5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

[Richard Anderson]

It was both.

Why yes, both a practical and a doctrinal reason for it.

If you read Gabel, I'm pretty sure he states this concisely, clearly, and often. Tank destroyer personnel were regarded as almost antitank specialist ninjas that were to be ready to dismount and kill panzers by any means necessary, including using Molotov Cocktails! Certainly there was a practical extension of the open top, but it was also an extenuation of the "big game hunter" mentality that TD'ers were supposed to be ingrained with. This of course was in response to the virtual frozen panic the Fall of France sent throughout the US gov't and military...

I have...a number of times. He is a good start to understanding what went on, but occasionally twists himself in knots regarding dates. For example, the "ninjas" - really "antitank Commandos" - concept actually only lasted into the early spring of 1942 and was just one of any number of early concepts explored before the heavy SP TD battalion/group/brigade concept was solidified. Ditto WRT the battalion infantry, engineer, and AA elements.

Well, they were used in the Norman hedgerows as hedge-choppers. I think one would be hard pressed to be more infantry support than that!

Sorry, but that is a mobility multiplier, not an assault weapon. They did not plan on spearing the enemy on their Rhino horns after all. Seriously, all kinds of tracked vehicles, armored and unarmored, were used to "bust the bocage".

I was speaking in terms of Tank Destroyers, at least the actual application of them in the field doctrine-be-damned!

And so am I.

I think so, but I'm 99% positive the M-36 was fielded with the cover in Korea at least...

I am not sure the M36 was actually fielded by American forces in the Korean War, but I believe the ROK's got some?

(crikey fuck! I'm in quote hell again )

The edit button is your friend.

[Richard Anderson]

Steady on!

Yep, nothing quite so fun as getting a Cannon-cocker worked up...unless it is getting a Treadhead worked up.

I wouldn't say it was a blind alley. The British anti tank doctrine worked pretty well as evidenced by El Alamein and Medennine and Normandy. There was more than one way to deal with tanks. The best anti tank weapon isn't always another tank - despite clankie propaganda.

Indeed, but getting a big enough gun while keeping it mobile became a distinct problem. The Tank Destroyers were actually correct on focusing on heavy SP guns in early 1942, but then got sidetracked on speed.

(snip off topic aside, which is interesting but not relevant)

RAC had a patchy record for combining with other arms in the first half of WW2 and were obsessed with the idea of the tank v tank duel.

Now you're likely to get the Treadheads worked up...

[Sheldrake]

Picking up a point that nickdfresh made about US tank destroyers.

There was a difference in mentality between the RA and RAC. Tankies have an umbilical to their tank. If it breaks down they build a fire and wait for REME. Gunners work on foot around the equipment. Indeed troop commanders of anti tank troops (Platoons) in WW2 did not command from an AFV. They exercised command,at least initially on foot or a carrier or hanging on the outside of the lead SP gun. (Late 1944 the Archer Troop commander had a Valentine tank, giving comparabkle mobility and protection.

It was a brave place to be in a tank battle, but it provided had more situational awareness than a closed down tank commander. In Op Totalise one of the Canadian FOOs gets a medal for indicating targets for tanks on foot. George Blackburn thinks he might have been key in Wittmans' demise - which brings us back on topic.
Op Totalize demonstrated that five tigers (and 20 other assorted panzers) can't beat two armoured Brigades in a head on fight. Though there engagements in that battle that also demonstrated that a well handled group of panthers and Tigers can give a bloody nose to incautiously commanded armour exercising more dash than wise.

[genstab]

Just a general comment: It's strange that the US and Britain couldn't produce a decent main battle tank until the end of the war compared to the Germans and Soviet Union, especially with the United States' superior industrial power. Another stupidity was the failure to realize that diesels were better to prevent gasoline explosions- the troops called Shermans Ronsons for the way they went up when hit. There's a good book on the British tries- Rude Mechanicals by A. j. Smithers. As for the US, only in April 1945 did the first superior Pershings with a 90mm gun finally reach Europe, but only enough to equip a few tank battalions. They did well against Tigers and completely outclassed Panthers.

Best regards,
Bill in Cleveland

[Sheldrake]

Just a general comment: It's strange that the US and Britain couldn't produce a decent main battle tank until the end of the war compared to the Germans and Soviet Union, especially with the United States' superior industrial power. Another stupidity was the failure to realize that diesels were better to prevent gasoline explosions- the troops called Shermans Ronsons for the way they went up when hit. There's a good book on the British tries- Rude Mechanicals by A. j. Smithers. As for the US, only in April 1945 did the first superior Pershings with a 90mm gun finally reach Europe, but only enough to equip a few tank battalions. They did well against Tigers and completely outclassed Panthers.

Best regards,
Bill in Cleveland

Hi genstab.

Wah alert?

If not, you need to read this thread through.

The HMSO books (Official publications)_ by David Fletcher tell the British story in two paerts. Vol 1 the great Tank Scandal and vol 2 the Universal Tank.

[Michael Kenny]

Though there engagements in that battle that also demonstrated that a well handled group of panthers and Tigers can give a bloody nose to incautiously commanded armour exercising more dash than wise.

If you mean Worthington it took a long time for the Germans to lance that boil and whilst they were so engaged gains were made at other locations. The threat to the German line was so serious they had to make Worthington their no 1 priority. You would think map reading would be a military speciality!

[Richard Anderson]

Just a general comment: It's strange that the US and Britain couldn't produce a decent main battle tank until the end of the war compared to the Germans and Soviet Union, especially with the United States' superior industrial power.

The concept of what postwar became known as a "main battle tank" was first espoused by Montgomery, who felt the Sherman was just that tank. The Soviet version, the T34, was comparable and both outclassed the German equivalent the Panzer IV as did the final German medium tank, the Panther, outclass them...but was equaled by the American M26, British Centurion, and Soviet T44, all of which appeared just a few months later.

Another stupidity was the failure to realize that diesels were better to prevent gasoline explosions- the troops called Shermans Ronsons for the way they went up when hit.

No German tank used diesels, whereas about one-third of American ones did. Does that make the Germans two or three times more stupid?
There is no reliable evidence that a "gasoline explosion" ever harmed a tank...in fact, there are reliable examinations that demonstrated complete perforations of the gasoline tanks without explosions, which require a precise fuel-air mix. Meanwhile, ammunition fires are the main culprit for catastrophic fires in all tanks...including those sexy Panthers.

There's a good book on the British tries- Rude Mechanicals by A. j. Smithers. As for the US, only in April 1945 did the first superior Pershings with a 90mm gun finally reach Europe, but only enough to equip a few tank battalions. They did well against Tigers and completely outclassed Panthers

No tank battalions were ever completely equipped with the T26E3 and only twenty saw significant action.

[genstab]

My mistake- I didn't see that the thread had all those pages or I would have been more informed had I read them. I'm a sailor by military experience and just made a few comments based on a couple of books I read about tanks. Sorry, experten. But why did the Brits call the Shermans Ronsons? They did explode, no? Was it because of less armor?

Best
Bill in Cleveland

[Sheldrake]

Though there engagements in that battle that also demonstrated that a well handled group of panthers and Tigers can give a bloody nose to incautiously commanded armour exercising more dash than wise.

If you mean Worthington it took a long time for the Germans to lance that boil and whilst they were so engaged gains were made at other locations. The threat to the German line was so serious they had to make Worthington their no 1 priority. You would think map reading would be a military speciality!

Not just Worthington. The Germans were able to hold off the 1st Polish Armoured Division.

The 2nd Polish Armoured Regiment of the Polish Armoured Division lost 26 tanks out of 36 tanks in their two leading squadrons in the afternoon of 8th August. "heavily engaged with enemy armour SE of Robertmesnil (0950) 'twenty tiger tanks were reported'. By nightfall the armour had been withdrawn to regroup" (PRO:CAB 44 Vol III breakout Chapt IX 1 Cdn Army 23 Jul-16 Aug- para 62)

[Michael Kenny]

The 2nd Polish Armoured Regiment of the Polish Armoured Division lost 26 tanks out of 36 tanks in their two leading squadrons in the afternoon of 8th August. "heavily engaged with enemy armour SE of Robertmesnil (0950) 'twenty tiger tanks were reported'. By nightfall the armour had been withdrawn to regroup" (PRO:CAB 44 Vol III breakout Chapt IX 1 Cdn Army 23 Jul-16 Aug- para 62)

A casualty is any tank disabled. A total loss is a destroyed tank. I am fairly certain the 26 number given are casualties. However the 'loss' number is not exceptional. A well handled group of Shermans & Cromwells caused the loss of 32 Pz IV in 12th SS alone June 27-28 during EPSOM. This does not include the Panzer losses in the other German Units involved in the battles.

The scale of the German losses can be glimpsed by reading Stuart Hill, By Tank Into Normandy.
Cassell 2002 ISBN 0304362166 page 107

It had been a great day. Thirteen Panzer Mark IVs had been knocked out, along with a Tiger and a Panther. The enemy tank force defending Rauray had been eliminated and their infantry overrun. Aggressive tactics had
paid off, and at relatively small cost to ourselves. C Squadron had lost two tanks, with two dead and two wounded. I felt encouraged by the way each squadron had performed and this was reflected in the general morale of my troop, in spite of the casualties. We had won a tank battle against significant opposition, and this gave our confidence an important boost.

Only 2 SRY tanks lost however the next day they did not have it so easily. The point is that the destruction was not confined to those tanks painted green .




Total tank losses of 1st Polish Armoured Divison 7-12 August are given as:

The losses in armour (mostly from direct hits or set on fire): total number 66. They have been
replaced with the exception of ten tks destroyed. There are also destroyed 5 A Tk guns SP (4 -
3-inch and 1 – 17-pdr); 5 6-pdr A Tk guns; 1 25-pdr gun SP and 1 25-pdr gun tractor drawn.


http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent. ... ontext=cmh

And for the Unit used in your example 2nd Armoured Regiment (26 losses in an afternoon) the total of all tanks destroyed to wars end was 68.

Total wartime losses for the Division:


Polish 1st Armoured Division August 1944-April 1945

Sherman 172
Cromwell 51
Stuart 35
Command Tanks 7 = 265 tanks

Roughly 100% turnover.

[Sheldrake]

The 2nd Polish Armoured Regiment of the Polish Armoured Division lost 26 tanks out of 36 tanks in their two leading squadrons in the afternoon of 8th August. "heavily engaged with enemy armour SE of Robertmesnil (0950) 'twenty tiger tanks were reported'. By nightfall the armour had been withdrawn to regroup" (PRO:CAB 44 Vol III breakout Chapt IX 1 Cdn Army 23 Jul-16 Aug- para 62)

A casualty is any tank disabled. A total loss is a destroyed tank. I am fairly certain the 26 number given are casualties. However the 'loss' number is not exceptional.

Regardless of the whether the Polish tanks were total losses or not. the Germans were able to inflict enough damage on the leading squadrons to frustrate the planned second phase of OP TOTALIZE.

The heavy losses suffered by the first two squadrons seems to have been enough to make the Poles think twice about sending the other fourteen squadrons in the division on the same route.

i.e. The Germans were not so absorbed by the destruction of Worthington Force of 4th Canadian Armoured Division that they could not halt a second armoured division with what they had left.

[Kingfish]

Regardless of the whether the Polish tanks were total losses or not. the Germans were able to inflict enough damage on the leading squadrons to frustrate the planned second phase of OP TOTALIZE.

Phase II was not frustrated by the Polish reversal on August 9th. Rather it was the screw up by Cnd II Corp in assigning Gaumesnil (in the 4th Cnd AD sector) as a phase I objective, even though the village was south of the "bomb line" for the phase II bombing by 8th USAF. This resulted in a 5 hour delay before 4th Cnd AD got going.

Even with that delay they still managed to outflank the German forces that had stopped the Poles. Had there not been a delay they could very well had pushed as far as hill 195 (Worthington force objective) by last light.

[Michael Kenny]

Regardless of the whether the Polish tanks were total losses or not. the Germans were able to inflict enough damage on the leading squadrons to frustrate the planned second phase of OP TOTALIZE.................................

Let us do like for like comparison:

Regardless of the whether the German tanks were total losses or not the British were able to inflict enough damage on the leading Panzers to frustrate the German plan (II SS launched whilst EPSOM was in progress) to reach the beaches and defeat the invasion.

The heavy losses suffered by the leading Pz IVs the seems to have been enough to make the Germans think twice about sending the others on the same route.

(Note that the German attack was totally defeated whilst TOTALIZE took longer than expected to succeed)

The Germans were not so absorbed by the destruction of Worthington Force of 4th Canadian Armoured Division that they could not halt a second armoured division with what they had left.

This is the version of history where the German ability to frustrate parts of large offensives is lauded as a stunning 'victory' whilst every Allied operation that does not end in the complete annihilation/capture of every German facing them is an abject failure.
Worthington got lost and plunged deep into the centre of the German defences. Because the Canadian had the wrong location for Worthington no relief was possible at the critical time. Still Worthington Force held out for over 12 hours and only succumbed when all ammunition was exhausted. A good number of vehicles and men managed to escape from the pocket. No denying it was a cock-up but given the circumstances a very capable performance in the face of the desperate do-or-die German effort to eliminate them. I guess I am a glass half full man whilst others are glass half empty types.

[Nickdfresh]

Why yes, both a practical and a doctrinal reason for it.

Well, mainly becoming practical after a while.

..
I have...a number of times. He is a good start to understanding what went on, but occasionally twists himself in knots regarding dates. For example, the "ninjas" - really "antitank Commandos" - concept actually only lasted into the early spring of 1942 and was just one of any number of early concepts explored before the heavy SP TD battalion/group/brigade concept was solidified. Ditto WRT the battalion infantry, engineer, and AA elements.

Meh. I understand that the Doctrine evolved somewhat, but I think his overall implication was likening the TD Doctrine to a quasi-religion, a "theological" island of certainty in an ocean of doubt. I'm heavily paraphrasing there but those were his words to affect. Certainly they evolved a bit with what I am assuming would be their observations in the Desert War...

Sorry, but that is a mobility multiplier, not an assault weapon. They did not plan on spearing the enemy on their Rhino horns after all. Seriously, all kinds of tracked vehicles, armored and unarmored, were used to "bust the bocage".

I think you're twisting yourself in knots of semantics here. Merely by busting the bocage they were inevitably going to engage the enemy at close quarters and open holes for sappers and infantry. If they were used as Rhinos they certainly weren't driving through and over hill-and-dale! They were used as effectively assault guns at points and Gabel states this more or less. I mean, do you think TD men and their machines just sat in the rear in absence of panzers in the hedgerows while infantry were blundering into bloody firefights with Heer and SS ambushers?

I certainly doubt it and it would make no sense to me. If they walked like a tank and quaked like a tank - the poor, bloody infantry certainly saw them as one and demanded they be used as an AFV...

I am not sure the M36 was actually fielded by American forces in the Korean War, but I believe the ROK's got some?

We did give the ROK some as well as M-10's. I hate to use Wiki as a source but they say it was used in Korea and I think I've heard that elsewhere that it was used in a very limited role as "overwatch" while we amassed EZ8 Shermans and the Pershings/Pattons. The 90mm gun could pummel anything the KPA or Chinese "Volunteers" had...

The edit button is your friend.

Much like spellcheck, sometimes yes, others no...

[Nickdfresh]

Just a general comment: It's strange that the US and Britain couldn't produce a decent main battle tank until the end of the war compared to the Germans and Soviet Union, especially with the United States' superior industrial power.

The concept of what postwar became known as a "main battle tank" was first espoused by Montgomery, who felt the Sherman was just that tank. The Soviet version, the T34, was comparable and both outclassed the German equivalent the Panzer IV as did the final German medium tank, the Panther, outclass them...but was equaled by the American M26, British Centurion, and Soviet T44, all of which appeared just a few months later.

Pretty much what Mr. Anderson said. Much of the problem lies in the fact that the U.S. didn't begin upgrading the Sherman sooner, but the final definitive version was essentially a bit superior to the Soviet T-34/85 when all factors are considered. The Western Allies also faced issues of maritime transport and simply could not take everything they had and deploy it overseas and suspect the Germans would have had a nasty shock against some U.S. heavy tanks in the T-29 line had they been able in invade CONUS. But not having a large navy and very little sea-lift capacity, the Americans never had to worry about that. The M-26 Pershing required at least some modicum of port facilities whereas the Sherman could be just driven onto a beach and that was a huge factor.

But most importantly, while on paper the Tiger/Panther look awesome, they may not have appeared so great when breaking down after driving less than 200 miles where a Sherman was just getting warmed up!

No tank battalions were ever completely equipped with the T26E3 and only twenty saw significant action.

This was unfortunate as they could have been feasibly ready much sooner...