Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leader?

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durb
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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#106

Post by durb » 20 Oct 2014, 17:13

Civilised nations meant in "civilised West" of 1930´s mostly white nations in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand - and colonialism was seen as a civilizing effort to educate so-called lesser people. When Italy invaded Ethiopia, nothing really important happened to stop that and economical sanctions were teethless. Baldwin & co. were more interested to maintain good Anglo-Italian relationships than to make strong protest on Italy´s use of chemical weapons and ruthless executions in Ethiopia. Maybe because British had similar methods in their colonies earlier...

Maybe Japan was considered civilized too as it had same technological level than "white nations", although the cruelties of Japanese warfare in China became known in 1937 (Nanjing incident). There was a anti-Japanese public opinion expressed in some newspapers. But the reality was that China/Japan was not important for Western statesmen. China had to fight alone against Japan, which by no means was isolated by West in late 1930´s. Europeans and USA became interested in China only by 1941 after Japan had occupied "white man´s territory" in French Indochina. Before that time only foreign country to support significantly China in Sino-Japanese war was USSR.

When it comes to Chamberlain (and also Churchill), he wanted to maintain British Empire. With strong means if necessary (like using gas shelling against rebels of Somaliland in 1919/1920, massacre of Amritsar 1919 etc.). I do not know what were his ideas regarding home rule of India - would not surprise if he opposed the idea strongly. Still Britain was relatively "soft" as a colonial power - Germans/Italians would have "neutralized" Gandhi - "suicide" in prison might have happened...

There has been a suggestion that maintaining Empire made Chamberlain an appeaser - that Japan was seen a threat to British colonies in Far East, India problem etc and that more British resources were needed there. This could indeed have made him to look for avoiding war in Europe because it would have weakened British Empire (as it actually did).

But although the colonial problems undoubtedly played a part in Chamberlain thinking, I do not believe that they were the principal reasons for his appeasement policy. Both in 1939 and in 1940 Chamberlain/Churchill rejected Hitler´s propositions of status quo in west and Hitler´s offers to "guarantee" British Empire.

I believe that the memory of carnage of 1914-1918 played a more important part in Chamberlains appeasement thoughts - it was perhaps the most important reason why British public opposed the war. It is an irony that the very appeasement policy led to a situation, in which Hitler became too arrogant and launched a war, which proved to be a even bigger carnage and caused much more ruins in Europe than WW1.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#107

Post by wm » 20 Oct 2014, 18:53

Civilized in the sense guided by some form of a moral system, even if imperfect. The Stalinist Russia was a totally amoral totalitarian country.


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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#108

Post by ChrisDR68 » 20 Oct 2014, 20:08

durb wrote:I believe that the memory of carnage of 1914-1918 played a more important part in Chamberlains appeasement thoughts - it was perhaps the most important reason why British public opposed the war. It is an irony that the very appeasement policy led to a situation, in which Hitler became too arrogant and launched a war, which proved to be a even bigger carnage and caused much more ruins in Europe than WW1.
As stated numerous time in David Fromkin's book Europe's Last Summer it takes two countries or more to maintain the peace but it only needs one to start a war. As soon as Hitler became German chancellor in 1933 he directed the German economy and her people towards another European war. If it could have been localised to eastern Europe all the better but if the western powers chose to intervene then so be it.

Incidentally WW2 was far more destructive in terms of casualties than WW1 but not for the UK and France. Their casualties were far lower in the second war than the first.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#109

Post by durb » 20 Oct 2014, 22:03

The British and French military casualties were lower in WW1 than in WW2. But the civilian casualties were bigger in WW2 - the German air attacks in WW1 were quite modest as Zeppelins and Gothas had modest bombload. Losses suffered during Blitz and V-bombing were greater + more material destruction. This could be not avoided by appeasement policy. The only choice to avoid it would have been a pact with Hitler that would have let continental Europe under permanent German domination. But even Chamberlain was not willing to do such deals.

The official British history gives it that Munich deal 1939 bought valuable time for RAF´s development and saved Britain and thus ultimately led to Allied victory in WW2!! I consider such statement highly controversial - maybe from British/RAF perspective Chamberlain bought valuable time and thus saved the whole western civilisation, but people of continental Europe do not necessarily share the same vision.

The time between Munich pact and Sept. 1939 gave also Hitler and Luftwaffe valuable time to prepare better for war. Hitler´s generals in 1938 were very worried and suspicious about German´s possibility to crush possible British-French-Czech alliance (there were even plans of military coup to remove Hitler and stop the war considered too dangerous). Their doubts were considerable less by Sept. 1939. Britain and France showed such weakness in Munich that it was the green light to Hitler and his generals to drive forward and accelerate speed. And the signal that Munich gave to USSR was not the one which would have encouraged common "peace front" against Germany (and that was difficult anyway). It gradually led to conclusion that the best bet for USSR was to make "win-win" deal with Germany.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#110

Post by Attrition » 20 Oct 2014, 22:55

~~~~~mostly white nations in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand~~~~~

Racist, terrorist, military dictatorships are civilised?

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#111

Post by wm » 20 Oct 2014, 23:24

The Munich Agreement wasn't the enabler of the WW2, and didn't make Hitler arrogant, he had been like that already.
In 1938 Hitler wanted a war with Czechoslovakia, and later felt he was cheated out of his war. That was because temporarily both the Allies, and especially the USSR were relatively weak at that time, so he saw there a window of opportunity for a successful conquest. Without Munich the WW2 would start in 1938.

For the USSR any deal, any war was win-win. Both the USSR and the Nazi Germany had a common goal - the destruction of the European political order. To achieve that goal a war on the side of the Allies in 1938, or the war enabled by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was equally desirable.
Last edited by wm on 21 Oct 2014, 00:35, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#112

Post by durb » 21 Oct 2014, 00:20

I disagree that for USSR the alliance with Allies and with Hitler were equally desirable. The latter was much more interesting as it enabled USSR to be outsider from the war between "imperialist powers". All it had to do was to wait until nations in Central and Western Europe had been weakened by years of warfare. After that strong USSR could appear at the scene and dictate its terms.

Chamberlain and Daladier tried to reach agreement with Soviets, but Soviet terms were considered too difficult (free trespassing of Soviet troops through Poland and Romania, which both were strongly against such idea). However with Hitler Soviets did get all what they wanted: eastern part of Poland, Baltic states, Bessarabia and Finland (only the last one was not annexed to USSR). Germany and USSR would also have friendly "non-belligerent" relationship and Soviet Union would avoid war at its own border (if it did not start one) for the nearest years to come (until June 1941, but that was still far away future in August 1939). Fuel, grain, raw materials would be exported to Germany, which would provide engineering know-how and industrial products in exchange. And this was achieved in quick negotiations while Chamberlain & co. had negotiated with Soviets many months without any result. Chamberlain & Co. had no chance to make better offer than Germany.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#113

Post by steverodgers801 » 21 Oct 2014, 06:36

The last straw for Stalin was when the allies sent a delegation (by boat) to discuss an alliance. Stalin was livid that the delegation had no one with any actual authority to make an agreement. The delegation offered no plans for an offense. They simply asked about how soon the Soviets could attack Germany with out offering an idea of how the allies would cooperate. Stalin decided the west wanted the Soviets to fight Germany alone, so Stalin decided he would do the same to the allies. In fact during the attack on Finland there was serious discussion of attacking the Soviets, which probably got to Stalin's ear. Is it any surprise he signed with Germany??

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#114

Post by wm » 21 Oct 2014, 12:30

Well, usually plans for an offensive weren't attached to any of the defensive agreements signed by France, Britain, Poland (except the sketchy ideas in that in 1939). It was simply stated in case of war a support would be given, or a war would be declared.
That was sufficient, they didn't plan an aggression after all.
Stalin had his spies everywhere, and of excellent quality. In Poland (one of the close associates of the Polish Foreign Minister), in Germany (they delivered him the text of the Anti-Comintern Pact before it was singed), in France they were doing as they pleased, and there were the well know spies in the UK. Really, he knew what was going on.

And it was him who demanded as a condition of his cooperation, what was basically a military occupation of Poland by the USSR. When in fact simply doing nothing would be sufficient to prevent the WW2.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#115

Post by durb » 24 Oct 2014, 00:37

As Stalin was not cooperative in constructive spirit, Britain and France should have sought other better allies - such that had good reason to fear German aggression. Then the most obvious candidates were Czechslovakia and possibly Poland (the Danzig/Corridor was always more or less open wound in German-Polish relations - even during Weimar Republic). But as we know the former gave up without fight as no Anglo-French back-up was to be reckoned with, because Britain and France were not prepared for war. Czechs had thus the sad role to be sacrifice lambs for the "common good".

Poland was not well equipped for modern warfare which was demonstrated in Sept. 1939. To equip Poland better efficient Anglo-French military aid program should have started in 1938 (modernization of air force, more AA and antitank weaponry etc.), by spring 1939 such program was perhaps too late. Still equipping efficiently Poland with antitank, AA, planes as much as possible should have been tried in a period between March - Sept. 1939 - and it would have been also a strong signal toward Hitler. But maybe unavoidable bureacracy arrangements and own urgent needs kept Anglo-French aid at symbolical level. Too little too late as so often is said.

And maybe arming Poland with modern equipment as much and as soon as possible was actually avoided, because it was thought that it would be the last straw to provoke Hitler to start the war. We know that Hitler needed not to be provoked, but Chamberlain & Co. did not know and must have hoped that Hitler would somehow come to his senses. Poland was never fully mobilised for September 1939 war - again this mobilisation delay was due to Anglo-French suggestion that full Polish mobilisation would provoke Hitler. The actual end of appeasement policy is not 31.3.1939 (guarantee to Poland) but actually 3.9.1939 (when the guarantee effectively realized - although the "phoney war" did not help Poland).

Chamberlain & Daladier were weak because their countries were weak in 1938 at least in mental sense. But were they really so weak than they could do nothing against Germany if the latter attacked such Czechoslovakia, which would have fought fiercely for its existence? What did British and French military advisors tell to Chamberlain & Daladier - that their armies and air forces were not ready and Germans were overwhelmingly superior? Did Chamberlain and Daladier actually consult military experts before deciding what to do in Munich conference?

The interesting thing is that many German senior officers were afraid of war in 1938 - they were sure that German would lose against superior British-French-Czech alliance. I have read that German Army and Luftwaffe were far from ready on autumn 1938 and for this reason some generals were thinking to break the loyalty oath which they had made to Führer. This makes me to suggest that Hitler more or less bluffed and his military threats in 1938 were bigger than their real execution. Maybe Hitler was warned by his military advisors, but he just ignored them. At the same time Chamberlain & Daladier were maybe listening carefully what their military advisors had to say and thus decided that war had to be avoided by all costs. Britain had not that many divisions of ground forces to be sent to European continent although there were strong Navy and RAF gradually modernizing to same level as Luftwaffe.

And then we come to the conclusion made so often earlier - Chamberlain and Daladier and even Mussolini were fooled by Hitler. Hitler´s bursts (after Munich conference) that the chance of military glory had been taken away from him by Chamberlain were perhaps just a show, in which Hitler believed himself only at that very moment (while silently knowing that Sudetenland and soon whole Moravia and Bohemia were in his pocket without a single shot). Hitler was like a gifted actor who believed 100 % in his role and 100 % in his words at the moment of acting. He lived his role. That made him so convincing that Chamberlain believed in him in Munich. Chamberlain was not a stupid weak man - he just fell victim to the play and even certain charisma of a master actor like millions of sensible and educated Germans had done before Chamberlain. But when Hitler broke his word and annexed Czechs to his empire, the spell was broken.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#116

Post by wm » 25 Oct 2014, 14:01

According to Goebbels' diaries - Hitler, pushed by Ribbentrop, was serious about a war with Czechoslovakia. It was Göring (Mein Führer, if you think that the German public is thirsting for war, you are wrong. They watch its approach with a leaden sense of apathy) supported by Goebbels who convinced him it wasn't worth it.
But still he wrote a few days later: Under the circumstances, we are unable to realize our grand plan - seizing all of Czechoslovakia.

Unfortunately the Stalinist Russia was the only worthwhile ally available. Poland and Czechoslovakia were military weak. Czechoslovakia had been already encircled, and half-defeated. Not to mention it was a fragile state, maybe even a failed state.
France had its numerous internal political problems, its army was in bad shape, its foreign minister was an ignorant, regularly abused by his wife. They didn't have enough military equipment for themselves , so there was no chance for a meaningful aid program for Poland.

They wrote this in Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany:
Whereas at sea Great Britain and France have a marked advantage over Germany, on land and in the air they are at a disadvantage. Even if the Czechoslovak Army is included, Germany will probably be able to dispose as great, if not greater, strength than the combined strength of the three Allies. A bare comparison of numerical strengths, however, may be misleading. In the initial stages Germany is likely to employ a large proportion of her land and air forces towards obtaining a quick decision in Czechoslovakia; nevertheless she could still man her new field fortifications in the west in sufficient strength to render any initial French land offensive a costly and probably ineffective operation.
It is our opinion that no pressure that Great Britain and France can bring to bear, either by sea, on land, or in the air, could prevent Germany from overrunning Bohemia and from inflicting a decisive defeat on Czechoslovakia. The restoration of Czechoslovakia's lost integrity could only be achieved by the defeat of Germany and as the outcome of a prolonged struggle, which from the outset must assume the character of an unlimited war.

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#117

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Oct 2014, 19:39

Chamberlain & Daladier were weak because their countries were weak in 1938 at least in mental sense. But were they really so weak than they could do nothing against Germany if the latter attacked such Czechoslovakia, which would have fought fiercely for its existence? What did British and French military advisors tell to Chamberlain & Daladier - that their armies and air forces were not ready and Germans were overwhelmingly superior? Did Chamberlain and Daladier actually consult military experts before deciding what to do in Munich conference?
An RAF air marshall and his French counterpart...I'll have to check the names, the episode is recorded in ER Hooton's Phoenix Triumphant...were on an inspection tour of the "new" Luftwaffe" just before the Crisis - and the Germans, by shuttling squadrons fro0m airfield to airfield before the two guests got there, fooled them into thinking the Luftwaffe was literally twice as large as it historically was at that point. Thus the Air Ministry, whom he reported to on his return, informed Cabinet that the RAF was in no position either to fight a war yet....or to fight a war against THAT size of enemy. They ALSO told Cabinet that it would take at least three weeks to position anything worth sending - by which time they reckoned that Czechoslovakia would be lost anyway.

EDIT - jusy found my copy, and it was the French general Joseph Vuillemin who toured Germany - after he and Sir Cyril Newall had prepared their very downbeat...downright dismal, actually!...estimates of the British and French air strength vs. the Germans'. Their reports had said that both nations' bomber forces were incapable of effective offensive operations, and would be rapidly destroyed by the Luftwaffe. Within a fortnight, according to Vuillemin. Ludlow-Hewitt had ALREADY reported in March 1938 that "our (the RAF's) bomber force is, judged from a war standard, practically useless". Meanwhile there were OTHER "jeremiahs" whose reports were reaching the Cabinet...in Paris as well as London; Lindberg's famous estimate of exaggerated German air strength was actually only a regurgitation of The US air attache Truman Smith's exaggerated numbers...designed to encourage rearmament in the U.S....but fed into the deliberations - as did Sir Frederick Sykes', the RAF's 2nd Chief of Staff, who confidently asserted to the Foreign Office that the Luftwaffe had 12,000 aircraft!!! 8O

Regarding "yet" - the RAF and Air Ministry had begun, immediately after Hitler's acession to power in 1933, began focusing the RAF's efforts on Germany as the prospective enemy in any European war. Prior to that, through the 1920s, France had often been discussed as a potential enemy in the air simply because of its proximity :P Through 1934 and 1935 the RAF excerised various scenarios, presented the results to Cabinet, and this eventually resulted in the 1935-6 Air Plan for re-growing the RAF to 1918/WWI strength and ability, growing the RAF's techncial side, extending its capabilities...nightflying etc., creating an integrated air defence system for the UK, a cohesive strategic bombing force for taking the war across the Channel to the Enemy...and all the while creating/reactivating squadrons by hiving off cadres from old ones and growing new squadrons around them....

But of course by 1937 all this was only in its very first stages - the Air Plan was intended for completion after the European barley harvest in the summer of 1939 I.E. September 1939...and was "phased" accordingly; monies being spent on certain parts of the Plan at certain times, while OTHER capabilities and strengths that only time could develop were being developed in other sections of the Plan.

So the AIr Ministry reported to Cabinet that not only was the potential enemy too large to fight at the RAF's 1937 strength, it would be several more years before they would be ready - basically the same argument the Air Ministry used to stop the government intervening against Italy over the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935!

As noted above, see ER Hooton...and also John James' The Paladins.
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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#118

Post by steverodgers801 » 26 Oct 2014, 05:25

When one makes an assumption then one will find proof of that assumption. Its a common intelligence practice to maximize every possible strength of an enemy, whether possible or not and to minimize your own strength. The Germans were using the JU 52 as a bomber, did any one ask if it was actually capable of flying al the way to London. The logic of the allies is we cant fight Germany so they can concentrate their whole army on the Czechs making it pointless to fight for the Czechs. No one asked what would happen if Germany had to divide its forces on two fronts

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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#119

Post by phylo_roadking » 26 Oct 2014, 17:06

When one makes an assumption then one will find proof of that assumption. Its a common intelligence practice to maximize every possible strength of an enemy, whether possible or not and to minimize your own strength.
Which is of course exactly the wrong way to do intelligence analysis. You're supposed to come up with a hypothesis and look for evidence that supports it AND evidence that contradicts it...or else you come up with the major errors in decision that the Nazis repeatedly made in 1940 with respect to Britain's willingness to resist etc.. They started with a given position - and looked for evidence that supported it. Only. :wink:

In the case of the Air Ministry - not only were they fooled - they actually didn't WANT to fight a war in 1938 as they were only part-way through the Air Plan. Yes, they massaged the decisionmaking process in Cabinet...
The Germans were using the JU52 as a bomber, did any one ask if it was actually capable of flying all the way to London.
The Air Ministry/RAF wasn't thinking in terms of terror bombing; politicians were doing that. They were thinking more in terms of counterforce bombing...and Bomber Command's fields in Norfolk etc., beside the North Sea, were indeed in range of German bombers flying from the North Sea coast of Germany ;)
The logic of the allies is we cant fight Germany so they can concentrate their whole army on the Czechs making it pointless to fight for the Czechs. No one asked what would happen if Germany had to divide its forces on two fronts
The logic seems to have continued to escape them...right through September 1939...
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Re: Was Neville Chamberlain really a weak and terrible leade

#120

Post by Pavel Novak » 26 Oct 2014, 21:10

After May crisis in 1938 which wasn't a crisis at all Britain considered to guarantee Czechoslovakia as a way to prevent start of war by deterring Germany. However this was not accepted because Brits came to conclusion that this will not prevent Germany to start war and instead the idea to give Germany what it wants was taken as a way to prevent war.

In February 1939 Germany demanded from Czecho-Slovakia to sign "treaty of friendship" to de facto become puppet of Germany including of subordination of foreign relations to Germany. Czecho-Slovak goverment asked for help Britain and France based on their commitments from Munich pact but Britain violated it by literal response that Britain will not honour their commitment to guarantee new czechoslovak borders.

So after March 1939 British foreign office somehow come to conclusion that the best way to prevent war is to deter Germany by British commitment to Poland, Romania and anybody else who will ask for it. This in situation where strength comparation was much more favorable towards Germany than in 1938. This after british guarantee was just seen in action as unreliable and worthless.

In comparison French from the start thought that they will end in a war with Germany. They thought that to have Britain on its side is a must so everything was subordinated to task to ally with Britain - as there was no alliance with Britain during interwar years and as British diplomats did not forget to remind that to their french colleagues in every situation. So they abandoned Czechoslovakia to get British obligation for french security interests. And they get what they wanted: Britain on French side in the next war. That french army failed in such a way was another thing.

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