5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

[Sheldrake]

What 'drove me over the edge' was your recent Villers post. It was so dated. It was a classic late 1990s post full of errors that have long since been corrected by me and a number of others. Even Dan Taylor has put out a ATB update and DVD correcting some of the more glaring mistakes. Indeed there seemed no point to your reply other than to disagree with me. If you had read any of my posts in the last decade you would know how the picture has changed. Thus you did not take me seriously enough to read my posts in the past so why would I care if you don't read them in the future?

Michael old chap,

Sorry to put your reason "interfecit in ore gladii" But I am grateful for your posts and responses.

You are right. I have lived with what seemed a rational interpretation of VB for some time - one shared by many I might add. Perhaps its just then disquiet of a challenge to an comfortable certainty, but your posts on VB raised questions in my mind which leave me unconvinced.

- Whatever the local French civilians said or wrote, I am not convinced that the tanks on the road were placed there as a "flak trap." How did the French know the German's intentions? Did they give a press conference? I accept that there would have been flak covering the road. Its a supply route that needed to be protected. Its obvious from the aerial photographs that the tanks attracted attention from allied aircraft. However, I find it hard to believe they were left in the middle of the road on purpose.

a. This was a road that german supply vehicles needed to traverse at night without lights. What idiot would obstruct it?

b. Why would the Panzer troops go to the hassle of extracting a Tiger tank from VB to leave it as bait for fighter bombers? Towing a tiger tank was not an easy task, and needed a specialist recovery vehicle or three other tigers risking damage to their gearboxes. The AFVs would be exposed to air attack for the duration of the operation? I find it hard to imagine panzer troops doing this purely to help flak gunners get some extra kills (as if there was a shortage of targets for them?)

I can believe that the tanks might have been abandoned after an abortive recovery effort, but I need more sources to accept the flak trap explanation.

- Sgt Bray's gun looks to be facing the wrong way to knock out tank 213 as it drove into VB.

Maybe the information I seek is in the revised material on VB, which is now on my shopping/library list.

[Kingfish]

a. This was a road that german supply vehicles needed to traverse at night without lights. What idiot would obstruct it?

How would parking these derelict Tigers on the shoulder obstruct the road?

[Michael Kenny]

but I need more sources to accept the flak trap explanation.

It is mentioned in accounts by residents of Villers as ' a flak trap on the Aunay road'.
This is in direct contradiction to acccounts by Kurowski and others who said Wittmann's Tiger was repaired.
In the last year 2 sets of photos were found showing Tiger hulks in a field at the side of a hedge in a field with 1 set giving the exact location.
I then checked all the period photos of 'the Aunay road' for June/July 1944.
2 large objects can be seen 'on the Aunay road' with a lot of disturbed earth around them. (Bomb/rocket strikes?)
Checking the 1947 IGN air views of the same area shows the large objects have been moved one field west 'by the side of the Aunay road.
The photos of the Tigers by the hedge match up with the position of the large objects as seen on the 1947 air views.

Sgt Bray's gun looks to be facing the wrong way to knock out tank 213 as it drove into VB.

It is not confirmed as 'Bray's gun'.
The other 6 pdr is still unlocated and that could be Bray's gun.
The wrecks have been battered and rammed all ways to sunday and the location in any photo cam only be taken as proof they were in the position they were photographed at the time of the photo. Later pics show the carriers all over the road with one on its side.
There is an account by a Lehr Pz IV crewman who entered Villers on that road and he states there was a knocked out Tiger there with 1 dead crewman and others wounded. Only I crewman from 2/SS 101 is listed as KIA. He was a driver. Tiger 231 seen being towed has the marks of a strike on the drivers visor.

[Richard Anderson]

Apparently there is some serious man-love for McNair going on here, so much so that they cannot recognize the man's obvious failings. Even the Official Histories published by the Center For Military History, which is located at Fort Leslie McNair, show that he was an obstructionist, wrong headed, and failed to keep up with an ever changing battlefield.

What a seriously childish response. "Man-love"? You have a strange fixation about what you think I "love" and "hate". I "hate" acronyms and the word "doctrine" too according to you, although how you arrived at that odd notion still escapes me.

Meanwhile, try focusing on actually providing evidence of obstructionism, wrong-headedness, and failures of keeping up. You haven't done so yet. I have yet to see any evidence for obstructionism. I believe he was wrong-headed in his desire to field the towed TD battalions in 1944, but that has nothing to do with the supposed myth under discussion. There are others, but you are singularly unaware of them. And keeping up with the Jones' on the battlefield is not easy for anyone.

Sorry, Mr. Anderson. By the middle of 1944, Leslie McNair, like the M-4 Sherman, was a pig that no amount of Lipstick could fix. And, tragically, they both got men killed.

Colorful language without a shred of evidence is...just colorful language. Which seems all you are cognitively capable of.

Which is why it took five Shermans to defeat one Tiger.

As witness the lack of logic in that particular gem of a statement from you.

Er, no, that wasn't a quote from an "official History", it was a paraphrase of Baily.

Oh, sorry, I thought you were referring to MY quote.

you can read it for yourself on pages 331-332.

Already have, along with much of the relevant source material on tanks that it and its companion two volumes were written from. So do you suppose Ordnance wodl lay the blame on Ordnance in its official history?

Mr Anderson, It astonishes me still that such ignorance passes the bar and only demonstrates you know as little about McNair's incompetence and lack of foresight as you do of everything else you spout off on.

And it astonishes me that you have so very little understanding of who McNair was and what his abilities were, but would rather judge him based on your own incompetent understanding of events.

[Norbear]

This "5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?" question is very difficult, because the combat effectivness of a tank or SPG depend on the situation, tactis and environment. Another factor was the knocked out tanks that after take back and repaired. How the tank crews decide it was repariable or not? It was a difficult question, especially in frontline situations. In this case, impossible to avoid overclaims and it was not the crew fault.

The allied airforce destroyed only the 8-10% of the enemy tanks, but had a major effect to decrase the german factories product rates, and made great losses to the support troops. Due to the lack of fuel and resorces, the combat effectiveness of german tanks were debase. The standard traning level of the german armored corps were also decrase in late war period.

[Nickdfresh]

My head is spinning, but relevant to the thread: has it been mentioned yet that German tank destroyers probably killed more Shermans than actual panzers did?

[Norbear]

My head is spinning, but relevant to the thread: has it been mentioned yet that German tank destroyers probably killed more Shermans than actual panzers did?

I think this is also true for russian and british TDs too. Weapons like SU-85, SU 100, ISU122, ISU152, Achilles, Archer, M18, M36, Nashorn, Jagdpanther, Hetzer, Jagdpanzer IV were very effective against enemy armor and could inflict huge losses. Even Italy had a TD with well fire power like Semovente da 90/53 but was a little bit problematic with 6 rounds ammo salary.

[Michael Kenny]

OK, Mr. Kenny, you want figures: The following data is from the

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II , The Technical Services , THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT , by Lida Mayo, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY , WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-60000, First Printed 1968-CMH Pub 10-11


From chapter XVII, Lessons from the Roer and Ardennes, pages 318 to 338, we learn that

During the First Army breakthrough battles in July and August, the 2d Armored Division tankers had learned how to fight German Panther and Tiger tanks with their M4 Shermans. They knew that the ammunition of the 75-mm. gun with which most of the M4's were armed (a low-velocity shell about 13 inches long, as compared with the 28- to 30-inch high-velocity 75-mm. shell of the Panthers) would not penetrate at any range the thick frontal armor of the Panthers and Tigers, but could damage the sides and rear. Therefore the tankers had used wide encircling movements, engaging the enemy's attention with one platoon of tanks while another platoon attacked from the rear. They had suffered appalling losses: between 26 July and 12 August, for example, one of 2d Armored Division's tank battalions had lost to German tanks and assault guns 51 percent of its combat personnel killed or wounded and 70 percent of its tanks destroyed or evacuated for fourth echelon repair. But by using flanking tactics and by enlisting artillery support to fire directly on enemy tanks, the Americans had won their battles and even managed to inflict heavy losses on the Germans

So, Mr. Kenny, here is a number: since the 2nd Armored was a Heavy Armored Division, that mean that a battalion had roughly 52 tanks, 70% of which means that 35 tanks were destroyed or badly damaged, and, with 5 men per tank, that give us 250 men total, of whom roughly 125 had been killed or wounded in combat. This is in 17 days.

Your personnel figures are insane but if you want to compare tank losses try 12th SS for June 26-27 1944. During EPSOM II/ SS Pz Reg 12 suffered 11 Pz IV destroyed and 21 sent for repair. That is 32 tanks in 2 days and 10 KIA, 23 WIA & 3 MIA. Makes 2nd AD numbers look a lot better than you thought!

See page 77 of Szamveber 'Waffen SS Armour In Normandy' for translation of the Unit War Diary.

[ChristopherPerrien]

My head is spinning, but relevant to the thread: has it been mentioned yet that German tank destroyers probably killed more Shermans than actual panzers did?

A different threat, that is of no surprise, since it got to the point where there were more German asualt guns than German tanks. Even at the time/place we are talking about here PZ IV's prolly killed far more Shermans than PZ V's and VI's, because of their greater numbers. In fact since the IV often looked like the VI through the "haze of battle" the VI gained a lot of respect for kills earned by its far more numerous cousin the IV.

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.

[Kingfish]

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.

I would think the opposite to be true.

Open country would allow opposing tank units to outflank SPGs, whereas the restricted bocage would channel allied armor into prepared kill zones.

[ChristopherPerrien]

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.

I would think the opposite to be true.

Open country would allow opposing tank units to outflank SPGs, whereas the restricted bocage would channel allied armor into prepared kill zones.

In close in terrain, it is far easier to get on a flank on an enemy position than open terrain. And with the SP having to pivot to face such threats, the ability to pivot in such terrain is very limited as well. Tanks were far more effective in the Bocage for this reason along with several others.

1) It is easier to traverse a turret than pivot. (though there can be obstacles to traversing as well, those are easier to get around with a tank)

2 ) the higher gun on a tank than an SP gun, gave them more ability to fire over the Hedge wall dirt embankments, where an SP would be packing its gun full dirt trying to/i.e. simply could not.

3) Tank are better observation and "watch" platforms than SP guns(moreso in closer terrain as well) , due to their height and being able to traverse rather than the highly limited traverse of an SP gun or its limited ability to pivot(which also involves engine starting/running and being able to pivot in position in the first place. The constant noise and need have the engine running adds all kinds of problems/disadvantages for SP guns, anywhere.- Noise blocks listening and communication, gives away position, and a lot more fuel/oil consumption and engine wear.

4) Again due to low gun height and fixed barrel, SP guns while moving through such terrain, will often dig their guns into the earth/embankments(this noted as a continuous and serious problem with SP guns especially in Normandy IIRC,) I know of a notation in a German AAR that noted this issue.-Wish I could recall location of that report, I believe it was from the 654th Heavy Antitank Battalion, equipped with JagPanthers. Which are pretty much the epitome/acme of the SP gun as tank destroyer concept.

Anyway, basically tanks are far more effective than SP guns in "close terrain". There is no realistic argument otherwise. And the Bocage of Normandy was IMO the "closest terrain" of a natural nature that armies ever fought in. The British and Americans should have noted this before the Invasion/landing (and move the invasion solely because of it IMO) , but few/no generals had the actual experience of driving/operating AFV 's in such areas, or realized how "close in" even the nature of infantry combat in such an area would be. One experience tank driver or infantry commander looking the pictures of that hedgerow country would have shook their heads in disbelief that it was contemplated to quickly fight through such an area.

But on the flip side even the Germans were totally ignorant of the defensive/movement limitative aspects of the Hedgerows before the invasion and even afterwards during their counter attacks and they had been sitting there for almost four years. Of course after the invasion , German operations were directed from Berlin, and operations such as the counterattack at Mortain should have never been expected to work , given the Hedgerows, but then, by then, doped-out Hitler had never seen a hedgerow and certainly would never have conceivably accepted the problems they would cause.

I would accuse leaders of both sides , of planning the operations in Normandy solely based on looking at nice flat maps, and assuming the area on the map was as nice and flat as the paper they were looking at. Happened in WWI as well. Generals didn't know what the trenches looked like and ignored the severe limitations/problems imposed, nor did they care. And in WWII none of them knew what a Hedgerow looked liked or the quite apparent problems associated with them as they were willfully ignorant.

Map knowledge is often deceiving and far different from ground and operational knowledge. And operational knowledge of how a different AFV's would work in such terrain, is far different from "book knowledge" about the various vehicles involved and minutiae such as cannon sizes or merely looking at the maps.

Also of note, the Germans ended up with Tank destroyers not out of perception, rather they ended up that way, because their Assault guns were developed to carry the heavy "infantry guns, their infantry had to knock down strong points. And then since they were disastrously short tanks and as well tanks with up to date AT guns , and SP guns were cheaper, and they were desperate for more AT defense , they ended up modifying them(and then finally purposely building them) to be Tank destroyers , because they had no other choice.
^bad run-on sentence, need work on I know.

[Richard Anderson]

My head is spinning, but relevant to the thread: has it been mentioned yet that German tank destroyers probably killed more Shermans than actual panzers did?

Yes, numerous times, just not in this thread. For example, the cause of tank losses in the ETO (according to WO 291/1186)

Mines 22.1%
AT guns 22.7%
Tanks 14.5%
SP Guns 24.4%
Bazooka 14.2%
Other 2.1%

This is comparable to a sample of 506 US First Army tanks lost (destroyed and damaged) between 6 June and 30 November 1944.

Mines 18.2%
AT/Tank guns 46.2%
Artillery 7.3%
Mortars 1.8%
Bazooka 13.6%
Other 12.9%

Also from this sample it was determined that 39.7% burned (all were gasoline engined M4 and M5 types) and 57.5% of those lost were repairable. In 104 cases there were no casualties incurred in the loss (20.6%), in 50 the number of casualties was unknown (9.9%), and in the remaining 352 cases, there were a total of 129 KIA (0.37 per loss) and 280 WIA (0.80 per loss) for a total of 409 casualties in 352 losses (1.16 per loss).

In the full survey of 883 First U.S. Army tanks lost from 6 June 1944 to 21 April 1945, 1.36% were to "mortars", 9.06% to unknown causes, 8.83% to "artillery" (including indirect fire as well as direct fire from guns 75mm and larger), 13.59% to infantry antitank rockets, 19.59% to mines, and 49.83% to "antitank guns", which was a very loose term including tank guns, assault guns, and towed antitank guns. Survey of Allied Tank Casualties generalizes the data from a sample of 12,140 cases (some possibly overlapping) as 6% mortars and misc., 7.5% hollow charge, 13% non-enemy, 20% mines, and 54% enemy gunfire.

A different threat, that is of no surprise, since it got to the point where there were more German asualt guns than German tanks. Even at the time/place we are talking about here PZ IV's prolly killed far more Shermans than PZ V's and VI's, because of their greater numbers. In fact since the IV often looked like the VI through the "haze of battle" the VI gained a lot of respect for kills earned by its far more numerous cousin the IV.

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.

To start on 31 May 1944, Ob. West reported 1,466 Panzers and 345 StuG on hand, many of both of which were never committed. In Normandy initially were 21. Panzer with c. 100 Panzers (not including French) and 40 of Becker's StuG, while another 20 "German" StuG were present in two divisional Pz.Jg.-Abtl. However, 17. SS-Pz.Gren. brought 42 StuG-IV when it arrived and the Stu.G. Lehr-Abtl. of 7. Armee brought another 31 when it was committed, as were those of other divisions. With losses, the Becker StuG were soon in a minority, but you are correct there was never the large numbers of StuG found in other theaters.

[Sheldrake]

But in Normandy , these German assault guns were not present in large numbers(except for Becker's "homemade" unit), and in the Bocage they were and would have been far less effective than any tank, given their inherent SP gun limitations in such terrain.

I would think the opposite to be true.

Open country would allow opposing tank units to outflank SPGs, whereas the restricted bocage would channel allied armor into prepared kill zones.

In close in terrain, it is far easier to get on a flank on an enemy position than open terrain. And with the SP having to pivot to face such threats, the ability to pivot in such terrain is very limited as well. Tanks were far more effective in the Bocage for this reason along with several others.

......SNIP..........

Also of note, the Germans ended up with Tank destroyers not out of perception, rather they ended up that way, because their Assault guns were developed to carry the heavy "infantry guns, their infantry had to knock down strong points. And then since they were disastrously short tanks and as well tanks with up to date AT guns , and SP guns were cheaper, and they were desperate for more AT defense , they ended up modifying them(and then finally purposely building them) to be Tank destroyers , because they had no other choice.
^bad run-on sentence, need work on I know.

There are a couple of points re tank destroyers and tanks and Normandy.

Re Normandy:

The Normandy battlefield was not solely "bocage" or hedgerow country. The area around Caen has larger fields and the area between Caen and Falaise is open with long fields of fire. The area between the river Dives and the Seine has lots of woods and is crossed by many rivers. Nor was it an unknown quantity. Brooke the CIGS had commanded a force there in 1940 and large paerts of Britain contain hedgerow country. Brooke and the Allied planners recognised that Normandy hedgerow country provided ready built defences, but this was seen as neutral. It was hadrd for the Allies to attack, and the Germans.

Neither the Allies nor the Germans saw the bocage country as ideal tank country. It hurt the Germans more than the allies because they failed to transfer enough infantry to the sector to man their defensive line and, as a consequence burned up their panzer troops. They were also committed to a static defensive policy of holding every inch of ground which committed them to an attritional battle which they would lose.

Tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers(US)/[panzer jeager(Ge)/ SP anti tank guns (UK) are different weapon systems with a different place in their army's doctrine and follow .

Tanks provided shock action and are manned by the armoured Corps.
Assault guns were self propelled artillery manned by artillerymen.
Tank destroyer AFVs were anti tank artillery, manned by whatever corps was responsible for anti tank defences. They are not an alternative to tanks, but a self propelled complement to towed equipment

Whatever AFVs were deployed, the arm of service tended to use them according to their principles. The Panzer regiments might be equipped with StuG or even JagdPanzers in lieu of tanks. Though the capabilities of the weapon also exerted an effect. Royal Artillery anti tank units equipped with the M10 might occasionally use them as tanks, because they could. Nor would the weapons be deployed in isolation from other arms.

So an armoured unit manouvering against SP anti tank guns is rather artificial. AFvs of any nature were vulnerable in close terrain to attack by infantry with hand held weapons, or light anti tank guns such as the 6pdr/57mm anti tank guns ineffective at long range. Both sides deployed all arms forces.

In British practice SP anit tank guns were used in two main ways:-
1. To KO tanks in the initial assault and provide anti tank defence on consolidation until towed equipment could be deployed and dug in.
2. In defence they provided the mobile anti-tank reserve against penetrations by German attacks.
Self defence for the infantry rested on their 6 pdr guns while towed 6pdr and 17 pdr guns were deployed in killing zones - in many cases sited to deal with tanks trying cunning flanking attacks.

Montgomery's instructions as land force commander in Jan 1944 were that armour should not be deployed as pill boxes in the front line, but be held in reserve. Anti tank defence should rest on anti tank weapons.

... returning to the topic.

The idea of one tiger = five shermans doesn't have a lot of meaning in this context. The Tigers, in Normandy at least, usually faced Shermans as part of a clash of all arms forces, and engaged by towed and SP 17 pdr guns and a variety of tanks.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Yea, all kinds of bad things and confusion happen when you put a turret on an SP Gun and forget it is not tank or when you put a SP gun in a tank unit and think it is one.

[Kingfish]

In close in terrain, it is far easier to get on a flank on an enemy position than open terrain.

Not if the terrain restricts the opponent's ability to execute the flanking maneuver, which is what the bocage tended to do with regards to allied armor.