British Army at home September 1940

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phylo_roadking
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#721

Post by phylo_roadking » 22 Jul 2014, 02:22

On the subject of timing, by the way: both sides practised "daylight saving time" and it was 1 hour earlier in Britain, if I'm not mistaken, so a landing planned by the Germans at 06h00 would be 05h00 British time.

Not exactly. The British were on Double Summer Time (GMT+2), but the Germans were on Berlin Daylight Savings Time (GMT+2), so it all worked out nicely.

Are you sure about that? I have a book about the cross-channel guns (Hans Sakkers and Marc Machielse, Artillerieduel der Fernkampfgeschütze am Pas de Calais 1940-1944), and it seems that in Sept. 1940 the British consistently reported the same events (eg start of shelling) as being one hour earlier than in German reports. I may be wrong of course.

Well, the British were certainly on DBST and German field forces used Berlin Time (we did quite an investigation on the matter when putting together the Kursk Data Base) and the Germans followed the Summer Time routine during the war in order to extend daylight working hours, so...
As late as Kursk they were on Double Summertime in the UK ok....but IIRC it didn't happen until 1941...

So BOTH of you are correct! The timings were an hour astray in 1940, yes - but by 1941 and on to the end of the way the two timings then balanced out ;)
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#722

Post by phylo_roadking » 22 Jul 2014, 02:29

For a pessimistic assessment of the German chances of getting across, a couple of pages from Duncan Grinnell-Milne, Silent Victory (1958).
The barge fleet would be moving a bit faster than he assumes, but it would indeed be a problem that on the British side all the normal aids to navigation (lighthouses, lightships, harbour lights, buoys ...) would be absent, or deliberately misplaced. Lighthouses on the French side would be in operation for the occasion.
The Channel was not entirely dark ;) The "Swept War Channel" along the British Coast from the Thames Estuary round to the Western Approaches....and north along the North Sea Coast...was for the duration of the war marked out by a series of lit buoys every five miles.

As for other navigational beacons and markers being misplaced - well, noone managed to run ashore on the Goodwin Sands despite the MANY cross-Channel destroyer and coastal craft sorties by BOTH sides during the war, so the Goodwin Sands Lightship for one can't have been deliberately misplaced! Or on any other "obstacles to navigation" in the Narrows or elsewhere...

I'll need to check, but I've a feeling that removing or displacing navigational aids at sea may have been against the Hague Conventions...as well as being bloody dangerous for your OWN side!
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#723

Post by RichTO90 » 22 Jul 2014, 02:49

phylo_roadking wrote:As late as Kursk they were on Double Summertime in the UK ok....but IIRC it didn't happen until 1941...
Yes, misreading on my part - the clocks weren't set forward at the end of September in 1940, so "Double Summer Time" began the following summer. In the summer of 1940 British and German times were off by an hour.

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#724

Post by RichTO90 » 22 Jul 2014, 03:29

phylo_roadking wrote:No, what I'm saying is that the rest of the Mark VIB was grossly vulnerable to even S.m.K steel-cored ammunition, let alone S.m.K.H....but the couple of times that one poster has mentioned its armour as being "up to 14mm" doesn't adequately emphasise how weak the rest of the "armoured perambulator" was...
And the fact that the Panther was well nigh impenetrable to 99% of the projectiles it encountered from the frontal aspect (and, ye, I do in fact know about shot traps, mantlet vulnerabilities and so on) doesn't adequately emphasize just how deathly vulnerable it was to flank and rear shots too.
And for the record - that's ALL I'm saying; so please don't apply that answer to any other flight of fancy about Panthers, or whatever you think I should be referring to...
I understand perfectly what you're saying, which is perfectly true. It also, very simply, applies to virtually all armored vehicles.
No; and sadly the site rules don't permit me to call that statement of yours for what it is - given that I've already noted perfectly clearly that my reply...
Perhaps it would help if you could be bothered to attribute who said what in your carefully clipped quotes. I did not say:
However, in a fight against enemy troops on foot and without effective AT weapons, when regarded as a machine gun carrier they would have certain advantages when used intelligently, such as firepower, mobility, protection (up to 14 mm armour), and the capacity to carry more ammunition than a squad of soldiers
Someone else did. What YOU SAID was that the OTHER POSTER claimed invulnerability for the Mark VIB Light Tank. That is not what he said.

Sadly, the site rules also don't permit me to call your habitual tactic of not referencing who made the quote you have carefully snipped and added onto another posters quote for what it is. I just noticed today you pulled that slight of hand with the Churchill reference at Dieppe as well. Please don't do it; at the least it is annoying and at the worst it is deliberately deceitful.
I'll deal with the Crete issue before moving on to other issues...
Oh, good.
I'll be coming back to this, for it applies directly to TWO of my next points...
Any time now.
...hastily conceived; on the morning of the 20th as the squadron observed the Germans beginning to land they scrambled for their tanks - and Farran found himself with one of the squadron's gunners in his tank's driving seat!
Yes...and Matilda's were hastily crewed at Retimo by fitters and odd Aussies and/or New Zealanders.
His tank shed its track immediately after the incident when he accidently shot and wounded a Cretan woman...whom he shot at thinking she was a German in a greatcoat while under MG fire from a couple of concealed MGs. His "driver" was apparently "so excited by it all" that when Farran ordered him to turn round he pulled the tiller too hard to one side!
Yes. How does that affect my more abbreviated version? He also shot at Germans herding wounded PW as well as surrendering Germans...and then later made a mess of things in Palestine. What does that have to do with your claim that another poster said the Vickers was invulnerable?
To be fair - and this has some bearing on the grenade statement above - a lot more happened to Farran's tank at that point than just getting tangled in barbed wire! Just after getting free his tank was subjected to a "shower of grenades" rolling off the side of the tank but "causing no damage"...which as Farran later admits himself was not the case...
...or they may have been the mortar bombs, which with along with machine gun fire was preventing his advance up the road...at least according to the New Zealand history. In either case, grenades, mortars, or simply wire...it had an affect the next day.
I'm not sure this is the case; during his briefng by Brigadier Hergest for that day's action, he was told the captured Bofors were near Maleme village - but he encountered the "antitank guns" right in the village square, hidden in the churchyard.

It's just after this encounter that he took his unfortunate detour through a stand of bamboo - quite common on Crete - to hide from a posse of Bf109s that attacked the two surviving tanks...at which point one of his bogey wheels collapsed...which he does put down partly to the barbed wire encounter - but ALSO says...

"It collapsed as though it had been made of cardboard, having also been damaged by a grenade[/b], and there were were as immobile as the Rock of Gibraltar."

Remember the "shower of grenades"?
Or mortar shells. Either way, there was a gun near Pirgos that Farran thought could punch holes in his tank...and that was what he was withdrawing from. The "shower of grenades" - or mortar shells - was the day before.
Vickers Light bogey wheels are relatively strong steel forgings about five to six inches wide, and the same as those used on Bren Gun Carriers, and with a solid rubber "tyre" on them. I don't see how barbed wire could actually damage one that much - but a "shower of grenades"? ;)
Tetrach Light Tank? Normandy? Wire?
To be fair - Farran's description of the "fatal blow" was...
Farran's tank wasn't knocked out by antitank rifle fire....the crew was knocked out by something - and the injured driver drove the tank off the road into the ditch where it was never to to be recovered. Same as the loss the day before. From cover, over the next few hours, Farran THEN watched antitank rifle fire drill holes in it!
Sure...it could easily have been an AT gun as well...or an AT rifle. He never mentions "grenades" or "mortar rounds" in this case though. OTOH, he describes the AT rifle turning his tank into a colander afterwards...so it carefully held fire to allow the "grenade" to be used first?
From the description of the initial hit - and possibly the KOH war diary, I'll have to check sometime - Beevor put this hit down to an "anti tank grenade".
Or, from the description, it could have been a bolt from Zeus. Thanks for bringing Beevor into this by the way.
I'd also note that your list doesn't make any distinction between actual antitank rifles - the PzB 38 and 39 - and plain old K98s firing S.m.K.H....
Perhaps because I don't care? Either one will work, although I don't believe S.m.K. or S.m.K.H. was an issue to infantry - I'll see what I can find from the German ammunition issue lists.
...not least to Hergests' face! "Armoured perambulators" was Farran's term for the Mark VIB in that conversation!
Yup.
Hopefully however, now that you'd said it too, Knouterer will take the point on board and leave aside his idea that the NewZealanders' Divisional Cavalry would use theirs as "machine gun carriers" supporting an infantry attack...which is where I came in.
Um, just because it wasn't a good idea doesn't mean that it wouldn't be done...as Farran versus Hargest demonstrates. So Knouterer's "idea" seems fairly sound to me? :lol:

BTW, what ever happened to you coming back to the GG-P40 knocking out tanks on Crete? You have proof of that? You may have a SINGLE instance - assuming Farran's "shower of grenades" is more correct than the New Zealand history's "mortars"...or TWO instances, assuming that Farran's bolt from the blue in Galatas wasn't Zeus. However that doesn't create a "rule" that Vickers light tanks automatically fall apart in "showers of stick grenades." :lol:

BTW, did you note the most critical problem WRT Farran's foray into Galatas? He, and the other tank left in his troop, were ALL ALONE. In a village - call it an "urban area". No infantry. No artillery or mortar support. No machine gun company providing any covering fires. No Bren carriers scouting. No I Tanks supporting his recce.

Yup. Exactly like Milforce. :lol:

[edited to correct quote formatting]
Last edited by RichTO90 on 22 Jul 2014, 13:39, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#725

Post by sitalkes » 22 Jul 2014, 05:40

phylo_roadking wrote:I'll need to check, but I've a feeling that removing or displacing navigational aids at sea may have been against the Hague Conventions...as well as being bloody dangerous for your OWN side!
Brian Lavery (We Shall fight on the Beaches) says that the Admiralty continued to supply regular updates about changes to navigational hazards and aids to neutral countries during the war, and the Germans found it easy to get hold of their own copies of the publication.

By the way, this interesting article about the RN's support for the fledgeling Free French Navy seems to say that few if any of the Free French ships in British ports in September 1940 would have had crews or been usable: http://www.britishnavalhistory.com/ambi ... 1940-1941/

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#726

Post by Knouterer » 22 Jul 2014, 10:56

IIRC lights were set up at Cuckmere Haven to simulate the harbour of Newhaven a few miles to the west, but this was more to mislead German bombers than vessels at sea I believe.

Re the Free French navy, it was certainly in some disarray, very small and not much of a fighting force. One or two French sailors of ships in British ports were even shot when they resisted RN boarding parties seizing their ships early July.
However, the article does not mention the torpilleurs of the Melpomène class - comparable to the German Torpedoboote - six of which were at Portsmouth in September. It seems that only one was manned by FF sailors, one by Dutch navy personnel, and four by the RN. These would have been very useful vessels in a Sealion scenario, but it's possibe they were not all fully operational (although Philson does list them as such in his OOB of the Royal Navy for 30.9.1940).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Melpom% ... rpedo_boat
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#727

Post by Knouterer » 22 Jul 2014, 11:17

RichTO90 wrote:
Knouterer wrote:Although slightly off topic, since there was some discussion on where the 4-metre depth mark was where U-Panzer would be launched from the Type B barges, here's a c. 1930 map showing the 25, 50, 75 and 100 feet depths at high water (I presume).
If that is an Admiralty chart, the depth indications should be lowest water, not highest water IIRC.
More like a tourist road map - and since the relatively wide beach at Littlestone-Greatstone is coloured blue, I assume this is meant to represent high water. Also, at low water depth over The Varne would be a good deal less than indicated I think.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#728

Post by Knouterer » 22 Jul 2014, 11:49

RichTO90 wrote:
phylo_roadking wrote:
Hopefully however, now that you'd said it too, Knouterer will take the point on board and leave aside his idea that the NewZealanders' Divisional Cavalry would use theirs as "machine gun carriers" supporting an infantry attack...which is where I came in.
Excuse me ??? I never said anything about "supporting an infantry attack" - that's blatant misquoting again. After all, there was a whole infantry tank battalion available for that. I would assume that the light tanks, and the scout carriers, would carry out the normal (light) cavalry role of probing the enemy defences, seeing how far they extended, looking for weak points/gaps, etc. Which would of course involve some shooting.

And yes, in that role, mobility, firepower and (even minimal) armour protection would give them certain adavantages over enemy troops on foot, which by the way were most unlikely to be "well dug in" by that time.

I'm sorry, but I can't quite accept the contention that these light tanks were so horribly bad and totally useless that their crews would have been well advised to park them somewhere and confront the enemy on foot with their revolvers.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#729

Post by sitalkes » 24 Jul 2014, 05:28

I found the answer to my question about the composition of the 1st ATB in one of Knouterer's previous posts on the Sussex history site:

"The 1st ATB consisted of the 4th, 8th and 44th RTR, with 27 Mk I Infantry Tanks and 125 Mk II, so about 50 tanks per Regt. In fact the 8th RTR was attached to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Canterbury-Ashford-Maidstone area at this time."

Would I be right in thinking that all three tank battalions were not together, and only two could support one another?

By the way, although it's about the Malayan campaign, I think this article could be relevant as it is about the standard of leadership and organisation of the early war British forces in general:

Poor Military Leadership or Flawed Military Organisation?: The British army and the Malayan Campaign http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ ... 29_1/3.htm

"To the British military mind, combat is inherently structured. It can therefore be centralised and controlled through a command structure that emphasized obedience to orders, rather than exercising initiative. However, this "system of inflexible, autocratic command and control" co-existed uneasily with the contradictory belief that "giving subordinates wider latitude to use their own initiative...was a positive handicap to success".15 Therefore, "British army doctrinal manuals stated general principles but did not provide concrete examples to show how these principles should be put into practice." It was a deliberate omission "designed to enable each individual commander to decide how to apply the principles in the light of the particular circumstances confronting him." "

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#730

Post by Knouterer » 08 Aug 2014, 14:23

Another interesting view of the "stone-faced" sea wall between Dymchurch village and the Redoubt, before the new wall was built a few years ago. It does look rather patched up. The low concrete wall on top would seem to be a postwar addition.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#731

Post by Knouterer » 08 Aug 2014, 21:00

If Schenk's map is anything to go by, Pz. Abt. (U) D (minus one company) would land between Dymchurch and the New Sewer outlet, which corresponds exactly with the reach of the 1891-1926 concrete sea wall (section 2 on the map), of which that article in the Structural Engineer also provides a cross section:
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#732

Post by Knouterer » 08 Aug 2014, 21:22

And here we have an interesting picture, which I would tentatively date to the 1930s (car, dress ...), of just that stretch of sea wall, if I'm not mistaken. With a little digging and a few sandbags, the clay bank could have been made into a good defensive position. Not over the whole length of course, if the defense was based on "Forward Defended Localities" manned at platoon strength - as it no doubt was - there would have been gaps of several hundred yards between such positions (I'll have to calculate that a bit more precisely later on), with barbed wire and perhaps a double line of the famous Beach Mines in between.

The coastal road behind the bank was - at least at this point - clearly immune to bombardment from the invasion fleet, allowing carrier/motorcycle/"tank hunting" platoons to rush to threatened spots in relative safety.

On the other hand, and to be strictly impartial, the sea wall also had a disadvantage for the defenders (as I believe Sitalkes noted before) in that it hindered enfilading/flanking fire along the beach. This was principally a problem for the 7th Devons, the machine gun battalion of the 45th division, which was scattered in platoons and sections all along the invasion front, but I'll get back to that later too.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#733

Post by Knouterer » 08 Aug 2014, 21:37

And while I'm at it, another shot of Dymchurch a few years before the war. The Martello tower (No. 22) was demolished in 1956 (or thereabouts) so that the road could be straightened out.
Frankly, the more I look at it, the more I think Dymchurch was a poor choice as a "fortress town" - flimsy buildings, no good observation points (apart from the Martellos of course) or any natural features favouring the defenders. But as yet we do not know in how far it was actually fortified.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#734

Post by phylo_roadking » 09 Aug 2014, 00:34

Now that the surgeon has done his worst, and I can sit at a pc again...in reverse order (not that I'll get caught up on it all tonight)...
And while I'm at it, another shot of Dymchurch a few years before the war. The Martello tower (No. 22) was demolished in 1956 (or thereabouts) so that the road could be straightened out.
Frankly, the more I look at it, the more I think Dymchurch was a poor choice as a "fortress town" - flimsy buildings, no good observation points (apart from the Martellos of course) or any natural features favouring the defenders. But as yet we do not know in how far it was actually fortified.
Bad call if you're basing it on THAT pic! If that's Martello Tower No.22...Martello Tower No.22 was at Willop Sluice, that's the hamlet of Willop we can see in that picture, not Dymchurch - nearly a kilometer north of the 1940 edge of Dymchurch village along the Hythe Road.
And here we have an interesting picture, which I would tentatively date to the 1930s (car, dress ...),
Car, and particularly dress, you're a decade out - it's late 1940's, maybe even early 1950s. It's the dress of the two women walking along the road that is particularly telling - postwar.
With a little digging and a few sandbags, the clay bank could have been made into a good defensive position. Not over the whole length of course, if the defense was based on "Forward Defended Localities" manned at platoon strength - as it no doubt was - there would have been gaps of several hundred yards between such positions (I'll have to calculate that a bit more precisely later on), with barbed wire and perhaps a double line of the famous Beach Mines in between.
Have you perhaps researched how the medieval sea wall was built? To dig dugouts/rifle pits....AND holes for a double line of (quite large) mines is going to take a LOT of digging.
The coastal road behind the bank was - at least at this point - clearly immune to bombardment from the invasion fleet, allowing carrier/motorcycle/"tank hunting" platoons to rush to threatened spots in relative safety.


And how do you reckon that??? Just from the fact that they won't be able to see it directly?

P.S. how does that provide for the invaders' "flying artillery" ?
f Schenk's map is anything to go by, Pz. Abt. (U) D (minus one company) would land between Dymchurch and the New Sewer outlet, which corresponds exactly with the reach of the 1891-1926 concrete sea wall (section 2 on the map), of which that article in the Structural Engineer also provides a cross section:
To be more precise, they're coming ashore just at the north side of the New Sewer...at a VERY interesting location...

Right in front of St. Mary's Bay, a few hundred yards from the airfield there...and at the one point along the coast where ONLY the thickness of the concrete back of the Type A seawall divides the beach from the coast road behind! The road loops right out to the edge of the beach where a section of the old earth bank seawall must have been worn away in the past...

Image

Time to whistle up the engineers and their explosives...
Another interesting view of the "stone-faced" sea wall between Dymchurch village and the Redoubt, before the new wall was built a few years ago. It does look rather patched up. The low concrete wall on top would seem to be a postwar addition.
Given that we know there was a VERY varied history of reinforcement and building in the two miles or so between Dymchurch village and the Redoubt - different angles of slope etc. - is that as precise as you can be about the location of that pic? 8O It could be anywhere along that stretch, whereas we now know exactly where Pz.Abt (U) B was coming ashore...

More to follow.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#735

Post by Knouterer » 09 Aug 2014, 12:34

And finally, as promised, the emergency coast batteries in Landing Zone B, once again on the basis of Schenk’s map. Naturally, I do not claim any great cartographic precision (and neither would Schenk I suppose), it’s a very schematic representation.
As the legend says, the barge fleet is represented in the formation it would have before it would execute its turn towards the coast, which in reality would take place further off shore to the SE.

Looking at the batteries, the Folkestone East and West batteries could not reach the invasion beach, but might have been able to score a few hits on the transports from Rotterdam as they steamed by.

412 Battery at Mill Point, armed with four 5.5in guns (max range 16,250 m) that had been removed from HMS Hood a few months previously, was up on a cliff and would have an excellent view of the whole affair, and (part of) the transport fleet after it had dropped anchor would be well within range.

The other three batteries were right on the shoreline, and the gun houses were well camouflaged as can be seen from RAF aerial photos. No idea what 340 battery near the Imperial Hotel in Hythe looked like; probably similarly disguised as some innocuous beachfront structure. The red line there indicates the main road and bridge across which Meindl’s intrepid Fallschirmjäger would come charging to link up with the 17th I.D.

It is not so clear how the three 6in guns of the MNBDO battery at Dungeness Point were arranged, but it seems a reasonable assumption that at least one could shoot to the NE (otherwise it would have been a very curious setup …) and reach (part of) the transport fleet at anchor.

I have added the heavy artillery in the area that was trained on the beaches; as mentioned before, the 56th Heavy Regt had two 6in guns at Westenhanger (observation post in Martello at Dymchurch) plus one 9.2in howitzer at Aldington. There were two 9.2in railroad guns near Saltwood north of Hythe, another two a bit south of Ashford, and two 12in RR howitzers on sidings between Sellindge and Ashford.

The was of course also the 55th Field Regt (24 guns of different types) supporting the 135th Inf Bde in Romney Marsh, and a couple of 4in guns on lorries.

The photo shows where the three Folkestone batteries were, the white Martello that is just visible was the BOP for the FE battery.
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