I dunno, if it was during the Battle of Arracourt, it took a quarter of a Sherman to knock out a Panther/Panzer Mark V/Tiger:paulrward wrote:Hello All ;
To Mr. Nickdfresh:
You stated that it did not take 5 Shermans to knock out a single Tiger because
You're wrong it didn't take 5-to-1 because of air power coupled with artillery could also help deal with German armor. Also, there were only under 100 Tigers in Normandy to begin with and Shermans were more likely to be killed by Heer landsers wielding AT weapons, direct and indirect artillery fire, or mines in the bocage than by actual panzers. And while the Panther was a very good tank, it's side armor was highly vulnerable and could be penned by 40mm Bofors guns firing AP!
While this is correct, it does not answer the question: How many M-4 Shermans does it take to defeat a Tiger in tank vs. tank combat if there are NO additional assets available ? If we leave out artillery, airstrikes, tank destroyers, and alien space bats, how many Shermans does it take to defeat one Tiger ?
The U.S. Army's 4th AD inflicted over 200 AFV losses on the Germans for about 31 of their own...
So I guess it depends. Doesn't it? A lot of inferior machines can be more than compensated for by veteran crews, training, tactics as well as fighting from prepared defensive positions and ambush tactics...
Since we're talking about alien spacebats, you're acting as if five Shermans went into a Roman Colosseum to face a Tiger in gladiatorial combat with a neat and tidy, glib equation. It simply did not work like that.
In what sort of "combat" and how can we even attribute what were losses to what else? There still weren't enough Shermans to have suffered such losses at that point in the ETO...
Firstly, as stated, the Allies were on the offensive and in keeping the the "defender always has the advantage" equation, there is no neat, clean nor easy answer.
Secondly, Shermans mounting the 76mm gun may have in fact have had a higher kill ratio of panzers when fighting from defensive, ambush positions during the Bulge and a single unit of anititank gunners manning 76mm AT guns took out three Tigers rather neatly by shooting their tracks out, then picking them to pieces. Do they now have 3-0 advantage?
That's nice, but the period is full of hyperbolic and frankly wrong commentary, like Death Traps that reported inaccurate, anecdotal information without providing a wider perspective that hindsight has given us. Was it unfair and a disservice to send our boys into battle in 1944 with virtually the same tanks they had in 1942? Yes! Does that mean there isn't quite a bit of exaggeration and hyperbole in regards to losses? I think so...According to General J. Lawton Collins, in a letter to General Gladeon Barnes dated March 17, 1945, " Usually it has been necessary for three or four M-4s to attack a ( Panther ) or ( Tiger ) simultaneously..... "
He also stated in the same letter that, " .... the present M-4s cannot engage the ( Tiger ) except under the most favorable coonditions. "
Considering that General Collins was a Corps Commander who helped mastermind and execute Operation Cobra, I submit that he knew exactly what he was talking about.
Belton Cooper included a lot of myths and wrong, inaccurate information from anecdotal sources. He also said that Patton personally "refused" the M-26 Pershing tanks when no such documentary record or evidence exists. And battle losses are battle losses in unit records, they do not differentiate whether a tank could be repaired and returned, just like human "casualties" are counted irregardless of whether they can heal up in a M*A*S*H unit or have to be sent home with "million dollar wounds."Also, I wish to submit a point: A great many M-4s were ' knocked out ' in combat, but were recovered, repaired, and then sent back into battle, often with a new crew to replace the first crew, now dead. These tanks were NOT included in the total of tanks destroyed in the fighting in Northern Europe, but as Belton Cooper notes, they far outnumbered the number of M-4s that were 'destroyed ' in combat. If we add in all of those repaired tanks, perhaps we now will have that legendary " Five Shermans for One Tiger " number.
I think Cooper has been somewhat criticized by historians. He makes some points and Allied personnel were needlessly sent to battle in inferior machines that at least should have been updated with better guns, armor and suspension. But he tends to be emotive on the issue and included a lot of bad "facts"..
I do agree with most of this, it's hard not to see McNair as obstinate and foolish...To Mr. Richard Anderson :
I would suggest you read the following paper, " The Wrong Track: The Inferiority of American Tanks in World War II ", by Jacob Fox, of Southern Virginia University, and which can be found as a PDF on the Marshal Foundation website.
http://marshallfoundation.org/library/w ... ox_opt.pdf
Though it dates back to 2010, it is still very relevant, as Mr. Jacob has done a masterful job of collecting and presenting the reasons and personalities who prevented the introduction of the M26 tank to Europe in a timely manner, and also demonstrates, by his own writings in letters and memorandum, that General McNair was still convinced that the purpose of the Tank was that of a maneuver weapon, while the task of defeating other tanks was that of the tank destroyers, and that he held this opinion ( and used it to block both the M-26 and the introduction of a 90 mm gun on the M-4s, both of which would have done much to reduce the level of casualties in the U.S. armoured formations.
And, based on the letters and memorandum from McNair that Jacobs quotes, as well as McNair's actions, your statement of :
is at best a somewhat weak attempt to deflect the blame for a failure within the U.S. Army's bureaucracy that was apparently the result of the short sightedness of one single severely myopic officer.No. Such. Thing. McNair has become the whipping boy for the faults of the U.S. Army in World War II for a very good reason. All those who blamed him in postwar writings were alive while he was dead and so could not respond.
...
Had, at this time, the new M-4s coming down the line been equipped with the 90mm gun, and the M-26 been completing it's testing, there would have been no reason to criticise General McNair.
...
The fact that it took the personal intervention of George C. Marshall to override McNair shows how completely McNair succeeded in blocking or slowing the introduction of anti tank guns on U.S. tanks because, as McNair was firmly committed to the concept of the Tank Destroyer, and, as McNair was not involved in combat at that time, he saw no reason to change his views.
True, the Sherman M-4A3E8 managed to kill a lot of those in Korea and the tanks were roughly equal with the Sherman having better trained, more comfortable crews...Further, you stated that the M-4s 40 caliber gun was superior to the T-34's 76 mm gun, This is true, but by the beginning of 1944, units of the Soviet Army were being equipped with the new T-34-85s, and the new T-44 was in the final stages of testing.
Eh, not many after a certain point. Almost everyone (as in commanders) in the ETO were screaming for bigger, better tanks and guns...One of the key stumbling blocks to the development of the new T-20 series of prototypes was the resistance by McNair to granting them " AA1 " priority status. As a result, the production of obsolete M-4s was given priority over the development of new tanks. This was extended to McNair's efforts to prevent the M10 Tank Destroyer from being upgraded to the M-36 with a 90 mm gun, and which stalled the introduction of that very useful vehicle into the early part of 1945.
Mr. Anderson, you stated :
First, there is a wealth of evidence that a number of American Armored Division Officers rejected the idea of an M-26, because it was a ' Heavy Tank ', and they were wedded to the idea and doctrine of the Medium Tank as a maneuver weapon.No "American Armour Commander" "resisted" introduction of the M26, nor did the M26 have a "higher track pressure", nor was it designed with the "goal of defeating enemy tanks in mind"
I'm far form a "Patton fanboi", but he gets unfairly maligned here. There is little if any documentary evidence regarding his views on the Pershing and Cooper erroneously attributes quotes to him that he never made...Second, the M-26 was in fact designed with a 90 mm gun SPECIFICALLY to defeat the new generation of German tanks, as has been explicitly stated in their writings by both General Devers and General Gladeon Barnes, who both recognized, based on the their acceptance of the British view of the future of armoured warfare delineated in the Findings and Final Minutes of the Joint British Tank Mission and the U.S. Tank Committee in March, 1942. that the future of tank warfare meant that tanks would be engaging enemy tanks in combat, that that this was rapidly becoming one of their primary functions. Only people like General Patton and General McNair continued to cling to the pre-War U.S. Army doctrine of separate Tank and Tank Destroyer Formations. This can further be supported by the fact that the British did everything in their power to build cruiser tanks with 17 pdr QF guns to allow them to engage and destroy German tanks.
Finally, Mr. Anderson, you dispute my statement that the M-26 had a higher Ground Pressure ( sometimes referred to as ' Track Pressure ' ) than the M-4 Sherman.
Mr. Anderson, what was the Track Pressure of the M-4 Sherman vs. the M-26 Pershing ? I am curious if you really know, as your statement that " nor did the M26 have a "higher track pressure" indicates that in fact, you do not. Please, Mr. Anderson, enlighten us all as to the relative Track Pressures of the two tanks.
Respectfully ;
Paul R. Ward
I think I was in quote hell there...