5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

[Michael Kenny]

Its a 'survey. of 45 tanks. I stand by everything I said. It will have been a total loss survey.

[Richard Anderson]

While I agree with the thrust of your post, I'd like to see the evidence for this sweeping statement.

Design of the "ultimate" Medium Tank M4, incorporating major requirements found in test and service experience gained since its introduction in mid 1942, began in July 1943. One of the major interior changes was the relocation of the ammo stowage to the floor in "wet" containers. See Hunnicutt Sherman pp. 260-261. The suggestion ammo fires were a problem came from the British in North Africa and Aberdeen tested the effects on Lima T-25191 on 25 March 1943. See http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minu ... _lima.html

[Sheldrake]

While I agree with the thrust of your post, I'd like to see the evidence for this sweeping statement.

Design of the "ultimate" Medium Tank M4, incorporating major requirements found in test and service experience gained since its introduction in mid 1942, began in July 1943. One of the major interior changes was the relocation of the ammo stowage to the floor in "wet" containers. See Hunnicutt Sherman pp. 260-261. The suggestion ammo fires were a problem came from the British in North Africa and Aberdeen tested the effects on Lima T-25191 on 25 March 1943. See http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minu ... _lima.html

Thank you. The nine month delay between the 1942 suggestion and 1943 modifications suggests that the improvements were made without realizing the significance of ammunition storage handling and discipline. Perhaps the problem only became prominent and urgent in 1944.

[Michael Kenny]

If there were lots of Shermans driving around surviving AP hits, why didn't ORS include them?
................If you have evidence that it took a lot more than 1.63 hits to KO a Sherman please share it.

Cryptic comment on page 397:

Look at the upload of the medical survey on WW2 Talk. Completed after the Rhine Crossing it has a wealth of data and (from memory) 'scoops' figure rather large in the counting of AP strikes. At over 400 pages it is THE most detailed survey of actual tank and crew losses I have ever seen.
Link to one page.
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?media/tank ... 945.16217/

[Sheldrake]

If there were lots of Shermans driving around surviving AP hits, why didn't ORS include them?
................If you have evidence that it took a lot more than 1.63 hits to KO a Sherman please share it.

Cryptic comment on page 397:


oct29317.jpg

Look at the upload of the medical survey on WW2 Talk. Completed after the Rhine Crossing it has a wealth of data and (from memory) 'scoops' figure rather large in the counting of AP strikes. At over 400 pages it is THE most detailed survey of actual tank and crew losses I have ever seen.
Link to one page.
http://ww2talk.com/index.php?media/tank ... 945.16217/

This is a large document about RAC personnel casualties. Can you direct me to the pages which contradict ORS12 and the terms of reference?

[Richard Anderson]

Thank you. The nine month delay between the 1942 suggestion and 1943 modifications suggests that the improvements were made without realizing the significance of ammunition storage handling and discipline. Perhaps the problem only became prominent and urgent in 1944.

Sorry, but your maths are a bit off. The combat debut of the Sherman was the last week of October 1942. The RAC did not have an accurate count of losses, let alone an evaluation of its pros and cons until late November. Devers, Barnes, and other Armor and Ordnance officer liaisons were there and in Tunisia (including McNair, who was wounded) and most did not return to the States until January-February. Knowledge that ammo fires were likely the problem was circulating by then and Ordnance conducted its test at the end of March. Roughly four months from problem hypothesized to problem tested. Various measures were experimented with and three months later the required design changes were incorporated. The major delay was in getting from changes in design drawings and specifications to new component manufacture and finished production. That took six months and was partly delayed by closings of various manufacturing plants as contracts ended as part of the end-war planned draw-down in industry (which was a short-sighted economics decision as it turned out, especially with regards to tank manufacture).

[Michael Kenny]

This is a large document about RAC personnel casualties. Can you direct me to the pages which contradict ORS12 and the terms of reference?

I know it is large.
450+ pages large because it lists over 300 tank casualties.
Location and action of the tank when hit.
Number of strikes on each tank.
Aspect of strikes,
Calibre of hit
Severity of damage to tank.
There are some 160 photos of individual tanks and 50 diagrams listing (nearly) every hit to the tanks.

This is the strikes numbered and cross-referenced to text. Tank type is representative and shown is the total strikes to that aspect of each type/sub type of tank. E.G. Sherman I/ III/17 pdr/Cromwell/Stuart all have own chart for top/front/side hits.

There is much more too detailed to list.


It also lists total crew casualties with severity of wound, length of stay in hospital and very detailed breakdowns of injuries.
So whilst about 70% is 'medical' the tank damage part is very significant.

I do not know how to link the full report of the (revamped since I bookmarked it) WW2 Talk site.
I have it printed out.

[paulrward]

Double submission

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

To Mr. Anderson ;

Let us look at your data for ground pressure ( Track pressure )

Medium Tank M4 75mm (mid production) – 13.7 psi

Medium Tank M4A3 76mm HVSS – 11.0 psi

Medium Tank T26E3 (M26) – 12.5 psi


At this point, I want to interject something: In the early autumn of 1944, as the rains started, and the ground grew muddy in France and the Low Countries, the armoured units began attaching Grousers ( sometimes called Duckbills ) to the outer edges of the tracks on the M-4s. This increased the effective width of the tracks from 16.5 " to just over 20.1", and reduced the ground pressure by about 2 psi. Thus, your Medium Tank M4 75 mm went from 13.7 psi ground pressure to about 11.7 psi ground pressure, not much different from the HVSS tracked M-4s with the 23 " tracks.

The M-26s had a ground pressure, as you correctly note, of around 12.5 psi. Thus, to the armored commanders, they were being offered a Heavy Tank that would be more likely to be bogged down in mud and snow, as it had not only a higher ground pressure, but also a lower power to weight ratio than the M-4A3 with HVSS and the Ford V8 engine. Add to it that the M-26 was slower than the latest models of the M-4, and the doctrinaire Armored officers, trained in the pre war concept of the Tank as a Maneuver Weapon, just could no see the use of the M-26.


As for Mr. Fox's errors, you can pick at all the nits you want, it still does not change the fact that Army Ground Forces, as late as July 1944, attempted to have the armament on the M-26 changed to the 76mm gun, and that they and the Armored Force Board insisted that the M-26 not be released until the Armored Force had been allowed to repeat all of the testing that had already been conducted by the Ordnance Department.


In fact, In the autumn of 1943, he wrote this letter to General Devers, responding to the latter’s advocacy of the T26E1:

The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank… There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure…

There is no indication that the 76mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank.

Mr. Anderson, those are General McNair's OWN WORDS ! You cannot dispute that he did NOT understand that the nature of armored warfare had changed, when, in his own words he stated that tank vs. tank duels were ' unsound and unnecessary '.



All of these shenanigans by McNair and others succeeded in stalling the M-26 until the disaster in the Ardennes rubbed the Army's nose in the fact that the Germans had superior equipment. Eisenhower, who had been lukewarm on the idea of a new tank, because he had been assured that the 76mm gun was adequate to deal with the new generation of German tanks, pushed through a request, and Marshall ran over Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force Board to get them to Europe.

In addition, in July 1944, Chrysler had fitted an M26 turret onto a M-4 Sherman. Also, the production of M-36B1 TD, which were essentially a late model Sherman with a Tank Destroyer Turret, had been ordered due to the shortage of M-10 hulls. So, it cannot be said that it would not have been easy for the Army to fit a 90 mm gun onto a significant number of Shermans for use in Northern Europe. Of course, this was all done AFTER McNair was dead, and could no longer interfere with the development of armored vehicles in the U.S. Army......

You know, General Doolittle may have performed a great service to the U.S. Army by not refusing to use heavy bomber for tactical missions, just by killing McNair......


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Nickdfresh]

While I concur with your wider point that Gen. McNair delayed the introduction of the M-26...

Hello All ;
...
The M-26s had a ground pressure, as you correctly note, of around 12.5 psi. Thus, to the armored commanders, they were being offered a Heavy Tank that would be more likely to be bogged down in mud and snow, as it had not only a higher ground pressure, but also a lower power to weight ratio than the M-4A3 with HVSS and the Ford V8 engine. Add to it that the M-26 was slower than the latest models of the M-4, and the doctrinaire Armored officers, trained in the pre war concept of the Tank as a Maneuver Weapon, just could no see the use of the M-26.
...

You're completely insane and lack any credibility with the above statement. Do you really think U.S. commanders were automatons instilled with "doctrines" that they found useless and contravening to the reality and didn't dispose of them in good order?

Nearly everything anecdotal or doctrinal I've read clearly stated that in fact commanders in the ETO were SCREAMING for better, bigger tanks!! You've already stated that it took the weight of Marshall and Ike to overcome McNair and the AGF objection over heavier tanks. So WTF would they do so unless the vast majority of commanders were demanding a shift to heavier armor? Stop contradicting yourself with ridiculous sophistry!

The documentary record shows that by 1944, the commanders in ETO were dispelling the TD Doctrine and were blending units of TD's with Shermans in order to increase AT capabilities! That alone shows they had a mentality that was both fluid and evolutionary and not wedded to any static, biblical "pre-war" doctrine...

[paulrward]

Hello Mr. Nickdfresh ;

Please note that I did NOT say ALL Armor Commanders ! However, even in the late summer of 1944, there were still many who did not believe that the M-4 was becoming obsolescent. In fact, the breakout that followed Operation Cobra seemed to support their belief, that a fast medium tank was what was necessary to win the war. It wasn't until they began to run into German tank formations with larger, heavier tanks that began to punish their units that they changed their opinions.

And, we must remember, in the fighting in Africa, and on Sicily, again, the speed and flexibility of the M-4 Sherman was a winning combination. In other words, the Sherman was the best tank around, unless it ran into better German tanks.....


The genius of men like Devers is that they anticipated this, and wanted a tank in place in the U.S. Army that could deal with the newest generation of German armor. Now, there is a lot of criticism of Devers and the others in the Ordnance Department, saying that they wanted to prematurely place into production and service the early versions of the T-20 series, which were not, as they say, ' Ready for Prime Time '. And some ( many ?) ( most ? ) of these criticisms are valid.

The point I was trying to make with Mr. Anderson and the analysis of the Track Pressures of the M-4 and the M-26 was that it was just one more reason for some ( NOT ALL ! And not many after December 1944 ! ) of the commaders of U.S. Army armored formations to believe that they did not need the M-26, and that if they were saddled with the M-26s, they would tend to either be road-bound or, if they left the roads, would get bogged down in the Autumn mud and Winter slush of the Low Countries.

In other words, I am saying that the armor commanders who were reticent about the M-26 had some logic on their side. The M-26 was slower on roads, slower cross country, had a lower power to weight ratio, higher track pressure, higher fuel consumption per mile, and was a totally new tank for which there was little or no training available, limited spares and maintenance support, and no experience base either operationally or technically. In effect, by accepting the M-26, the armor commanders were being asked to ' Switch Horses in Mid Stream ' !

And, as you note, as time went on, the armor units began to adding T.D.s to their formations, and, with the increasing number of M-4 76mm Shermans, they had good chances of defeating the German armor, as long as they had superior numbers, and were willing to accept a certain level of losses.


The problem is, while a General may be willing to accept a certain level of losses to achieve the desired military objective, the Private sitting in the loaders seat of an M-4 that has the old 75mm M3 gun might be less objective about the situation. He doesn't care about replacing his Eagle with a Star, he just wants to get home to Schenectady.....

Does this make me sound a bit less insane ?


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Michael Kenny]

, with the increasing number of M-4 76mm Shermans, they had good chances of defeating the German armor, as long as they had superior numbers, and were willing to accept a certain level of losses. ....................

The problem is, while a General may be willing to accept a certain level of losses to achieve the desired military objective, the Private sitting in the loaders seat of an M-4 that has the old 75mm M3 gun might be less objective about the situation.

You keep referencing 'losses' but at no stage do you specify such losses. I think you have no idea of the real numbers and just believe they must be 'high' because you read it in third rate historical fiction that the likes of Kurowski churn out.
So what is the number of losses you would label as 'high'?
Better still gives us your considered opinion as to why you believe the % number of Allied tankers KIA was greatly in excess of the number of German tankers KIA.

[Richard Anderson]

I guess the cry of "Google Rangers vor!" will continue.

At this point, I want to interject something: In the early autumn of 1944, as the rains started, and the ground grew muddy in France and the Low Countries, the armoured units began attaching Grousers ( sometimes called Duckbills ) to the outer edges of the tracks on the M-4s. This increased the effective width of the tracks from 16.5 " to just over 20.1", and reduced the ground pressure by about 2 psi. Thus, your Medium Tank M4 75 mm went from 13.7 psi ground pressure to about 11.7 psi ground pressure, not much different from the HVSS tracked M-4s with the 23 " tracks.

The M-26s had a ground pressure, as you correctly note, of around 12.5 psi. Thus, to the armored commanders, they were being offered a Heavy Tank that would be more likely to be bogged down in mud and snow, as it had not only a higher ground pressure, but also a lower power to weight ratio than the M-4A3 with HVSS and the Ford V8 engine. Add to it that the M-26 was slower than the latest models of the M-4, and the doctrinaire Armored officers, trained in the pre war concept of the Tank as a Maneuver Weapon, just could no see the use of the M-26.

No, Mr. Ward, they were called "extended end connectors", sometimes called "grousers" or "duckbills" due to the shape. And they extended the width of the 16 9/16" wide double-pin track by 3 9/16" to 20 1/8". The added width increased the contact area by about 20%. For the standard Medium Tanks M4 in use by the U.S. Army that meant an improvement from 13.7 to 14.5 psi to roughly 11 to 11.6 psi. Problematically however, the extended end connectors were subject to breaking off and were in constant short supply, which was why the fielding of HVSS and its wider track was important.

Yes, there was little or no difference between standard M4 tanks with EEC, HVSS, and the T26 (unless you refer to screed Cooper). However, there is no evidence Armor officers, doctrinaire or not, trained in their WARTIME tank doctrine, raised significant issues about the battlefield maneuverability of the T26, until experience demonstrated how important that maneuverability was. The objections were to its strategic and operational mobility, which is related to its size and weight and the capabilities of ships, craft, cranes, and beaches.

As for Mr. Fox's errors, you can pick at all the nits you want, it still does not change the fact that Army Ground Forces, as late as July 1944, attempted to have the armament on the M-26 changed to the 76mm gun, and that they and the Armored Force Board insisted that the M-26 not be released until the Armored Force had been allowed to repeat all of the testing that had already been conducted by the Ordnance Department.

It is a fact? Then prove it please. It was July when the matter was resolved, but in favor of the 90mm/105mm combination. The matter ended on 18 May 1944, when McNair got what he had desired - a firm commitment from the using end, i.e., the European Theater of Operations, that they desired the 90mm-armed M26.

In fact, In the autumn of 1943, he wrote this letter to General Devers, responding to the latter’s advocacy of the T26E1:

Sorry, but no in fact that letter was not to Devers, it was to Marshall, on 30 November 1943. It presented what McNair was advised by Ordnance with regards to the capabilities of the American guns. It also correctly stated the facts with regards to the request - only Devers was asking for the 90mm gun.

In addition, in July 1944, Chrysler had fitted an M26 turret onto a M-4 Sherman.

That was a one-off, placing the turret on the hull of a M4 (105) hull (Serial # USA 30103950) on the visit of BG Holly, Chief of the ETOUSA AFV&W Section, who had been dispatched on 5 July 1944 by Eisenhower to carry a personal letter to Marshall in which Ike lambasted Ordnance for the 76mm fiasco. The "tank" existed for one day. To produce more required production of turrets, which may as well have been placed on their intended T26E3 chassis. On the other hand, a Sherman with 90mm was practical if instead of adapting the T23 turret to the 76mm it had been adapted to the 90mm in May 1943...production would have started in January 1944 and it would have been 113 M4 90mm siting in depots in England on 6 June instead of M4 76mm.

Also, the production of M-36B1 TD, which were essentially a late model Sherman with a Tank Destroyer Turret, had been ordered due to the shortage of M-10 hulls. So, it cannot be said that it would not have been easy for the Army to fit a 90 mm gun onto a significant number of Shermans for use in Northern Europe. Of course, this was all done AFTER McNair was dead, and could no longer interfere with the development of armored vehicles in the U.S. Army......

Strawman again, you are really good at them. Meanwhile, just 50 90mm tank guns were produced in the second half of 1943. They had to be redesigned from the 90mm AA gun (the downfall of all the earlier attempts to get a 90mm SP was that they began with the 90mm AA gun. BTW, it was Ike who initially refused the M36 (T71) in the ETO, in May 1944.

You know, General Doolittle may have performed a great service to the U.S. Army by not refusing to use heavy bomber for tactical missions, just by killing McNair......

Fatuous much?

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

OK, Mr. Kenny, you want figures: The following data is from the

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II , The Technical Services , THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT , by Lida Mayo, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY , WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-60000, First Printed 1968-CMH Pub 10-11


From chapter XVII, Lessons from the Roer and Ardennes, pages 318 to 338, we learn that

During the First Army breakthrough battles in July and August, the 2d Armored Division tankers had learned how to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks with their M4 Shermans. They knew that the ammunition of the 75-mm. gun with which most of the M4's were armed (a low-velocity shell about 13 inches long, as compared with the 28- to 30-inch high-velocity 75-mm. shell of the Panthers) would not penetrate at any range the thick frontal armor of the Panthers and Tigers, but could damage the sides and rear. Therefore the tankers had used wide encircling movements, engaging the enemy's attention with one platoon of tanks while another platoon attacked from the rear. They had suffered appalling losses: between 26 July and 12 August, for example, one of 2d Armored Division's tank battalions had lost to German tanks and assault guns 51 percent of its combat personnel killed or wounded and 70 percent of its tanks destroyed or evacuated for fourth echelon repair. But by using flanking tactics and by enlisting artillery support to fire directly on enemy tanks, the Americans had won their battles and even managed to inflict heavy losses on the Germans

So, Mr. Kenny, here is a number: since the 2nd Armored was a Heavy Armored Division, that mean that a battalion had roughly 52 tanks, 70% of which means that 35 tanks were destroyed or badly damaged, and, with 5 men per tank, that give us 250 men total, of whom roughly 125 had been killed or wounded in combat. This is in 17 days.


Continuing with the Study, we get:

By the time the Roer offensive began, the 2d Armored Division's firepower had been stepped up to some extent. About half the division's M4's were armed with the 76-mm. gun.14 With this gun, firing the new but scarce tungsten-carbide-cored HVAP ammunition, the tankers could penetrate the front belly plate of the Panther at 300 yards and at 200 yards had a sporting chance (about one to four) of penetrating the front slope plate. The division's tank destroyer battalion had also recently been equipped with the new M36 destroyers mounting the 90-mm. gun.

So, at the time of the Roer offensive, the 2d Armored had half of its tanks with your much vaunted 76 mm gun.

Now, we get to the Roer Battle:

On the 17th ( of November ) , shortly after dawn, as two tank battalions of the 2d Armored Division's 67th Armored Regiment were drawn up on a slope outside Puffendorf, ready to attack toward Gereonsweiler, the men of the 1st Battalion saw long, high-velocity shells plowing furrows in the soft earth between their tanks. Then out of the heavy morning mist came a German tank; two Tigers and four Panthers moved out of the woods on the western fringe of Gereonsweiler. There was a hit; one of the Shermans went up in flames, then another and another and another, as the Germans got the range. Soon the tanks of the 2d Battalion were also being thinned by murderous fire from the big tanks. The Germans, alarmed by the speed of the American advance on the first day of the offensive, had brought up elements of the strong 9th Panzer Division—veteran of the Russian front—to Gereonsweiler and were attacking at Puffendorf with a force estimated by 2d Battalion at twenty to thirty Panthers and Tigers.

So, Mr. Kenny, we have one battalions of M-4 Shermans and one battalion of M-3 Stuarts, about 100 U.S. Tanks in all, up against ' twenty to thirty Panthers and Tigers...' This means that the odds are about 4 to 1 in favor of the 2d Armored.

The battle at Puffendorf was tank against tank: on both sides the infantry was pinned down by artillery fire. The Germans had the advantage of position: the Americans were hemmed in by sloping ground that made flanking movement impossible. The Shermans fought back desperately, stepping up to attempt to slug it out with their 75-mm. and 76-mm. guns, but the tanks that got close enough for their guns to be effective were quickly cut down by enemy fire. And when the American tankers did score direct hits on the German tanks, their shells ricocheted off the thick armor and went screaming into the air. One Sherman fired fourteen rounds of 76-mm. ammunition at a Tiger before it had any success at all—and the next moment was destroyed by another Tiger. When some companies were down to three or four tanks and ammunition was running low, both battalions sent back for the 90-mm. tank destroyers to come up. With the help of these "can-openers," as the tankers called the tank destroyers, the Germans were beaten off, but at heavy cost to the two battalions in tanks and men. The second day's action on the Roer plain cost the 2d Armored Division 38 medium tanks, destroyed or knocked out, and 19 light tanks; 56 men killed, 281 wounded, 26 missing; and all but a few of these losses were incurred at Puffendorf.

Mr. Kenny, look at those figures: The 2d Armored lost 57 tanks, suffered 339 Killed, wounded or missing. According to UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN , by Charles B. MacDonald, The cost to the Germans was 11 tanks destroyed.

Mr. Kenny, do the math: 57 tanks traded for 11 tanks works out to about 5 to 1. HMMMMMM - maybe that's where that ' 5 Shermans / 1 Tiger Myth comes from ?

But, Mr. Kenny, let us move on to the results of the battle,

The American tanks came off less creditably in the battle of the Roer plain. The tankers, deprived by the terrain and mud of their ability to outflank the enemy, by the congestion in the area of their usual artillery direct support, and by bad weather of much assistance from the air, had fought magnificently; but they had become disillusioned about the ability of their tanks to defeat German armor. "Our men no longer have as much confidence in their armor and guns as they used to have," one of the 2d Armored Division tankers said two days after the Roer plain offensive. Another said, "The Germans have been improving steadily ever since we met them in Sicily," and "Our Ordnance Department needs to get on the ball."

This was not merely a momentary reaction from battle-weary men. After the war an Armored School report, prepared with the assistance of 2d Armored Division tank commanders who had participated in the action, stated that the most important factor in the set-back at Puffendorf on 17 November—"the biggest tank battle in 2nd Armored experience"—was "the inferiority of our tanks in guns, armor, and maneuverability."

At the time of the Roer plain offensive the tankers had been impressed by the superiority of the wide German tank tracks, which barely sank in the ground, while the American tracks made trenches. The tankers complained that the Shermans were too slow to get quickly out of the way of antitank fire (as the light tanks could); that their suspensions, of the volute spring type, adversely affected maneuverability (most considered the torsion bar suspension superior in maneuverability and reliability); that their silhouette was too high; and that their armor was not much better than that of the tank destroyers. Above all, the tankers complained of their guns. They had seen their 75-mm. and 76-mm. shells bounce off the front plate of the Panthers as well as the Tigers—"like hitting them with a pea-shooter." The 76-mm. gun was better than the 75-mm. but did not have enough velocity to keep the tank out of the range of the more powerful German tank guns, which were effective at 3,000 to 3,500 yards. At practical ranges the 76-mm., even with HVAP ammunition, would not successfully penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther. "The guns are ineffective, the crews know it, and it affects their morale," the tank commanders stated. They concluded that the British had the right idea when they threw away the 75-mm. guns on their lend-lease Shermans and mounted their 17-pounders. The 2d Armored Division tankers believed that their own Shermans could easily mount a 90-mm. gun.

Now, Mr. Kenney, here is an important point: The Sherman crews and their commanders had seen the M-4s sink into the mud. This means that they had to be concerned about, not only their inferior guns and armor, but also their Track Pressure. Thus, while the commanders may have wanted a better tank, when they learned that the M-26 had a higher Track Pressure than the Shermans that had been fitted with growsers, it would have been a concern.


Continuing on with the report, we learn:

Not only on the Roer plain, but to a lesser extent in the Hürtgen Forest, where the wooded, boggy terrain kept the tanks road-bound, was there growing frustration with the performance of the Shermans, especially those with the 75-mm. gun. And in the Battle of the Bulge, one division commander's wish for a tank with armament to cope adequately with the German Panthers and Tigers was echoed "prayer-fully or profanely—wherever the enemy panzer divisions appeared out of the Ardennes hills and forests." Lacking such armament, the tankers stalked the German tanks, maneuvering to get a shot at flank or tail from behind the protection of walls and buildings, or lying in wait in a village lane until a German tank, advancing usually under cover of darkness or fog, got close enough for a kill broadside. With these tactics, with the help of individual heroic actions by tankers and by infantry with bazookas, and with the assistance of the ever-dependable artillery, the onrushing tide of the big German tanks was stemmed; but at great cost in American men and tanks. Between 20 November 1944 and 28 December 1944, losses in 75-mm. and 76-mm. Shermans amounted to 636

Finally, we get a section at the end of the Chapter, relating to Operation Zebra, the experimental introduction of the M-26 into Northern Europe at the beginning of 1945. One of the officers involved with the M-26, Colonel Colby of the Tank-Automotive Command, met with the 3rd Armored Division personnel. ( You know, Belton Cooper's Division......)

At the time of the ZEBRA mission, interest naturally was centered on the Pershing tank. Although the theater refused to subscribe to a blanket statement that the Pershing with the M3 gun was superior to the Panther or Tiger, all commanders considered it a step in the right direction and wanted all the Pershing tanks they could get as soon as possible. In the meantime they would settle for the M4 with the 76-mm. gun and as much HVAP ammunition as was available. They emphatically wanted no more M4's with the 75-mm. gun. When Colonel Colby tried to sell the battalion commanders of the 3d Armored Division on the Shermans they already had (being unable to offer them anything better on a large scale immediately), he ran into a hornet's nest. After the heavy casualties of the winter, they were beginning to regard the 75-mm. Shermans as deathtraps.

Deathtraps, Mr. Kenny. Deathtraps. Deathtraps.


And here is a question for all the Sherman Fanboys out there: How would YOU like to go to war in a DEATHTRAP ?


You wanted numbers, Mr Kenny ? Those are your numbers. Even when the U.S. tanks outnumbered the German Tanks by a four to one ratio, the Germans destroyed the U.S. tanks at a five to one ratio.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward


One final number: Even at the end of the war, the number of 76mm M-4 Shermans was no more than 40% of the total number of Shermans in Theatre. So, 60% of the Shermans that crossed the Rhine were still Deathtraps.

PRW

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

To Mr. Anderson ;

Well, you have conceded that I am correct on the matter of Track Pressure being lower on an M-4 fitted with grousers ( Or EECs, for the acronymically obsessed ). It is obvious that the M-26 had
a lower power to weight ratio than the M-4. But, as for battlefield maneuverability in mud, I submit that after the issues with the Shermans off road in the Autumn of 1944, this was in fact on the minds of Armored officers.

Then , you go on to state:

It is a fact? Then prove it please. It was July when the matter was resolved, but in favor of the 90mm/105mm combination. The matter ended on 18 May 1944, when McNair got what he had desired - a firm commitment from the using end, i.e., the European Theater of Operations, that they desired the 90mm-armed M26.

Quoting from the same official History from my posting above, we get the following on pages 331-332:

After the production of the first ten T26E1's, tests showed that certain modifications were necessary, including the provision for more ammunition stowage. After these changes were made, the tank was redesignated heavy tank T26E3, and was standardized as the M26 (General Pershing). General Barnes insisted that of the first 40 off the production line, 20 be sent overseas simultaneously with the shipment of 20 to Fort Knox for tests. Army Ground Forces objected, urging that the tests be made before the tanks were shipped overseas; but Barnes (threatening to go to General Marshall if necessary) appealed to Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, assistant chief of staff G-4, and won his point. The 20 T26E3's were in Europe before the end of January 1945.

As you can see, both the Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force Board in the U.S. were doing everything in their power to slow the introduction of the M-26, even to the point of insisting at the last moment that it be fitted with a 76mm gun.



Mr. Anderson, McNair's letter was sent to Devers, it was copied to Marshall. And, yes, only Devers was asking for the 90mm gun because only Devers had the foresight and intelligence to realize that the U.S. Army was about to go into a buzz saw when it ran up against the next generation of German Tanks.


You then go on an make the statement that the fitting of an M-26 turret on an M-4 was a 'One off". This is true. Mr. Anderson, have you ever heard of the Mustang X ? It was a 'One-off built by Rolls Royce, using a P-51A and a Merlin 65 taken from a Spitfire. First they built one. Then four more. Then they gave one to the United States. That's how development work is done. They call it a 'Prototype"......


And then YOU create a Strawman. The Reason so few 90mm guns were produced was because the Armored Force Board and the Army Ground Forces refused to ask for an increased priority for them.
Cause and Effect.

You know, General Doolittle may have performed a great service to the U.S. Army by not refusing to use heavy bomber for tactical missions, just by killing McNair......

No, Mr. Anderson. Not Fatuous. Just Realistic. God only knows how many good men that idiot would have killed with his pig-ignorant stupidity if Doolittle hadn't nailed him first. You know, I knew there was a reason why he deserved that Medal of Honor they gave him......


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward