Proposal for Aircraft Defence Police Sept'40

[phylo_roadking]

..except, for instance, the official government one mentioned previously. For which the railway timetables can still be found filed at Kew....And the government said in June that it would action in the event of invasion.

The three/four-days-to-action one, when noone anticipated more than 48 hours - two days - warning at most...so in effect at least half of the evacuation would be carried out AFTER the invasion.

I don't know why you find it so hard to grasp that...

P.S. -

(except perhaps locally on a small scale)

I look forward to you posting up war diary material proving that the British Army was intending to forcibly keep civilian populations in nodal points and fortresses...

Whereas we've seen that they planned to evacuate them...

[Knouterer]

On the subject of local small-scale evacuations of the civilian population in an around nodal points etc. in case of invasion: Lewes in Sussex for example would have been an important Type A nodal point (supposed to hold out for several days) that the Germans, according to their plans, would have had to take to create a viable bridgehead.
According to C. Elliston, Lewes at War (1999), page 117-131, the local authorities did make some plans to receive any refugees coming from the direction of Newhaven and Seaford. At the same time, some of the locals would have been moved out of their houses and brought into the town center to create free fields of fire for the defenders etc. The defended area (according to the June 1941 War Book which detailed all measures to be taken, but the plans in Sept. 1940 were probably not radically different) included almost the whole built-up area. Water supply in case the town was besieged and cut off was calculated for 15,700 persons, which means that even with the army garrison and any refugees coming in, the (majority of) the local civilians (prewar population about 12,000) would stay, supposedly, and the authorities were not expecting, much less planning, any great “outpouring” of refugees.

Similarly, the plans for the defence of Canterbury included, IIRC, a belt of about 500 yards wide around the center of town from which civilians would be evacuated and brought into the center.

If you want to maintain that (central or local) authorities had (by September) any wild schemes for wholesale evacuations while the invasion was actually happening, you'll have to come up with something very much better than a vague reference to "timetables" from three months previously.

[Knouterer]

As regards the “roads reserved for refugees”, provision was not overly generous, to put it mildly. As noted above, as a general rule the army reserved for its own use all the roads it thought it might conceivably need, and any refugees would have had to find their way around those. The little map is from “Hailsham at War” (edited by George Farebrother) and illustrates the point rather well. The “roads reserved for refugees” were in some cases no more than foot-paths, and where those crossed the “military” roads civilians would be held up (by troops, police and/or HG) and only allowed to cross if there was no military traffic in sight.

According to the WDs of units stationed there, the situation was much the same in Romney Marsh, where – once again – there weren’t many people left to flee in the first place. By the end of Sept. the population of Dymchurch was down to 300 or less.

[Knouterer]

As regards the arming of police with army rifles and revolvers, that seems to have been fairly general practice, at least in areas directly threatened with invasion.
For example, on the night of 4/5 September, a He 111 piloted by Oberleutnant Peter Biebrach was shot down by a Blenheim night fighter. Biebrach jumped and landed somewhere near Ipswich, and was arrested early that morning by two policemen carrying rifles with fixed bayonets (as related in C. Goss, The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain, page 139).
On the other hand, their firearms training seems to have been very basic; after they had relieved Biebrach of his Walther pistol, they couldn't figure out how to unload it and asked him to do it for them.
,

[phylo_roadking]

well, at last we are progressing; you're now admitting that yes -

On the subject of local small-scale evacuations of the civilian population in an around nodal points etc. in case of invasion: Lewes in Sussex for example would have been an important Type A nodal point (supposed to hold out for several days) that the Germans, according to their plans, would have had to take to create a viable bridgehead.

According to C. Elliston, Lewes at War (1999), page 117-131, the local authorities did make some plans to receive any refugees coming from the direction of Newhaven and Seaford.

...AND for the reasons I noted...

At the same time, some of the locals would have been moved out of their houses and brought into the town center to create free fields of fire for the defenders etc.

As for these...

The defended area (according to the June 1941 War Book which detailed all measures to be taken, but the plans in Sept. 1940 were probably not radically different) included almost the whole built-up area. Water supply in case the town was besieged and cut off was calculated for 15,700 persons, which means that even with the army garrison and any refugees coming in, the (majority of) the local civilians (prewar population about 12,000) would stay, supposedly, and the authorities were not expecting, much less planning, any great “outpouring” of refugees.

Similarly, the plans for the defence of Canterbury included, IIRC, a belt of about 500 yards wide around the center of town from which civilians would be evacuated and brought into the center.

Lewes and Canterbury???? Perhaps...

If you want to maintain that (central or local) authorities had (by September) any wild schemes for wholesale evacuations while the invasion was actually happening, you'll have to come up with something very much better than a vague reference to "timetables" from three months previously.

...if you were to actually determine the list of coastal towns that were to be evacuated in the event of invasion as per the end of June 1940, you might not find Lewes among them

As I'm sure you wouldn't find Canterbury - it not being a coastal town...

As regards the “roads reserved for refugees”, provision was not overly generous, to put it mildly. As noted above, as a general rule the army reserved for its own use all the roads it thought it might conceivably need, and any refugees would have had to find their way around those. The little map is from “Hailsham at War” (edited by George Farebrother) and illustrates the point rather well. The “roads reserved for refugees” were in some cases no more than foot-paths, and where those crossed the “military” roads civilians would be held up (by troops, police and/or HG) and only allowed to cross if there was no military traffic in sight.

You're going to extrapolate the situation in ALL of Kent and Sussex from one "little map" of the area surrounding ONE town...?

Anyway - I see nothing strange about the Army restricting for their own use the ONE main road out of Hailsham...but the TWO in...as it would be the easiest way of preventing such a two in-one out potential bottleneck breaking down into chaos...

As for this...

As regards the arming of police with army rifles and revolvers, that seems to have been fairly general practice, at least in areas directly threatened with invasion.
For example, on the night of 4/5 September, a He 111 piloted by Oberleutnant Peter Biebrach was shot down by a Blenheim night fighter. Biebrach jumped and landed somewhere near Ipswich, and was arrested early that morning by two policemen carrying rifles with fixed bayonets (as related in C. Goss, The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain, page 139).
On the other hand, their firearms training seems to have been very basic; after they had relieved Biebrach of his Walther pistol, they couldn't figure out how to unload it and asked him to do it for them.

I would have to disagree with your logic of this example proving that the arming of police was widespread in the invasion area...

...for have we not already learned - from the material YOU posted on the thread - that roving police patrols especially for the arrest of downed enemy aircrew were armed? See for example your material on the Metropolitian police...

As opposed to it being "general practice"...

[Knouterer]

Hi

On Sept 23rd 1940 Lord Beaverbrook (Minister for Aircraft Production) put forth a proposal, that:-

1. I ask the authority of the Cabinet to enrol an armed force to be known as the Aircraft Defence Police.
2. The purpose of this body will be to secure the protection of:-
(i) Aircraft factories,
(ii) Airfields under the control of this Ministry.
(iii Ferry Pools
(iv) Dispersed aircraft
3. I desire the power to recruit a force up to 10,000 strong and I would propose to enlist men of
50 years and upwards, save in the case of men now serving in the Ferry Pools, all of whom I wish to
enrol in the force.
4. It is necessary to give our establishments confidence. They are suffering from the after effects
of bombing attacks. They do not put much trust in the defences provided for them, which have indeed been
of a meagre character.
3. For these reasons, it is desired to organise the Aircraft Defence Police

Source CAB66/12/21

Does anyone know if this proposal went any further?

Regards

Andy H

From a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 30 Sept. 1940 (CAB 79/7/4):

"(d) Protection of Aircraft Factories.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to a letter from Lord Beaverbrook referring to the question of raising a Police Force, 10,000 strong, for the protection of aircraft factories against sabotage, parachutists and air bombardment. The "blue cap" police were already employed on anti-sabotage duty and seemed to be doing well. A considerable economy in armed guard and sentries had already been effected. It was doubtful, however, whether protection against air-borne attack could be afforded by the Police Force envisaged by Lord Beaverbrook, and it seemed likely that further calls would be made on the 60,000 young soldiers who were being organized for security duties. Unfortunately an increase in armed personnel would mean a further shortage of small arms for the army.
Lord Beaverbrook's exact requirements had not yet been clearly determined. When they were, Sir Alan Brooke said that he would send a statement to the War Office outlining the complete proposals."

[Knouterer]

Two days before that COS meeting (28 Sept.) Brooke noted in his diary: "A day spent in the office which included several visits (...) Holden to tell me about Beaverbrook's latest efforts at raising a special army of his own."

Clearly Brooke was not going to do anything to bring this "special army" into existence if he could avoid it. He actively disliked Beaverbrook and complained earlier in his diary about Beaverbrook "poaching" armour plate for "Beaverettes" protecting his factories, pointing out - not without reason - that if an invasion took place and the field army was defeated, such factory defence units were not going to make any difference.

I would assume that the whole "Aircraft Defence Police" proposal went no further than that, if no references to its existence can be found.

[Andy H]

Hi Knouterer

Thanks for those two responses.
Given there contents and as you say, the lack of further reference, its seems evident that the idea went no further.

Regards

Andy H

[Knouterer]

My pleasure. On the subject of Beaverbrook and his private armies, from S.P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard - A Military and Political History, p. 66, about the American Committee for the Defense of British Homes:

"This private US group had accumulated a quantity of donated revolvers and rifles and was looking for a way to get them into British hands. As the wheels of bureaucracy seemed to be moving too slowly, the committee was quite happy to accept private requests for shipment from the newspaper proprietor Edward Hulton, a great supporter of the Home Guard, and from another press baron, Lord Beaverbrook, who as Minister of Aircraft Production was quite happy to short-circuit normal channels in order to equip his MAP factory units.
Moreover, once Beaverbrook had received the weapons he refused to give any of them up to the War Office. "Nobody shall deprive me of the reward for well-doing", he sharply informed Eden in early October when the latter requested that at least some of the donated equipment be turned over to him."

This intransigent attitude on the part of B is perhaps also an indication that his ADP proposal was making no headway.

For more info on the activities of this American Committee, see this thread (from item 14):
http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=4139.0

[Knouterer]

A note from the Ministry of Supply concerning another attempt by Beaverbrook to obtain guns for his private armies. Needless to say, he didn't get his 12,000 Thompsons. The total number of Thompsons in the UK at that time (end of July) was rather less than 3,000 by my count, with another 6,000 or so expected to arrive in the course of August, and it would take until well into 1941 before the orders referred to (55,250 in total) were filled. The firm of Auto-Ordnance had problems getting large-scale production off the ground.

[Knouterer]

On the subject of armed police, I found this interesting little booklet, which carries no date but was allegedly published in 1940. With regard to the American M1917 rifles, it states: "Considerable numbers of the United States .30 rifle are now in use by the Police and the Home Guard."

"Winchester rifles" here refers to .22 rifles used for training.

[gambadier]

The RAF Regiment was formally formed by Royal Warrant in January 1942. Airfield Defence was their responsibility from then on (or a few months later while they actually formed). The RAF Police already existed (formed 1918). Why on earth would another 'police' or defence force be needed by the RAF?

[Knouterer]

It was not the RAF but Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production who wanted this force, primarily to protect his factories (and airfields under the control of the MAP). B was the self-appointed head of the Home Guard units raised from his workforce, and as explained above was constantly trying to expand his "private army" and obtain equipment for it.

Picture shows .30 Marlin MGs bought from the USA in June 1940 (with all the other "surplus" stuff) on an AA mount produced by the MAP for its own use. As noted above, they also built their own armoured vehicles.