"Square" vs "Triangular" Infantry

[AJFFM]

Interesting Topic.

Didn't battalions of the square system have 6 companies instead of 4 of the later generation?

Also if I am not mistaken the structure of officer cadre was instrumental and the massive losses it took (which resulted in a lot of battle field promotions of NCOs to Officer ranks) and so indirectly influenced the divisional structure.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Interesting Topic.

Didn't battalions of the square system have 6 companies instead of 4 of the later generation?

Also if I am not mistaken the structure of officer cadre was instrumental and the massive losses it took (which resulted in a lot of battle field promotions of NCOs to Officer ranks) and so indirectly influenced the divisional structure.

The TO I have for the German, British, French, & Russian Armies of 1914 show four rifle companies per battalion. For the first three all the companies were suprisingly similar in strength, close to 250 men each. Nothing in front of me for the US Army battalion of 1917-18, memory says four companies but... The US Army infantry battalion and regiment changed significantly post 1917 & there is discussion of that in the Infantry Journal, but I did not take notes on it.

Reorganizing to reflect realities in command and control sounds logical, that was a significant part of the internal debate in the USMC back in the 1980s concerning battalion structure.

[Gary Kennedy]

WW1 isn't my area for many things, organisations included. The few books I have indicate a reasonably common approach for early war French, German and late war US Div organisation, with two Bdes, each of two Regts, each of three Bns, each of four Rifle Coys. The British shifted from eight Coys per Bn, each of two Pls, to four Coys, each of four Pls, not long before the Great War as I recall. Every seems to have had their own take on MG organisation however.

I can't recall any of the major powers beginning WW2 with a square structure outside of the US model. The IJA look to have switched from four to three Regts in 1936, and as mentioned the Italians had the odd binary approach. The Germans did briefly retain a Bde HQ in Pz Divs, which commanded either two Pz Regts or two Schutzen/Pz Gren Regts as appropriate. I think they were discontinued 'sometime' in 1942?

Gary

[Carl Schwamberger]

.... The Germans did briefly retain a Bde HQ in Pz Divs, which commanded either two Pz Regts or two Schutzen/Pz Gren Regts as appropriate. I think they were discontinued 'sometime' in 1942?

Gary

I'd like to say earlier, in the 1941 reorganization, but dont have anything to quickly check against. Maybe someone else has the reference at hand for that. I'm also remembering the Red Army had a similar structure in its 1930s - 1941 armored divisions, but again cant check this easily. In either case it looks like differing arms in each brigade of the armored divisions caused the thing to function differently from the two brigade square infantry division.

[DocHawkeye]

Every seems to have had their own take on MG organisation however.

The British in particular were still organizing their machine guns into Battalion size units which I never quite understood. I suppose that was a holdover of the Great War, thinking in terms of trench busting. The Vickers was still seen and treated like a really small artillery piece than a tool of the infantry/maneuver. Strange how British infantry were so heavily armed with mortars but light on direct-fire. Everyone else was moving machine guns to weapon companies though and a few armies were doing both. The US was so well off they were moving them down to Platoons which wasn't as common as I used to believe. I guess they weren't afraid of being able to replace them.

[Sheldrake]

Every seems to have had their own take on MG organisation however.

The British in particular were still organizing their machine guns into Battalion size units which I never quite understood. I suppose that was a holdover of the Great War, thinking in terms of trench busting. The Vickers was still seen and treated like a really small artillery piece than a tool of the infantry/maneuver. Strange how British infantry were so heavily armed with mortars but light on direct-fire. Everyone else was moving machine guns to weapon companies though and a few armies were doing both. The US was so well off they were moving them down to Platoons which wasn't as common as I used to believe. I guess they weren't afraid of being able to replace them.

The British practice isn't that different to the German or US. The Germans and Americans had heavy weapons companies as organic parts of their three battalion Infantry Regiments The British organised battalions into brigades with MG and Mortar companies attached from the Divisional heavy weapons battalion.

One reason why the Americans used heavy MGs down to platoons was because of the limitations of the BAR imposed by a 20 rd magazine. The British had a decent LMG and the Germans an even better one. The big difference with a sustained fire MMG is the tripod and dial sight giving an indirect fire capability and a range of 4,000m, similar to than of the 4.2" Mortars - oh and a way to carry enough ammunition to sustain fire.

Centralising these assets at as high a level as possible makes it possible for their arcs to be co-ordinated in defence and concentrated in the attack. The British MMG units were fully motorised with the MMGs provided with Universal Carriers as armoured transport for the gun and ammunition - another good reason from separating them from footsloggers with different mobility.

These were quite handy pieces of kit in attack or defence. On D Day on Sword Beach the assault battalion 1th Bn South Lancs was pinned down in front of Strong point COD for the first half an hour after H Hour. CO dead and lots of other casualties as per Saving Private Ryan. At H+40 a platoon of four carriers from 2nd Middlesex under Lt Tony Milne landed from an LCT, As soon as they released the travelling clamps on the vickers MMG they advanced firing suppressing enemy fire long enough for the lead carrier to manouvre to fire down the line of German trenches, which is when the remaining 16 Germans decided to surrender. Massed fire from APC mounted MGs was not a tactical option available to the US soldiers on Omaha Beach.

[RichTO90]

One reason why the Americans used heavy MGs down to platoons was because of the limitations of the BAR imposed by a 20 rd magazine.

They did? The HMG Platoon was a battalion asset, which was part of the Weapons Company. They were centralized at the battalion, just as the 81mm mortars were. I do not know of heavy MGs allocated down to platoons in U.S. infantry units. Further, the .50 caliber BMG were vehicle-mounted and intended as antiaircraft weapons in the infantry battalions.

Massed fire from APC mounted MGs was not a tactical option available to the US soldiers on Omaha Beach.

Yes, they were, M15 and M16 MGMC were indeed one of the tactical options on OMAHA and played a significant role. The automatic 37mm and multiple .50 caliber weapons were considerably more fire power than four .30 Vickers were. The problem was the antitank assets on much of OMAHA were considerably more effective than on SWORD.

Cheers!

[Carl Schwamberger]

... The problem was the antitank assets on much of OMAHA were considerably more effective than on SWORD.

I digress, but if there is a text comparing the suppresion/destruction of these direct fire cannon covering the beaches it would be of great interest to me. Were any of the dozen odd cannon covering Omaha beach destroyed by the preparatory fires?

To return to topic, sort of: the US Army in the reorganization from 2003 recreated its brigades in a sort of binary or square arraignment. With two manuver elements, a fire support element of field artillery, and a reconissance element. Its claimed the reconissance element can act as a third manuver element, but I've not delved into the details of this to judge one way or another.

[RichTO90]

I digress, but if there is a text comparing the suppresion/destruction of these direct fire cannon covering the beaches it would be of great interest to me. Were any of the dozen odd cannon covering Omaha beach destroyed by the preparatory fires?

Although "COD" (WN20) covering QUEEN WHITE mounted 8.8cm Pak, a 5cm Pak, and a 4.7cm gun, it was WN18 on QUEEN RED with another 8.8cm and three 5cm Pak that seemed to have greater success against armor. Five of 14 DD tanks were knocked out there and two more swamped. Along with the carriers on QUEEN WHITE, another 15 DD tanks and four RMSG Centaurs successfully landed, along with two Sherman 17-pdr. Only three DDs were knocked out there, but another seven were swamped.

Probably the best details on OMAHA are in Steve Zaloga's new book, The Devil's Garden.

[Sheldrake]

One reason why the Americans used heavy MGs down to platoons was because of the limitations of the BAR imposed by a 20 rd magazine.

They did? The HMG Platoon was a battalion asset, which was part of the Weapons Company. They were centralized at the battalion, just as the 81mm mortars were. I do not know of heavy MGs allocated down to platoons in U.S. infantry units. Further, the .50 caliber BMG were vehicle-mounted and intended as antiaircraft weapons in the infantry battalions.

Massed fire from APC mounted MGs was not a tactical option available to the US soldiers on Omaha Beach.

Yes, they were, M15 and M16 MGMC were indeed one of the tactical options on OMAHA and played a significant role. The automatic 37mm and multiple .50 caliber weapons were considerably more fire power than four .30 Vickers were. The problem was the antitank assets on much of OMAHA were considerably more effective than on SWORD.

Cheers!

Thanks for the extra information about the Heavy weapons platoon. I was responding to the previous poster who suggested that MMG were deployed to platoon level.

I'd be interested to know more about the use of APC (halftrack?) mountged MGs on Omaha Beach.

For what its worth the balance of armoured firepower was also rather different on Sword (and Gold & Juno) than Omaha Beach too. As far as I can see the forced deployed on Omaha were 64 tanks launched as DD Tanks followed by a further 32 fromLCts supported by 36 SP guns firing from LCts in the run in shoot - which ended at H-10. This was to cover an assault by two RCTs on a 6 km frontage .

On Sword Beach the assault was one brigade (RCT) on a 2 km frontage supported by 148 gun tanks and 48 armoured engineer tanks mounting guns and 72 SP guns on the run in shoot, Even so, 1 South Lancs were still pinned down for 30 mins until the carrier mounted Vickers of 2 Middlesex turned up,However, the odds were stacked more in the attackers favour on Sword,

This is relevant to the thread topic as on On D Day 1 US Infantry landed as a Square division, with the 116 RCT under command. As I have explained, their fire support was spread a little thin during the assault.

On Sword and Juno beaches 3 British and 3 Canadian Divisions Div also operated as "square" divisions, each with a fourth armoured Brigade under command. This was the tactical norm for the British and Canadian armies in the latter part of Ww2. The US tended to add armoured, artillery and Tank destroyer battalions to augment formations. The British practice was to add a formation(Brigade HQ) to control the additional troops, which in the case of armour gave the divisional commander an extra manouvre brigade On Gold Beach 50 Div fought as a five brigade division for the first few days after D Day with 56,69 151 and 231 infantry brigades and 8th armoured brigades as manoeuvre formations.

The triangle v square discussion is a little academic. The reality is that the difference is made by a handful of men at the right time and place who do the right thing. the structure is to make sure they have the right balance of supporting arms and services.

[RichTO90]

Thanks for the extra information about the Heavy weapons platoon. I was responding to the previous poster who suggested that MMG were deployed to platoon level.

Yes, its always a problem it seems for many to understand that a U.S. Army "heavy" machine gun platoon was armed with .30 caliber weapons and not .50 caliber ones. Its tactical employment is usually the next misunderstanding. It was in fact very similar to the employment of the British MMG Battalion when its elements were assigned to support brigades and battalions. In a sense it is just how they were assigned in the overall organizational structure of the division that was different.

I'd be interested to know more about the use of APC (halftrack?) mountged MGs on Omaha Beach.

The M15 and M16 Machine Gun Motor Carriage (MGMC) were indeed mounted on a half-track chassis. The M15 had two water-cooled .50 caliber and one 37mm gun, the M16 had a quad .50 caliber mount. They were assigned much the same role as the Crusader AAA in the British landing scheme (most don't realize that the American and British landing plans were near mirror images, it was differences in basic organization and equipment as well as landing craft allocations that made the difference). On OMAHA, the unit in question was the 103rd AAA AW Bn, SP. If you want to know more about its employment, Zaloga's (already referenced) and Balkoski's OMAHA are probably the best secondary sources available, although I mention them in the chapter on assault organization and planning in my book..

For what its worth the balance of armoured firepower was also rather different on Sword (and Gold & Juno) than Omaha Beach too. As far as I can see the forced deployed on Omaha were 64 tanks launched as DD Tanks followed by a further 32 fromLCts supported by 36 SP guns firing from LCts in the run in shoot - which ended at H-10. This was to cover an assault by two RCTs on a 6 km frontage .

Slightly different, not rather different, and more a consequence as I said of organization and craft availability. For example, on OMAHA there were so few LCT available that it was decided to land much of the direct support artillery for the assault (the 7th and 111th FA) on DUKWs, with disastrous consequences. Another factor was that the British took to heart the decision not to land wheeled vehicles in the assault wave. Thus, all British assault division artillery was re-equipped with M7 or Sexton SP. Unfortunately that decision was taken too late by the Americans (many also seem unaware that there was just four months from planning inception to D-Day) and only the two assault FA battalions of the 4th ID on UTAH were equipped with M7...not that it would have mattered, since we run back into the LCT issue again. However, on OMAHA, two SP battalions, the 58th and 62d AFA Battalions were used and landed on LCT, 36 of them.

The tank support for OMAHA per RCT was 32 DD tanks, 16 deep wading tanks, and 8 dozer tanks, plus an additional six reserve tanks. The 16 deep wading tanks and 8 dozers filled the role of the RMSG and AVRE gaping teams combined by placing them on a single LCT as two tank and one dozer. The British used one LCT for the gaping team of AVRE and Crabs and one for the RMSG Troop of 4 Centaurs and one Sherman OP. However, the Centaurs were intended as indirect fire weapons - part of the beach drenching program - and originally hadn't even been intended to be mobile (the idea was the problematic engines of the Centaurs would be removed and extra ammo stored with the vehicle lashed into the LCT turning it into a sort of ad hoc monitor...fortunately saner heads prevailed and the engines were left intact).

The thing was, the American tank battalion organization was just different; the tank company even with its attached "assault gun" (that they didn't have until July so it was just another 75mm-armed M4 in practice) only had 18 tanks, the British squadron had 19 and with finagling 20. However, another problem is that all the American LCT were British-produced Mark IV or American 5 and 6. American DD tanks were launched from modified LCT-6, which held four tanks; British DD tanks were launched from LCT-III, which held five tanks - a 20% increase...and so on. So the Americans launched their tanks in groups of four or less, the British in groups of five.

On Sword Beach the assault was one brigade (RCT) on a 2 km frontage supported by 148 gun tanks and 48 armoured engineer tanks mounting guns and 72 SP guns on the run in shoot, Even so, 1 South Lancs were still pinned down for 30 mins until the carrier mounted Vickers of 2 Middlesex turned up,However, the odds were stacked more in the attackers favour on Sword,

3rd British Division had 27th Armoured Brigade in support with three regiments, each nominally consisting of 64 medium, 11 light, and 6 AA tanks. 1st US Infantry Division had 3rd Armored Group in support with three battalions, two consisting of 62 medium tanks and 18 light tanks each, and one consisting of 60 medium and 18 light tanks. 192 mediums versus 184 and 33 lights versus 54. The difference was in landing craft availability.

There were only 34 A.V.R.E. on Sword with 77th and 79th Squadrons of the 5th Assault Regiment R.E., 8 Log Carpet, 8 SBG, 8 Bobbin, and 10 unspecified, along with 8 D7 armored bulldozers, and 26 Crabs.

As I mentioned last night, I suspect from the narratives that I have seen of QUEEN WHITE, it was likely the five Shermans, one Sherman 17-pdr, and four Centaurs, along with the 10-odd Crabs and 10-odd A.V.R.E., 30-odd armored vehicles, had a bit more to do with it than some carriers. Certainly Major Rouse's account doesn't mention them nor the other accounts I've seen. Neither IIRC does Opposition Encountered on the British Beaches or Casualties and Effects of Fire Support, which are the two primary AORG reports, which contain considerable firsthand details from survivors.

This is relevant to the thread topic as on On D Day 1 US Infantry landed as a Square division, with the 116 RCT under command. As I have explained, their fire support was spread a little thin during the assault.

Indeed, so did 50th Northumberland Division, but for different reasons. 50th Division was reinforced for the assault with 56th Brigade, but the US 1st Division organization was for operations only. It was decided by the V Corps commander that it made more sense to have the assault echelon under a single divisional command. Thus the 116th RCT was attached until the 29th Division Headquarters landed.

The only real significant difference in fire support was the British beach drenching program, which effectiveness except as a means of consuming large quantities of ammunition has never been shown. Nor is it likely given the defenses at OMAHA that such a program would have made a difference - assuming of course enough LCT could be provided so it could have been done.

It might be better BTW if you compared SWORD with its mirror image, UTAH.

On Sword and Juno beaches 3 British and 3 Canadian Divisions Div also operated as "square" divisions, each with a fourth armoured Brigade under command. This was the tactical norm for the British and Canadian armies in the latter part of Ww2. The US tended to add armoured, artillery and Tank destroyer battalions to augment formations. The British practice was to add a formation(Brigade HQ) to control the additional troops, which in the case of armour gave the divisional commander an extra manouvre brigade On Gold Beach 50 Div fought as a five brigade division for the first few days after D Day with 56,69 151 and 231 infantry brigades and 8th armoured brigades as manoeuvre formations.

Does that mean 50th Division was pentagonal then? Seriously, as I noted, 1st Division also had an "armoured brigade" attached, only it was called an "armored group".

The triangle v square discussion is a little academic. The reality is that the difference is made by a handful of men at the right time and place who do the right thing. the structure is to make sure they have the right balance of supporting arms and services.

It is not academic when it comes to matters such as logistics, transportation, and command and communications. "Square" units were prized because of their strength and cohesion in combat, but weighed against that was the cost of maneuvering them.

However, in the sense as you say it, yes academic indeed.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
The only real significant difference in fire support was the British beach drenching program, which effectiveness except as a means of consuming large quantities of ammunition has never been shown. Nor is it likely given the defenses at OMAHA that such a program would have made a difference - assuming of course enough LCT could be provided so it could have been done.
....

Having had long ago some education in artillery projectile effects on targets the "drenching" thing always seemed a bit questionable to me. The combination of time length for the drenching fires, the size of projectiles, and solidly entrenched nature of the defense strongly suggests even a momentary suppresion might be optimistic. Once under 1000 meters something might be accmplished in the way of assault artillery technique, but at 2000 to 5000 meters range and beyond it does sound like a waste of ammunition.

But we digress...

[Sheldrake]

You are correct to point out that the RCT assault landing template was the same for the British nand US formations. Both were developed by Combined Operations. ETOUSA ran a conference to see how this would apply to the US Army. Norman Cota presented a paper about adapting an RCT to act as an "assault brigade".

Brigadier Parham the BRA of 2nd Army wass not convinced that there was enough firepower in the plan produced by Combined OPs. He was particularly concerned about dealing with concrete bunkers. He lobbied to get the heavy bombers involved in the fire plan and behind the move to add 80 centaurs to the assault. he made a nuisance of himself trying to get the RAf to put the same level of thought into the bunkers of the Atlantic wall as into the Mohne Dam. He sponsored the development of the RMASGto provide direct fire in the assault and close support from H-10 to H+60 when the SP Regiments landed. There was therefore no gap between the bombardment from the sea and the troops landing which was commented on by several defenders at Omaha Beach. Parham's papers and the pre D Day diary of Arty 2 Army tell a story of a lot of table thumping and arguing to get what was thought necessary to add belt and braces. Parham was not happy to accept that "not enough landing craft" was an acceptable excuse. He also wanted an aircraft carrier to operate AOP spotters or failing that helicopters off a helicopter carrier too. If someone had thumped the table harder on behalf of the GIs who had to land at Omaha beach some more LCTs might have been reassigned or built or mayvbe fewer of them would have been casualties.


If you visit the surviving bunkers it is clear that these were not effected by the fire from air or sea. Where there is damage this as been caused by a direct fire weapon from a flank - and I am a little dubious of claims that these were all caused by ships sailing onto the beach itself. I don't think any of the beaches were cleared in minutes. It took until H+40 to suppress COD. Regardless of the significance of the MMGs on the 2 Mddx carriers, no one claims that the fighting was over before they landed. On Gold beach Sgt Palmer's SP Sexton put a round into the Bunker at Asnelles sometime after H+60. Possibly the best contender might be Juno, where despite the casualties and lack of suppression, the Canadian infantry do seem to have been street fighting in Courselles quite quickly, maybe as early as H+10

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness and lack of destruction each drenching had two effects.

1. It does seem to have had some effect in keeping the defenders heads down. Even if most of the key weapons were sited to fire in enfilade, someone needed to be looking to the front to see what was going on. It was neutralisation not destruction. This was known in advance and one reason wby Brigadier Parham the Brigadier RA at 2nd Army fought so hard to add firepower to the attack.
2. The sight of artillery rounds landing on the enemy positions encouraged the attacked to keep moving and act aggressively. It may be gunner mumbo jumbo but it is the foundation of military tactics Fire and manoeuvre.

These are psychological effects . Maybe artillery support only worked because soldiers had faith in it


The British gunners got it right to insist on tracks only - even to the extent of borrowing a FAB from the US Army to provide tracked medium artillery.

Thanks for the explanation of the American resources on Omaha Beach and the break down of the numbers of vehicles. I don't agree with your maths. The 16 deep wading tanks in the US landings are matched by the reserve squadrons from the DD Tank Regiments. The 34 AVRE and 26 crabs add up to 60 engineer tanks which is a lot more than the 16 dozer tanks. The 20 RMASG tanks were all extra with no US equivalent. All of these supported landings on a single RCT frontage giving over twice as many AFVs per assaulting soldier.

No one can be sure that the higher casualties and greater difficulties at Omaha beach were a function of the terrain, bad luck or the much higher concentration of armoured firepower during the landing. In my opinion the latter had something to do with it. Parham made a prediction that the firepower was going to be enough to do the trick and he was proven right in the event.


These respurces were placed in support of a single RCT equivalent./

[RichTO90]

You are correct to point out that the RCT assault landing template was the same for the British nand US formations. Both were developed by Combined Operations. ETOUSA ran a conference to see how this would apply to the US Army. Norman Cota presented a paper about adapting an RCT to act as an "assault brigade".

What an interesting interpretation of "I suggest consideration be given to organizing, equipping and training special Assault Divisions for landing assault operations against a heavily defended hostile shore. A suggested Assault Division Organization is as follows (see Organization Chart attached). (Assault Training Center Conference Address by Brig. Gen. N.D. Cota, Chief of Combined Operations-ETOUSA, "Infantry in a Landing Assault", 2 June 1943, p. 6, et. seq.) Nor was the conference called to "see how this would apply to the US Army". Lt.Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, ETOUSA, laid out explicitly what the purpose of the conference was in his opening address:

"This conference has been assembled to enable us to get our teeth into all of the latest data on assault landings, the developments of assault doctrine and the most advanced training methods. Thus, when we start upon our next episode, we will have properly trained troops - who know what they are doing and where they are going."

The Forward makes it even more explicit as to what data they were looking for:

"One of the purposes of this Conference was the collection, the evaluation and the assembly of as much as possible of the different uncorrelated factual data on -assault landings; from experiments, records of actual experiences, studies of landing operations and other sources."

The data they considered included the extensive USN/USMC maneuver experience prewar and during the war in corps-sized assault landing operations, actual experience at Dieppe, Guadalcanal, the Aleutians, and North Africa.

British officers were attendees, both as lecturers and as conferees.

Brigadier Parham the BRA of 2nd Army wass not convinced that there was enough firepower in the plan produced by Combined OPs.

Is that a non sequiter? Brigadier Parham was not one of the lecturers on Artillery in a Landing Assault, an American and a British colonel were. If you are talking about Parham's views in general though you are quite correct.

He was particularly concerned about dealing with concrete bunkers. He lobbied to get the heavy bombers involved in the fire plan and behind the move to add 80 centaurs to the assault.

Indeed, but the majority of the bombs eventually carried could have little effect on those bunkers.

(snip)If someone had thumped the table harder on behalf of the GIs who had to land at Omaha beach some more LCTs might have been reassigned or built or mayvbe fewer of them would have been casualties.

Nonsense I'm afraid. The only way sufficient were gotten was by stripping the Med, accelerating the deployment of newly constructed flotillas, and by a phenomenal effort to get a 95% operational availability rate. It proved good enough that the number actually available slightly exceeded plan, which was why some of the RE Assault Squadrons were able to deploy "reserve" LCT teams. Since there were no Centaurs, AVRE, or Crabs for the Americans to use that option wasn't open to them.

If you visit the surviving bunkers it is clear that these were not effected by the fire from air or sea. Where there is damage this as been caused by a direct fire weapon from a flank - and I am a little dubious of claims that these were all caused by ships sailing onto the beach itself. I don't think any of the beaches were cleared in minutes. It took until H+40 to suppress COD. Regardless of the significance of the MMGs on the 2 Mddx carriers, no one claims that the fighting was over before they landed. On Gold beach Sgt Palmer's SP Sexton put a round into the Bunker at Asnelles sometime after H+60. Possibly the best contender might be Juno, where despite the casualties and lack of suppression, the Canadian infantry do seem to have been street fighting in Courselles quite quickly, maybe as early as H+10

I have and I never said any of that you follow up with...so why the strawman?

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness and lack of destruction each drenching had two effects.

1. It does seem to have had some effect in keeping the defenders heads down. Even if most of the key weapons were sited to fire in enfilade, someone needed to be looking to the front to see what was going on. It was neutralisation not destruction. This was known in advance and one reason wby Brigadier Parham the Brigadier RA at 2nd Army fought so hard to add firepower to the attack.
2. The sight of artillery rounds landing on the enemy positions encouraged the attacked to keep moving and act aggressively. It may be gunner mumbo jumbo but it is the foundation of military tactics Fire and manoeuvre.

Quite possibly so, except they were never able to put together concrete proof of it. The AORG was unable to show a direct link, but inferred one might exist.

The British gunners got it right to insist on tracks only - even to the extent of borrowing a FAB from the US Army to provide tracked medium artillery.

The gunners didn't insist, the NEPTUNE planners did. However, in many cases they had to accept that no viable substitute existed. The Americans wanted to equip their FA battalions with M7 and some were, but there wasn't enough to go round...and US artillerymen had an institutional prejudice against SP mounts that continued in the 1970s.

Thanks for the explanation of the American resources on Omaha Beach and the break down of the numbers of vehicles. I don't agree with your maths. The 16 deep wading tanks in the US landings are matched by the reserve squadrons from the DD Tank Regiments. The 34 AVRE and 26 crabs add up to 60 engineer tanks which is a lot more than the 16 dozer tanks. The 20 RMASG tanks were all extra with no US equivalent. All of these supported landings on a single RCT frontage giving over twice as many AFVs per assaulting soldier.

Since you are using my "maths" why do you not agree with them?

No one can be sure that the higher casualties and greater difficulties at Omaha beach were a function of the terrain, bad luck or the much higher concentration of armoured firepower during the landing. In my opinion the latter had something to do with it. Parham made a prediction that the firepower was going to be enough to do the trick and he was proven right in the event.

Thanks for your opinion , but the idea that the beach drenching made a difference simply remains unproven - extensive AORG research and analysis could not establish a firm correlation and even where they saw some there data were faultyMore armored vehicles also may have helped, except that on OMAHA the RCT with more AFV successfully landed did no better than the one without as many.

These respurces were placed in support of a single RCT equivalent./

Indeed. Now show me where the AVRE/Crabs/LCT "resources" to fit out the American RCT was to come from? OMAHA got shorted on LCT with comparison to UTAH and GOLD. Given the greater average capacity of the British LCT, they also got shorted there (O = 147, U = 160, G = 156, J = 123, S = 138). That's the simple fact. The why of it is a different question. I've long thought that V Corps could have better utilized what they had in terms of LCT...but then it gets back to the question of what and from where do they get the additional vehicles.

[Sheldrake]

I can see this has provoked a lot of thought. I am not sure I have the time read it or respond.

If I understand the logic correctly, the additional fire power that the British applied to their beach assaults was all pointless as theoretically this can have inflicted no real damage on an enemy in cover. The increased amount of fire power on the British beaches was irrelevant and no amount of additional firepower short of PGMs could have reduced the high casualties suffered by the US Army on Omaha Beach

Sorry, but this does now wash at all. Am I reading an American arguing that there is a maximum amount of fire power worth flinging at an enemy, as this is pretty much contradicted by the way the US has waged war over the past 100 years.