Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

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Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#1

Post by Andy H » 09 Oct 2014, 21:50

Hi

On Sept 23rd 1940 Lord Beaverbrook (Minister for Aircraft Production) put forth a proposal, that:-
1. I ask the authority of the Cabinet to enrol an armed force to be known as the Aircraft Defence Police.
2. The purpose of this body will be to secure the protection of:-
(i) Aircraft factories,
(ii) Airfields under the control of this Ministry.
(iii Ferry Pools
(iv) Dispersed aircraft
3. I desire the power to recruit a force up to 10,000 strong and I would propose to enlist men of
50 years and upwards, save in the case of men now serving in the Ferry Pools, all of whom I wish to
enrol in the force.
4. It is necessary to give our establishments confidence. They are suffering from the after effects
of bombing attacks. They do not put much trust in the defences provided for them, which have indeed been
of a meagre character.
3. For these reasons, it is desired to organise the Aircraft Defence Police
Source CAB66/12/21

Does anyone know if this proposal went any further?

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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#2

Post by Andy H » 09 Oct 2014, 23:55

Hi

I found that there was a Air Ministry Constabulary that was formed circa 1942, whose profile seems to fit that of the ADP.
Its peak strength was 3530 men in WW2, eventually falling to 1155 in 1948. By 1971 it had been absorbed into the Ministry of Defence Police, which is still going strong.

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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#3

Post by phylo_roadking » 12 Oct 2014, 23:44

Hi Andy - I can't help thinking there's part of the story missing though; from what I can see, the "Air Ministry Constabulary" was actually formed in 1923!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of ... nstabulary

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_ ... nstabulary

What seems to have happened in 1942 was it was brought by degrees under central Air Ministry authority...as opposed to remaining as Special Constables belonging to local constabularies; but most definitely not under MAP authority.
Policing at Air Ministry establishments was originally provided by the Metropolitan Police and local county constabularies. For a while, as an economy measure, some establishments were manned by warders who had no police powers but the Home Office Forces remained at Stores Depots, where warders were considered to be inadequate, until about 1925. The passing of the Special Constables Act 1923 enabled these warders to be sworn as special constables under section 3 of the Act, and the regular police were then gradually withdrawn and replaced by warders or, as they were later styled, Air Ministry Constables.

Originally the warders and later constabulary departments were under direct control of the Commanding Officer of the unit at which they served. In 1942 a Superintendent was appointed to RAF Maintenance Command, which was the main user of the Constabulary, to advise on police matters. Later in the same year, the superintendent was moved to the Air Ministry and the beginnings were made to centralise control. During World War II, the Constabulary increased to a peak strength of 3,530 men.
...but it reads as falling far short of the Ministry of Aircraft Production force that Beaverbrook wanted; he always was a bit of an empire-builder :D

The real problem with that request of Beaverbrook's...and the major potential sticking point...is this bit -
I ask the authority of the Cabinet to enrol an armed force to be known as the Aircraft Defence Police...
...in that the debate was still on (detailed by Norman Longmate) on arming any of the police at all. And the fact that he was gone in another seven months anyway.
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#4

Post by Knouterer » 20 Oct 2014, 12:16

There may well have been some "debate" here and there but the decision that the police should be armed - as far as available resources permitted - had already been taken by the War Cabinet at the end of May 1940. See for example:

http://www.pfoa.co.uk/uploads/asset_fil ... 1945_2.pdf

In practice many police forces showed little enthusiasm, but in certain places like for example Folkestone or Portsmouth, where the threat of invasion was perhaps more keenly felt, revolvers and rifles were issued and carried quite early on (May/June), judging from contemporary accounts, photos &c. In fact, in the memorandum of 24 May quoted in that article Home Secretary Sir John Anderson referred to "... a limited number of rifles and service revolvers lent by the War Office for
use by the police employed at ports or in protecting certain vulnerable points." So that fits.
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#5

Post by Knouterer » 20 Oct 2014, 18:47

From Roy Humphreys, Target Folkestone (1990):
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#6

Post by phylo_roadking » 20 Oct 2014, 19:00

In practice many police forces showed little enthusiasm, but in certain places like for example Folkestone or Portsmouth, where the threat of invasion was perhaps more keenly felt, revolvers and rifles were issued and carried quite early on (May/June), judging from contemporary accounts, photos &c. In fact, in the memorandum of 24 May quoted in that article Home Secretary Sir John Anderson referred to "... a limited number of rifles and service revolvers lent by the War Office for
use by the police employed at ports or in protecting certain vulnerable points." So that fits.
In practice - it had little to do with enthusiasm or the lack of it; as noted in that article...apart from one short paragraph on page one discussing the makeup of the police nationally, and the first paragraph here...all the rest of THIS -
This must have been greeted with a mixture of concern and amusement in those forces that only had a handful of officers and had never had any firearms, or where a lone police officer (with his wife as an unpaid assistant) was responsible for a considerable rural area with no help for miles. A national campaign was mounted calling for any privately owned weapons to be handed in for official use and the stocks of weapons held by arms dealers and gun shops were commandeered.

The weapon available to the Met at the time was the .32 calibre Webley & Scott ‘M.P.’ model self-loading pistol (see The Siege of Sidney Street) but during the 1930s there had been a reduction in the number of officers considered ‘trained’. In the 1920s, terrorist activity by IRA ‘Volunteers’ on the mainland had resulted in more officers carrying firearms than ever before. Indeed, after the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson in June 1922, when Churchill was Colonial Secretary, questions were asked in the House of Commons about why the police were not yet fully armed so that they could prevent such outrages. The Home Secretary at the time, Edward Shortt, answered that it was because the police did not wish it, although it would probably have been more accurate to say that it was the Met Commissioner, Brigadier-General Sir William Horwood, who did not wish it. Nevertheless, Horwood had substantially increased the number of weapons available to the Met and had introduced, over and above the armed protection already being provided, additional armed foot and motor patrols for the duration of the IRA campaign (see The Nineteen Twenties).

In November 1931 Lord Hugh Trenchard was appointed Commissioner of the Met and he made so many changes that the Daily
Express commented dryly that: ‘The monthly reorganisation of the Metropolitan Police will take place weekly in future’. On 12 June 1934, Confidential Memorandum No. 9 standardised the number of weapons held by each division, sub-division and sectional station for the first time. Weapons over and above the new allocation were returned to central stores leaving 1,099 pistols in divisions with another 119 held by Scotland Yard departments.

A few other changes were announced in force orders dated 28 July 1936. Officers on night duty could no longer carry a firearm at their own request (see Armed Burglars – The 1880s) and the Station Officer (a sergeant), under the directions of the sub-divisional inspector, became responsible for ensuring that pistols were ‘only be issued to officers who have been properly
instructed in their use, and can give a satisfactory reason for issue’.

However, one addition to the regulations was that officially only twenty-four officers in each of the Met’s twenty-three divisions (i.e. including Thames Division) were to attend the annual ‘firing practice and proficiency test’ and thereby be considered ‘properly instructed’. Similar limitations were imposed on Scotland Yard departments. Before this regulation was introduced, superintendents could decide for themselves how many ‘trained’ officers they had. Because the weapons were shared and cover was needed twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the numbers ‘trained’ always exceeded the number of weapons available, usually by a considerable margin (the opportunity to get away from the day-to-day routine by taking part in the annual practice may have had a bearing on the number of officers keen to be included). If the new regulation was followed to the letter, even in the unlikely event that all ‘properly instructed’ officers were on duty at the same time, there were nearly enough pistols available for them to have two each. The record of whatever logic was behind this attempt to dramatically reduce numbers has not survived (although a cutback in what were probably seen as wasted ‘training days’ resulting in a loss of officers on the ground may have had something to do with it) but even if the figures were only partially adhered to, and in some divisions and Scotland Yard departments they must have been ignored as being completely unworkable, the force was in no state to provide anything like the kind of armed manpower needed to cover the circumstances envisaged by the Home Secretary in 1940.

The Commissioner, now Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game, was obviously being kept informed of political developments by the Home Secretary but on 24 May, when Anderson’s seven points were due to be discussed by the War Cabinet, he allowed the
Assistant Commissioner ‘A’ Department, John Fillis Carré Carter, to jump the gun and issue Confidential Memorandum 20/40 headed ‘Protection of Police Personnel and Police Buildings. Issue of Firearms’: ‘In view of the prevailing conditions, it is necessary to take precautions against the possibility of the enemy or his agents obtaining control of, or causing damage to, certain vulnerable points and buildings of public importance including Police Stations’. It was suggested that pistols be distributed throughout each police station ‘and maintained in a state ready for immediate use, and kept in positions which are most likely to prove effective’. In a masterpiece of understatement, Carter added that: ‘It is appreciated that all officers who may possibly be called upon to use these weapons are not qualified to do so in the normal way. To overcome this difficulty, it will be sufficient if an officer who is thoroughly conversant with the use of pistols explains the mechanism in any case where this is necessary’. As far as the actual use of the weapons was concerned ‘... obviously much must be left to the discretion of the individual concerned, but it should be pointed out that the firing of a shot, not necessarily at the intruder, and even after an entry has been effected, may be the best means of giving the essential warning to those inside’. When the Home Office circular explaining the War Cabinet decision arrived a few days later, Game decided to distribute an extract from it in the form of a secret memorandum (6/40) dated 29 May 1940. Interestingly, he had evidently made up his mind right from the start that he did not have men who could be ‘spared’ to cover all ‘bridges or other key points’ in London and so, using the loophole provided by Anderson, he omitted any reference to forces setting up ‘armed police posts’.

Even so, Anderson had included ‘motorised patrols’ with no handy escape clause. Whatever discussions took place over this are not recorded but on 28 May, the day before the extract was circulated, it was decided that ‘arrangements are to be made for a short course of instruction in the handling and loading and unloading of pistols ... to be given to as many Regular Police [of whom there were about 19,500 in the Met] as possible. A limited amount of firing practice may be carried out if ranges are available, but firing is to be done with the .22 pistol, and Divisions who have none of these weapons will be supplied with 4 weapons from Store. Supplies of .22 ammunition, up to 2,000 rounds [for each division], will be allowed for practice purposes’. The 2,000 rounds would not have gone very far amongst as many as 800 or more regular officers in each division and Scotland Yard departments appear not to have been allocated any.

The ‘.22 pistol’ was a Webley & Scott single-shot version of the force issue weapon that had first been taken into use for training in 1912 (see Churchill’s Other Bodyguards). By 1934 during Trenchard’s period of office they were considered obsolete and given free of charge to any of the divisional shooting clubs that wanted them. Carter had joined the Met in 1919 and the Assistant
Commissioner ‘D’ Department, (later Sir) George Abbiss, had joined the Met as a constable in 1905 and so they had been able
to tell Game all about them.

When the .22 pistols were recovered from the clubs, four turned out to be completely unusable and another twenty had to be comprehensively repaired before they could be fired again but a return, dated 11 October 1941, shows that by then there were 128 training pistols back in use, although it seems that no one had wanted to be so impolite as to ask for the handing back of .22 pistol now belonging to HM King George VI. It was included in the return but the Met would just have to manage somehow without it.

Carter was suffering from ill-health (he was allowed to retire in September 1940) and so it was decided that Abbiss would take over responsibility for any further arrangements relating to police arming. Discussions with the War Office resulted in him issuing
Confidential Memorandum 25/40 on 29 May 1940 to accompany Game’s secret memorandum of the same date: ‘In view of the decision to arm Police whilst engaged on certain duties it is necessary to (a) revise the existing allocation of pistols and ammunition, and (b) issue rifles and ammunition to Divisions’. Additional pistols would be supplied and also made available for all officers of Inspector rank and above as a personal issue. Rifles were to be supplied on the basis of fifteen to each sub-division (five were for the protection of the station and ten were for use ‘should the need arise’ anywhere on the sub-division) and five to each sectional station. Each district garage (the Met was divided into four districts) was to have ten rifles, each Group Reserve Centre five rifles and each stables either ten or five depending on location. Each wireless car (up to four operated on each division as an immediate response to 999 calls – a system first introduced in June 1937), ‘Q’ car, CID car and Traffic Patrol car was to be equipped with two rifles so that the force could undertake ‘motorised patrols’. Two magazines, each with eight rounds, were to be issued with each pistol and twenty rounds with each rifle.

For training in the use of rifles Abbiss wrote that ‘in Secret Memo. 6/40 it is stated that firearms should only be entrusted to thoroughly reliable personnel who are trained in their use. This must be interpreted in a somewhat liberal sense’. In fact, the requirement that officers should be ‘reliable’ and ‘trained’ had been in the Home Office circular but Game had not included this part, probably because he too realised that it needed a ‘liberal interpretation’ and thought that it would cause misunderstandings if he left it in. Abbiss went on to say that ‘it will not be possible, nor in fact is it necessary, to arrange for firing practice. If however, there are available in Divisions some .22 rifles, ammunition, and suitable ranges, no objection will be raised to a limited number having practice in the case of men who have not previously fired a rifle’. Any .22 rifles ‘available in Divisions’ would have been civilian target-rifles owned either by divisional shooting clubs or by individual police officers.

The War Office supplied the Met with 3,500 First World War vintage Canadian Ross rifles and 72,384 rounds of .303 calibre
ammunition on 1 June 1940 (another fifty rifles and 34,000 rounds were delivered over the next few months). Fifty rifles and 1,000 rounds were handed over to the London Fire Brigade and one hundred rifles with 2,000 rounds to the Port of London Police. 3,122 rifles and 62,440 rounds of ammunition were distributed to divisions in accordance with the arrangements notified on 29 May. Even Thames Division was issued with sixty-one rifles in case any enemy paratroopers landed in the river.

That left 228 rifles and on 3 July Abbiss asked the Commissioner what he should do with them. He also had sixtyseven rifles (this would increase to over 120 by 1945) and 2,300 rounds of .303 calibre ammunition that had been either commandeered from gun-dealers or handed in by their private owners for official use. Also in the stores were still 585 Webley & Scott pistols that were all that remained after the additional allocations to divisions and the personal issue to inspectors and above the previous month (the Commissioner had been issued with his (Serial No. 137478) on 6 June; in addition, twelve had been allocated to the Met officers serving in the detention camp detachment on the Isle of Man (housing ‘enemy aliens’) and for some reason one had also been issued to HRH the Duke of Kent (Serial No. 63765). The DAC of No. 1 District declined the offer, preferring to carry his privately owned revolver). To this he added 1,721 revolvers, in calibres ranging from .38 to .455, together with 3,120 rounds of ammunition, all of which had been handed in. He explained that: ‘We have now to consider how we are going to deal with this stock; obviously we should not continue to hold such a large amount at this office’ and suggested that there should be a further issue of pistols and rifles to divisions.

Game replied that: ‘I agree to the further issue of our own 320’s [the Webley & Scott pistols] ... G.O.C. London District would be very glad of any revolvers we can let him have. Is there any particular point in keeping the revolvers we got from gunsmiths? We were told to hand them over to the Military’. As a result, all the surrendered revolvers were collected by the War Office two days later. Abbiss issued Confidential Memorandum 44/40 on 4 July 1940 in which he explained that there would be an increase of 226 rifles and 380 pistols held by divisions, to be collected from Scotland Yard (by an armed escort) the next day, and on 13 July another 1,000 rounds of rifle ammunition were provided for each division although ‘this supply is to be regarded in the nature of a
Divisional reserve and will normally be held intact, the distribution and use being at the discretion of the Superintendent’.

On 6 July (in Con Memo 46/40) Abbiss agreed to training in use of pistols and rifles being given to the 25,000 full-time male auxiliaries in the Met. However, only 18,800 rounds of .22 calibre ammunition could be provided for training purposes because supplies had dried up. On 10 September the force was told by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, the company which had provided the ammunition used so far, that its ‘entire output of .22 rimfire ammunition has been requisitioned by the Ministry of Supply’. When the force contacted Major Polehill Drabble at the Ministry of Supply it was referred to the War Office. Eventually a Colonel Peploe at the War Office was tracked down and he explained that he had received similar requests from many other police forces around the country. He suggested that the force put its request for more ammunition in writing so that it could be considered by a ‘Priority Committee’ because he was also inundated with requisitions from Home Guard commands.
...is about the London Metropolitan Police and its constituent divisions. One city. As Norman Longmate notes -
The original decision to arm the police was never formally rescinded, but the first weapons ordered for the purpose did not arrive until 1941. A scattering of weapons remained in police stations for use against criminals, but the overwhelming majority of policemen in 1940 were, and remained, unarmed. If any refugees had poured out of the coastal towns of kent and Sussex that autumn, they would not have found their way barred by some grim-faced gendarme flourishing a gun, but by a familiar, blue-helmeted figure armed with nothing more legal that persuasion, cajolery, and, as a last resort, a truncheon, reciting that often heard litany, "This way please."
This is confirmed in the article; as noted under the "Lend/Lease" section -
In December 1940 the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, declared that the US should be ‘The Arsenal of Democracy’ and in March 1941 he signed a bill into law which allowed him to ‘sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of ... any defence article’. Amongst the material supplied were thousands of .32 calibre Colt revolvers that
had been in storage for years and which the US was probably glad to offload onto anyone willing to take them. In April, the War Office offered them to the police and 20,062, along with 346,776 rounds of ammunition, were distributed to Met divisions. The idea was that not only would there then be enough to equip every regular and auxiliary officer on duty but that they would also
replace all the Webley & Scott pistols which would be withdrawn.
Unfortunately there were soon so many complaints about the condition of the revolvers that on 28 April it was arranged for inspectors from the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield to attend Scotland Yard every morning to be taken by police transport (the inspectors would not have wanted to use up their small petrol ration) to examine the weapons in every division from 30 April to 24 May. The results were that although the revolvers were generally considered ‘serviceable’, the condition of many was described as ‘poor’. Even so, all but 72 remained in use but it was suggested that divisional superintendents should keep the Webley & Scott pistols in their divisions as a ‘reserve’.
In other words - even in the London Metropolitan Police, which as we can see had taken what steps were availableto them to arm themselves...there was still a shortfall of many many thousands of revolvers for arming all its officers. And of course - the Home Guard had first call before the police...and both of them before any minister's private army :lol:
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#7

Post by Knouterer » 20 Oct 2014, 22:44

And a couple of pictures of policemen in Portsmouth in the summer of 1940, from Paul Jenkins, Battle over Portsmouth (1986). There at least, the "debate on arming any of the police at all", that allegedly was still going on in September, seems to have been resolved quite a bit sooner.

So according to Longmate "If any refugees had poured out of the coastal towns of Kent and Sussex that autumn, they would not have found their way barred by some grim-faced gendarme flourishing a gun" - but I believe I see one standing RIGHT there.

In all likelihood, similar "grim-faced gendarmes" - carrying great big Webley revolvers rather than little .32 pistols - were manning roadblocks and checkpoints in Brighton, Hastings, Eastbourne, Folkestone, Dover, Ramsgate, and so on.

In any case, I have already explained in another thread that there would not have been many refugees "pouring out of the coastal towns of Kent and Sussex that autumn", for several good reasons.
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#8

Post by phylo_roadking » 20 Oct 2014, 23:53

In any case, I have already explained in another thread that there would not have been many refugees "pouring out of the coastal towns of Kent and Sussex", for several good reasons.
You just can't help widening a thread to re-fight old arguments you've already lost elsewhere, can you?

As that particular thread discussion showed, the government had plans for evacuating coastal towns, and Ironside wanted them activated in June to get the civilian population out of the way of his military preparations, but the government refused...and said they'd be activated if an invasion occured.That's quite clearly an intention to do so in the event of invasion. And we also know that the Army and Police had maps pre-marked with separate roads marked for the use of refugees and for the use of the military...which apart from anything else confirms they knew there would be refugees fleeing by road as well as the planned evacuations ahead of invasion by rail. We also know that local councils were asked to participate in gathering evacuees for the mass evacuation of coastal towns, and that they continued with those preparations and in places extended them even after they heard no more officially after that decision at the end of June.

As for Portsmouth...Interesting that one picture shows a policeman with armed sailors walking past - which puts that policeman on guard outside a naval establishment. Perhaps that book you reference can tell you how many of Portsmouth's police were armed..? After all - you've already managed to demonstrate how very few of the nation's largest constabulary were armed before 1941...
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#9

Post by Knouterer » 21 Oct 2014, 11:12

phylo_roadking wrote:
In any case, I have already explained in another thread that there would not have been many refugees "pouring out of the coastal towns of Kent and Sussex", for several good reasons.
You just can't help widening a thread to re-fight old arguments you've already lost elsewhere, can you?
Phylo my boy ... as I have also explained before, the purpose of this forum is not to "win" arguments or "score points" against other posters. And you should be very glad of that, because your score would be pretty awful.
In any case it is beyond me why I would have "lost" the argument in question. YOU certainly did not refute any of the following points:

1. There weren’t that many people left to flee. Some two-thirds or more of the population of Dover, Folkestone, Deal, Eastbourne and other coastal towns had already left by mid-September. Those remaining - after repeated invitations from the authorities to leave if their presence was not needed - were apparently prepared to stick it out.

2. Even if they were not, reports about what happened in Belgium and France, not to mention their own experiences of recent weeks, would have made it clear to them that going on the road once the shooting started was much more dangerous than staying in their Anderson Shelter or (suitably reinforced) cellar. It is also not clear where these panicking refugees from coastal towns are supposed to flee to - anybody fleeing inland from Dover, for example, would be heading TOWARDS the (sounds of) fighting, which would not seem like a good idea either.

3. Whatever wild plans there may have been before, by August/September policy was clear and the government had ordered the population, repeatedly and unequivocally, to stay put in case of invasion and there were more than enough police, Home Guard and military on hand to enforce that order – and the road blocks were already in place for other reasons. The Chief Constable of Maidstone instructed his men as follows: “It is of paramount importance that when a crisis arises the public must remain where they are and any attempt at panic evacuation must be stopped, if necessary by force, regrettable though this course may be.” Frankly, it is absurd to suggest that at the same time town councils would be planning just such a panic evacuation, in open defiance of government orders. And there is no credible evidence that they did.

4. A number of roads were designated one-way roads reserved for military traffic. We can safely assume that any civilian vehicles found going against that traffic would be pushed off the road immediately and the occupants would be lucky not to be shot as spies or Fifth Columnists.

5. And on top of all that of course, by Sept. 1940 there were few civilians left who owned motor vehicles and had the necessary permits and petrol coupons to keep them running.

Of course there would be SOME refugees here and there, in spite of all of the above - but they would hardly be "pouring out" of towns, and it seems extremely unlikely they would "clog the roads" and hamper military operations to any significant extent.

But we're getting a bit off topic, aren't we?
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#10

Post by Knouterer » 21 Oct 2014, 11:16

phylo_roadking wrote: As for Portsmouth...Interesting that one picture shows a policeman with armed sailors walking past - which puts that policeman on guard outside a naval establishment.
Only in your imagination - ad hoc units of armed sailors were part of the land defences of Portsmouth, so this scene could be anywhere in town.
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#11

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Oct 2014, 18:27

Phylo my boy ...
Remind me again exactly who it is keeps complaining about my condecension?
1. There weren’t that many people left to flee. Some two-thirds or more of the population of Dover, Folkestone, Deal, Eastbourne and other coastal towns had already left by mid-September. Those remaining - after repeated invitations from the authorities to leave if their presence was not needed - were apparently prepared to stick it out.
1/ As you've already been shown - this was not the case, there were many coastal towns with less than or just around half their normal populations still there; two thirds had not flown the coop from the majority of coastal towns.

2/ You're making yet another assumption that "they were prepared to stick it out". This is not the case; as shown previously, the government had made preparations for non-combatants' evacuation which would have been actioned in the immediate lead-up to or in the event of an invasion. Getting on a government-provided and timetabled train and heading north away from the coast is not sticking it out.
2. Even if they were not, reports about what happened in Belgium and France, not to mention their own experiences of recent weeks, would have made it clear to them that going on the road once the shooting started was much more dangerous than staying in their Anderson Shelter or (suitably reinforced) cellar.
It might have made it clear to the Army...who were the ones wanted the coastal strip evacuated early...but panicking civilians don't tend to make that sort of reasoned decision.
It is also not clear where these panicking refugees from coastal towns are supposed to flee to - anybody fleeing inland from Dover, for example, would be heading TOWARDS the (sounds of) fighting, which would not seem like a good idea either.
I don't know how you reckon THAT; anyone fleeing inland from Dover along the A2 or A255 or any of the minor roads heading in the same directions would be heading away from the fighting west and north-west of Folkestone - which was the closest eventually that German plans had invasion forces landing on S-Day.
3. Whatever wild plans there may have been before, by August/September policy was clear and the government had ordered the population, repeatedly and unequivocally, to stay put in case of invasion
As has been shown - the "Stay Put" instruction was actually recalled and more toned-down instructions ordered.
and there were more than enough police, Home Guard and military on hand to enforce that order – and the road blocks were already in place for other reasons.
Except there weren't; as I've noted before, do you not think that in the event of an invasion, the Home Guard and Military would be busy elsewhere?
The Chief Constable of Maidstone instructed his men as follows: “It is of paramount importance that when a crisis arises the public must remain where they are and any attempt at panic evacuation must be stopped, if necessary by force, regrettable though this course may be.”
Any point in remind you yet again (even in this thread) about the government provisions made for handling these non-existent refugees I.E. the marking out of roads/routes specifically for refugees' use on maps issued to the Army etc.? And that the Chief Constable of Kent was involved in drawing up plans to deal with the expected flood of refugees; according to him, some places such as nodal points, which were going to be subject to all-round defence and in those cases all "useless mouths" - women and children and the aged-infirm - would be compulsorily evacuated.
Frankly, it is absurd to suggest that at the same time town councils would be planning just such a panic evacuation, in open defiance of government orders. And there is no credible evidence that they did
On the contrary, there's clear evidence they did just that. And NOT in defiance of government orders, initially as their "local" part of the overall government evacuation scheme prepared in early June.
4. A number of roads were designated one-way roads reserved for military traffic. We can safely assume that any civilian vehicles found going against that traffic would be pushed off the road immediately and the occupants would be lucky not to be shot as spies or Fifth Columnists.
You're determined to ignore the roads that were likewise marked out om maps specifically for refugees, aren't you?
5. And on top of all that of course, by Sept. 1940 there were few civilians left who owned motor vehicles and had the necessary permits and petrol coupons to keep them running
You're assuming that refugees were all be in cars??? Weren't you just talking about the Belgium/France experience?
But we're getting a bit off topic, aren't we?
Once again, in yet another thread...
In any case, I have already explained in another thread that there would not have been many refugees "pouring out of the coastal towns of Kent and Sussex that autumn", for several good reasons.
...you are the one who chose to take us there.

On the matter of armed police controlling refugees...you appear to have missed the whole point of arming the police -
On the same day during a meeting of the War cabinet a throwaway remark by the Home Secretary on the role of armed police officers resulted in several months of serious discussion during which it was even suggested that if there was an invasion the British Police should become part of the armed forces of the Crown.
After seeing which way the Churchill wind was blowing, Anderson presented the War
Cabinet with proposals on police arming in the form of a seven-point memorandum at its
meeting on 24 May: ‘1. The police are a civilian force, normally unarmed, and only a
minority of the members of the regular and auxiliary police forces are at present trained in the
use of firearms. 2. Even in the existing situation the main body of the police must remain
available for the performance of normal police duties, for most of which the carrying of arms
is unnecessary and undesirable. There is, however, a large number of men - approximately
10,000 full-time policemen and many thousands of part-time Special Constables - now
employed in guarding vulnerable points against sabotage. 3. As regards the risk of enemy
landings by parachute, the functions of the police should in the main be confined to (a)
observing, and reporting to the military authorities, the presence of parachutists; and (b)
preventing attempts at sabotage or other acts of violence by isolated individuals and
overpowering and arresting the individuals where possible. 4. There are accordingly, certain
particular purposes for which it would be proper and desirable to take steps immediately to
arm the police, namely (a) Guarding vulnerable points against sabotage, as far as this is
undertaken by the police. (b) Protecting important police stations against attempts to seize
them by enemy raiding parties, whether parachutists or not. For this purpose selected
members of the staffs of the stations should be armed. (c) Armed motorised patrols employed
in parties of from two to four men, especially in rural districts and at the approaches to
important towns. (d) Armed Police posts should be established, where men can be spared, at
bridges or other key points with a view to controlling movements on the road, and holding up
individual parachutists attempting to reach their rallying point or to approach particular
objectives, e.g. for [the] purpose of sabotage’....

...Churchill accepted the compromise and the War Cabinet ‘approved the proposal of
the Home Secretary to take steps immediately to arm the Police - so far as the arms available
permitted - to enable them to carry out the functions referred to in paragraph 4 of his
Memorandum’.
Confidential Memorandum 25/40 on 29 May 1940 to accompany Game’s secret memorandum of the same date: ‘In view of the decision to arm Police whilst engaged on certain duties it is necessary to (a) revise the existing allocation of pistols and ammunition, and (b) issue rifles and ammunition to Divisions’. Additional pistols would be supplied and also made available for all officers of Inspector rank and above as a personal issue. Rifles were to be supplied on the basis of fifteen to each sub-division (five were for the protection of the station and ten were for use ‘should the need arise’ anywhere on the sub-division) and five to each sectional station. Each district garage (the Met was divided into four districts) was to have ten rifles, each Group Reserve Centre five rifles and each stables either ten or five depending on location. Each wireless car (up to four operated on each division as an immediate response to 999 calls – a system first introduced in June 1937), ‘Q’ car, CID car and Traffic Patrol car was to be equipped with two rifles so that the force could undertake ‘motorised patrols’.
When the Home Office circular explaining the War Cabinet decision arrived a few days later, Game decided to distribute an extract from it in the form of a secret memorandum (6/40) dated 29 May 1940. Interestingly, he had evidently made up his mind right from the start that he did not have men who could be ‘spared’ to cover all ‘bridges or other key points’ in London and so, using the loophole provided by Anderson, he omitted any reference to forces setting up "armed police points".
...it was for internal security - guarding their own stations, security against saboteurs and scattered parachutists etc...and the idea of "movement control" by armed police posts had been abandoned by the end of May.

As we can see later in your article, Churchill had pushed the arming of the police because he saw THEM...along with the ARP wardens etc...providing a two-tier system in the event of invasion, when there would be armed combatant branches of both assisting/being part of the Crown forces. And in fact...
Churchill was having none of it and said that ‘his view of the Cabinet decision ... was that we did not contemplate or countenance fighting by persons not in the armed forces, but that we did not forbid it. What he had had in mind was that the
police, and, he hoped, the A.R.P. services, could be divided into combatant and noncombatant branches, armed and unarmed; those armed would co-operate actively in fighting with the Home Guard and Regulars in their neighbourhood, and would withdraw with them if necessary; the unarmed would assist in the "stay put" policy for civilians’.
I.E. no armed police for handling refugees! In other words -
If any refugees had poured out of the coastal towns of kent and Sussex that autumn, they would not have found their way barred by some grim-faced gendarme flourishing a gun, but by a familiar, blue-helmeted figure armed with nothing more legal that persuasion, cajolery, and, as a last resort, a truncheon, reciting that often heard litany, "This way please."
The younger (fitter :P) police officers were armed to "...co-operate actively in fighting with the Home Guard and Regulars in their neighbourhood"...and/or "withdrawn" :P ....from invasion areas as necessary and under military orders.
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 21 Oct 2014, 20:54, edited 3 times in total.
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Knouterer
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#12

Post by Knouterer » 21 Oct 2014, 19:58

Just in case somebody is wondering what the .32 and .22 Webley pistols referred to in the article I linked to and Phylo has so kindly - if somewhat excessively - quoted from looked like, I see that Google doesn't produce much, so here's a picture (from "Handguns" by Frederick Wilkinson, 1993). The .32 pistol as adopted by the Met in 1911 is bottom right, the top two pistols with open-top slides are the .22 version as used for training (with different barrel lenghts).
As an aside, some .32 Webley pistols were fitted with silencers for use by SOE agents - rather cumbersome weapons for their modest calibre.
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WebleyPistols 001.jpg
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Knouterer
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#13

Post by Knouterer » 22 Oct 2014, 22:29

I'm sorry I haven't been able to find anything about the Aircraft Defence Police, if it ever got off the ground (so to speak ...) but since the subject of the thread has been widened to the subject of armed police, here's an interesting item - a revolver holster stained dark blue belonging to the Metropolitan Police, according to the caption.
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MetHolster 001.jpg
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
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Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#14

Post by Knouterer » 23 Oct 2014, 09:32

phylo_roadking wrote: On the matter of armed police controlling refugees...you appear to have missed the whole point of arming the police -
Excuse me ????? All of a sudden I'm the one who "missed the point"? :lol: I thought we were discussing your mistaken belief - on the doubtful authority of Longmate - that the "debate on arming any of the police at all" was still ongoing as late as September ?
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
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Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

#15

Post by Knouterer » 23 Oct 2014, 10:29

phylo_roadking wrote:

You're assuming that refugees were all be in cars??? Weren't you just talking about the Belgium/France experience?
Try to think a little bit before you start your compulsive contradicting ... what I mean, obviously, is that the temptation to take to the road and flee would be very much stronger for people with a car with a full tank at their disposal than for people who would have to transport their most precious belongings in a pram or wheelbarrow.

The situation would have been different from Belgium and France. People there expected a repeat of WWI and did not want to be in the German-occupied zone. If they had known the outcome in all likelihood they would not have fled, because in the large majority of cases they returned home after a while and so had risked their lives on the road, abandoned their livestock, and/or had their houses plundered, for nothing.

I imagine that most people in Britain at the time were smart enough to figure out that in case of invasion there were only two likely scenarios: either the invaders would be defeated and thrown back into the sea in a relatively short time - in which case staying in tne cellar was the best bet - or they would win and occupy the whole island, in which case fleeing was pointless.

To repeat myself, I'm not saying there wouldn't have been any refugees at all - just not large masses blocking the roads everywhere.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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