m1903 and m1917 US use in WWII

[firstflabn]

Hi, all. New guy here; attracted by the serious researchers (who also know how to have fun). Marcus was nice enough to allow me in - and to unglitch my registration.

I have an ETOUSA progress report dated April 30, 1945 showing 242,500 '03 type rifles in the theater. This total includes reserve supplies, but excludes sniper versions and those in French hands.

Another document, the Army Service Forces Annual Report for 1943, includes an interesting comment on '03 issuance. Remarkably, the need for defense against low flying aircraft was given as the reason that "... a policy was adopted whereby at least 25 percent of the enlisted personnel of service troop units were armed with the .30 caliber rifle."

I have collected a smattering of service unit T/O&Es over the years (even harder to locate than those for combat units). I had previously noticed this 25% phenomenon in service unit T/O&Es dated 1943 or later - and since reading this went back and checked the handful of 1942 QM T/O&Es I have. For the 1942 versions, it's mixed bag - two had no rifles, the other two already had approx. 25% rifles.

Assuming the 25% applied across the board for service troops, 242k might be close. With right at 3 million shoulder arms in ETOUSA around V-E Day, this would amount to about 8% '03s.

Don

[RichTO90]

Assuming the 25% applied across the board for service troops, 242k might be close. With right at 3 million shoulder arms in ETOUSA around V-E Day, this would amount to about 8% '03s.

Don

Very good info for a new guy Don, thanks!

In terms of overall numbers it is actually hard to pin down just how many M1903 and variants there were. By April 1917 a total of 843,239 were completed and another 312,878 to 30 November 1918...but there is no data I can find for production from then until 1 July 1940. For M1903, M1903A1 and M1903A3 production after that was:

1 Jul 40-31 Dec 41 - 1,273
1942 - 342,393
1943 - 868,415
1944 - 77,959 (albeit all but 874 were delivered by end Feb)

For M1903A4 "sniper":
1 Feb-31 Dec 43 - 17,045
1944 - 11,320 (program complete 30 Jun)

Of all those, 191,713 were delivered as Lend-Lease, so there were quite a few to go around. To compare, M1 figures were:

21 Jun 37-30 Jun 40 - 48,505
1 Jul 40-31 Dec 41 - 352,898
1942 - 758,567
1943 - 1,220,748
1944 - 1,098,818
1945 - 554,375

M1C production beginning in Nov 44 was:

1944 - 11
1945 - 6,885

[Dunnigan]

Not dwell on this matter, but it was also discussed in this January 2013 conversation:

Um, yes, but there isn't anything other than the same assertions made over and over again - I'm simply not sure how it could have been done and I have yet to see some proof - other than anecdotal - that it was done. I've looked for photographic evidence, but that is ambiguous or simply unclear. There were M1903 in all infantry regiments. There were 126 grenade launchers in the infantry battalion alone - if they did not have the M7, which were in scant supply in June 1944 - they had to have an M1903 to utilize the M1 Grenade Launcher. The battalion also nominally had nine M1903A4 for issue as sniper weapons. Further, if they did not have the M8 Grenade Launcher for the M1 Carbine, they would possibly substitute as many as 26 more.

Oh yeah, this topic. I did a quick google search to see if there was anything new and this came up recently as a comment to D-Day photos posted on the web:

"Joe Huld wrote:
June 03, 2014
My dad was a platoon sgt in Co L of the 23rd inf who fought with them from Omaha beach to the Rhine. He did mention using 03 Sringfields but only for launching rifle grenades or sniping. All of his wartime pictures show only the M1 Garand. Some years ago his platoon leader gave me a copy of an undated (but surely 1944) QMC list of the rifles issued to the platoon and all were noted as M1s with serial numbers indicating manufacture earlier in 1944. While it is possible that the 23rd went ashore with 03s I think it is far more likely they were replaced with M1s before the invasion. A competent & prudent division CO (and Walter Robertson surely was both) would have overruled a regimental commander and armed all 3 of his regiments with the same rifles. Col Fuller was relieved on June 16 1944 and even if the 23rds rifle companies were still carrying 03's then, the new regimental CO would probably have made replacement a priority."

[firstflabn]

Thanks, Rich. Interwar '03 production numbers appear in Brophy's Springfield Armory book, but those figures don't account for quantities expended (nor the quantities of low number '03 receivers destroyed). A more direct route to WWII numbers is a June 1940 figure given in the Army Green Books - about 895k on hand. Since this comes from an army report, I presume this is for the army alone (excluding USN and USMC.)

From there, add in Remington and Smith Corona production (about 1.3 million) to get 2.2 million. The USN admin history says there were 330k 03A3s procured for them during WWII, though the number actually received may vary from that. Anyway, that's the best number available. That brings the total down to about 1.9 million. Take away another 200k for L/L to get 1.7 million.

Keeping in mind that we are looking very broadly at the subject (until better data is located), almost 60% of army personnel overseas in May '45 were in the ETO. Extrapolate the quarter million '03s there to the total army force overseas and you get 400k worldwide. (No data to use to account for losses). That's a pretty low field usage rate. Wish I could find status reports for stateside distribution. Still waiting for winning lottery numbers so I can buy my condo in College Park (maybe a timeshare would work).

[RichTO90]

Sorry, I forgot to reply...

Thanks, Rich. Interwar '03 production numbers appear in Brophy's Springfield Armory book, but those figures don't account for quantities expended (nor the quantities of low number '03 receivers destroyed). A more direct route to WWII numbers is a June 1940 figure given in the Army Green Books - about 895k on hand. Since this comes from an army report, I presume this is for the army alone (excluding USN and USMC.)

Yup, forgot about that one. GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943, p. 34, but it was 900,000. Which is the 895,000 from? Yes, it likely only includes War Department holdings, but the Navy, USMC, and Coast Guard holdings would be relatively small.

From there, add in Remington and Smith Corona production (about 1.3 million) to get 2.2 million. The USN admin history says there were 330k 03A3s procured for them during WWII, though the number actually received may vary from that. Anyway, that's the best number available. That brings the total down to about 1.9 million. Take away another 200k for L/L to get 1.7 million.

It's easier just to take the production figures I gave. They are from Official Munitions Production of the United States by Months, July 1, 1941 - August 31,1945 as prepared by the War Production Board 1 May 1947, so probably can be safely counted as definitive...give or take a few. Adding wartime production - excluding M1903A4 - to the 900,000 held by the War Department as of 30 June 1940, you get 2,190,040. Subtract 191,713 for Lend-Lease and you have 1,998,327. Also give or take a few...

Keeping in mind that we are looking very broadly at the subject (until better data is located), almost 60% of army personnel overseas in May '45 were in the ETO. Extrapolate the quarter million '03s there to the total army force overseas and you get 400k worldwide. (No data to use to account for losses). That's a pretty low field usage rate. Wish I could find status reports for stateside distribution. Still waiting for winning lottery numbers so I can buy my condo in College Park (maybe a timeshare would work).

With an active strength of 8,157,386 officers and men in the Army on 31 March 1945 and 66% of them overseas, I suspect that a lot of them were issued an M1903 as their basic weapon. Of course, given that such a small proportion of those were AGF combat infantry units, I suspect by that time most of them had their TO&E M1 rather than M1903.

[firstflabn]

I discovered one more source in my files (piles?). As always, can't assure that's it's necessarily representative, so the standard warnings remain in effect.

Official history of the Ninth U.S. Army shows weapons quantities by type. With no easy way to present a table, hope this is clear:

20 Nov 44
'03s - 6,720
Strength - 183,228

20 Feb 45
'03s - 7,426
Strength - 270,216

20 Mar 45
'03s - 7,224
Strength - 326,084

So, less than 4% (and dropping). I don't have a detailed order of battle for the Ninth, but about half of this army's strength was in its divisions. If every rifle squad in the Ninth in March still carried an '03 for grenade launching, that would only account for about 2,700. If the Ninth is representative, then with five field armies operating in the ETO, that would mean about 36,000 of the theater's 270,000 '03s were anywhere near the front. That's what, 13%? As army strength rose 75%, '03 quantities rose only 8%.

Another important role for the '03 in the ETO was arming replacements. Too complex to say much about it here, but until about Feb 45, in accordance with War Dept policy, ETO replacements arrived in the theater unarmed - they were supposed to be armed by the unit they were assigned to. Well, this didn't work as replacements could sit around for awhile and their skills eroded. At the same time, weapons losses were being grossly underreported in the ETO - and since replacement weapons were shipped based on these loss reports, a shortage inevitably developed. Fortunately, a big pile of '03s were sitting around - ones that had gone over with early service troops when carbines were not yet available in sufficient quantities. So, repo depots got '03s for training and replacements got assigned to their units carrying '03s - until salvage and shipments from stateside brought the numbers up to where they were supposed to be. The Ardennes disaster set this back a bit, but then things settled down.

So, the seemingly unloved '03 saved the day twice in the ETO - providing a grenade launching platform until the M7 GL woes could be fixed and again through a disastrous supply policy.

[RichTO90]

I discovered one more source in my files (piles?). As always, can't assure that's it's necessarily representative, so the standard warnings remain in effect.

Good stuff. I may have something similar for June-September 1944 - I'll check.

So, less than 4% (and dropping). I don't have a detailed order of battle for the Ninth, but about half of this army's strength was in its divisions. If every rifle squad in the Ninth in March still carried an '03 for grenade launching, that would only account for about 2,700. If the Ninth is representative, then with five field armies operating in the ETO, that would mean about 36,000 of the theater's 270,000 '03s were anywhere near the front. That's what, 13%? As army strength rose 75%, '03 quantities rose only 8%.

For those periods, Ninth Army consisted of:

20 NOV 44: five ID (29, 30, 78, 84, 102) and two AD (2, 7) (however, the 84th ID was attached to 2d British Army)
20 FEB 45: seven ID (29, 30, 35, 75, 84, 95, 102) and three AD (2, 5, 8)
20 MAR 45: eight ID (29, 30, 35, 75, 83, 84, 95, 102) and three AD (2, 5, 8)

Another important role for the '03 in the ETO was arming replacements.

I suspect that was true for all replacements in all theaters as well as many of the CONUS-based forces.

[LineDoggie]

Also non Combat Arms units- MilGov, Engineer(not Combat Engineers), Corps MP's, Ordnance, Transportation, QM truck co's, Port cargo units, GR, etc. would not need a M1 for their duties

[firstflabn]

From very sketchy evidence, Pacific replacements seem to have brought their personal weapons along with them. If that gets confirmed by better evidence, it would point out the dangers inherent in using logic to fathom army decisions. Much as I would enjoy seeing it, I know of nothing showing stateside weapons issuance.

Similarly, if logic provided a path to puzzling out what happened, the March 1944 T/O&Es for the QM Truck Company and the QM Pack Troop Company wouldn't have authorized Garands (with no '03s). The 25% rule mentioned earlier still applied, but right there on the paper it says Garands. The army published over 500 different T/O&Es (not counting revisions). Wish they were all available in one place - at least for the more popular unit types. My favorite one on the obscurity scale is the Pigeon Company - of which there were 5 in the ETO (don't know what the pigeons were armed with - except maybe for their dive bombing apparatus).

A 1944 AAA AW battalion had 39 more Garands than an infantry battalion - despite having 93 fewer men. Obviously the War Dept decided the AAA battalion needed them more than the infantry. There's a file at NARA that contains T/O&E correspondence - presumably discussions of who should get what - that might provide answers.

In that AAA battalion, the switchboard operator was authorized a Garand while the three electrical technicians got carbines. Figure that one out.

[LineDoggie]

Also Authorized doesn't necessarily mean actually got.


For instance today every Machine Gunner for an M240 is authorized a M9 Pistol as his individual weapon. Yet due to a shortage only Medics and Officers got pistols in my Bn. Platoon leaders werent even authorized a pistol yet got the few in the Arms room.

IIRC I read about the 29ths first wave overstrength had many '03's and needed Garands. So they were taken from the FA Bn's to re-equip the 29ths overstrength.

[Sarge]

Several of the divisions fighting in Italy - Among them the 34 & 36th - had 03s (most likely actually 03A3s). When they were pulled out and sent to England to get ready for Overlord they got M1s. I'm sure that a check of division fighting in North Afrika will also show 03s.
Sarge

[firstflabn]

Also Authorized doesn't necessarily mean actually got.

Agreed, but in the absence of something better than an anecdote here and there (with little or no context and no verification), the starting point is always the book. I know of no way to account for every single weapon, so starting with the known - authorized quantities and reported totals on hand seems like the only choice.

For instance today every Machine Gunner for an M240 is authorized a M9 Pistol as his individual weapon. Yet due to a shortage only Medics and Officers got pistols in my Bn. Platoon leaders werent even authorized a pistol yet got the few in the Arms room.

An anecdote is often a good starting point, sometimes providing that first clue that eventually leads to solving the mystery (or at least to a better defined question), but in isolation it is just as apt to mislead. A single anecdote establishes something happened once - but is no better than a coin flip in painting the big picture. If someone had asserted that something never happened, then an anecdote from a reliable source would carry considerable weight.

IIRC I read about the 29ths first wave overstrength had many '03's and needed Garands. So they were taken from the FA Bn's to re-equip the 29ths overstrength.

No FA unit was authorized Garands (almost all got carbines), so you might want to check that story. Part of the story fits, however. Assigned overstrengths to all the assault divisions (and the two earliest followups) were assigned '03s - no Garands. At least that's what it says in the Feb 44 Neptune planning documents. Not sure whether that held up in later revisions. If it did, it would fit pretty well with the War Dept policy mentioned above. For the sake of those who aren't as familiar with the term 'overstrength' as you obviously are: it was anticipated that heavy losses would be suffered by the first infantry in, so the theater created a dedicated replacement pool for each infantry division to be immediately available - to avoid having to requisition them from the general pool.

My guess is that arming them ahead of time was a way to further speed up the process. Perhaps they anticipated heavier than usual equipment losses as well. It is certain they understood it would be impossible to immediately set up a normal supply operation, so making a temporary exception to the War Dept policy seems sensible. A springtime small arms shortage in the ETO had led to an order to scrounge carbines and Garands from service units which were slated to remain in the UK. That was in April. I don't know whether the shortage cleared up by D-Day.

The June issue of American Rifleman had a good article by Marty Morgan. One undated photo from around St. Lo shows a pile of '03s. My wild guess is there are maybe 750 there. Might those be exchanges from overstrengths? Unfortunately, no unit is identifiable, so tantalizing, but no payoff. Probably mentioned in G-3 or G-4 report.

[firstflabn]

Several of the divisions fighting in Italy - Among them the 34 & 36th - had 03s (most likely actually 03A3s). When they were pulled out and sent to England to get ready for Overlord they got M1s. I'm sure that a check of division fighting in North Afrika will also show 03s.
Sarge

You must be thinking of some other units. Neither the 34th nor the 36th were ever in UK. The 34thID finished the war in Italy; the 36thID served in the Fifth Army, then the Seventh Army in the invasion of southern France.

With the development problems of the M7 Grenade Launcher, the '03 served an important purpose. If you have a source mentioning use by others in the rifle squad or elsewhere, I'd be pleased to see it. As you seem certain, I think maybe you should provide the evidence on North Africa. Again, the question is not whether any were used, but how widespread.

[Gary Kennedy]

I currently have a membership to the Fold3 website, which has a lot of USMC reports and war diaries I've not found elsewhere. I haven't searched it much for US Army info, but tried M7 grenade launcher and found one report. I don't have time to scan through the whole thing and offer the all important context, but here's the gist of it.

First US Army - Op Neptune;

Non-rolling major items - M1 (10,070), M1903 (1115), M1903A4 (50); M1 grenade launcher (2260), M7 (1325), M8 (428)

Losses 6 Jun - 31 Jul - M1 (6575), M1903 (299), M1903A4 (229); M1 g/l (199), M7 (9251), M8 (1237)

Now from memory the M1 was the g/l for the M1903, the M7 for the M1 and the M8 for the carbine. It surprises me to see just how many M1903s and M1 launchers are detailed, but it does look like there were plenty of M1+M7 launcher combos around. My instinct is that Rifle Squads departing for France in 1944 were not relying on the M1903 for grenade launchers, but instinct is all it is.

The comparison of the rifle levels authorised for Inf and AAA Bns given earlier caught my eye as my figures are slightly different;

Inf Bn (T/O 7-15 Feb44) 871 men with 535 M1s, 9 M1903A4s, 219 carbines, 81 pistols and 27 BARs
AW Bn Mob (TO 44-25 Apr44) 814 men with 597 rifles, 93 carbines, 3 pistols and 121 SMGs
AW Bn SP (TO 44-75 Apr44) 710 men with 487 rifles, 89 carbines, 3 pistols, 131 SMGs

As to the decision of which weapon a man who isn't primarily expected to be shooting the enemy gets on the tables, my guess is they flipped a coin a lot. The British Army did adopt a reasonably straightforward system in 1943 for deciding who got a pistol, a Sten or a rifle, based on arm of service, with just the usual handful of traditional British exceptions

Gary