Azimuth Guided Bomb"
By Grant D. Gordon, III,
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College.
The B-26 unit tried Azon once and decided it was not usable
as a tactical weapon, The mission was flown on 4 August 1944 by
s1x (five were Azon equipped) Ninth Bomber Command B-26s. The
targets were a railroad embankment and three highway bridges at
Epernon, France. A total of ten Azon bombs were ,dropped. The
need for evasive maneuvers immediately after weapon release
degraded the bombardiers ability to accurately guide his ,_ weapon.
The lead bombardier was aiming for the entire flight and had
insufficient time to acquire and aim on target two.
Consequently, he had to direct a withhold against it (43:2).
Because evasive action negated the guidance advantage of Azon,
the B-26 crews felt it was no more effective than an ordinary GP
bomb and never used the weapon again (11:1).
.
11. Taylor, L. S., Chief, Operational Research Secfion,~Ninth
Air Force. Letter to Hq Army Air Force, Washington D.C.
6 October 1944.
And the reason that General Vandenberg and his 9th Air Force flying commanders acted that way had to do with how the bomber brass scored success.

See:

SUMMARY TECHNICAL REPORT OF DIVISION 5, NDRC
VOLUME 1
GUIDED MISSILES AND TECHNIQUES
WASHlNGTON, D.C .. 1946

page 45.
It is not clear why the Azon progmm was cancelled
in the summmer of 1944. There seems to be no question
that the system whereby bombardment groups receiieved
credit for tons of bombs dropped rather than
for targets destroyed seriously biased theater commanders
in favor of mass salvos as against aimed single drops
This system, together with the basis for awarding decorations,
has been harshly criticized by the Air Forces Evaluation Board
of the Pacific Ocean Area.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#28

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Jun 2014, 04:46

I wonder how that connects to the items I've read describing how concerned the "brass" were with hitting the target. I supose the tonnage thing might derive in part from overall weight estimated or allowed for the stratigic or operational goals, but there is probablly more to it.

In the case of the B26 mission I need to look at what altitude they were attacking at. Also the comment about the AA fires was itneresting. Cant say any of that is pertinant this subject, but who knows?

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#29

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 07 Jun 2014, 16:14

I wonder how that connects to the items I've read describing how concerned the "brass" were with hitting the target. I suppose the tonnage thing might derive in part from overall weight estimated or allowed for the strategic or operational goals, but there is probably more to it.
It is a reflection of how bad USAAF battle damage assessment was.

The OSRD weapons effects boffins -- there are a whole series of weapons effects books they put out during and after the war -- were aghast at how little real data the 8th Air Force had gathered.

Tonnage became the driving force because the bomber brass could measure it as a proxy of airmanship.

Experienced crews and outfits could fly farther and carry more than green ones.

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Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#30

Post by EKB » 07 Jun 2014, 22:33

Mil-tech Bard wrote:
I wonder how that connects to the items I've read describing how concerned the "brass" were with hitting the target. I suppose the tonnage thing might derive in part from overall weight estimated or allowed for the strategic or operational goals, but there is probably more to it.
It is a reflection of how bad USAAF battle damage assessment was.

The OSRD weapons effects boffins -- there are a whole series of weapons effects books they put out during and after the war -- were aghast at how little real data the 8th Air Force had gathered.

Without highly placed spies across the Nazi government, there was no way to get consistently accurate bomb damage evaluation.

Better pictures might be obtained with low level PR (Photo Reconnaissance) over Germany and that was done occasionally, but the spy planes usually flew at high altitude to avoid interception - and because a high-flying PR pilot could receive warnings of approaching German aircraft from radar stations in the UK. At 30,000 feet, the PR pilots sometimes reported clear radio reception from England for the entire mission, weather permitting, but that radio link was broken if the pilot descended to take pictures at low altitude.

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