British Army at home September 1940

[Gooner1]

Anyway, the hotly discussed postcard of the sea wall is from a local history website and undated (otherwise I would have mentioned it, obviously):
http://www.dymchurchheritagegroup.co.uk ... 4553387919
This postcard was also sold on Ebay a while ago and described as a "Valentine's Real Photograph Postcard no. K 1604", so an expert postcard collector might be able to date it on that basis.

K 1602 shows a fairground at Dymchurch and can be dated to the late 1940s apparently; so OK, it's a postwar shot.

What was the significance of the postcard again?

Good positions for enfilade fire but that's what you'd expect on the seafront anyway.

[phylo_roadking]

Or, of course, the M35 class minesweepers and R-boats that carried a good part of the Vorausabteilungen and had to get close to the shore (300 m or so according to Schenk) to launch the rubber boats.

...and of course they're going steam right inshore at 25+ knots to the c.300 metre mark - in the gloom...

What was the significance of the postcard again?

Good positions for enfilade fire but that's what you'd expect on the seafront anyway.

It's supposedly illustrating that it would be a great idea (in Knouterer's mind) to attempt to dig firing positions in the clay bank of Dymchurch sea wall behind the 19th/early 20 century concrete and stone improvements - a bank compacted by hundreds of years of pounding by the sea...oh, and and string a twin line of mines between them along that width of ten or so feet of footpath...

And that the war diary of the 7th Btn. SLI shows that they did EXACTLY that...

However, It's also been shown that in the relevant sections of said war diary ...while there are several very NON-specific references to digging defensive positions, there's only one (1) mention of these being on the "sea front" at Greatstone - and although invited to twice now to comment on how this CAN'T mean digging firing positions in the clay bank of Dymchurch sea wall behind the 19th/early 20 century concrete and stone improvements as he cited the war diary in support of - Knouterer still hasn't commented...

[phylo_roadking]

In both Macksey's and Longmate's books (Invasion! and If Britain Had Fallen), the German ground troops are in a bit of strife, with British troops about to break through to the beaches, when the British high command orders its forces back from the beaches to a pre-defined defence line in order to prepare for the counter-attack. In both books, this withdrawal is critical to the eventual German victory, as it allows the Germans to expand their bridgehead easily. How realistic is this?

It isn't.

Nor, however, is it unrealitic. Longmate didn't write those "invasion" chapters of the book himself; he handed the job over to a panel of historians (chosen IIRC by the BBC, the book was very much "a book of the series", there was an early '70s BBC series on the subject) who carried out an exercise in comparative history...

Their idea at this point was based on the BEF in France in May 1940 example - of successive withdrawals in search of a practical counterattack that could be carried out with the forces at their disposal - resulting in the initial plans for Arras, which of course eventually went ahead sans the French, sans adequate preparation for the British armoured force after a long withdrawal ito the start line, etc., etc...and failed. Too little too late - AND unsuccessful. Even the one limited success of the operation - getting the reinforcements into Arras itself under cover of the operation - was a waste as Arras had to be abandoned three days later.

The rationale is set out later in the chapter concerned - that the British armoured strength available for a large scale counterattack would only permit ONE throw of the dice, so Brookie would be looking and looking and holding off and husbanding his strength UNTIL such a point was identified...

After all - haven't we already seen this enshrined in British orders for their armoured forces? Remember the "hurry up to the front - then wait for further orders depending on how the campaign goes" order?

[Knouterer]

Anyway, the hotly discussed postcard of the sea wall is from a local history website and undated (otherwise I would have mentioned it, obviously):
http://www.dymchurchheritagegroup.co.uk ... 4553387919
This postcard was also sold on Ebay a while ago and described as a "Valentine's Real Photograph Postcard no. K 1604", so an expert postcard collector might be able to date it on that basis.

K 1602 shows a fairground at Dymchurch and can be dated to the late 1940s apparently; so OK, it's a postwar shot.

What was the significance of the postcard again?

Good positions for enfilade fire but that's what you'd expect on the seafront anyway.

The significance of the postcard was mainly that it provided a nice illustration to the diagram of the (1891-1926) sea wall in that article in the Structural Engineer:

[Knouterer]

Or, of course, the M35 class minesweepers and R-boats that carried a good part of the Vorausabteilungen and had to get close to the shore (300 m or so according to Schenk) to launch the rubber boats.

...and of course they're going steam right inshore at 25+ knots to the c.300 metre mark - in the gloom...

????? If that comment makes any sense it escapes me completely. Of course they wouldn't be going in at 25+ knots; why would they? They would on the contrary have to slow down considerably, or even come to a complete stop, to launch, first the assault boats, then the Flosssäcke (inflatables) - which as I pointed out before would make them easier targets for the guns on shore.

Regarding the horizontally floating nets, I wouldn't have placed too much reliance on them, but it's quite possible that a number of vessels, especially those with unprotected/unshielded screws - such as M35 minesweepers or R-boats - would have become tangled up in them. At least I don't see why we should exclude that possibility.

[Knouterer]

However, It's also been shown that in the relevant sections of said war diary ...while there are several very NON-specific references to digging defensive positions, there's only one (1) mention of these being on the "sea front" at Greatstone - and although invited to twice now to comment on how this CAN'T mean digging firing positions in the clay bank of Dymchurch sea wall behind the 19th/early 20 century concrete and stone improvements as he cited the war diary in support of - Knouterer still hasn't commented...

Perhaps you would be so kind as to explain exactly what it is you are trying to argue? That digging holes was beyond the capablities of the British army at the time? Or that quite naturally they would have dug in somewhere where they couldn't see anything and couldn't bring their weapons to bear?

And I did not say that the 7th SLI was digging in at that particular point, you're being deliberately obtuse again ... as I have discussed at some length, the 6th SLI was at Dymchurch. I only referred to the WD of the 7th to show that there was a lot of digging, sandbagging, wiring and mine laying going on.

[Gooner1]

Nor, however, is it unrealitic. Longmate didn't write those "invasion" chapters of the book himself; he handed the job over to a panel of historians (chosen IIRC by the BBC, the book was very much "a book of the series", there was an early '70s BBC series on the subject) who carried out an exercise in comparative history...

Well its a good job the defence of the UK was in the hands of the military and not a panel of historians then!
Guess they were after a good story rather than an attempted simulation.


And of course its unrealistic. We know the orders of the troops defending the coast "fight to the last man and the last round" etc. we know the orders of the counter-attack forces and we know the commanders intentions. They had been virtually unchanged since the beginning of the invasion period. Brooke is not suddenly going to say 'no, lets withdraw and wait' :roll: If he'd even suggested such a thing a friendly arm would have been placed round his shoulders and he'd have been quietly led out of the room with a "come on old man, time to go"

Their idea at this point was based on the BEF in France in May 1940 example - of successive withdrawals in search of a practical counterattack that could be carried out with the forces at their disposal -

The BEF wasn't staging successive withdrawls in search of a counter-attack. They staged successive withdrawls under French orders because of a German breakthrough elsewhere in the Allied line. Worth pointing out that the BEF had oft recourse to counter-attacks in defence of their various lines.

The rationale is set out later in the chapter concerned - that the British armoured strength available for a large scale counterattack would only permit ONE throw of the dice, so Brookie would be looking and looking and holding off and husbanding his strength UNTIL such a point was identified...

That point had long been identified - its when the enemy are in the process of landing.

After all - haven't we already seen this enshrined in British orders for their armoured forces? Remember the "hurry up to the front - then wait for further orders depending on how the campaign goes" order?

No, we haven't seen those orders.

[Gooner1]

The significance of the postcard was mainly that it provided a nice illustration to the diagram of the (1891-1926) sea wall in that article in the Structural Engineer:

Oh I see, right. Can't see a problem with infantry positions on/in the clay bank at all. Not as if they were short of time or tools.

Dunno about mines in/on the concrete though - a bit obvious possibly, though I guess they could have put sand on top?

[phylo_roadking]

And of course its unrealistic. We know the orders of the troops defending the coast "fight to the last man and the last round" etc. we know the orders of the counter-attack forces and we know the commanders intentions. They had been virtually unchanged since the beginning of the invasion period. Brooke is not suddenly going to say 'no, lets withdraw and wait' If he'd even suggested such a thing a friendly arm would have been placed round his shoulders and he'd have been quietly led out of the room with a "come on old man, time to go"

You haven't read what Sitalkes posted up carefully enough...Longmate isn't taking about withdrawing from the coastal crust...he's talking about halting the more localised counter-attacks and withdrawing those forces.

The BEF wasn't staging successive withdrawls in search of a counter-attack. They staged successive withdrawls under French orders because of a German breakthrough elsewhere in the Allied line. Worth pointing out that the BEF had oft recourse to counter-attacks in defence of their various lines.

Localised ones - not the four-division setpiece that Gort first intended.

The rationale is set out later in the chapter concerned - that the British armoured strength available for a large scale counterattack would only permit ONE throw of the dice, so Brookie would be looking and looking and holding off and husbanding his strength UNTIL such a point was identified...

That point had long been identified - its when the enemy are in the process of landing

Not necessarily -
1/ not if your counterattack(s) can't physically reach them;
2/ not if you can wait until attempts to inhibit the flow of POL, ordnance etc. across the Channel have begun to bite;
3/ not if you can wait until the Germans' supply lines for those have become attenuated AND are being impacted by the activities of the Aux Units;...

In fact there are MANY factors at work influencing what Brooke would view as the optimal time and location for a massed counterattack.

[phylo_roadking]

The significance of the postcard was mainly that it provided a nice illustration to the diagram of the (1891-1926) sea wall in that article in the Structural Engineer:

Being a little selective now, aren't we? What you actually said was...

And here we have an interesting picture, which I would tentatively date to the 1930s (car, dress ...), of just that stretch of sea wall, if I'm not mistaken. With a little digging and a few sandbags, the clay bank could have been made into a good defensive position. Not over the whole length of course, if the defense was based on "Forward Defended Localities" manned at platoon strength - as it no doubt was - there would have been gaps of several hundred yards between such positions (I'll have to calculate that a bit more precisely later on), with barbed wire and perhaps a double line of the famous Beach Mines in between

Strangely - no mention of the article in the Structural Engineer...

And I did not say that the 7th SLI was digging in at that particular point, you're being deliberately obtuse again ...

And YOU are being deliberately disingenuous Noone was talking about that particular POINT in the picture, but in fact about digging in as you described above in the clay bank behind the 19th/early 20th century stone and concrete improvements

When challenged on THAT aspect, you replied quite specifically -

As decribed in, for example, the WD of the 7th SLI that I quoted a few pages back, who spent a couple of weeks doing just that.

As for this -

I only referred to the WD of the 7th to show that there was a lot of digging, sandbagging, wiring and mine laying going on.

...you seem to be choosing to forget that your reply was in answer to something specific I challenged...

Have you perhaps researched how the medieval sea wall was built? To dig dugouts/rifle pits....AND holes for a double line of (quite large) mines is going to take a LOT of digging.

As decribed in, for example, the WD of the 7th SLI that I quoted a few pages back, who spent a couple of weeks doing just that.

Perhaps you would be so kind as to explain exactly what it is you are trying to argue? That digging holes was beyond the capablities of the British army at the time? Or that quite naturally they would have dug in somewhere where they couldn't see anything and couldn't bring their weapons to bear?

It's quite simple, really...and given the time that has elapsed and the couple of times I queryed it, one might have expected you to check... :roll:

As mentioned previouisly, the war diary of the 7th SLI does NOT support your citing it in defence of your ideas that "...the clay bank could have been made into a good defensive position." Because the only place it even mentions digged/establishing positions on the "sea front"...

There WAS no clay bank or improved sea wall!

The Dymchurch Wall STOPS at Littlestone - the war diary uses the term "sea front" to describe the location of the activities of the 27th to finish then test A Company's section of the defences up to the Right Boundary I.E. Greatstone...



You can even just about make out the end of the sea wall in the distance, at Littlestone-on-Sea; but at Greatstone, the "sea front" is just sand dunes.

One would have thought that since YOU were the one who brought THIS map to the thread -



- you might have realised where the Dymchurch Wall stopped...

[Knouterer]

On the subject of German intelligence, General Günter Blumentritt, who was chief of the operations staff of Army Group A (Von Rundstedt) and therefore well placed to know whatever there was to know, wrote after the war (1949) in an article for the Irish Defence Review (An Cosantoir):

"Intelligence from England was extremely meagre. No one knew whether there were any coastal defences or field fortifications on the English coast or where they were, if they existed. It was not known which beaches were mined. No one could say exactly what forces the British had available for defence."

See http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=121586

[Knouterer]

In the same vein, one Erich Roseke, a soldier in the 11th company of the Brandenburgers (and later recipient of the Ritterkreuz), later recalled:

"Our platoon was to be the first to land - in British uniforms. It was not possible to train on models of the targets because nobody knew exactly what these targets would look like. We only had unclear photographs of positions, radio stations etc."

(as quoted by Leo McKinstry, Operation Sealion, p. 312 - from an interview somewhere in the Bundesarchiv apparently).

[Knouterer]

The significance of the postcard was mainly that it provided a nice illustration to the diagram of the (1891-1926) sea wall in that article in the Structural Engineer:

Oh I see, right. Can't see a problem with infantry positions on/in the clay bank at all. Not as if they were short of time or tools.

Dunno about mines in/on the concrete though - a bit obvious possibly, though I guess they could have put sand on top?

No, although we know that in a number of cases beach mines were laid in front of the sea wall, that was clearly not a good idea - and later on formally forbidden - and I would expect mines to be laid on the bank between platoon positions, which might well be several hundred yards apart. As the plans below (both from J. Goodwin, Defending Sussex Beaches) show, minefields were often very narrow strips, sometimes not more than 10 yards or so (No. 9C at Hove for example), which means that at intervals of 20-25 feet there would be just enough space for a double line of mines, if that.

[Knouterer]

[quote="phylo_roadking"] [It's quite simple, really...and given the time that has elapsed and the couple of times I queryed it, one might have expected you to check... :roll:

As mentioned previouisly, the war diary of the 7th SLI does NOT support your citing it in defence of your ideas that "...the clay bank could have been made into a good defensive position." Because the only place it even mentions digged/establishing positions on the "sea front"...

There WAS no clay bank or improved sea wall!

/quote]


And no one ever said there was, least of all me :roll: :roll: :roll:

For the nth time: in view of your apparent doubts about the British Army's ability to dig a few holes, or trenches, or rifle pits, or whatever, I referred to the the WD of the 7th SLI because it shows that the defenders spent quite a lot of time doing just that.

Do you really never get tired of arguing about nothing? Or did I already ask that?

[phylo_roadking]

For the nth time: in view of your apparent doubts about the British Army's ability to dig a few holes, or trenches, or rifle pits, or whatever, I referred to the the WD of the 7th SLI because it shows that the defenders spent quite a lot of time doing just that.

Your fist pounding would be mildly more believeable if your "the WD of the 7th SLI that I quoted a few pages back, who spent a couple of weeks doing just that" hadn't been in direct answer to MY challenge to your idea of digging positions specifically in the clay bank behind the stone fronting on the sea wall...

As for THIS suggestion appearing yet again...

and I would expect mines to be laid on the bank between platoon positions, which might well be several hundred yards apart. As the plans below (both from J. Goodwin, Defending Sussex Beaches) show, minefields were often very narrow strips, sometimes not more than 10 yards or so (No. 9C at Hove for example), which means that at intervals of 20-25 feet there would be just enough space for a double line of mines, if that.

1/ the clay bank is only some four to five yards wide...

2/ what use against tanks is a double row of mines...unless backed by A/T guns??? Once one or more goes off - what you have is a big HOLE in the line, not a tank shaped penetration of a deeper minefield...

3/ what on earth is the use of laying a double row of mines against armour THERE on your example pic??? Even if they get through the line of mines - do you REALLY think they're going to go down the sharp slope on the rear side of the sea wall? They're going to looking for breaks in the sea wall - the ramps up it provided in various places, and physical breaks like Millop Sluice...or even have the engineers blow a hole in the sea wall.

which means that at intervals of 20-25 feet there would be just enough space for a double line of mines, if that.

Before you go any further with this fantasy of positions and minefields ON the clay bank - have you considered actually LOOKING at the aeriel recce montage on google Earth and attempting to pick out anywhere from Littlestone to Dymchurch where this was actually done?

Did it not strike you that they would be next to impossible to camoflage??? Sitting on top of the Sea wall they should be more than obvious...


By the way...

As the plans below (both from J. Goodwin, Defending Sussex Beaches) show, minefields were often very narrow strips, sometimes not more than 10 yards or so (No. 9C at Hove for example),

...did it equally not strike you WHY 9C was so narrow???