Unserviceable Lorries - Jul - Sep 44

[Simon_C]

Dear Tom

I have quite alot of stuff actually - a letter from Commanding Officer, all of my GF's original D-Day german truck/half-track identification photos (about 30) and all of his service record, pay book, etc. I am interested to know more about 39 GT Coy as I understand they were involved early on D-DAY. Perhaps we can take it off line? my email is slcollinson@yahoo.co.uk. Although I am in Singapore, not UK.

Regards
Simon

[Simon_C]

I forgot also to say thank you for the information - can we talk via email? I can share anything of interest to others via the forum later?

regards
Simon

[Tom from Cornwall]

More information that suggests Austin 3-ton defects were not seen as critical in Oct 44:

DME stressed that quick output was the Order of the Day without too much stress on the final standards. I advised DME that we had relaxed the standards on B Vehicles but not on Tanks where we were working to completion standards which had been agreed with AFV Servicing Units. Even on B Vehicles quick output conflicts with the priorities laid down. Priority equipt e.g. Lorries 6-ton Rigid G.S., Cars Recce, Jeeps, is never released by units except when worked to its limit or if it has been badly smashed in an accident.

This is from WO171/2835 - war diary of 22 Advanced Base Workshop which was at this time working on 50 Austin 3-tonners - if the Austin defects were affecting 21 Army Group logisitics in a major way I would expect that repair of 3-tonners would have been mentioned as a priority.

Regards

Tom

[phylo_roadking]

Well, Tom...

Priority equipt e.g. Lorries 6-ton Rigid G.S., Cars Recce, Jeeps...

....THIS might also argue that there's a hitherto unacknowledged SIX-ton lorry issue!!!

[Aber]

No, looks like just a shortage of vehicles:

21 Army Group conference on 27 Apr 44:

"Owing to 6-ton and 10-ton Rigid G.S. vehicles being in short supply, a re-organisation of vehicle holdings in certain RASC units in 21 Army Group is necessary. It has therefore been decided that the following policy will be adopted immediately.
1. (a) All Heavy and Medium Regt Pls RASC will be equipped temporarily with 3-ton GS vehicles only.
(b) Army Transport Coys (four Pl) to be temporarily equipped with one Pl 6-ton rigid vehicles in lieu of 2 Pl 6-ton.
(c) The necessary 2nd line coys RASC will be completed with rigid 6-ton vehicles.
2. In order to effect the above policy without delay all 6-ton rigid vehicles will be withdrawn from HAA, LAA and Med Regt Pls, and 6-ton GT Coys in order to equip units in para 1 (b) (c). These transfers will be carried out under the orders of DST 21 Army Group."

[phylo_roadking]

Well, a "shortage" is still an "issue"...but at least it explains why they ALSO had repair priority

[Tom from Cornwall]

As for the distribution of the offending Austin 4 x 4 3-tonners and what that meant for the effect of the defects:

WO171/2482 - 524 Coy RASC (50 Inf Div) war diary:

14 May 1944
0830 Capt. L.G. PERRY with 94 Dvrs to CURBRIDGE to collect prewaterpoofed 4x4 Austin 3 ton vehs. Vehs to return to this location pending distribution instructions.

Later in the month, 524 Coy seems to have collected 77 vehs for itself - which makes me think that all of the 50 Division units were issued with pre-waterproofed Austins, although I will do a little more digging in war diaries to check further.

Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, this RASC Coy did not move to France until mid-July - which seems to show that the somewhat constrained nature of the initial beachhead limited the amount of transport the assault units actually needed. I will try to find out whether this delay was part of original plan or they were delayed due to limited expansion of L of C routes in June 44.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hmm,

5 Coy RASC (Armd Bde) which was under command 4th Armd Bde for D-Day, was equipped with 3-ton Austins and happily water-proofing them in May 1944 when suddenly they were ordered to go off and draw replacement Ford 3-ton 4x4 lorries (Source: Wo171/2346). Is this a hint that the Austin "problem" had been identified before D Day? Or just typical services organisation!

Off to Kew next week for another RASC trawl - am also planning to look in the file for the War Office "Warlike Stores" branch which seem to have been involved with lorry re-supply.

Cheers

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

From WO165/110 - Director of Warlike Stores war diary for May 1944

The 1,400 Austin vehicles which had to be reworked at the contrctors factory have been covered within the time required and the whole have been redistributed to VRDs and sub-VRDs.

This seems to be another source that suggests that there were 1,400 pre-waterproofed Austins prepared for 21 Army Group assault formations whose waterproofing was subsequently found to be defective and required re-working. This must explain why several units handed in Austin 3-ton vehicles in May 1944 and were issued with alternative 3-ton 4x4 vehicles. It also suggests that 21 Army Group was allocated a total of 1,400 Austin 3-ton 4x4's.

Curious that the 1,400 number was then repeated by the Admin History of 21 Army Group. Does this indicate that many of the infamous 1,400 were not yet in fact issued to units but still held in reserve in VRD? And how come we have a record of 3,000 being frozen in VRDs in Dec 44?

Regards

Tom

[phylo_roadking]

And how come we have a record of 3,000 being frozen in VRDs in Dec 44?

Tom - simple; it depends on HOW this sentence is read...

The 1,400 Austin vehicles which had to be reworked at the contrctors factory ...

Should the emphasis be perhaps HERE....

The 1,400 Austin vehicles which had to be reworked at the contrctors factory...

...thus meaning that there were ~1,600 others "reworked" - somewhere else???

That's perhaps the problem with written accounts - you can't "hear" the emphasis that was in the writer's mind when he was putting his thoughts down in print....

[Tom from Cornwall]

Phylo,

I think elsewhere I have read that 1,400 Austins were specifically waterproofed for D-Day which suggests that the other 1,600 were in the normal reserve vehicle supply chain.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Phylo,

You asked a while ago whether the pre-waterproofed 4x4 Austins were being issued in May 44 as replacements or as special "assault" vehicles, I think I can show that at least in some cases it was the latter.

I found confirmation in the WD of 90 Coy RASC (Armd Bde) attached to 27 Armd Bde that its three 3-ton platoons were meant to be equipped with 4 x 2 3-ton vehicles, however, when space became available for a platoon to land on the 1st tide it was re-equipped with Austin 4x4s.

18 May 1944
33 Bedford 3-ton vehicles 4 x 2 of “C” Platoon exchanged for 33 Austin 3-ton vehicles 4 x 4 pre-waterproofed.

Which also seems to suggest that if or when those Austins broke-down/were destroyed by enemy action/drowned there were spare vehicles around to replace them.

Regards

Tom

[phylo_roadking]

I found confirmation in the WD of 90 Coy RASC (Armd Bde) attached to 27 Armd Bde that its three 3-ton platoons were meant to be equipped with 4 x 2 3-ton vehicles, however, when space became available for a platoon to land on the 1st tide it was re-equipped with Austin 4x4s.

18 May 1944
33 Bedford 3-ton vehicles 4 x 2 of “C” Platoon exchanged for 33 Austin 3-ton vehicles 4 x 4 pre-waterproofed.

Which also seems to suggest that if or when those Austins broke-down/were destroyed by enemy action/drowned there were spare vehicles around to replace them

Tom, that's especially interesting...

...but DOES beg a couple more questions! Doesn't it always?

1/ If this was the case...why all the fuss about the "Austin issue"? Why not draw from reserves ASAP? They were sitting there in park, after all - it shouldn't have taken THAT long, surely, once the issue materialised...

2/ if these were intended as "special assault vehicles"...why no plans to swap back afterwards?

...and of course...

3/ Any chance that the waterproofing regime itself caused heavier wear/overheating??? (Poor cooling, extra weight, lube changes made awkward, etc. ...) Were the Austins post-D-Day pressed into a service that they should maybe have been re-(de-?)converted for?

{ In my mind, despite the issues with the octane level of MT pool changing, with the issues of batches of bad valves or piston rings, with the issues of superloading....I STILL have a problem with the fact that the Austin K5 gave such sterling service in the Western Desert - killer of period motor vehicles - for two years...and yet "so many" are supposed to have failed in France in 1944? }

[Tom from Cornwall]

Phylo,

1/ If this was the case...why all the fuss about the "Austin issue"? Why not draw from reserves ASAP? They were sitting there in park, after all - it shouldn't have taken THAT long, surely, once the issue materialised...

Which if you go back to page 1 of the thread is my question 3!

"3. Given that there were at least 1700 'B' vehicles in 21 Army group's GHQ reserve on 1 Sep 44, has the significance of these defective vehicles been blown out of proportion."

2/ if these were intended as "special assault vehicles"...why no plans to swap back afterwards?

I have seen tantalising clues about the scale of vehicle losses expected to be suffered by the assault units and references to spare vehicles for just this eventuality, i.e. I think there was a plan to replace losses but not necessarily swap back from 4x4 to 4x2 unless necessary.

3/ Any chance that the waterproofing regime itself caused heavier wear/overheating??? (Poor cooling, extra weight, lube changes made awkward, etc. ...) Were the Austins post-D-Day pressed into a service that they should maybe have been re-(de-?)converted for?

Possibly, but then why freeze the other 1,600 that weren't waterproofed?

I STILL have a problem with the fact that the Austin K5 gave such sterling service in the Western Desert - killer of period motor vehicles - for two years...and yet "so many" are supposed to have failed in France in 1944? }

And surely there were Austin K5's being used at this period in other theatres of war, for example Italy.

It is certainly a curious issue, and certainly not one that has been helped by the use made by historians of either the intial comment in 21st Admin History or Chester Wilmot's subsequent use of the information.

Regards

Tom

[phylo_roadking]

Possibly, but then why freeze the other 1,600 that weren't waterproofed?

Ah..weren't they? You're assuming that at present...

...which suggests that the other 1,600 were in the normal reserve vehicle supply chain.

...but remember my caveat from just before...

Should the emphasis be perhaps HERE....

The 1,400 Austin vehicles which had to be reworked at the contrctors factory...

...thus meaning that there were ~1,600 others "reworked" - somewhere else???

Maybe we should (if possible) find out exactly where those were, and who had waterproofed them...if at all.

They COULD, after all...

I have seen tantalising clues about the scale of vehicle losses expected to be suffered by the assault units and references to spare vehicles for just this eventuality

....have been waterproofed and been kept in park for THIS eventuality?

It increasingly looks as if....like my threads here and on ww2talk some time ago about Vickers Light MkVICs...you'll end up having to account for them all, and work out what the real problem(s) was/were by confirming what it wasn't!