5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#136

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Dec 2016, 20:35

Nickdfresh wrote:Well, mainly becoming practical after a while.
The "practical" use of TD's in Northwest Europe from 6 June 1944 on mirrored the doctrinal changes in place as of 18 July 1944, which in turn were espoused in Training Circulars from the previous year and were already followed in Italy.
Meh. I understand that the Doctrine evolved somewhat, but I think his overall implication was likening the TD Doctrine to a quasi-religion, a "theological" island of certainty in an ocean of doubt. I'm heavily paraphrasing there but those were his words to affect. Certainly they evolved a bit with what I am assuming would be their observations in the Desert War...
No, the doctrine evolved quite a bit, from the farcical "Tank Destroyer Commando" of fall and winter 1941, to the first doctrinal statement in March 1942, to the first experiential modifications disseminated through training circulars based on the experience in North Africa and Italy. It was never "quasi-religious" but was more "team spirit" oriented, which is typical of all military organizations.
I think you're twisting yourself in knots of semantics here. Merely by busting the bocage they were inevitably going to engage the enemy at close quarters and open holes for sappers and infantry. If they were used as Rhinos they certainly weren't driving through and over hill-and-dale! They were used as effectively assault guns at points and Gabel states this more or less. I mean, do you think TD men and their machines just sat in the rear in absence of panzers in the hedgerows while infantry were blundering into bloody firefights with Heer and SS ambushers?
Not at all what I meant. Read the battalion war diaries and see what they were doing. The practice of using SP TD as "assault guns" ended very quickly. The 803d TD illustrates what they learned. While supporting the 29th ID from 16-18 June they lost three M10 GMC to "rifle-grenade fire" (likely Panzerfaust) and one to "bazooka fire" (likely Panzerschreck), which pretty much ended the attempts to use them as "assault guns". Instead they were used primarily as long range direct fire weapons, while the tanks took on the role of "assault gun", which was doctrinally theirs anyway.

Meanwhile, there are also photos of M5 Light tanks, and M8 HMC, fitted with hedgerow cutters. I think I've also seen a photo of a TRV with a hedgerow cutter, but can't locate it now. It allowed them to get off road while maintaining mobility when confronted by the Norman hedges, but it did not make them assault guns.
I certainly doubt it and it would make no sense to me. If they walked like a tank and quaked like a tank - the poor, bloody infantry certainly saw them as one and demanded they be used as an AFV...
Yes, they did, which quickly resulted in lost GMC. Meanwhile, most of the SP TD battalions were held in reserve until the breakout, fulfilling their doctrinal role as an antitank reserve, which they did at La Desert and Mortain. It was after breakout that you find them more and more permanently attached to divisions, with one SP battalion per armored division and the rest when available to infantry divisions, filled out with the towed battalions. That is also when the program to rearm the towed battalions with redundant M10 began as did tghe program to re-equip the CDL battalions as standard tank battalions in order to give as many infantry divisions as possible an "assault gun" component, i.e., a tank battalion.
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#137

Post by Nickdfresh » 19 Dec 2016, 18:39

Richard Anderson wrote:...

No, the doctrine evolved quite a bit, from the farcical "Tank Destroyer Commando" of fall and winter 1941, to the first doctrinal statement in March 1942, to the first experiential modifications disseminated through training circulars based on the experience in North Africa and Italy. It was never "quasi-religious" but was more "team spirit" oriented, which is typical of all military organizations.
I think perhaps I was quoting Gabel on the perceived attitudes of McNair and the USAGFC...
Not at all what I meant. Read the battalion war diaries and see what they were doing. The practice of using SP TD as "assault guns" ended very quickly. The 803d TD illustrates what they learned. While supporting the 29th ID from 16-18 June they lost three M10 GMC to "rifle-grenade fire" (likely Panzerfaust) and one to "bazooka fire" (likely Panzerschreck), which pretty much ended the attempts to use them as "assault guns". Instead they were used primarily as long range direct fire weapons, while the tanks took on the role of "assault gun", which was doctrinally theirs anyway.
Understood. I don't think we're far apart here and probably agree far more than we disagree. I have perhaps a bit more of an abstract notion of assault gun perhaps but I think I would include long range direct fire support role. I think even the traditional assault guns performed that role also as direct fire artillery - situationally dependent of course. You say tomah'to I say tomay'to...
Meanwhile, there are also photos of M5 Light tanks, and M8 HMC, fitted with hedgerow cutters. I think I've also seen a photo of a TRV with a hedgerow cutter, but can't locate it now. It allowed them to get off road while maintaining mobility when confronted by the Norman hedges, but it did not make them assault guns.
Perhaps not as assault guns, but while some scout cars and recon tanks used them to flank positions and keep momentum while casing enemy positions they also could have been used in an "Infantry/Calvary Fighting Vehicle" role as well. I know their 37mm guns may not have been as effective as an area destruction weapon, they were bristling with machine guns and certainly were capable assisting assault troops, and sappers, moving in on hedges flanking prepared killzones. IIRC, the 37mm did fire a descent antipersonnel round....
Yes, they did, which quickly resulted in lost GMC. Meanwhile, most of the SP TD battalions were held in reserve until the breakout, fulfilling their doctrinal role as an antitank reserve, which they did at La Desert and Mortain. It was after breakout that you find them more and more permanently attached to divisions, with one SP battalion per armored division and the rest when available to infantry divisions, filled out with the towed battalions. That is also when the program to rearm the towed battalions with redundant M10 began as did tghe program to re-equip the CDL battalions as standard tank battalions in order to give as many infantry divisions as possible an "assault gun" component, i.e., a tank battalion.
Yup, agreed...


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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#138

Post by Nickdfresh » 19 Dec 2016, 18:58

As an aside, looking forward to reading Armored Thunderbolt in the new year!

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#139

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Dec 2016, 19:06

Nickdfresh wrote:I think perhaps I was quoting Gabel on the perceived attitudes of McNair and the USAGFC...
Except the "quote" describing that "attitude" invariably seems to be "Certainly it is poor economy to use a $35,000 medium tank to destroy another tank when the job can be done by a gun costing a fraction as much. Thus the friendly armored force is freed to attack a more proper target, the opposing forces as a whole." The problem is, those who so happily quote it rarely seem to know when or in what context it was uttered. The full quote is actually "...the counter-attack long has been termed the soul of defense. decisive action against a tank attack calls for a counterattack in the same general manner as against the older forms of attack. A counterattack, of course, may be delivered by other tanks, but the procedure is costly. There is no reason why antitank guns, supported by infantry, cannot attack tanks just as infantry, supported by artillery, has attacked infantry in the past. Certainly it is poor economy to use a $35,000 medium tank to destroy another tank when the job can be done by a gun costing a fraction as much. Thus the friendly armored force is freed to attack a more proper target, the opposing forces as a whole." General McNair in the closing remarks to the third Antitank Conference, 17 July 1941.

What BTW is "USAGFC"?
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#140

Post by Nickdfresh » 21 Dec 2016, 00:05

I'm just perusing Gabel a bit now and will try to expedite my reading on the subject as I get some books incoming as the result of some generous Amazon gift cards. :)

In any case, Gabel seems to be rather inditing of Gen. McNair from the outset. In the period you mention McNair's rather eloquent speech he seems to have an excessively optimistic set of beliefs regarding the prospects of an active, mobile antitank defense and that he drew on some nefarious data in war-games conducted in 1941 period that seemed rather stilted against tanks. I.E.:

-tanks could not kill an antitank gun unless they physically overran it.

-small caliber 37mm guns nearing obsolescence and even .50 MG rounds were overrated in their effectiveness against armor giving a false impression that TD's might have an advantage in combat when in fact the opposite was true. And several observers noted their "faith in the mobile antitank gun was lacking". But never McNair's.

-the employment of said tanks was rather faulty and lacking combined arms support.

I believe Gen. Jacob Devers stated, "we were licked by a set of umpire's rules!"

Just a couple observations. General McNair sort of strikes me as a counter-scientific sort that used experimental data to validate his preordained beliefs rather than using data to establish them. Maybe stubborn or obstinate comes to mind?..
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#141

Post by Nickdfresh » 21 Dec 2016, 00:25

Richard Anderson wrote:
What BTW is "USAGFC"?
I was thinking United States Army Ground Forces Command but I have a tendency to make up acronyms left over from my Army days...

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#142

Post by Richard Anderson » 21 Dec 2016, 00:47

Nickdfresh wrote:I'm just perusing Gabel a bit now and will try to expedite my reading on the subject as I get some books incoming as the result of some generous Amazon gift cards. :)
Lucky devil. I tend to leave broad hints...and then get a book picked for me.
In any case, Gabel seems to be rather inditing of Gen. McNair from the outset. In the period you mention McNair's rather eloquent speech he seems to have an excessively optimistic set of beliefs regarding the prospects of an active, mobile antitank defense and that he drew on some nefarious data in war-games conducted in 1941 period that seemed rather stilted against tanks. I.E.:
Tsk, tsk, look to my comment regarding dates. The Carolina war games where the proto-Tank Destroyer concept was first tried, were in October-November 1941. He made his comments in July. So that is backwards...the war games tested the concepts expressed in the three AT conferences of spring and summer. Meanwhile, Marshall and Bruce "created" the Tank Destroyer's; McNair's involvement was relatively minor other than participating in the AT conferences.

Yes, the war games were stilted, but McNair did not set them up or create the rules.
Just a couple observations. General McNair sort of strikes me as a counter-scientific sort that used experimental data to validate his preordained beliefs rather than using data to establish them. Maybe stubborn or obstinate comes to mind?..
Why? What "experimental data" did he use? Yes, the initial concepts expressed in Anti-mechanized Defense were "experimental, but then there was zero data to go on other than the badly misunderstood results of the Spanish Civil War...and not just American observers got that one wrong. Yes, later he got it wrong when he pushed for the towed guns in 1943, but then he was using experiential data rather than experimental.
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#143

Post by Richard Anderson » 21 Dec 2016, 00:49

Nickdfresh wrote:I was thinking United States Army Ground Forces Command but I have a tendency to make up acronyms left over from my Army days...
It wasn't a "command", which in the Old Army was a lesser status than a "Force". It was Army Ground Forces or AGF, one of the three overarching forces created by Marshall - AGF, ASF, and AAF - operating under the War Department General Staff.
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#144

Post by Nickdfresh » 25 Jan 2017, 00:24

Richard Anderson wrote:
Nickdfresh wrote:My head is spinning, but relevant to the thread: has it been mentioned yet that German tank destroyers probably killed more Shermans than actual panzers did?
Yes, numerous times, just not in this thread. For example, the cause of tank losses in the ETO (according to WO 291/1186)

Mines 22.1%
AT guns 22.7%
Tanks 14.5%
SP Guns 24.4%
Bazooka 14.2%
Other 2.1%

This is comparable to a sample of 506 US First Army tanks lost (destroyed and damaged) between 6 June and 30 November 1944.

Mines 18.2%
AT/Tank guns 46.2%
Artillery 7.3%
Mortars 1.8%
Bazooka 13.6%
Other 12.9%

Also from this sample it was determined that 39.7% burned (all were gasoline engined M4 and M5 types) and 57.5% of those lost were repairable. In 104 cases there were no casualties incurred in the loss (20.6%), in 50 the number of casualties was unknown (9.9%), and in the remaining 352 cases, there were a total of 129 KIA (0.37 per loss) and 280 WIA (0.80 per loss) for a total of 409 casualties in 352 losses (1.16 per loss).

In the full survey of 883 First U.S. Army tanks lost from 6 June 1944 to 21 April 1945, 1.36% were to "mortars", 9.06% to unknown causes, 8.83% to "artillery" (including indirect fire as well as direct fire from guns 75mm and larger), 13.59% to infantry antitank rockets, 19.59% to mines, and 49.83% to "antitank guns", which was a very loose term including tank guns, assault guns, and towed antitank guns. Survey of Allied Tank Casualties generalizes the data from a sample of 12,140 cases (some possibly overlapping) as 6% mortars and misc., 7.5% hollow charge, 13% non-enemy, 20% mines, and 54% enemy gunfire.
ChristopherPerrien wrote: A different threat, that is of no surprise, since it got to the point where there were more German asualt guns than German tanks. Even at the time/place we are talking about here PZ IV's prolly killed far more Shermans than PZ V's and VI's, because of their greater numbers. In fact since the IV often looked like the VI through the "haze of battle" the VI gained a lot of respect for kills earned by its far more numerous cousin the IV.

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.
To start on 31 May 1944, Ob. West reported 1,466 Panzers and 345 StuG on hand, many of both of which were never committed. In Normandy initially were 21. Panzer with c. 100 Panzers (not including French) and 40 of Becker's StuG, while another 20 "German" StuG were present in two divisional Pz.Jg.-Abtl. However, 17. SS-Pz.Gren. brought 42 StuG-IV when it arrived and the Stu.G. Lehr-Abtl. of 7. Armee brought another 31 when it was committed, as were those of other divisions. With losses, the Becker StuG were soon in a minority, but you are correct there was never the large numbers of StuG found in other theaters.
Since Mr. Paul Ward like to quote Zaloga, he might have missed this:

...German records from the Tenth Army, which was defending Cassino front in May 1944, indicate that the primary Sherman killer was self-propelled antitank guns, followed by towed antitank guns. Of the 432 (presumably Sherman) tanks killed, 205 (47 percent) were claimed by 75mm PaK 40 towed AT guns, 93 (21 percent) by 75mm and 88mm self-propelled panzerjäger, and 118 (27 percent) by StuG III and Italian Semovente 75mm assault gun; panzers accounted for only 2 kills.

Zaloga p.89

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#145

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Jan 2017, 01:32

Nickdfresh wrote:
Since Mr. Paul Ward like to quote Zaloga, he might have missed this:

...German records from the Tenth Army, which was defending Cassino front in May 1944, indicate that the primary Sherman killer was self-propelled antitank guns, followed by towed antitank guns. Of the 432 (presumably Sherman) tanks killed, 205 (47 percent) were claimed by 75mm PaK 40 towed AT guns, 93 (21 percent) by 75mm and 88mm self-propelled panzerjäger, and 118 (27 percent) by StuG III and Italian Semovente 75mm assault gun; panzers accounted for only 2 kills.

Zaloga p.89
This should not be surprising. The Tenth Army did not command any Panzer divisions on the Cassino front and the main AFVs were Stug and panzer jaegers.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#146

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Jan 2017, 03:22

Sheldrake wrote:This should not be surprising. The Tenth Army did not command any Panzer divisions on the Cassino front and the main AFVs were Stug and panzer jaegers.
Pretty much, but to be precise, on 23 May the 26. Panzer Division returned to control of 10. Armee.
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#147

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Jan 2017, 10:44

Richard Anderson wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:This should not be surprising. The Tenth Army did not command any Panzer divisions on the Cassino front and the main AFVs were Stug and panzer jaegers.
Pretty much, but to be precise, on 23 May the 26. Panzer Division returned to control of 10. Armee.
I think this is the date that the Canadian official history identifies as the end of the battle for the Gustav line ans the start of the pursuit. Its the day of the break out from the Anzio beachhead and the capture of the Hitler Line. Not sure of the rel;ative numbers, but I suspect there were more Panther turret bunkers than tanks.
Image

The point is that this thread has been predicated on the idea of tanks v tanks rather than the relative military value of these tanks in the context of the war as a whole. The equation might be written as

Military value = function of physical component of fighting power value (lethality, mobility, protection, and sustainability) as well as a function of its value to the conceptual component of fighting power (tactical options offered) and moral componant (the psychological impact on either side).

The relative significance changed with the phase of war and strategic situation. The M4 was a far better tank for pursuit. It would have been harder to liberate France and Belgium with an armoured force of Tiger tanks. Jochim Peiper would have preferred a battalion of M4 tanks to the Panzer VIBs that followed his column.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#148

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Jan 2017, 18:56

Sheldrake wrote:I think this is the date that the Canadian official history identifies as the end of the battle for the Gustav line ans the start of the pursuit. Its the day of the break out from the Anzio beachhead and the capture of the Hitler Line. Not sure of the rel;ative numbers, but I suspect there were more Panther turret bunkers than tanks.
Indeed. On that day, 26. Panzer reported 10 Flammpanzer, 6 Panzer IV (k), and 18 Panzer IV (l) operational. I./Panzerregiment 4. under command had 7 Panthers operational.
The point is that this thread has been predicated on the idea of tanks v tanks rather than the relative military value of these tanks in the context of the war as a whole. The equation might be written as

Military value = function of physical component of fighting power value (lethality, mobility, protection, and sustainability) as well as a function of its value to the conceptual component of fighting power (tactical options offered) and moral componant (the psychological impact on either side).

The relative significance changed with the phase of war and strategic situation. The M4 was a far better tank for pursuit. It would have been harder to liberate France and Belgium with an armoured force of Tiger tanks. Jochim Peiper would have preferred a battalion of M4 tanks to the Panzer VIBs that followed his column.
Pretty much...although I suspect the American forces would have preferred to have more gasoline tanker trailers and ones that didn't leak as well. :D
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#149

Post by Michael Kenny » 13 Jul 2017, 23:42

Richard Anderson wrote:
paulrward wrote: In addition, in July 1944, Chrysler had fitted an M26 turret onto a M-4 Sherman.
That was a one-off, placing the turret on the hull of a M4 (105) hull (Serial # USA 30103950) on the visit of BG Holly, Chief of the ETOUSA AFV&W Section, who had been dispatched on 5 July 1944 by Eisenhower to carry a personal letter to Marshall in which Ike lambasted Ordnance for the 76mm fiasco. The "tank" existed for one day. To produce more required production of turrets, which may as well have been placed on their intended T26E3 chassis. On the other hand, a Sherman with 90mm was practical if instead of adapting the T23 turret to the 76mm it had been adapted to the 90mm in May 1943...production would have started in January 1944 and it would have been 113 M4 90mm siting in depots in England on 6 June instead of M4 76mm.
A recent post on ML adds to the above:

http://www.network54.com/Forum/47208/th ... iew+Thread
M4A3E8 with T26 turret.jpg
M4A3E8 with T26 turret a (1)aaaaaaaa.jpg
M4A3E8 with T26 turret a (2)bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb.jpg
M4A3E8 with T26 turret a (3)cccccccccccccccccc.jpg

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#150

Post by JD » 11 Jan 2019, 15:51

Thought I'd resurrect this thread, hopefully peacefully, with this nugget I saw recently:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNjp_4jY8pY

I'm particularly interested in his comment that US tanks attacked in fives anyway. Maybe this is where some of the confusion comes from. Other things like tactics are loosely discussed but probably need more elaboration. A lot of assertions are made about the Sherman's effectiveness against the frontal armour of German big cats but nobody ever questions the idea that fighting to your opponents strengths is a poor tactic. It also sell the Allied tankies short.

So what I'm saying is that I think we've exhausted the technical details - armour/range/penetration data, degrees/second the turret could turn at etc. We know the losses too. I don't believe for a minute that tankies just resigned themselves to their fate and left it at that. They were highly trained and had contingency plans. They might have wished for a more powerful gun and thicker armour but they knew how to make the most of what they had. After all, the Sherman had met the Tiger in Italy and done well. How was it suddenly a bad tank in France? Allied tankies had ways of dealing with German tanks that involved communication and teamwork. Some had high levels of training and were combat proven. Others were totally inexperienced. But I don't think anyone just gave up.

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