5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

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Richard Anderson
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#76

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Nov 2016, 22:14

paulrward wrote:The following data is from the
Google vor!
here is a number: since the 2nd Armored was a Heavy Armored Division, that mean that a battalion had roughly 52 tanks, 70% of which means that 35 tanks were destroyed or badly damaged, and, with 5 men per tank, that give us 250 men total, of whom roughly 125 had been killed or wounded in combat. This is in 17 days.


Continuing with the Study, we get:
It's not a "Study" capitalized or not. It's a history. A study is Alvin D. Coox and L. Van Loan Naisawald, Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1 March 1951), which produced findings. One of which was that in 274 medium tanks studied in First Army, with 1,370 crewmen, casualties were 171 killed, 406 wounded, and 59 missing for a rate of 50.8 percent. In a sample of 48 light tanks and 192 crewmen the rate was 65.1% (52 killed, 72 wounded, and 1 missing).
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#77

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Nov 2016, 23:04

paulrward wrote:Well, you have conceded that I am correct on the matter of Track Pressure being lower on an M-4 fitted with grousers ( Or EECs, for the acronymically obsessed ). It is obvious that the M-26 had
a lower power to weight ratio than the M-4. But, as for battlefield maneuverability in mud, I submit that after the issues with the Shermans off road in the Autumn of 1944, this was in fact on the minds of Armored officers.
Not "obsessed" at all with acronyms, just interested in accuracy. Yes, I concede I misread your initial comment to be a parroting of your favorite author who got the matter of the ground pressure and power to weight ratio wrong, but it is also irrelevant. The T26 beat also out an M4A3E8 over an "obstacle course" at Aberdeen.

So, yet again, where is the evidence that "battlefield maneuverability in mud" was an issue?
Quoting from the same official History from my posting above, we get the following on pages 331-332:
Er, no, that wasn't a quote from an "official History", it was a paraphrase of Baily.
After the production of the first ten T26E1's, tests showed that certain modifications were necessary, including the provision for more ammunition stowage. After these changes were made, the tank was redesignated heavy tank T26E3, and was standardized as the M26 (General Pershing). General Barnes insisted that of the first 40 off the production line, 20 be sent overseas simultaneously with the shipment of 20 to Fort Knox for tests. Army Ground Forces objected, urging that the tests be made before the tanks were shipped overseas; but Barnes (threatening to go to General Marshall if necessary) appealed to Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, assistant chief of staff G-4, and won his point. The 20 T26E3's were in Europe before the end of January 1945.
As you can see, both the Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force Board in the U.S. were doing everything in their power to slow the introduction of the M-26, even to the point of insisting at the last moment that it be fitted with a 76mm gun.
As you can see, the Ordnance Department postwar was covering its tracks and shifting blame onto AGF and McNair, who could not reply. It did so using the same methodology beloved by you, ignoring dates and pretending things occur in in a fictitious temporal order.

18 May 1944 - AGF ceases objections based on the ETOUSA request
29 June - Ordnance Committee redesignated the T26 as a "heavy" tank
12 July - McNair departs for Europe
25 July - McNair is KIA; by that time 10 T26E1 existed and were being tested in the US
31 August - Ordnance Department proposes T26E3 be standardized
19 October - AGF requests the first 20 T26E3 go to Knox for service tests in order to facilitate a faster deployment to Europe
24 October - ASF orders Ordnance to comply with the AGF request
November-December - first 30 T26E3 production models completed
8 December - Barnes, having ignored the ASF directive as long as possible, convinces the New Developments Director in the War Department to override ASF so that only T26E3 numbers 1 to 7 were sent for testing and 8-28 (including the rebuilt T26E1-1) went as the ZEBRA mission
March 1945 - T26E3 standardized as M26

The ultimate result was that the T26E3 was produced and sent into service in the same way as the Panther, without service testing of the production tanks. The result was similar too. Of the 20 ZEBRA tanks, one never ran and the others suffered numerous mechanical faults, most related to a transmission couple design fault identified in the T26E1, but not fixed by Ordnance in the pressure to get the T26E3 into production.
Mr. Anderson, McNair's letter was sent to Devers, it was copied to Marshall. And, yes, only Devers was asking for the 90mm gun because only Devers had the foresight and intelligence to realize that the U.S. Army was about to go into a buzz saw when it ran up against the next generation of German Tanks.
Dear me, so many errors, so little time...
You then go on an make the statement that the fitting of an M-26 turret on an M-4 was a 'One off". This is true. Mr. Anderson, have you ever heard of the Mustang X ? It was a 'One-off built by Rolls Royce, using a P-51A and a Merlin 65 taken from a Spitfire. First they built one. Then four more. Then they gave one to the United States. That's how development work is done. They call it a 'Prototype"......
Because aircraft and tanks are the same thing?

Meanwhile, without Packard production, the P51B would never have seen the light of day, because, just like the T26 turret production, Merlin engine production was a bottleneck.
And then YOU create a Strawman. The Reason so few 90mm guns were produced was because the Armored Force Board and the Army Ground Forces refused to ask for an increased priority for them.
Cause and Effect.
The 90mm Tank Gun began development in September 1942 and was ready in December. Meanwhile, priority AS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT limited the number of 90mm guns that could be produced as tank guns. It wasn't until the later half of 1943 that priority for the AA Command was changed, allowing production capacity to shift to the tank gun.

No, Mr. Anderson. Not Fatuous. Just Realistic. God only knows how many good men that idiot would have killed with his pig-ignorant stupidity if Doolittle hadn't nailed him first. You know, I knew there was a reason why he deserved that Medal of Honor they gave him......
It astonishes me still that such ignorance passes the bar and only demonstrates you know as little about McNair's intellect and capability as you do of everything else you spout off on.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#78

Post by paulrward » 01 Dec 2016, 01:14

Hello All :
It astonishes me still that such ignorance passes the bar and only demonstrates you know as little about McNair's intellect and capability as you do of everything else you spout off on.
Apparently there is some serious man-love for McNair going on here, so much so that they cannot recognize the man's obvious failings. Even the Official Histories published by the Center For Military History, which is located at Fort Leslie McNair, show that he was an obstructionist, wrong headed, and failed to keep up with an ever changing battlefield.

Sorry, Mr. Anderson. By the middle of 1944, Leslie McNair, like the M-4 Sherman, was a pig that no amount of Lipstick could fix. And, tragically, they both got men killed.


Which is why it took five Shermans to defeat one Tiger.

Quoting from the same official History from my posting above, we get the following on pages 331-332:


Er, no, that wasn't a quote from an "official History", it was a paraphrase of Baily.

Wrong, Mr. Anderson. It was a direct quote from UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:
The Technical Services , THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT,
by Lida Mayo. If you go to

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... rXVII.html

you can read it for yourself on pages 331-332.


Mr Anderson, It astonishes me still that such ignorance passes the bar and only demonstrates you know as little about McNair's incompetence and lack of foresight as you do of everything else you spout off on.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#79

Post by Michael Kenny » 01 Dec 2016, 02:59

paulrward wrote: So, Mr. Kenny, here is a number: since the 2nd Armored was a Heavy Armored Division, that mean that a battalion had roughly 52 tanks, 70% of which means that 35 tanks were destroyed or badly damaged, and, with 5 men per tank, that give us 250 men total, of whom roughly 125 had been killed or wounded in combat. This is in 17 days.
No. Just taking your numbers at face value with no checking (a dangerous act) a total of 35 tank casualties would yield on average 70 KIA/WIA. Nowhere near your absurd figure.
paulrward wrote: shortly after dawn, as two tank battalions of the 2d Armored Division's 67th Armored Regiment were drawn up on a slope outside Puffendorf .............So, Mr. Kenny, we have one battalions of M-4 Shermans and one battalion of M-3 Stuarts, about 100 U.S. Tanks in all, up against ' twenty to thirty Panthers and Tigers...' This means that the odds are about 4 to 1 in favor of the 2d Armored.
That would depend on where all the elements of CCB 2nd AD were. CCB was further sub-divided into 3 commands. I suggest you concentrate on TF1, 1/67 & 2/67 which is 5 tank Coy. 3 medium and 2 light
CCB T1.jpg
For the record it is 2 Medium Coys and 1 Light tank Coys per Bat. I note also the way you hilariously equate a Stuart with a Tiger/Panther.

paulrward wrote: Mr. Kenny, look at those figures: The 2d Armored lost 57 tanks, suffered 339 Killed, wounded or missing. According to UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN , by Charles B. MacDonald, The cost to the Germans was 11 tanks destroyed.
I suspect it is your ignorance that lets you down here. Casualties for an Armored Division are not all casualties of a sub-unit. By far the biggest number are taken in the Infantry units. You just have not got a clue.

As for tanks there is a clue in the AAR of 67 AR for November. Note the dates. 16-23 and not as you would like us believe just Nov 17.
oct30823.jpg

There is also a history of the Roer Campaign that lists Divisional casualties as:
oct30523.jpg
And tank casuaties as :
oct30423.jpg
And lists replacement tanks issued
oct30623.jpg
All in I reckon that qualifies as a 'devastating' rebuttal of your whole argument!

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#80

Post by paulrward » 01 Dec 2016, 08:17

Hello All ;

To Mr. Kenny ;
All in I reckon that qualifies as a 'devastating' rebuttal of your whole argument!
No it doesn't.

Even if we just use YOUR figures, the 2d Armored had to get either 43 or 41 replacement tanks. According to THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN , by Charles B. MacDonald, an official publication of the United States Army, the Germans suffered 11 tanks lost. So, even using your figures, two batallions of U.S. Tanks, roughly 100 in total, against 20 - 30 German tanks, suffered heavy losses, and only destroyed 11 in return. And how many tanks did the U.S. loose? Well, based on your scans, it was either 43 tanks ( 31 medium, 12 light ) or it was 41 tanks ( 21 M4, 15 M4A1, and 5 M5A1 )


But, I have to say, based on the history written in 1968 by Mayo, I find your figures contradictory. Remember, Mayo specifically states 38 M4s and 19 M3A1s, a total of 57 tanks knocked out, with casualties of 56 KIA, 281 WIA, and 26 MIA ( These last are probably dead, but never recovered, giving a total of 82 KIA, or about 1.5 men KIA per tank knocked out.

In addition, according to THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, by Charles B. MacDonald, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.G., 1993 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-60001 , on page 533, it states,
Though the 2d Armored Division had relinquished little ground during the first encounter with the 9th Panzer Division, General Harmon obviously was concerned about what another day might bring. In the second day's fighting, CCB had lost 18 more medium tanks destroyed and 16 more damaged and out of action, plus 19 light tanks in similar categories. In a brief commitment, CCA had lost 4 mediums. Personnel casualties were double those of D Day: 56 killed, 281 wounded, 26 missing.
This is a total of 53 tanks from CCB and 4 tanks from CCA, for a total of 57 tanks And this, Mr. Kenny, was with the arrival late in the action of a number of M-36 Tank Destroyers with 90 mm guns, who knocked out a number of the German Panthers, and forced the 9th Panzer to withdraw. We have to ask: What would have happened if those 90mm gunned TDs had not been available, or if they had been armed with the 3" M7 of the M-10s ?



And here we have a question of Organization. I have seen T.O.&E.s for 2nd Armored in 1944 which list the organization as being two Armored Regiments, each of which consists of three Battalions, ( two Medium, one Light ) each Battalion consisting of three companies, either of Medium or of Light Tanks, depending on the Battalion. I have seen other T.O.&E.s , from equally trustworthy sources, which describe the three Battalions as consisting of two Medium Companies and one Light Company.
However, based on the ratios of losses, and the description of events in McDonals's THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, it is apparent that the Battalions were, in fact, mixed Battalions at this time.



So, from the records, we can infer that there were at least 68 M4s going up against ' 20 to 30 ' Panthers and Tigers. And, I again need to interject: Despite the fact that Mayo specifically states that the 2d Armored was facing a mixture of Panthers and Tigers, there is strong evidence that, in fact, the tanks they were facing were a actually a mixture of Panthers and PzKw IVs, the second of which, under some circumstances, strongly resemble the somewhat larger PzKw VI Tiger 1. There are some sources which state that, at the time of the engagement at Puffendorf, the 9th Panzer was reduced in strength to about 28 Panthers and 14 PzKw IVs, and that they didn't get their first Tigers until late November or early December.



Now, Mr. Kenny, I chose to focus on the engagement at Puffendorf for a simple reason: The weather was cloudy with intermittent rain, which meant that the Allied Air support was non existent, and the U.S. Artillery was greatly impeded by the lack of visibility. As a result, this was a straight Tank vs. Tank Action. And, the Germans handed the Hell on Wheels boys their heads.

Mr. Kenny, I know that, like all the other Sherman Fanboys, you don't want to read anything that contradicts your prejudices, but you can go to

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... l#contents

and read the Mayo's entire work, or at least the sections in Chapter 17. It was an eye opener to me when i first read it in a ' Green Book ' many years ago.


Also a note: this history was written in 1968, long before Belton Cooper penned his memoir. So, it cannot be said that it was colored by Mr. Cooper's work.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward


( That's right - I read them in a Green Book - so much for the Google Ranger B.S. that some idiot has been using as an epithet )
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#81

Post by Aber » 01 Dec 2016, 10:20

Where's the popcorn smiley for when you really need it. :D

Michael Kenny
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#82

Post by Michael Kenny » 01 Dec 2016, 14:00

paulrward wrote: And how many tanks did the U.S. loose? Well, based on your scans, it was either 43 tanks ( 31 medium, 12 light ) or it was 41 tanks ( 21 M4, 15 M4A1, and 5 M5A1 )'
This is the total for the week 16-23 Nov. You are trying to cram a divisional loss for a week into one days action. The discrepancy between 43-45 is not really that important but I understand why you latch on to it. It destroys your fiction of 50+ plus losses in a few hours and thus you have to try and make it look significant.
Here you can see some of the losses taken on Nov 16 (the day before 'Puffendorf') when no German tanks were involved:

four tanks mired in the soft ground and six others were blown up by mines,........................The tank assault of FLOVERICH reduced Company Gs strength by six tanks. Mines blew up three, a bazooka set one on fire as it crossed a trench, a mortar shell stopped another, and a sixth had mechanical failure due to previous damage................The Germans held their fire until the tanks had reached an area approximately 300 yards south of APWEILER. Then the guns simultaneously opened with intense and accurate fire on the attackers. In two minutes Captain White lost seven medium tanks. Three 'burned and the others were Immobilized, The three remaining tanks opened fire on the guns silenced four of them. In the ambush, Company G suffered the loss of seven tanks, three
tankers killed and seven seriously wounded.................Company G had a bad day. The days action had cost the company. 14 of their 16 tanks.


Your feeble attempts to conflate the events on Nov 17 (1 day Pudffendorf) with the battles of Nov 16-23 (8 days) is puzzling. Surely no one can be that dim? I conclude your ignorance is wilful.

Again I caution against using the number of tank casualties as it it were total losses.



paulrward wrote: But, I have to say, based on the history written in 1968 by Mayo, I find your figures contradictory. Remember, Mayo specifically states 38 M4s and 19 M3A1s, a total of 57 tanks knocked out, with casualties of 56 KIA, 281 WIA, and 26 MIA ( These last are probably dead, but never recovered, giving a total of 82 KIA, or about 1.5 men KIA per tank knocked out.
Well there you go. You use a 1968 account by Mayo whereas I gave you a 1949 account that says:

Records and accounts of the planning phase are meager, no doubt because they were never written down in permanent form until they became decisions and orders. However, Major Greene provided us with ample after action reports, unit histories, and documents dealing with the battle.
We were particularly fortunate in obtaining first hand accounts from members of the 2nd Armored Division who participated in the events. Brigadier General John H. Collier, former commander of CCA; Colonel Paul A, Disney, who commanded the 67th Armored Regt; Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Muller, assistant division G-4 during the operation. Major H. S. Long, Jr.. commander of the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment; and Major Paull A. Bane executive officer of the 3rd 3attalion, 67th Armored Regiment gave their time generously to answer our Questions, We gratefully record our thanks to them and to Major General Ernest N. Harmon, former division commander, for their interest and assistance.



paulrward wrote: And here we have a question of Organization. I have seen T.O.&E.s for 2nd Armored in 1944 which list the organization as being two Armored Regiments, each of which consists of three Battalions, ( two Medium, one Light ) each Battalion consisting of three companies, either of Medium or of Light Tanks, depending on the Battalion. I have seen other T.O.&E.s , from equally trustworthy sources, which describe the three Battalions as consisting of two Medium Companies and one Light Company.
However, based on the ratios of losses, and the description of events in McDonals's THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, it is apparent that the Battalions were, in fact, mixed Battalions at this time.


So you struggle with a basic fact like the Divisional structure at Puffendorf and yet you would like us to believe you have a good understanding of the losses incurred Nov 16-23?
Let me help you out and at the same time show the readers who has the more complete information:

oct31911.jpg
oct31811.jpg
paulrward wrote: As a result, this was a straight Tank vs. Tank Action. And, the Germans handed the Hell on Wheels boys their heads.
I think you are puddled. The German attack was intended to throw 2nd AD back from the river crossings. It failed to re-take any of the target towns/villages and the river crossings were taken a few days later. The sum total of the German attack? It delayed the advance of 2nd AD by 2 whole days!

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#83

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Dec 2016, 14:13

Michael Kenny wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: This is a large document about RAC personnel casualties. Can you direct me to the pages which contradict ORS12 and the terms of reference?
I know it is large.
450+ pages large because it lists over 300 tank casualties.
Location and action of the tank when hit.
Number of strikes on each tank.
Aspect of strikes,
Calibre of hit
Severity of damage to tank.
There are some 160 photos of individual tanks and 50 diagrams listing (nearly) every hit to the tanks.

There is much more too detailed to list.

It also lists total crew casualties with severity of wound, length of stay in hospital and very detailed breakdowns of injuries.
So whilst about 70% is 'medical' the tank damage part is very significant.

I do not know how to link the full report of the (revamped since I bookmarked it) WW2 Talk site.
I have it printed out.
Understood , but which pages contain the summary which contradict the findings of ORS 12?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#84

Post by Michael Kenny » 01 Dec 2016, 14:20

paulrward wrote: There are some sources which state that, at the time of the engagement at Puffendorf, the 9th Panzer was reduced in strength to about 28 Panthers and 14 PzKw IVs, and that they didn't get their first Tigers until late November or early December.
Really? And what has that got to do with the price of fish?
9th Pz Div never got any Tigers, Not in 1944 nor in 1945. Tigers were grouped in separate Abteilung and whilst they could be attached to a Division they were never a part of it. Perhaps you should be looking for information on sPz Abt 506.


paulrward wrote: , I chose to focus on the engagement at Puffendorf for a simple reason..........
Because you make the error of conflating one days fighting and 8 days fighting and gleefully thought 8 days losses were all taken on one day?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#85

Post by Michael Kenny » 01 Dec 2016, 14:23

Sheldrake wrote:
Understood , but which pages contain the summary which contradict the findings of ORS 12?
Read it yourself and find out-just like I did.
Get back to me when you have a specific point.
I am busy with another contrary at the moment.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#86

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Dec 2016, 18:58

Michael Kenny wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
Understood , but which pages contain the summary which contradict the findings of ORS 12?
Read it yourself and find out-just like I did.
Get back to me when you have a specific point.
I am busy with another contrary at the moment.

Sorry, but you can't prove your point by saying "here is a pile of data analyse it yourself." It is not self evident that this survey was based on the Normandy campaign. At first sight it looks like a survey of tank losses after Normandy, when lessons from that campaign may have been learned.

It is you who claim that the ORS report 12 on British Sherman casualties is wrong, and that reputable historians, such as Terry Copp have been misled. If you want your arguments to be taken seriously you need to present you case so the logic can be tested.

Until you do I will treat your claims with caution.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#87

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Dec 2016, 19:02

Richard Anderson wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:Thank you. The nine month delay between the 1942 suggestion and 1943 modifications suggests that the improvements were made without realizing the significance of ammunition storage handling and discipline. Perhaps the problem only became prominent and urgent in 1944.
Sorry, but your maths are a bit off. The combat debut of the Sherman was the last week of October 1942. The RAC did not have an accurate count of losses, let alone an evaluation of its pros and cons until late November. Devers, Barnes, and other Armor and Ordnance officer liaisons were there and in Tunisia (including McNair, who was wounded) and most did not return to the States until January-February. Knowledge that ammo fires were likely the problem was circulating by then and Ordnance conducted its test at the end of March. Roughly four months from problem hypothesized to problem tested. Various measures were experimented with and three months later the required design changes were incorporated. The major delay was in getting from changes in design drawings and specifications to new component manufacture and finished production. That took six months and was partly delayed by closings of various manufacturing plants as contracts ended as part of the end-war planned draw-down in industry (which was a short-sighted economics decision as it turned out, especially with regards to tank manufacture).
The link you (?) gave to me says
Starting in the Spring of 1942, British Workshops in North Africa proposed armoring the ammunition racks of Grants as a way to reduce tank fires. They passed their suggestions on to the US, and about a year later, the Ordnance Department tested the idea in the third production Lima, T-25191
http://the.shadock.free.fr/sherman_minu ... _lima.html

The original suggestion was made with respect to the M3 Grant. Someone in North Africa was already thinking about the risk of ammunition rather than fuel fire.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#88

Post by Michael Kenny » 01 Dec 2016, 20:02

Sheldrake wrote:
Sorry, but you can't prove your point by saying "here is a pile of data analyse it yourself."
I am not out to prove anything. I gave you my opinion on the 45 tank survey and in my experience it looks like a graveyard survey. I am actively working on it and if I can find confirmation you will find it posted here. Until such time believe what you will. I am under no obligation to provide you with anything other than a source and in the past I have been publicly reprimanded for doing this exact same ' please quote the actual source' to another poster.
For some time now I have thought your replies to me or posts in a thread where I post are a bit 'sharp'. The one that stuck out for me was the Colombelles thread where you had a dig because I re-posted data I got (via a forum request) from WW2 Talk. Nothing overt mind you but I get the distinct impression I am in danger of a 'fragging'. Bad enough that I have to face my obvious enemies that I should worry about my back.
Also you are doing what 90% of the people who disagree with me do. You ask me to provide you with information which will then be used to try and discredit my case. I'm buggered if I am going to do your hard work for you so get off your arse and download the 400 pages, read it then make an argument. I am not hiding or concealing anything. I gave you the link to the source document. I just refuse do your research for you.
Sheldrake wrote:It is not self evident that this survey was based on the Normandy campaign. At first sight it looks like a survey of tank losses after Normandy, when lessons from that campaign may have been learned.
The full title is 'Survey Of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units In North West Europe 24 March to 5 May 1945 WO 205 1165 Not much room for confusion there.
Sheldrake wrote: It is you who claim that the ORS report 12 on British Sherman casualties is wrong, and that reputable historians, such as Terry Copp have been misled. If you want your arguments to be taken seriously you need to present you case so the logic can be tested.
Until you do I will treat your claims with caution.
What 'drove me over the edge' was your recent Villers post. It was so dated. It was a classic late 1990s post full of errors that have long since been corrected by me and a number of others. Even Dan Taylor has put out a ATB update and DVD correcting some of the more glaring mistakes. Indeed there seemed no point to your reply other than to disagree with me. If you had read any of my posts in the last decade you would know how the picture has changed. Thus you did not take me seriously enough to read my posts in the past so why would I care if you don't read them in the future?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#89

Post by LineDoggie » 01 Dec 2016, 21:42

why dont you two stop acting like jealous teenage girls and act like the adult men you are supposed to be. Can the catty remarks
"There are two kinds of people who are staying on this beach: those who are dead and those who are going to die. Now let’s get the hell out of here".
Col. George Taylor, 16th Infantry Regiment, Omaha Beach

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#90

Post by Michael Kenny » 02 Dec 2016, 08:01

paulrward wrote:
But, I have to say, based on the history written in 1968 by Mayo, I find your figures contradictory. Remember, Mayo specifically states 38 M4s and 19 M3A1s, a total of 57 tanks knocked out, with casualties of 56 KIA, 281 WIA, and 26 MIA ( These last are probably dead, but never recovered, giving a total of 82 KIA, or about 1.5 men KIA per tank knocked out.
They are not 'my' figures. They are a combination of the November 1944 AAR of 67 Arm Regt and the 1949 study of the campign again by 2nd AD commanders. That is some 24 & 19 years prior to Mayo.

Here is an extract from the Nov 17 entry in the 67 Arm Rgt AAR:
oct3505.jpg
paulrward wrote:
In addition, according to THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, by Charles B. MacDonald, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.G., 1993 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-60001 , on page 533, it states,
Though the 2d Armored Division had relinquished little ground during the first encounter with the 9th Panzer Division, General Harmon obviously was concerned about what another day might bring. In the second day's fighting, CCB had lost 18 more medium tanks destroyed and 16 more damaged and out of action, plus 19 light tanks in similar categories. In a brief commitment, CCA had lost 4 mediums. Personnel casualties were double those of D Day: 56 killed, 281 wounded, 26 missing.
Hmmm..................seems you do not notice something significant about your two sources.

Let me give you a clue:

MacDonald
oct3473 aaaaaaaaaa-vertn.jpg
Mayo
oct33819vv.jpg
In your hasty Google to find numbers that agree with your fantasy you failed to notice source 1 (Mayo) was in fact footnoted as coming from source 2 MacDonald). You do not have 2 sources only the 1.
Checking all the footnotes of MacDonald reveals he also uses the 1949 Campaign Study that I am using. Quite how MacDonald got his 50+ totals is a puzzle because careful reading shows that only 35 are mentioned in the 1949 version and it appears to me 7 of those are being double counted.
The number of tank casualties (not losses) in the AAR and the 1949 account both agree on mid 30s and not the 50+ version you would prefer.

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