Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

Discussions on all aspects of the United States of America during the Inter-War era and Second World War. Hosted by Carl Schwamberger.
Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#31

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Jun 2014, 00:08

I would not really know about the 8th AF, or a number or other situations. Most of my (limited) study has been on the 9th Bombardment from late 1943, the US 5th AF in the south Pacific, and some other air/naval actions. In the case of the 9th most of my focus has been on the transportation campaign, over France and later over Germany. In that case there were some fairly clear indicators. ie: The bridge is down, or it is still up. Or in the case of the 5th AF: The ship was hit, it was not. In the latter case there was still some room for error, tho not remotely in the same league as the evaluations of the industrial attacks by the 8th AF or the 15th AF. In the case of the bridges the error in damage estimation seems very small. That is reflected in the literature I've read concerning the transportation campaigns and the 9th AF operations over France. With such solid evidence for the outcome of their efforts there was a bit more attention to finding solutions. That is what made me curious about the Azon weapon & the 9th AF. By the date of the test operation they had found some solutions to the difficulty in dropping bridges, but those were not entirely satisfactory in terms of resources used or other aspects. Tho they did eventually drop enough bridges by 6th June.
Mil-tech Bard wrote: It is a reflection of how bad USAAF battle damage assessment was.

The OSRD weapons effects boffins -- there are a whole series of weapons effects books they put out during and after the war -- were aghast at how little real data the 8th Air Force had gathered.
My father, a ordinance officer in a B26 Group had a few nasty words about the 'weapons effects boffins' of 1943-44. "Knotheads" was his specific term, which in his 1930s -40 midwestern vernacular was a clear insult. I think he was including some high level Brit or other in that lot. He continued on in the air ordnance business post war and was familiar with the differences between what the leaders and their staff of 1943-44 thought and those post war evaluations with the new data. However, where his contempt seemed to derive from or be aimed at was the portion who were operating from theory they had contrived earlier in the war, that they were unwilling to modify by the experience of the crews actually flying the missions, and they seemed to be ignoring or cherry picking data from prewar tests. To attempt to reconstruct his remarks: "Even we knew what we had would not work they way they had us doing it." 'We' being both very junior officers like himself, and the career commanders of the squadrons and groups; "what we had" being the ordnance and the bomb sights; and the last being the attack methods, and general strategy for use of the 9th Bombardment Div. His other remarks on this addressed the deficiencies his group found when they first started ops in 1943, and the solutions they identified. Sorry I did not take notes back in 1978. At the time I had no clue what use his insights into this might have. I suspect from his experience in the ordnance effects and how it was used or misused by the 9th a lot of useful information passed by uncollected with him.

Enough of that. Reviewing the descriptions of the AA defense of the targets the 9th attacked the description of it interfering with the guidance of the Azon bombs to target fits. I strongly suspect the crews were skeptical long before the mission. I can visualize the group or wing commanders estimating exposure and likely losses as soon as they read the book on the Azon weapon. I suspect that if they have been told to keep trying a solution, if there was one, would have been found. I also suspect there is more to this that the bits we see here & my speculation.
Mil-tech Bard wrote:Experienced crews and outfits could fly farther and carry more than green ones.
Probably could hit the targets better too.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#32

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Jun 2014, 15:57

My father, a ordinance officer in a B26 Group had a few nasty words about the 'weapons effects boffins' of 1943-44. "Knotheads" was his specific term, which in his 1930s -40 midwestern vernacular was a clear insult. I think he was including some high level Brit or other in that lot. He continued on in the air ordnance business post war and was familiar with the differences between what the leaders and their staff of 1943-44 thought and those post war evaluations with the new data. However, where his contempt seemed to derive from or be aimed at was the portion who were operating from theory they had contrived earlier in the war, that they were unwilling to modify by the experience of the crews actually flying the missions, and they seemed to be ignoring or cherry picking data from prewar tests. To attempt to reconstruct his remarks: "Even we knew what we had would not work they way they had us doing it." 'We' being both very junior officers like himself, and the career commanders of the squadrons and groups; "what we had" being the ordnance and the bomb sights; and the last being the attack methods, and general strategy for use of the 9th Bombardment Div. His other remarks on this addressed the deficiencies his group found when they first started ops in 1943, and the solutions they identified. Sorry I did not take notes back in 1978. At the time I had no clue what use his insights into this might have. I suspect from his experience in the ordnance effects and how it was used or misused by the 9th a lot of useful information passed by uncollected with him.
Carl,

You need to get yourself an interlibrary loan copy of the following:

Rockets, Guns and Targets

Rockets, Target Information, Erosion Information and
Hyperveolocity Guns Developed During World War II
by the Office of Scientific Research and Development

Volume Editor
john E. Burchard

Atlantic Monthly Press Book,
Little, Brown, and company,
Boston 1948

This is what the OSRD's AN-23 Operational Research Section had to say about the 8th Air forces battle damage assessment capabilities on page 299 --

The attention of AN-23 was concentrated in Washington on extracting from
the available data the infomation, incomplete though it might be, which
could be put into immediate operational use. Eventually the analysis was
extended to include data that began to come in from the Pacific.

As the work of AN-23 was nearing its goal in the summer of 1945,
Rojansky and later Bohnenblust had to leave because of long-standing commitments
elsewhere. The responsibility for the project was taken on by
King, who carried the work to completion. 55

The data brought by AN-23 from Europe cover 36 American attacks on
industrial plants in Europe. It may appall the reader to learn that of the
hundreds of such attacks made by our Air Force and studied by AN-23,
only 36 were found to be sufficiently well documented, damage-assessed,
and not too confused by too great a variety of bombs, to permit reliable
weapons analysis.
But such are the facts!
Judging from that passage, most of the problems your father had came from the senior USAAF commanders, not the OSRD.

And as the 9th Air Force Bomber Command was a much lower priority outfit for everything than the "Mighty 8th," I don't see their BDA capability being much better than the 8th Air Force.

Enough of that. Reviewing the descriptions of the AA defense of the targets the 9th attacked the description of it interfering with the guidance of the Azon bombs to target fits. I strongly suspect the crews were skeptical long before the mission. I can visualize the group or wing commanders estimating exposure and likely losses as soon as they read the book on the Azon weapon. I suspect that if they have been told to keep trying a solution, if there was one, would have been found. I also suspect there is more to this that the bits we see here & my speculation.
Given the emphasis on gaming dropped tonnage versus hit targets, and particularly given who General Vandenberg was, I have little doubt that the 9th Air Force wanted nothing to do with Azon.


Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#33

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Jun 2014, 16:31

Carl,

Another interesting OSRD book to get for the civilian view of the ETO American military in action is the following --

COMBAT SCIENTISTS

by LINCOLN R. THIESMEYER and JOHN E. BURCHARD

VOLUME EDITOR
Alan T. Waterman

An Atlantic Monthly Press Book
Little, Brown and Company
Boston 1947

This passage will give you an idea what the OSRD men did in the ETO and in particular the sticky fingers the 8th Air Force had regards anyone who was valuable -- (outside of the VB-1 Azon folks!) -- who showed up supporting Air Force units.

CHAPTER XVI
WIZARDS OF ETHER AND WIRE
THE ELECTRICAL EYE-AND-EAR SPECIALISTS
pages 255 - 256

One day in the. spring of 1944 two American tanks went out over
forested, rolling terrain behind the lines in Europe. Each had new radio
equipment and their orders were to maneuver, establish radio contact,
and then practice a joint operation. Thiey were guoe for" sonil tiie
When suddenly observers were startled. The two tanks nearly collided
as they approached from opposite sides of a low ridge. If this had becn
a combat operation and the gunners were at all "trigger-happy" they
might have shot one another.

An OFS radio and radar man was on hand to investigate - Harold
S. Balmer, astrophysicist from the Museum of Science and Industry
in Chicago and staff member of the Radiation Laboratory. He found
that the tank crews had removed parts of the radio antennas - they
proved inconvenient in getting in under trees-and, to make matters
even worse, the men had brought along the wrong crystals for operat

ing their sets. The incident is another demonstration of the importance
of making civilian specialists available to keep our troops supplied with
up-to-date knowledge about the complex equipment arriving in greater
and greater quantities.

Balmer also cited an example of the superb discipline in military
matters displayed in a unit of the 9th Pathfinder Troop Command to
which he was an advisor on the use of radar in big transport planes.
On D-Day one of these ships was unable to gain the altitude needed to
clear a coastal ridge. Orders came back to jettison parachutes and all
unnecessary equipment. They obeyed to a man and each remained
calmly in his seat until the pilot crash-landed near a destroyer and
gave the order to leave the plane.

Balmer's primary mission was to demonstrate that there would be
little mutual interference of the radar equipment we planned to use in
the invasion. Given the probable disposition of the various sets for
Operation Overlord, the landings at Normandy, he allayed the fears
of operations officers of the 8th and 9th Air Forces that one piece of
equipment would limit the effectiveness of its neighbors.

The 9th Air Force had another radar specialist from OFS. Donald
J. S. Mcrten of the Sperry Gyroscope Co. had gone to ETO with
Balmer and worked for a short time with the ORS of the 9th. Then he
was released to become a personal technical advisor on radar to Major
General Hugh Knerr, Deputy Commander of the Strategic and
Tactical Air Forces. Merten was a key liaison man with research and
development agencies, the manufacturers of radar gear, and the Army
Technical Services.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#34

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 09 Jun 2014, 19:22

Carl,

The OSRD weaponeers were pretty good, if the attached photo is any indication.
Bridges -- Weapon Data, Fire Impact Explosion.  -- Oct 1945 -- CB-180860.jpg
This is a picture from the final October 1945 Weapons Data: Fire Impact and Explosion, OSRD No. 6053
As far as Azon is concerned, it only had a single nose impact fuze.

Note what the bridge weapons effect photo calls for in terms of fuzing.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#35

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Jun 2014, 23:13

Yet more material to digest, and slowly knowing my work schedule. Still a few things jump out.
Mil-tech Bard wrote: Judging from that passage, most of the problems your father had came from the senior USAAF commanders, not the OSRD.

And as the 9th Air Force Bomber Command was a much lower priority outfit for everything than the "Mighty 8th," I don't see their BDA capability being much better than the 8th Air Force.
Maybe after I review the items at hand this might be clarified. My impression is there were some changes in the 9th Bmdt Div when it moved from 8th AF to 9th AF. A lot of the names at the top change of course, and some fundamental practices change as well. My memory revolves around the attacks on the bridges, perhaps becasue the items I read were focused on that. In that case there was little to debate or 'process' either the bridge span was in the river, or it was not. Early on in 1943 the 8th AF or those training my fathers group in the US had some wrong assumptions about the sort of damage it took to put a bridge out of action. From the text at hand it is clear they were suprised by the reality, and the difficulty in getting the desired result. The attacks on airfields, marshalling yards, industrial sites, or V1 sites made by the 9th may very well have been as subject to error in damage analysis as those cited for the 8th AF in general. but in the case of bridges the post attack photos show either a span in the river, or a intact bridge with traffic.

The document you reproduced is dated to 1945, tho technically it might have been made in 1925. I've found descriptions of US Army tests made in the early to mid 1920s that would have provided the same information. ie: Tests on a steel reinforced concrete automotive bridge with artillery projectiles and aircraft bombs. In that specific case the greater efficiency of delay fuzes is noted, as are other details of the superficial and structural damage. Other wise the chart is dated after three years of bridge bombing experience by the 9th BD & 15th AF was accumulated & it hopefully reflects that :wink:

Anyway, thanks for posting all this, and anything else you might have, however off topic it is. Hopefully I can review all this fairly quickly.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#36

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Jun 2014, 16:18

Carl,

If you are really into the OSRD and 9th Bomber Command groove, se the following:

"New weapons for air warfare: fire-control equipment, proximity fuzes, and guided missiles."

Main Author: Boyce, Joseph Canon, 1903-
foreword by Richard C. Tolman.
Boston, Little, Brown, 1947.

See pages 214 - 216

It will give you the history of proximity (VT) fused bombs and the 9th Bomber Command in the closing days of WW2.

The book is on-line with the Hathitrust and you can find it there using the full title above as your search term.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#37

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Jun 2014, 16:50

The document you reproduced is dated to 1945, tho technically it might have been made in 1925. I've found descriptions of US Army tests made in the early to mid 1920s that would have provided the same information. ie: Tests on a steel reinforced concrete automotive bridge with artillery projectiles and aircraft bombs. In that specific case the greater efficiency of delay fuzes is noted, as are other details of the superficial and structural damage. Other wise the chart is dated after three years of bridge bombing experience by the 9th BD & 15th AF was accumulated & it hopefully reflects that

This is what was placed at the end of the aerial bombing section in that "Weapon Data: Fire Impact & Explosions " document --
GENERAL REFERENCES

The following publications contain much general material similar to that in Weapon Data - Fire, Impact, Explosion or
contain Information of general Interest on the effectiveness of weapons. Much of the material in these works and in
the present report is based on the same sources, and in many instances the interpretation used in one of the reports
is taken directly from one of the others. Such repetition of Information and interpretation should by no means be
interpreted as lendinq authenticity to the material .

143. Selectton of Bombs and Fuzes for Bombardment Targets . The Army Air Forces Board. Project No. 3554A471.6. The
Army A i r Forces Board, Orlando, Florida. October 1944.

144. The Relatrve Effectiveness of Varaous Type Bombs and Fuzes Against Strategic and Tactical Objectaves. Army Air
Forces Evaluation Board, Mediterranean Theatre of Opdratins. October 1944.

145. Selection of Bombs and Fuzes to be Used Agarnst Varaous Targets . OPNAV-16-V #A6. Air Intelligence Group,
Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Naval operations, Navy Department, Washington. March 1944.

146. Selection of Bombs and Fuzes for Destruction of Varrous Targets . FM 1-110; FTP 224. War and Navy Departments,
Washington. April 1945.

147. Ballistic Data, Performance of Ammunition. TM 9- 1907. War Department, Washington. September 1944.

148. Selection of Weapons for Fighter Bombers against Tactical Targets . Operations Research Section, Ninth Air Force.
Memorandum No. 70. February 1945.

149. Effects of Explosion of HE Bombs: I. General and Air Blast . BRL Report No. 554. Ballistic Research Laborator,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. June 1945.


150. Performance of Bombs and Projectiles agarnst Shore Installataons. Ordnance Pamphlet 1172. Bureau of Ordnance,
Navy Department, Washington. May 1944.

151. Air Attack of Japanese Coast Defense Batterries, Target Analysas. CINCPAC-CICPOA Bulletin No. 17-45. Feb. 1945.

152. Effects of Weapons on Targets . Volumes 1-6. Div. 2, Div. 11, and the APPlied Mathematics Panel, Pational Defense
Research Committee. Monthly publicatlon. April - September 1945.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#38

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Jun 2014, 17:06

Carl,

You can get a PDF document from the US Army Combined Arms Resource Library Digital library at this link --

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/comp ... 375/rec/17

titled:

TERMINAL BALLISTIC DATA
Volume III
Bombs, Artillery,
Mortar Fire & Rockets
Dated September 1945
By the Office of the Chief of Ordnance

Which will give most of the OSRD document's aerial bomb performance data and a lot more regards specific performance of American bomb fuzes, as well as gun AP round performance against rolled homegenious Armor and much else.

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#39

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 17 Jun 2014, 21:55

Carl,

A book I just got and read seems to be what you are looking for --

TO COMMAND THE SKY: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944 , by Stephan McFarland and wesley Phillips Newton, Smithsonian history of Aviation Series, copyright 1992.

It is a 8th Air Force Fighter Command versus Luftwaffe alternating POV with coverage of both sides signals and intelligence in support of the fighters.

It is premo good stuff. Check it out.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#40

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 23 Aug 2014, 20:31

Picked through bits of this. The limited amount I've looked at mostly is very late war or post war data and analysis and so far is entirely hind sight from that date. It does not directly relate to the PoV of the bomber commanders, specifically in the 9th Div/AF had in 1943 & much of 1944. I expect after asorbing enough of that material the data can be revrese engineered back to 1943-44 to understand it in that application. Along the way two names did resurface on the question of mass vs precision. First was the name anderson appearing again. In my previous reaading he was associated with the transportation campaign and its eventual sucess in 1944. anderson is suposed to have rejected the 'more is best' doctrine as ineffcient and worked on how to make fewer bombs count vs targets like bridges. Maybe more on that will be revealed as the reading progresses. Second was a Gen Nye. His approach in 1943 was more tactical than technical. He was given the task of developing extreme low level bombing techniques/tactics, and a bomber group to develop this with. The early results were unfortunate and while Nye was allowed to continue development these tactics did not become mainstream doctrine.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

#41

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 23 Aug 2014, 20:34

Mil-tech Bard wrote:Carl,

You can get a PDF document from the US Army Combined Arms Resource Library Digital library at this link --

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/comp ... 375/rec/17

titled:

TERMINAL BALLISTIC DATA
Volume III
Bombs, Artillery,
Mortar Fire & Rockets
Dated September 1945
By the Office of the Chief of Ordnance
My father may have had a copy or partial copy of that. It disappeared from my sight in the 1980s, & may have been among the items he donated to the AF museum @ Tuscon Az.

Post Reply

Return to “USA 1919-1945”