Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regiments?

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Felix C
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Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regiments?

#1

Post by Felix C » 13 May 2014, 16:47

CCA and CCB were basically a regiment each of armor and infantry with artillery?
Was this formation considered useful or did it spend itself too soon?
How does this compare to UK-BC or German armored division OOB? I mean non adhoc groupings.
Do CCRs ever fight or are strictly replenishment depots?

Sorry if basic. Amazing how much still left to learn about basics.

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#2

Post by binder001 » 15 May 2014, 18:51

First are you refering to "British" regiments (which in armor were about like US battalions) or to the three-battalion infantry regiment? The Combat Command was actually closer to a brigade - a mixture of battalions of different arms under one commander. The Combat Command was not a "replenishment" organization but a tactical fighting element. A 1943-pattern US armored division contained two full combat command headquarters elements, plus there were enough "extra" HQ elements to form a third; Combat Command R ("reserve"). The armored division had organic elements of three tank battalions, three armored infantry battalions and three SP artillery battalions, plus a battalion of engineers and a squadron (battalion equivelent) of mechanized cavalry. A combat command could be assigned any units from this pool of resources, but in many cases the same battalions were often kept together for cohesive operations. If the division was divided up into three equal combat commands then each CC would have a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion, a field artillery battalion, a company of engineers and a mech.cavalry recon troop. With the "attachment" system of augmenting divisional strength, each CC might also have a tank destroyer company, AAA elements and maybe extra artillery. The US armored division was found to be relatively short on infantrymen in many situations so a battalion or even a full regiment of infantry could be assigned for support. Conversely, a combat command might be detatched from its parent division and temporarily assigned to an infantry division. In many cases the combat command then became the tactical HQ of a heavy brigade or even a light division. The combat commands were to have enough logistical support to be able to operate independently of their parent divisions for a period of time. For many tactical operations the combat commands were broken down into "task forces" which could vary in size from a company to a reinforced battalion. This flexible command approach allowed the US armored division to be in several places at once. One CC might be suporting an infantry division in a defense while the other two attacked the enemy.

It's hard to compare this with the Germans. While they didn't have a formal "combat command" HQ element the panzer divisions were usually quite successful at forming "kampfgruppe" or battle groups based around a regimental headquarters. As the war ground onwards the German panzer division often had more organic infantry than the US armored division, but the US division had armored transport for all of its infantry - something the Germans could never accomplish. The US division was more likely to be closer its authorized equipment levels than an equivelent German unit.


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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#3

Post by Gary Kennedy » 17 May 2014, 23:03

Just to add to the above, the initial 'Heavy' US Armd Div consisted of three actual Regts, two Armd and one Armd Inf, plus three Armd Arty Bns. The Armd Regts had two Medium and one Light Tk Bns, the Armd Inf three Bns, all in halftracks. The original concept was to have two Armd Divs and one Motorized Inf Div operating together, with the latter reinforcing the relatively small 'bayonet strength' of the Armd Inf Regt. The Heavy Armd Div had two Combat Commands, sitting a little awkwardly between Regimental and Divisional HQs.

When the 'Light ' Armd Divs came in the two CCs were retained and the RHQs abolished, so the CCs occupied a position more akin to a RHQ but without a fixed allocation of units. CCR was skeleton only and required an influx of personnel to turn it into a functioning HQ. The Light Armd Div kept the same Armd Inf strength as before (three Bns, now slightly larger due in part to having a Service Coy), and while the Tank strength dropped from six to three Bns, two of those dispensed with were Light Tk Bns (with each Medium Bn getting its own Lt Tk Coy). With the Motorized Divs idea dropped Armd Divs were dependent upon standard Inf Regts (detached from Inf Divs) being attached and motorised courtesy of Quartermaster Truck Coys from higher up the chain.

The Combat Command approach wasn't perfect by any means. The US Army 'Organization of Ground Combat Troops' notes deficiencies in numbers of infantry, and also the lack of 155-mm artillery units under direct control. (That volume used to be online at the USA CMH website, but looks to have gone over to a hefty PDF version now). Also Patton himself wrote a critical analysis of its shortcomings (mostly giving his comments on how it should be re-organised) -

http://www.pattonhq.com/textfiles/divnotes.html

Both the British Armoured and German Panzer Divs underwent their own organisational cavalcade between 1939-45. By 1944 the British Armd Div was based on one Armd Bde (three Armd Regts (Bn sized) and one Motor Bn of inf), one Inf Bde (three Bns, provided with 3-ton lorries from the RASC to effect movement), two Arty Regts (Bn sized), one SP and one towed, plus one Atk and one LAA Regts. Also one Armd Recce Regt, two Field Sqns (Coy sized) RE units and an MG Coy for the Inf Bde. By Jul-Sep 1944 11th Armd and Guards Armd Divs had gone to a pairing system, with one Armd Regt and one Inf Bn. This was made possible by the return of the Armd Car Regts from Corps HQ level to the Armd Divs, freeing the Armd Recce Regt to act as an Armd Regt proper, and not dispersing the Motor Bn out among the Armd Regts. This allowed the Divs to field four Groups, with two under each Bde HQ; not a million miles away from the CC system, but retaining a fixed allocation of units. 7th Armd Div dabbled with the format, but mostly kept the Armd Bde/Inf Bde approach.

The 1944 Panzer Divs had settled down to a single Pz Regt of two Bns, two PzGren Regts, each of two Bns, an Arty Regt of three Bns, plus Atk, Pio, AA and Recce Bns. These units were routinely assigned to Battle Groups, which get some folks very excited indeed, using the three RHQs available. For the most part these contained a mixture of inf and armour, plus varying arty and engr support, which again isn't strikingly dissimilar from the CC approach.

Gary

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#4

Post by steverodgers801 » 18 May 2014, 08:22

The concept of CC was to adjust the force to the needs of the mission. Marshall made attacking a simple job of two units to cover and one to advance. This tactic could be done from squad level to division.

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#5

Post by EKB » 19 May 2014, 04:28

The Combat Command system was essentially employed to tailor custom-made combined arms battlegroups to fit changing needs.

The support elements of the armored division seldom operated as complete independent units, they were instead divided up into parts - and constantly moved back and forth to various Combat Commands - according to whatever objective was required at the time.

Eric Bergerud described the Combat Command concept this way:


" ... The Combat Command system used for U.S. armored divisions, which used complete combined arms teams at the regimental level, was the most complicated combat organization in any army and was copied by the German Bundeswehr after the war. In general, American units of all types excelled at the use of combined arms. In particular, American artillery was faster to react on both offensive and defensive missions than that of any other army. This fact made American units very dangerous to attack and on numerous occasions (the Kasserine Pass and the Ardennes are good examples) saved U.S. forces from suffering the full consequences of poor deployment.
It is noteworthy that, during the entire war, large American formations were forced to surrender only twice: 12,000 men at Bataan and 9,000 during the Battle of the Bulge. The British lost more than this combined total at both Singapore and Tobruk, and every other major army suffered massive defeats totally beyond the American experience ..."

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#6

Post by Felix C » 19 May 2014, 16:43

Thanks everyone but one last question. Was Combat Command R the logistical tail unit from where replacements and supply were issued or was it an actual fighting organization? Was an CCR actually used in battle?

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#7

Post by Gary Kennedy » 19 May 2014, 20:09

From FM-17 -

"Reserve Command - The reserve command, consisting of five officers and three enlisted men, is provided for control of the division reserve. It is augmented by nine enlisted men who operate the necessary transportation and communication facilities. It is commanded by a colonel who is also charged with supervision of infantry training.

"Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combat Command - This is similar to the headquarters used to control non-divisional armored groups. It contains the necessary staff, operations, intelligence, communications, supply, and evacuation personnel for control of a tactical grouping of the combined arms. Three (light) tanks, in addition to the regular transport, are provided for the commander and his staff. One combat command is commanded by a brigadier general and the other by a colonel."

I've seen it mentioned that a non-divisional Armored Group HQ could be attached to an Armd Div proper to provide a fully functioning CCC/R. If the Div deploys three identical groups, each one Tk, one Inf and one SP Arty Bn, then CCC/R would be a combat HQ, if the Div opts for a more mixed bag then CCC/R might just have a few Coys under its control.

One example is given in the 'encirclement of Nancy' paper available at usacac.army.mil, which concentrates on CCA of 4th Armd Div, which was built around one Tk Bn, one Armd Inf Bn, two SP Arty Bns, plus allocations from the Cav Recn Sqn and Engr Bn, and non-Div Arty and Engr assets.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/d ... /gabel.pdf

Nice, sweeping comments from the quoted author, Bergerud. Here was me thinking the RA and their Commonwealth equivalents at least knew which end to put the round in :wink:

Gary

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#8

Post by RichTO90 » 19 May 2014, 21:13

Gary Kennedy wrote:From FM-17 -

"Reserve Command - The reserve command, consisting of five officers and three enlisted men, is provided for control of the division reserve. It is augmented by nine enlisted men who operate the necessary transportation and communication facilities. It is commanded by a colonel who is also charged with supervision of infantry training.

"Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combat Command - This is similar to the headquarters used to control non-divisional armored groups. It contains the necessary staff, operations, intelligence, communications, supply, and evacuation personnel for control of a tactical grouping of the combined arms. Three (light) tanks, in addition to the regular transport, are provided for the commander and his staff. One combat command is commanded by a brigadier general and the other by a colonel."

I've seen it mentioned that a non-divisional Armored Group HQ could be attached to an Armd Div proper to provide a fully functioning CCC/R. If the Div deploys three identical groups, each one Tk, one Inf and one SP Arty Bn, then CCC/R would be a combat HQ, if the Div opts for a more mixed bag then CCC/R might just have a few Coys under its control.
Hi Gary, I hope you don't mind me butting into your excellent discourse, but this is the subject of my next book. :D

Don't forget there were actually three major iterations of the armored division in the U.S. Army, not two.

The first was as it was created in the aftermath of the June 1940 mechanization conference that established the Armored Force. It included some real oddities, including an armored brigade of three regiments, an infantry regiment of three battalions plus a separate artillery battalion, and an artillery regiment of two battalions. Two combat commands existed in the initial organization, but as headquarters elements that were part of division headquarters. In that scheme units were assigned as necessary to the two by the division CG, who retained direct control of the division reserve.

The March 1942 FM and following TO&E refined things, eliminating the brigade headquarters, one armored regiment, and the artillery regiment headquarters, while formalizing a headquarters and headquarters company 'A' and 'B'. It also instituted a separate "reserve headquarters" as part of the division headquarters, which consisted of three officers and five EM (I think you reversed those), augmented by nine EM from headquarters company and elements of the divisional service company as directed. CCA and CCB each were to be commanded by a brigadier general, but the reserve command headquarters senior officer was a colonel.

The September 1943 FM and TO&E changed things again, eliminating the armored and armored infantry regiment and substituting separate battalions. In addition, the Reserve Command (not officially a "Combat Command") ended its ad hoc existence and was expanded into a Headquarters and Headquarters Company with about two-thirds the personnel (and capability) of the Combat Command. In Europe in late 1944, the Reserve Command was sometimes augmented by attaching an Armored Group Headquarters so that it had a comparable capability as the Combat Commands. However, until 1945, all still operated on the September 1943 (with changes to February 1944) organization. It wasn't until the issue of the 13 January 1945 TO&E's for the HQ Armored Division (17-1), HQ&HQ Company Armored Division (17-2), and HQ & HQ Company Combat Command (17-20-1), and the 24 January 1945 TO&E for the Armored Division (17) that the Reserve Command was officially recognized as a tactical organization.
One example is given in the 'encirclement of Nancy' paper available at usacac.army.mil, which concentrates on CCA of 4th Armd Div, which was built around one Tk Bn, one Armd Inf Bn, two SP Arty Bns, plus allocations from the Cav Recn Sqn and Engr Bn, and non-Div Arty and Engr assets.
Each division functioned slightly differently in combat.

The two "heavy divisions", the 2nd and 3rd, created a functional "CCR" by utilizing the headquarters of the armored infantry regiment. However, they usually operated two fairly balanced combat commands.

4th and 6th Armored habitually only utilized CCA and CCB as "combat" organizations, with one organized as armor-heavy and the other infantry-heavy, retaining just a small reserve and augmenting the reserve command with the headquarters of the attached TD battalion - the use of "CCR" 4th Armored Division in the Bastogne Relief was a fluke dictated by the tactical circumstances.

5th AD pioneered the "balanced" division concept, utilizing all three headquarters as tactical elements; as they entered the continent the other divisions tended to follow similar practices, but there were always variations and until they were augmented by attachments, the reserve commands always had limitations.
Nice, sweeping comments from the quoted author, Bergerud. Here was me thinking the RA and their Commonwealth equivalents at least knew which end to put the round in :wink:
Yes, he's very good on Pacific matters, not sure why he strayed into Europe. :D

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#9

Post by RichTO90 » 19 May 2014, 21:28

Felix C wrote:Thanks everyone but one last question. Was Combat Command R the logistical tail unit from where replacements and supply were issued or was it an actual fighting organization? Was an CCR actually used in battle?
No, the "logistical tail" was the 'division trains', which were part of the division rear echelon. It consisted of a headquarters, a maintenance battalion, and a medical battalion. Supply was handled through the battalion service company/battery. One peculiarity of the "light" armored division organization, which eliminated the divisional quartermaster (supply) battalion was that it turned out there were no longer sufficient trucks and trailers in the division to haul the mandated divisional unit of supply (for food, fuel, ammunition, and spare parts), which meant that in practice two Quartermaster Transportation Corps Truck Companies were permanently attached to each division, giving them an extra 96 trucks.

CCR was an administrative organization intended to oversee those combat units held in reserve by the division. Those units were sometimes held in reserve to rest and refit, but replacement and training was not a reserve command function.

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#10

Post by steverodgers801 » 19 May 2014, 23:26

Also, there were units that a higher HQ could attach to a division for a time and those also could be used in a CC

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#11

Post by Leo Niehorster » 20 May 2014, 09:42

And please excuse me for inserting my 2 cents.

The March 1942 organization of the Armored Division called for Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments (T/O 17-1-1) for two combat commands (A & B) — each commanded by a brigadier general — as part of the Division Headquarters (T/O 17-1). There was at that time no official reserve combat command, although an ad-hoc ("reserve") combat command could be formed with the armored infantry regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company (T/O 7-22).

The September 1943 reorganization upgraded the HHD to HHC (T/O&E 17-20-1) only for the two combat commands (A & B), as separate units. One was now to be commanded by a colonel, the other by a brigadier general.

It also created an official Headquarters Combat Command Reserve (T/O&E 17-30-1), with a strength of 1 colonel, 2 majors, 3 NCO, and 5 enlisted. However, no detachment or company was authorized, and it was completely reliant on administration, mess, and supply, as well as vehicles and additional personnel from the Headquarters Company, Armored Division and and signal equipment from the Division Signal Company.

The 1944 and the two 1945 armored division organizations maintained this concept.

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#12

Post by RichTO90 » 20 May 2014, 13:33

Leo Niehorster wrote:And please excuse me for inserting my 2 cents.
No problem...better than my memory.
The 1944 and the two 1945 armored division organizations maintained this concept.
Leo, I track:

The 1 November 1940 TO&E (there was also the 15 July Provisional TO&E the 1st and 2nd AD were organized under)
The 1 March 1942 TO&E (and Change 2 dated 29 October 1942; later changes in the ETO were not official)
The 15 September 1943 TO&E (developed from the March 1943 Proposed Light Division TO&E)
The 12 February 1944 TO&E
The 24 January 1945 TO&E

I know a "sixth" TO&E existed, but have never run across it or a date. I presume that is the second one in 1945? What date was it?

Also, until recently I thought the 12 February TO&E was Change 2 to the 15 September 1943 TO&E - do you know why they made it a new TO&E? Nothing changed dramatically AFAIK?

Cheers!

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#13

Post by Leo Niehorster » 20 May 2014, 16:55

US armored divisions' organizations

T/O 17, dated 15 November 1940, superceding a tentative table (T/O 17P) dated 8 August 1940.
Superceded on 1 March 1942.

T/O 17, dated 1 March 1942, "heavy" organization.
— Two changes: 1 August 1942 and 29 October 1942.
Superceded on 15 September 1943.

T/O&E 17, 15 September 1943 "light" organization (except 2nd & 3rd Armored Divisions) *
— Two changes: 18 November 1943 and 7 January 1944.
Superceded on 12 February 1944.

T/O&E 17, 12 February 1944.
Superceded 24 January 1945.

T/O&E 17, 24 January 1945.
— Superceded on 16 June 1945.

T/O&E 17, 16 June 1945 (all divisions standardized, including the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions).

* Notes:
New organizations with major structural changes, took time to implement, and did not occur overnight. For example, the 1st Armored Division, in action in Italy, was not converted to the "light" organization until July 1944.

These 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions had been directed on 19 January 1944 to retain their 1942 organization, but to modify the T/E of the subordinate units to the most recent ones, so — although these two divisions finished the war in the 1942 "heavy" organization — there were changes were made to them during 1943 and 1944. For example, the three tank battalions were standardized early 1944 with one light and two medium companies, each, identical to the "light" divisions.

The important reorganizations were the March 42 and the September 43 ones.

There are minor differences between the September 43 and the February 44 organizations, but as RichTO90 in post #12 notes, those could have just as easily been effected through Changes. No idea why this warranted a new T/O&E. Clean sheet(s) for the upcoming invasion?

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#14

Post by RichTO90 » 20 May 2014, 17:54

Thanks Leo!
Leo Niehorster wrote:* Notes:
New organizations with major structural changes, took time to implement, and did not occur overnight. For example, the 1st Armored Division, in action in Italy, was not converted to the "light" organization until July 1944.
Indeed.
These 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions had been directed on 19 January 1944 to retain their 1942 organization, but to modify the T/E of the subordinate units to the most recent ones, so — although these two divisions finished the war in the 1942 "heavy" organization — there were changes were made to them during 1943 and 1944. For example, the three tank battalions were standardized early 1944 with one light and two medium companies, each, identical to the "light" divisions.
Yes, however, the standardization of the tank battalions was done by interchanging companies between the battalions rather than by an actual organizational change. One modification was the decision in August and September 1944 authorizing the M4 105mm, although oddly enough the two divisions were authorized different numbers initially (likely due to the reality of availability). The issue of 57mm AT guns to replace the 37mm was another.
The important reorganizations were the March 42 and the September 43 ones.
Yes and thanks for reminding me about the 16 June 1945 one. That was a D'uh moment on my part. :lol:
There are minor differences between the September 43 and the February 44 organizations, but as RichTO90 in post #12 notes, those could have just as easily been effected through Changes. No idea why this warranted a new T/O&E. Clean sheet(s) for the upcoming invasion?
The ways of the U.S. Army are mighty and mysterious...

One thing IIRC changing in the February 1944 TO&E was the substitution of the M4 105mm for the M8 75mm HMC in the Assault Gun Platoon of the Armored Infantry Battalion. Not that any units actually did so in the ETO during the war.

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Re: Did the Combat Command concept basically mean two regime

#15

Post by EKB » 21 May 2014, 07:51

Gary Kennedy wrote:
Nice, sweeping comments from the quoted author, Bergerud. Here was me thinking the RA and their Commonwealth equivalents at least knew which end to put the round in :wink:

Gary

Eric Bergerud was more positive than critical of the British Army.

This particular book was a Vietnam study and at the beginning of Chapter 3, Bergerud back-tracked to World War II to explain how U.S. Army organization had evolved by 1944 - and how it remained similar in 1965 - for better or worse. This is more of what he said, to frame his opinion about the Command Command system:

“… It is necessary to examine some aspects of the earlier experience that both shaped and limited the mode of employment of the American military in South Vietnam. Although there is a certain continuity in the American military tradition, principally passed on through the service academies, the modern U.S. Army was born on the battlefields of Europe in 1944.
Regardless of any strategic errors the Allies may have committed, the tactical performance of American and British ground forces was very impressive. Though numerically superior, the force ratio facing the Allies (roughly 3:2) was nowhere near as favorable as that facing the Soviet Union (roughly 3:1 or even more). Yet, in ten months, the Western Allies routed an experienced foe, and while doing so, inflicted many more casualties than they themselves suffered. Considering the numbers involved and the magnitude of the victory, the cost in blood paid by British and American troops was very low.
Leaving aside the British, the U.S. Army developed a mode of operations so effective that it has influenced American and Western military operations on land to the present day. The superiority of the U.S. Army did not result from better officers, soldiers, or weapons. In many respects enemy forces were superior in each of these categories.
The army was, however, totally superior in two critical areas—tactical air power and technical support services. Tactical air power slowed enemy deployments and supply and often supplemented artillery for direct support. American superiority in technical and support services, though less obvious in effect, was just as important as mastery of the air.
U.S. soldiers were well fed and benefited from the best medical support in the world. American divisions were lavishly supplied, and, in contrast to enemy units, normally kept up to or close to authorized strength by an enormous ‘pipeline’ of men and matérial. Drawing on the world’s largest supply of technically proficient civilian manpower, the U.S. Army was totally mechanized, had enough engineers to allow it to function well in any terrain, and benefited from excellent battlefield communications.
Because of all of these factors, the makeup of American combat units grew more and more complex. The Combat Command system used for U.S. armored divisions, which used complete combined arms teams at the regimental level, was the most complicated combat organization in any army and was copied by the German Bundeswehr after the war. In general, American units of all types excelled at the use of combined arms. In particular, American artillery was faster to react on both offensive and defensive missions than that of any other army. This fact made American units very dangerous to attack and on numerous occasions (the Kasserine Pass and the Ardennes are good examples) saved U.S. forces from suffering the full consequences of poor deployment.
It is noteworthy that, during the entire war, large American formations were forced to surrender only twice: 12,000 men at Bataan and 9,000 during the Battle of the Bulge. The British lost more than this combined total at both Singapore and Tobruk, and every other major army suffered massive defeats totally beyond the American experience.
The United States fought a rich man’s war against Germany and Japan and would do so again in Vietnam. Whenever possible, money in the form of firepower was expended instead of blood. To do this, the U.S. Army created the largest ‘tail’ (i.e., the highest percentage of support personnel relative to combat troops) of any army in the world.
Just as it did later in Vietnam, the system had its critics. Perhaps the Americans, particularly officers, were overly concerned with creature comforts. Perhaps the system, because of its size, was often inefficient and marked by corruption. Perhaps the American system did a poor job of distributing the risks of combat. Those relatively few soldiers that did fight often had to fight too much.
Yet, whatever the drawbacks, the lavish support given American divisions gave them firepower at least equal to that of any nation and staying power that was unmatched. Above all, the American system worked. Nothing happened in the twenty years between the end of World War II and the beginning of full-scale war in Vietnam to cause the U.S. military to doubt the effectiveness of its mode of operations …”

Bergerud is not a statistician and I don’t know if he has got accurate data sets on force ratios, kill ratios, and loss ratios, or if he counted POWs in his calculations, etc. But obviously he believes that the British Army finished the job with a high degree of efficiency.

See p.85-86,
Eric M. Bergerud. The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in the Hau Nghia Province, 1991.
Last edited by EKB on 21 May 2014, 15:21, edited 1 time in total.

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