British Army at home September 1940

[gambadier]

According to the RA History (Farndale's 'Years of Defeat 1939-41) the state in autumn 1940 was
Eastern Comd
1 SHy Regt (9 & 10 Btys)
2 SHy Regt (5, 7, 8, 11, 12 Btys)
3 SHy Regt (4, 13 Btys RA, X, Y Btys RCA) X & Y Btys were serving in a Coast role as were the two Newfoundland heavy regts (57 & 59)
14 SHy Bty was in Southern Comd

The other relevant Coast Regts were:
516 Isle of Grain
517 Canvey Island,
518 Isle of Sheppey,
519 Dover,
521 Newhaven

It would seem that the place to look for deployment details of the emergency btys equipped with 6 in naval guns etc is the war diary for RA Branch GHQ Home Forces. Presumably RA Branch Eastern Comd war diary will give details of the units under their command.

It's also useful to remember that the SHy heavy batteries were totally different to the coast batteries, the former were organised, deployed and equipped for indirect fire, the latter for direct fire.

[Knouterer]

Before returning to the subject of the railway guns, I have been going through the The War Diary of the 2/5 Queens which is a treasure trove of information and has some interesting info on the defence of airfields too. In Nov. 1941 they were tasked to provide the relief column for Martlesham Heath near Ipswich. This airfield was a satellite for North Weald and there was a single fighter squadron stationed there at the time as far as I can make out, No. 403 (Canadian) with Spitfires Vb.
Even though the threat of invasion must have seemed remote at the time, the army and the RAF were clearly taking no chances.

Operation Order No. 3 of 23 Nov. 1941 stated:

“3. MARTLESHAM Aerodrome defence tps consist of the following:

R.A.F. Personnel: 4 Hispano 20 m.m. guns, 12 Lewis L.M.G.’s, 164 Thompson S.M.G.’s, 365 (approx) rifles, 3 Armadillos.

2 Coys 70 Suffolks (that is, a YS battalion - K): 21 Vickers M.G.’s, 10 Lewis L.M.G.’s, 5 Thompson S.M.G.’s, 6 A/Tk rifles, 2 2-in mortars, 475 (approx.) rifles, 1 Carrier, 2 Beaverettes.

84/49th L.A.A. Bty, R.A.: 4 Bofors guns, 13 Lewis L.M.G.’s.

908 Def. Bty., R.A.: 2 mobile 3-pdr guns, 1 Lewis gun.”

The entire Queens battalion, supported by 228 Fd Bty and “K“ Tp. 268 A. Tk. Bty, would “prevent the occupation of MARTLESHAM Aerodrome by the enemy, and destroy any enemy in the immediate vicinity.”
To that end, the battalion and supporting units would first concentrate in two areas north and south of the airfield. Interestingly, the orders stipulated that in order to avoid confusion between attackers and defenders, no troops on foot would enter the perimeter; only carriers would break through the wire (at predetermined breaking-in points where there was only a “double apron wire” instead of dense concertina barriers) and attack any enemy on the airfield itself, if necessary.

Looking at the numbers, while some (Hispano guns, Lewis, Armadillos …) seem entirely familiar from our Lympne discussions, 164 Thompsons in the hands of RAF personnel seems rather a lot, though perhaps not impossible. At that time, Thompsons were distributed to the Home Guard on a remarkably generous scale too for such an expensive weapon; according to the official monthly returns they had no less than 43,017 of them by March 1942, after which they were gradually replaced by Stens.

In any case, if those numbers of weapons are anywhere near correct, there must have been well over 600 RAF personnel at the airfield.

Although most infantry battalions were down to normal strength of about 800 again by the end of 1941, those two Young Soldiers companies apparently were very considerably over strength still, at 500+ men/boys, and with a lot of firepower too, assuming they knew how to handle those 21 Vickers M.G.’s. In general, the YS battalions were not rated very highly, the officers and NCO’s were mostly those the parent regiments felt they could do without, and while many of the boys (meaning under 19) were undoubtedly keen to serve, it is also true – as one veteran YS observed – that with so many men in the services it was not difficult for an enterprising lad to find a good job, and so the YS battalions were to some extent recruited from the ranks of the unemployable. With poor leadership, little interesting training and endless boring guard duty, discipline problems could not fail to develop, which in some cases went as far as vandalizing aircraft.

[phylo_roadking]

Before returning to the subject of the railway guns, I have been going through the The War Diary of the 2/5 Queens which is a treasure trove of information and has some interesting info on the defence of airfields too. In Nov. 1941 they were tasked to provide the relief column for Martlesham Heath near Ipswich. This airfield was a satellite for North Weald and there was a single fighter squadron stationed there at the time as far as I can make out, No. 403 (Canadian) with Spitfires Vb.

Looking at the numbers, while some (Hispano guns, Lewis, Armadillos …) seem entirely familiar from our Lympne discussions, 164 Thompsons in the hands of RAF personnel seems rather a lot, though perhaps not impossible. At that time, Thompsons were distributed to the Home Guard on a remarkably generous scale too for such an expensive weapon; according to the official monthly returns they had no less than 43,017 of them by March 1942, after which they were gradually replaced by Stens.

In any case, if those numbers of weapons are anywhere near correct, there must have been well over 600 RAF personnel at the airfield.

Well, for one thing - there may actually have been TWO full RAF squadrons at Martlesham Heath around that time; No.71 Sqn. Fighter Command, the "Eagle Squadron" of the RAF, was formed at Church Fenton in September 1940, and moved to Martlesham Heath in April 1941, where they operated from for the rest of the year at least, IIRC.

However - I fail to see how details of the defence of an RAF airfield fourteen months outside the timeframe of this thread is relevant...as even the most cursory reading of the early chapters of Kingsley Oliver's book would indicate how rapidly the RAF's defensive plans for airfields matured and grew way past its summer/autumn 1940 plans.

R.A.F. Personnel: 4 Hispano 20 m.m. guns, 12 Lewis L.M.G.’s

Looking at the numbers, while some (Hispano guns, Lewis, Armadillos …) seem entirely familiar from our Lympne discussions

And how do you make THAT out? Given that as yet we do not have any numbers of defensive AA for the RAF at RAF Lympne...

You'd be able to say that IF you managed to turn up said figures...but at this moment in time we can only compare those 1941 numbers with what was establishment for an RAF airfield as of September 1940. Remembering that Kingsley Oliver notes that this establishment did increase with time...

The only figure that is "entirely familiar" there is the three Armadillos Given that they were issued in flights of four, something must have happened to one of RAF Martlesham Heath's too!

[Clive Mortimore]

I am at a loss, Knouterer has written a post of what a typical defence of an airfield was like. Information about no ground troops were to enter the airfield when under attack is relevant to all the airfields and useful addition to this thread.

Phylo's point about it being a later date is worth mentioning because we are not certain that airfields would have been so well armed in September 1940. But why oh why do you need to nit-pick on every sentence with your over use of bold, underlining and italics? All it does is distract from your own argument.

Pure assumption about there only being 3 Armadillos at Martlesham Heath. One was broken down and under repair somewhere else? The quartermaster only had 3 on his shelves to give them? The young soldiers had taken the fourth one on a joy ride for a night out in Ipswich and left it outside Electric House? It is recorded as there only being 3 where most were issued in flights of 4......so what.

I did read a thread recently where one of the posters suggested that the German parachutist would not land at Lympe but elsewhere and attack the airfield later. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=154629

[phylo_roadking]

I am at a loss, Knouterer has written a post of what a typical defence of an airfield was like.

Clive -

1/ how do you know that RAF Martlesham Heath was typical...

2/ let alone typical of an airfield's defence in 1941?

We know for instance that RAF Lympne only had one Army company in its defence...

Phylo's point about it being a later date is worth mentioning because we are not certain that airfields would have been so well armed in September 1940.

Clive, here's a hint; take a look back a few pages at the long post I made regarding the detailed information available about the early wartime years of RAF airfield defence before the RAF Regiment was formed in 1942...

Note particularly my comments regarding the establishment number of RAF-manned AA positions...as opposed to Army ones...and how that changed (increased) slowly - then look again at THIS -

R.A.F. Personnel: 4 Hispano 20 m.m. guns, 12 Lewis L.M.G.’s

...and think about what that part of the war diary of the 2/5 Queens is saying

Pure assumption about there only being 3 Armadillos at Martlesham Heath. One was broken down and under repair somewhere else? The quartermaster only had 3 on his shelves to give them? The young soldiers had taken the fourth one on a joy ride for a night out in Ipswich and left it outside Electric House? It is recorded as there only being 3 where most were issued in flights of 4......so what.

Er...hardly "pure assumption" when that's the figure recorded in the said war diary.

So what? It's purely a historical factlet, but it does show that Martlesham Heath, like Lympne, ended up one under establishment for whatever reason. Obviously we don't know the reason - what's interesting is that it happened. And that this was the number in service at Martlesham Heath as notified to the Army as the RAF's contribution to the airfield's defence....

...the The War Diary of the 2/5 Queens which is a treasure trove of information and has some interesting info on the defence of airfields too. In Nov. 1941 they were tasked to provide the relief column for Martlesham Heath near Ipswich. ...

Operation Order No. 3 of 23 Nov. 1941 stated:

“3. MARTLESHAM Aerodrome defence tps consist of the following:

R.A.F. Personnel: 4 Hispano 20 m.m. guns, 12 Lewis L.M.G.’s, 164 Thompson S.M.G.’s, 365 (approx) rifles, 3 Armadillos.

2 Coys 70 Suffolks (that is, a YS battalion - K): 21 Vickers M.G.’s, 10 Lewis L.M.G.’s, 5 Thompson S.M.G.’s, 6 A/Tk rifles, 2 2-in mortars, 475 (approx.) rifles, 1 Carrier, 2 Beaverettes.

84/49th L.A.A. Bty, R.A.: 4 Bofors guns, 13 Lewis L.M.G.’s.

908 Def. Bty., R.A.: 2 mobile 3-pdr guns, 1 Lewis gun.”

I did read a thread recently where one of the posters suggested that the German parachutist would not land at Lympe but elsewhere and attack the airfield later. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=154629

Yes, this is indeed the situation...and what all the discussion as to the forces available for the defence of RAF Lympne from ground attack is predicated on.

And finally...

Information about no ground troops were to enter the airfield when under attack is relevant to all the airfields and useful addition to this thread.

Actually - no; read again what Knouterer posted up..."...I have been going through the The War Diary of the 2/5 Queens which is a treasure trove of information and has some interesting info on the defence of airfields too. In Nov. 1941 they were tasked to provide the relief column for Martlesham Heath near Ipswich..."

His comment was regarding a fully worked-up plan for the relief of RAF Martlesham Heath, if attacked, by a third party....the relief column from the 2/5 Queens. We've yet to see such an operational order for any Army unit specifically for the relief of RAF Lympne; MILFORCE was to be operating just north of RAF Lympne...but heading onwards towards RAF Hawkinge and Folkestone.

There IS however something interesting about that sentence...but I doubt it's what you meant...

To that end, the battalion and supporting units would first concentrate in two areas north and south of the airfield. Interestingly, the orders stipulated that in order to avoid confusion between attackers and defenders, no troops on foot would enter the perimeter; only carriers would break through the wire (at predetermined breaking-in points where there was only a “double apron wire” instead of dense concertina barriers) and attack any enemy on the airfield itself, if necessary.

Although most infantry battalions were down to normal strength of about 800 again by the end of 1941, those two Young Soldiers companies apparently were very considerably over strength still, at 500+ men/boys, and with a lot of firepower too, assuming they knew how to handle those 21 Vickers M.G.’s. In general, the YS battalions were not rated very highly, the officers and NCO’s were mostly those the parent regiments felt they could do without, and while many of the boys (meaning under 19) were undoubtedly keen to serve, it is also true – as one veteran YS observed – that with so many men in the services it was not difficult for an enterprising lad to find a good job, and so the YS battalions were to some extent recruited from the ranks of the unemployable. With poor leadership, little interesting training and endless boring guard duty, discipline problems could not fail to develop, which in some cases went as far as vandalizing aircraft.

...it would appear the Army didn't trust the two "Young Soldier" companies and the RAF defenders not to fire at them!

Personally speaking - there's something else that can possibly be taken from that paragraph;

The entire Queens battalion, supported by 228 Fd Bty and “K“ Tp. 268 A. Tk. Bty, would “prevent the occupation of MARTLESHAM Aerodrome by the enemy, and destroy any enemy in the immediate vicinity.”
To that end, the battalion and supporting units would first concentrate in two areas north and south of the airfield. Interestingly, the orders stipulated that in order to avoid confusion between attackers and defenders, no troops on foot would enter the perimeter; only carriers would break through the wire (at predetermined breaking-in points where there was only a “double apron wire” instead of dense concertina barriers) and attack any enemy on the airfield itself, if necessary.

To me - that reads as if no matter what was to happen inside the Army perimeter around RAF Martlesham Heath manned by the two companioes of the 70th Suffolks, THEY were not to leave the perimter and counterattack; they were to maintain the perimter and wait for the relief column. It was the 2/5 Queens', not the "Young Soldiers" of the 70th Suffolks, that was to deal with any enemy inside the perimeter.

What would really be interesting now is to see orders for any of the "Young Soldiers" companies defending RAF airfields, to see if they do indeed stipulate the other side of that order I.E. instructions for them to hold fast on the perimeter.

[sitalkes]

I just found the book "Operation Cuckmere Haven" http://www.maureenschoice.co.uk/book_wi ... haven.html - is it worth buying?

[Clive Mortimore]

Pure assumption about there only being 3 Armadillos at Martlesham Heath. One was broken down and under repair somewhere else? The quartermaster only had 3 on his shelves to give them? The young soldiers had taken the fourth one on a joy ride for a night out in Ipswich and left it outside Electric House? It is recorded as there only being 3 where most were issued in flights of 4......so what.

Er...hardly "pure assumption" when that's the figure recorded in the said war diary.

So what? It's purely a historical factlet, but it does show that Martlesham Heath, like Lympne, ended up one under establishment for whatever reason. Obviously we don't know the reason - what's interesting is that it happened. And that this was the number in service at Martlesham Heath as notified to the Army as the RAF's contribution to the airfield's defence....

You really do beat me at times, could not you see that I was being lighthearted as to where the 4th Armadillo was.

[phylo_roadking]

You really do beat me at times, could not you see that I was being lighthearted as to where the 4th Armadillo was.

Yes - but the point is that it's absence actually is both interesting, and...to the defenders...important. Interesting in that for whatever reason it wasn't there, the missing one hadn't been replaced.

There's a numbers disparity thrown up by the Wikipedia article on the Armadillo; the text of the article lists batches totalling 667 Armadillos of all marks...but the article's sidebar states 877 produced, and this figure is attributed in the text to the Air Minsitry file on the Armadillo, AIR 2/7212. It would be interesting to know what other batches (or replacements?) were commissioned over and above the 667 to reach the 877 figure.

Whichever is correct - it's not a large number when shared out in fours around RAF airfields. I wonder just how many RAF fields received them...? For whatever reason they went u/s...enemy action as at Lympme, "gifted" mechanical maintenance, RTA...it's not a large pool to provide spare vehicles from.

[phylo_roadking]

I just found the book "Operation Cuckmere Haven" http://www.maureenschoice.co.uk/book_wi ... haven.html - is it worth buying?

I've heard of it...seen it referenced...but never read it myself; but it does seem to have generated a lot of references and content contributed to websites etc.. It's not that expensive although it IS a small folio...almost the same size as the recent copy of In Harm's Way about the 1940 bombing of Pembroke Dock oil depot I picked up recently for the Oahu Invasion What-if thread...

Total cost-wise, however - it depends how much they want to mail it to the Antipodes!!! I've had a look for you, there isn't a copy on Ebay.co.uk at the moment

It comes from the start of that period ten years or so ago when a lot of work was being done by local historians on their local defences, the Home Guard and its role in them etc....possibly generated by the degree of interest and netowrking afforded by the Internet. The same period has also generated a lot of area-specific websites.

[Knouterer]

To return to Lympne for a moment: from The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II, by Richard Alexander Hough and Denis Richards, about Lympne on 15 Aug. (page 164): "Not far away, at Lympne, our conscientious Inspector-General turned up as promised, examined the bomb damage and promptly put in his report. It praised the courage of AC2 Anderson and his party, who had promptly extinguished a burning petrol fire above a tank dynamited (sic) for demolition, and it recommended the supply of more men and machines to fill up the 380 bomb craters. Some strengthening of the anti-aircraft defences – four Hispano guns – was also strongly urged."

This is of course not proof that those guns were actually installed, but it seems likely. As we have seen before, the WD of the 6th SLI noted "fierce A.A. fire" from Lympne, driving off attacking fighter bombers, on 1 Sept.

[Knouterer]

Since the subject of the purpose of the visits of the Inspector-General has come up before, the same book has some info on that - for what it's worth of course. Page 148-150, about 12 Aug.:
"The three airfields scheduled for destruction were the three nearest the coast, Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston. By an odd and unfortunate stroke of fate the first two airfields were on the itinerary of the RAF's Inspector-General, the admirable Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. (...) (description of the first attack at around 8 am and the ensuing aerial fighting)
"While this combat was still in progress, Lympne's station commander was issuing urgent orders to tidy the place up before Ludlow-Hewitt arrived with his entourage. War was important, but so was protocol. There was general relief when the word got round that the Inspector-General had rearranged his timetable to visit this airfield at 5.35 pm. Cooks, clerks, kitchen staff, orderlies and batmen swarmed out on the grass with shovels and barrows for a day of relentless digging in the sun.
The ubiquitous Inspector-General, with unfortunate timing, arrived simultaneously - to the very minute - with a second large force of bombers. Ludlow-Hewitt was hustled into a shelter while Ju 88s plastered the airfield from end to end ..."

[Knouterer]

But to return to the Super Heavies. It appears that the list in After the Battle magazine I mentioned earlier is not wholly accurate and reflects the situation in October rather than September for several batteries.

The railway guns entered Kent from the beginning of Sept. and came under command of the Corps Commander Medium Artillery (C.C.M.A.) of XII Corps, a certain Brigadier Medley (http://www.gibbsfamilytree.co.uk/people/view/542 ), who until then had been in charge of:
- 5th Medium Regt., which had lost its guns in France and was manning several dozen 6pdr guns in pillboxes along the GHQ line in the Maidstone to Tunbridge Wells region (roughly);
- 74th Medium Regt., with 12 x 60pdrs and 4 x 6in howitzers;
- 56th Heavy Regt, spread along the front as discussed above;
- some odds and ends.

To save myself the typing and to add a touch of authenticity I'll just post the WD of the C.C.M.A. (WO 166/347) for September. As I noted before, there was some confusion and disagreement about what those guns were for; they certainly did not have the range to "close the Straits of Dover by gunfire"

[phylo_roadking]

But to return to the Super Heavies. It appears that the list in After the Battle magazine I mentioned earlier is not wholly accurate and reflects the situation in October rather than September for several batteries.

...but we still haven't been told the name of the article OR the issue of ATB it was published in - which was what was requested.

To save myself the typing and to add a touch of authenticity I'll just post the WD of the C.C.M.A. (WO 166/347) for September. As I noted before, there was some confusion and disagreement about what those guns were for; they certainly did not have the range to "close the Straits of Dover by gunfire"

....that of course not being the ONLY mention of tasks/duties in those two pages...

19.9.40 Task tables issued (Appx 38) Letter Anti-ship role (Appx 39)

I don't suppose you happen to have the said appendicies? They might be very enlightening.

Since the subject of the purpose of the visits of the Inspector-General has come up before, the same book has some info on that - for what it's worth of course. Page 148-150, about 12 Aug.:
"The three airfields scheduled for destruction were the three nearest the coast, Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston. By an odd and unfortunate stroke of fate the first two airfields were on the itinerary of the RAF's Inspector-General, the admirable Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. (...) (description of the first attack at around 8 am and the ensuing aerial fighting)

Interesting statement - which it should be possible to check

To return to Lympne for a moment: from The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II, by Richard Alexander Hough and Denis Richards, about Lympne on 15 Aug. (page 164): "Not far away, at Lympne, our conscientious Inspector-General turned up as promised, examined the bomb damage and promptly put in his report. It praised the courage of AC2 Anderson and his party, who had promptly extinguished a burning petrol fire above a tank dynamited (sic) for demolition, and it recommended the supply of more men and machines to fill up the 380 bomb craters. Some strengthening of the anti-aircraft defences – four Hispano guns – was also strongly urged."

This is of course not proof that those guns were actually installed, but it seems likely. As we have seen before, the WD of the 6th SLI noted "fierce A.A. fire" from Lympne, driving off attacking fighter bombers, on 1 Sept.

...although strengthening the defence of RAF Lympne by in effect 50% more defensive positions, let alone the accuracy of the Hispano cannon, should have done a little more perhaps than just driving off a raid.

Interestingly - the Lympne ORB does not mention the transfer into RAF Lympne of any more RAF ground gunners in the rest of August or September to man any extra AA, so the safer assumption would be that they were weren't installed within this period.

[Knouterer]

Interestingly - the Lympne ORB does not mention the transfer into RAF Lympne of any more RAF ground gunners in the rest of August or September to man any extra AA, so the safer assumption would be that they were weren't installed within this period.

As we have seen, the Lypmpne ORB contains very little information on the movements of Other Ranks, which however undoubtedly took place, so that doesn't prove anything. And I don't see how it would be a "safer assumption" to assume that a pressing request/recommendation by the Inspector-General was blithely ignored by whoever was in charge of distributing the available guns.

[Knouterer]

A location statement (appendix 42 to the Sept. War diary of the C.C.M.A) dated 23 Sept. lists the following SH batteries:

- 4th SH battery, two 9.2in guns at Hythe/Folkestone, “in action”;
- 5th SH battery, two 12in howitzers at Shepherdswell,“in action”;
- 37th SH battery, two 12in howitzers at Eythorne,“in action”;
- “Y” SH battery, two 9.2in guns at Bridge (613725), one “awaiting stores” and one “returning to ordnance”;
- “X” SH battery, two 9.2in guns at Littlestone, “in action”;
- 47th SH battery, two 12in howitzers at Lyminge, “awaiting sights”.

So that agrees nicely with the list for 24.9 in the WD of the C.R.A. XII Corps posted by Gooner a couple of pages back, except that the latter lists “Y” battery as having 1 gun “in action” and the 47th as having two “in action”. Which may have been a bit of a relative term; the fact that guns were awaiting sights or stores doesn’t mean they were unable to fire, of course.

Re: the Canadians, it appears that X and Y batteries, while undoubtedly in existence, were not yet Canadian-manned, or only partially. According to a history of the Canadian artillery, volunteers from various (artillery) units in Britain were selected at the beginning of Sept, but training was it seems still ongoing at the end of that month; the WD of the 4th SH bty (WO 166/1904) notes for 12.9: “Two Canadian batteries now being formed undergoing training with the unit”.