Order of Battle 7 Support Group 17 Nov 41

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

As promised in another thread, here is the OOB of 7 Sp Gp as ordered at the start of Op Crusader taken from the WD of 3 RHA (WO169/1428):

Appendix “A” to 7 Sp Gp O.O. No.1 dated 16 Nov 41
ORDER OF BATTLE 7 SP GP
(As at 1800 hrs 17 Nov 41)
(This cancels Appdx “A” to 7 Sp Gp O.O. No. 35)
1. Under Comd 7 Armd Bde.
“D” Bty, 102 (N.H.) R.H.A. less one tp (One tp suballotted to 4 S.A. Armd Car Regt)
“A” Coy, 2/R.B.

2. Under Comd 22 Armd Bde
One tp “D” Bty, 102 (NH) R.H.A.
“B” Coy, 1/K.R.R.C.

3. Under Comd 11 H
Comd. Major the Visct GARMOYLE.
“M” Bty 3 R.H.A. less one tp (Includes one tp 11H)
203 Bty, 51 Fd Regt R.A.
One tp 3 Bty, 1 Lt A.A. Regt R.A.
“B” Coy, 2/R.B.
Det 4 Fd Sqn, R.E.
Det 151 Lt Fd Amb.
(This coln may rejoin 7 Sp Gp at any moment and will then come under comd 2/R.B.)

4. 1/K.R.R.C. Coln
Comd. Lt-Col S.F.C. De SALLIS, D.S.O., 1/K.R.R.C.
3/R.H.A. less one Bty and one Tp.
60 Fd Regt R.A. less one Bty plus one tp.
One tp 2 Bty, 1 Lt A.A. Regt R.A.
1/K.R.R.C. less one coy.
Det 4 Fd Sqn R.E.

5. 2/R.B. Coln. (Reserve)
Comd. Lt-Col A.S.G. DOUGLAS, O.B.E., 2/R.B.
One tp “J” Bty, 3/R.H.A.
One Bty, 60 Fd Regt R.A. less one tp
One tp 2 Bty, 1 Lt A.A. Regt R.A.
One coy 2/R.B.

6. Adv H.Q. 7 Sp Gp
One sec, “M” Bty 3/R.H.A.
One tp, 2 Bty, 1 Lt A.A. Regt R.A.
One pl, 2/R.B.
One sec, 151 Lt Fd Amb

7. Rear H.Q. and “B” Ech Gp
Rear H.Q. 7 Sp Gp
One sec “M” Bty, 3/R.H.A.
One tp 4 Fd Sqn R.E. less two Dets
One coy 2/R.B. less one Pl
2 Bty, 1 Lt A.A. Regt less three tps.
151 Lt Fd Amb less one sec and one det
“B” Ech incl Rear H.Q. all units
7 Sp Gp L.R.S. O.F.P. and Rec Sec

8. Amn Pt
Comd 2/Lt HAIG (Attd 60 Fd Regt R.A.)
W/T Set and R.A.S.C. Amn vehicles

Regards

Tom

[dor1941]

Thanks for that.

An interesting arrangement of columns-it seems the British understood the practical usefulness of such combined-arms groups, but when larger formations of mixed arms were assembled there sometimes seemed to be some innate problem which resulted in a lack of cooperation within them. Perhaps a lack of a coherent doctrine which would require the different arms to train together?

In Crusader it appears that generally the infantry, artillery and the slow infantry tanks-Matildas and Valentines-did work well together, but the brigades of cruiser tanks seemed to be immune to the notion of combined-arms battle. The fact that only tiny elements of 7th Support Group's artillery and infantry are shown here as "under command" of 7th Armoured Division's two brigades (7th and 22nd) suggests that the British armour intentionally sought out the Axis tank formations with a minimal amount of artillery and infantry in direct support, and that there was no actual cooperation between the arms.

David R

[Gary Kennedy]

Thanks for posting that Tom, just wondering if I can clarify a few details re the RA units?

I think from the earlier thread on 18-prs that both 3 RHA and 102 were both Atk Regts, rather than Field Arty? The 25-prs were then from 60 Fd Regt and a single Bty of 51 Fd Regt rather than 4 RHA. I'm sure it's a blindingly simple answer but where was 4 RHA of 7 Sp Gp deployed at this time?

If my understanding is correct then the Fmn fielded a single Atk Regt, plus an Atk Bty (total 48 guns); a single 25-pr Regt, plus a Bty (total 32 guns); and a single LAA Bty plus a Tp (total 16 guns)?

7 Armd Bde fielded its (presumably) three Armd Regts, one 2-pr Atk Tp (4 guns) and one Motor Coy (with 4 SA Armd C Regt having a second 4 gun 2-pr Atk Tp), and no supporting 25-prs. Likewise 22 Armd Bde had its (again presumably) three Armd Regts, a single 2-pr Atk Tp (4 guns) and a single Motor Coy.

The 11 H group was then built around the Hussars Armd C Regt, supported by two 2-pr Atk Tps (each 4 guns), one Bty of 25-prs (8 guns), one Tp of 40-mm LAA guns (4 guns) and a Motor Coy, plus a Det of RE.

The 1 KRRC Coln was built around a Motor Bn (less the Coy with 22 Armd Bde), and supported by a Fd Regt (less one Tp) (total 20 guns), 1 full Bty and two Tps of 2-pr Atk guns (total 20 guns), one Tp of 40-mm LAA guns (4 guns) and a Det of RE.

The RB Coln consisted of a single Motor Coy, plus a Tp of 2-pr Atk guns (4 guns), a Tp of 25-prs (4 guns) and a Tp of 40-mm Bofors (4 guns).

That left Sp Gp itself with a single 2-pr Sec (2 guns), a single 40-mm LAA Tp (4 guns) and a single Motor Pl of 2 RB in the Adv HQ, with Rear HQ having another 2-pr Sec (2 guns), the balance of the 2 RB Motor Coy, a Tp of RE (less two Dets) and a LAA Bty HQ.

If that's anywhere near correct, then the Armd Bdes were very 'tank-centric', with the bare minimum of a single Motor Coy, backed by a 2-pr Atk Tp, to support all the Armd Regts, rather than a Motor Bn proper. The Recce Gp looks to have had a good mix of supporting arms, with Inf, Fd Arty, Atk and LAA guns, plus Engrs. The KRRC Coln, providing the main Inf element, had the strongest Arty component, and even the RB Coln had a good mixture of sp.

The 'beefing up' of the RA element of the Armd Div of 1941 does indicate a recognition that the allotment of 24 x 25-prs and 36 x 2-prs was insufficient when grouping units in this manner. It does make you wonder though whether sub-alloting a Tp of four 25-prs to the RB Coln was worthwhile, given it meant the single Fd Regt couldn't bring all its guns to bear as a unit.

Thanks again for that Tom, gave the brain a bit of a workout! One thing that does confuse me is the ref to 102 RHA, as there doesn't appear to have been one -

http://www.ra39-45.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk ... index.html

Did that refer to 102 Atk Regt (Northumberland Hussars)?

http://www.ra39-45.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/atk/page59.html

Cheers,

Gary

[Clive Mortimore]

Thanks again for that Tom, gave the brain a bit of a workout! One thing that does confuse me is the ref to 102 RHA, as there doesn't appear to have been one -

http://www.ra39-45.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk ... index.html

Did that refer to 102 Atk Regt (Northumberland Hussars)?

http://www.ra39-45.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/atk/page59.html

Cheers,

Gary

Hi Gary

Could there have been an error by the person entering the information?
102 Atk Regt (Northumberland Hussars) falls into the numbering squence for some other converted Yeomany regiments who were at first given the title 1XX Fld Regt RHA only later to be rename 1XX Fld Regt RA, so could the Northumberland Hussars at first been allocated RHA title which through time has been lost/forgotten? Or was the missnaming done because other anti tank units at the time were Royal Horse Artillery, 3 RHA and 106 RHA (Lancashire Yeomanry)(TA).

Clive

[dor1941]

I think from the earlier thread on 18-prs that both 3 RHA and 102 were both Atk Regts, rather than Field Arty? The 25-prs were then from 60 Fd Regt and a single Bty of 51 Fd Regt rather than 4 RHA. I'm sure it's a blindingly simple answer but where was 4 RHA of 7 Sp Gp deployed at this time?

According to the South African OH for Crusader, the 4th R.H.A. (Field) Regiment had twenty-four 25-pdrs in three batteries, with two batteries in the 7th Armd Bde and one in the 22nd Armd Bde.

I primarily used that source for my list of 30th Corps (post of 03 Sep 2011, "Crusader OOB" in the AHF WW2 in Africa & the Med section). 4th Armd Bde Grp was not part of 7th Armd Div at the start of Crusader and had a full motor bn (2nd Scots Guards) as well as 2nd R.H.A. (Field) Regt and two of the three batteries of 102nd Atk Regt.

I vaguely remember a source (possibly "British Artillery in World War 2", nigelef.tripod.com ?) that mentioned an effort was made in 1941 to make the 102nd Atk Regt R.A. a R.H.A. unit, but it failed to be officially sanctioned as such.

David R

[Tom from Cornwall]

Gents,

Re 102nd (N.H.) being titled R.H.A. I've had a look at the original and that is definitely what it says. I'm pretty sure that I have seen references elsewhere about this time to 102nd R.H.A. and think it is highly likely a local attempt to join a "classier" section of the Royal Artillery more in keeping with their Yeomanry background!!

Re 4th RHA - definitely equipped with 25 pdrs and according to their WD (WO169/1429):

1 – 16 November 1944
Regt remained split – C Bty under Comd 22 Armd Bde, F Bty under comd 7 Armd Bde, DD Bty with “Archie” Coln.
Note: C Bty War Diary appears later owing to separation of this Bty from Regt.

16 November 1941
“Archie” Coln ceased to exist and 4 RHA less C Bty moved to 7 Armd Bde area under comd 7 Armd Bde. On this day orders were received for the long-awaited offensive. The Regt was up to strength in officers and men, but far from completely equipped and had many vehicles which were not battle-worthy and for which replacements had been promised but not received. The majority of the vehicles were still those issued in a great hurry to the Regt in April at BENI YUSEF and had seen a lot of service before then.

17 November 1941
[No entry]

18 November 1941
The advance began. “G” Tp was sent in support of the S.A. Armd Car Regt working on front of 7 Armd Bde. “F” Bty less “G” Tp with one coy 2 RB under comd were formed in “Withers” Coln to be ready if called upon. The advance was slow and uneventful and the night was spent at HAGFET-EL-GABR.

So it would seem that the difference was that 4 RHA was under command 7 Armoured Brigade as a whole unit (rather than the parts of units mentioned above) and therefore part of that unit and not the Support Group as I'd always assumed. Does that sound reasonable from the strange ways of the British Army and it's "in support/under comd" jargon?

Gary,

I'll try to spend a bit of time working out whether your OOB is correct over the next week or so, but we need to add the 4th RHA units to it ('C' Bty, 4 RHA u/c 22 Armd bde, 4 RHA (less one Bty) under comd 7 Armd bde).

Interesting points about 4th Armoured Brigade - I'll try to get a look at the WD of their attached arty next time I'm at Kew - incidentally I copied the WD of 22 Armoured Brigade Recovery section yesterday which should keep me busy for a while as it was written in typical "doctor's handwriting". Anyone would think they were too busy to worry about typing up the blooming thing!

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

Thanks for that.

An interesting arrangement of columns-it seems the British understood the practical usefulness of such combined-arms groups, but when larger formations of mixed arms were assembled there sometimes seemed to be some innate problem which resulted in a lack of cooperation within them. Perhaps a lack of a coherent doctrine which would require the different arms to train together?

The issue with these columns is however that they were much too small to have an effect on the battlefield. They were too weak to do anything but fall on unsupported transport units. Doctrinally they were also a failure. By the end of CRUSADER the British command decided to move to mixed Brigade groups, based on the experience. That was a better size, but too inflexible.

Your point about the inability of achieving true combined arms is quite correct.

7th Armoured Division's two brigades (7th and 22nd)

As for 4 Armoured Brigade, I know there are forever discussions who it was under, just as in the run-up to CRUSADER, but Operation Order No. 9 of 7 Armoured Division of 15 November 41, items 10, 11, are very clear that 4 Armoured Brigade was under 7 Armoured Division. It was also on the division's radio net.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Some more OOB details this time from WO 169/1439 - "J" Bty 3 RHA:

The advance to the wire started at dusk on the 17th Nov, the battery being allotted to the R.B’s and the 60th Fld. Regt R.A. with a troop in reserve to guard H.Q. Support Group 7th Arm’d Divn.
The battery strength on crossing the wire into Libya was 6 Officers and 121 O.R’s and 12 2 Pdr A.Tk Guns on new 3 Ton Chev. Portees.

Regards

Tom

[dor1941]

7th Armoured Division's two brigades (7th and 22nd)

As for 4 Armoured Brigade, I know there are forever discussions who it was under, just as in the run-up to CRUSADER, but Operation Order No. 9 of 7 Armoured Division of 15 November 41, items 10, 11, are very clear that 4 Armoured Brigade was under 7 Armoured Division. It was also on the division's radio net.

It is certainly true that Gott directed the operations of all three armoured brigades during most of Crusader, but we should note that the establishment of a British armoured division was 6 tank battalions, not nine, and that the planners of this offensive initially envisioned a special role for 4th Brigade-that is, to provide a connecting link between 30th and 13th Corps. In fact, Carver (Tobruk, p. 35) states the brigade was originally planned by Cunningham to be under the command of 13th Corps, not the 30th.
The final Plan was to concentrate the three brigades of cruiser tanks (7th, 22nd and 4th) around Gabr Saleh which was expected to provoke an immediate counterattack by Rommel. However, Rommel was still hyperfocused on his plan to attack Tobruk on Nov 21 and the first reports of a British advance were believed to be a feint. On the evening of Nov 18 Rommel only authorized Cruewell of D.A.K. to send Kampfgruppe Stephen (the reinforced Panzer-Regiment 5) to Gabr Saleh in order to support the German reconnaissance units, which reported they were being attacked by 200 tanks.
However, the concentration of the three brigades of 30th Corps (nearly 500 tanks) at Gabr Saleh had been achieved by Nov 18 but had not brought the expected German response. Cunningham (GOC Eighth Army) impatiently then ordered Norrie (30th Corps) to send Gott (7th Armoured Div) directly to Sidi Rezegh on the evening of the 18th, where it would be in a position to link up with the Tobruk garrison. However, the 4th Armoured Brigade was to remain at Gabr Saleh.
The result of all this was that 4th Armd Bde alone (with only two of its battalions instead of three) fought the reinforced Panzer-Regiment 5 at Gabr Saleh on the afternoon of Nov 19, and 23 British M.3 Stuart tanks were lost, as opposed to seven German tanks.
This should make it clear that 4th Armoured Brigade began the Crusader offensive as a independent formation of 30th Corps, and that its subordination to Gott was at the discretion of Norrie (GOC 30th Corps)-any Order of Battle listing the brigade under Gott's division on November 17th 1941 would clearly be incorrect.
David R

[Urmel]

Hi David

You need to take that up with Gott, it's his report. As I said, the case is a bit less clear than it appears from your post. I am aware of the intricacies and the special role. But on the other hand, the Brigade was on the radio net, and Gott clearly saw it as his tank force, judging by the way he treated it in his report.

[Urmel]

This should make it clear that 4th Armoured Brigade began the Crusader offensive as a independent formation of 30th Corps, and that its subordination to Gott was at the discretion of Norrie (GOC 30th Corps)-any Order of Battle listing the brigade under Gott's division on November 17th 1941 would clearly be incorrect.
David R

Hi David

Just such an order of battle can be found in the war diary of 7 Armoured Brigade, however, dated 10 November 1941. It is Appendix D to 7 Armoured Brigade Operation Order No. 17.

As an aside, I would not get too hung up about how many armoured regiments a division was supposed to have. I don't think there were set rules for this kind of thing in the desert at this point. For example, when 1 Armoured Division was taken to the cleaners in January 42, it had only 3 armoured regiments, not the six it should have had.

[dor1941]

Hi David
You need to take that up with Gott, it's his report. As I said, the case is a bit less clear than it appears from your post. I am aware of the intricacies and the special role. But on the other hand, the Brigade was on the radio net, and Gott clearly saw it as his tank force, judging by the way he treated it in his report.

I certainly agree that Gott was directing the activities of 4th Armd Bde from the beginning of Crusader, and it is logical that in the interest of coordinating the operations of the three armoured brigades Gott was in the best position to accomplish this. Clearly, Gott effectively failed to do this, and he was largely responsible for the dispersion of the British armour and their consequent defeat in detail by the D.A.K. For example, the S.A. OH states that Gott decided to launch 22nd Armd Bde at the Divisione Ariete at Bir el Gubi without consulting his corps commander!-at the time when his whole division had been ordered to advance to Sidi Rezegh.
I must respectfully contend that regardless of what is in Gott's reports, the force structure specified by the planners of Operation Crusader-and approved by Cunningham-should dictate how Eighth Army's correct Order of Battle should be presented. The intention of the planners, not the will of Gott (nor any allowance given to him by his superior Norrie) should be of greater importance here in establishing the initial structure of Eighth Army on Nov 17th, 1941.

David R

[Urmel]

Hi David

As I said, it is not just the report, but also the official document in 7 Armoured Brigade Operations Order, which is a bit more relevant. Also, 4 Armoured Brigade was fully integrated in the comms system of 7 Armoured Division.

Regardless of the intent, I think it is important to be clear then that the intended structure and the actual structure differed, and this had implications for the battle.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi David,

I must respectfully contend that regardless of what is in Gott's reports, the force structure specified by the planners of Operation Crusader-and approved by Cunningham-should dictate how Eighth Army's correct Order of Battle should be presented. The intention of the planners, not the will of Gott (nor any allowance given to him by his superior Norrie) should be of greater importance here in establishing the initial structure of Eighth Army on Nov 17th, 1941.

Is this based on a primary source or a secondary source? Who were the "planners" you mention? I'm confused - shouldn't the plan have been worked up by Cunningham as the Army Commander, is that who you mean?

Regards

Tom

[dor1941]

Regardless of the intent, I think it is important to be clear then that the intended structure and the actual structure differed, and this had implications for the battle.

The Order of Battle I refer to was the preliminary force structure adopted by Eighth Army at the start of Crusader, and what the planners intended was the actual structure on Nov 17, 1941. Of course, some changes to a formation or unit would inevitably occur with ongoing operations. However, I see an OOB as an initial static snapshot, not the constantly revised structure which battle necessitates.

David R