Hi
Does anyone have the exact losses of the 22nd AB in its attack on the Ariete position at Bir el Gobi? I have seen figures of total-write offs range from 26 to 50, and I would also be interested in personnel losses. Breakdown by type of loss would also be helpful, i.e. total-write off/damaged, WIA/KIA/MIA.
I have found some info on 2nd RGH, who appear to have lost 30 tanks and 50 personnel, 22 of whom were MIA, 19 WIA, 10 KIA.
http://www.warlinks.com/armour/2nd_rgh/2nd_rgh_41.html
Thanks a lot!
All the best
Andreas
22nd Armoured Brigade losses on 19 November 1941
Hi Andreas
You've most likely read these figures, but just in case you haven't and for others:-
The following is from 'The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941' by Agar-Hamilton & Turner (part of the Union at War Series) and published by Oxford UP
From Page 138
"22nd Armoured claimed, in addition to the capture of prisoners, the destruction of 'about 45 Ital;ian tanks', but, in a message that night, stated that 50% of its own tanks had been lost and reinforcements were needed. Interpreted precisley, the signal would mean that the Brigade had lost 82 tanks, but the official Italian History clims the destruction of no more than 50, with 6 Officers and 31OR's as prisoners. General Norries stated in January 1953 that, when visting Bir el Gubi not long after, he estimated the number of British tanks remaining on the battlefield at under 20. A South African report the day after the action states that their 1st Brigade counted 10. The probability is that the Brigade was reckoning among its losses the total number of its tanks-the notoriously unreliable Crusaders-which had broken down from all causes during the previous 2days"
Playfair in Vol III of the official British history of the campaign in the Med, gives a figure of 25 tanks lost, whilst this figure is also quoted in Walkers Iron Hulls Iron Hearts (Pg 84), he also eludes to a further 10 damaged. However he then states that this combined figure is on the low side, and goes with the 50 claim of the Italian official history.
Regards
Andy H
You've most likely read these figures, but just in case you haven't and for others:-
The following is from 'The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941' by Agar-Hamilton & Turner (part of the Union at War Series) and published by Oxford UP
From Page 138
"22nd Armoured claimed, in addition to the capture of prisoners, the destruction of 'about 45 Ital;ian tanks', but, in a message that night, stated that 50% of its own tanks had been lost and reinforcements were needed. Interpreted precisley, the signal would mean that the Brigade had lost 82 tanks, but the official Italian History clims the destruction of no more than 50, with 6 Officers and 31OR's as prisoners. General Norries stated in January 1953 that, when visting Bir el Gubi not long after, he estimated the number of British tanks remaining on the battlefield at under 20. A South African report the day after the action states that their 1st Brigade counted 10. The probability is that the Brigade was reckoning among its losses the total number of its tanks-the notoriously unreliable Crusaders-which had broken down from all causes during the previous 2days"
Playfair in Vol III of the official British history of the campaign in the Med, gives a figure of 25 tanks lost, whilst this figure is also quoted in Walkers Iron Hulls Iron Hearts (Pg 84), he also eludes to a further 10 damaged. However he then states that this combined figure is on the low side, and goes with the 50 claim of the Italian official history.
Regards
Andy H
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Michael Kenny
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This is from 'Carpiquet Bound' a privately published account of 4th CLY in WW2.
"Bir el Gubi
---------------
The 22nd Armoured Brigade had moved up by train to the open desert area south of Mersa Matruh at the end of October 1941 where 'shakedown' exercises continued until 16th November when Brigadier Scott-Cockbum summoned his Commanding Officers to receive orders for the advance into Libya on 18th November. The "Dogs of War" were about to be unleashed.
On the night of 17th/18th as a kind of Wagnerian prelude, a storm of tropical proportions broke at the precise moment these orders were being relayed to Troop Leaders by their respective Squadron Leaders. However, by 0900 hrs on 18th November when the advance began the weather had cleared.
The Brigade advanced through the previously created gaps in the frontier wire, 2nd RGH in the centre with 4th CLVto the left and 3rd CLY to the right. By the end of the day they had reached a position some 20 miles south-east of Bir el Gubi. The next morning 19th November, 4th CLY had 'A' Squadron in the lead with 'B' Squadron and 'C' Squadron echeloned back to left and right respectively. On 'C' Squadron's right was 'G' Squadron of 2nd RGH. The approach march of someeighty miles had taken its toll of the Regiment's Crusaders, due in part to inherent weaknesses in their design, but also to the inexcusable failure of the manufacturers to make various essential modifications when asked for well before we left England. So no Squadron was at full strength at this crucial moment - 'C' Squadron for example went into battle with only eleven tanks.
It was known that Bir el Gubi was an enemy strong point and that the Italian Ariete Division was in the vicinity. Wisdom passed down to us from Brigade Intelligence was that the Italian M13 tank would present us with no difficulties, nor would the German Mk.11 and 111 tanks. As for the German MkJV there were only twenty of those in North Africa'. We almost felt sorry for the enemy, but the rude awakening was not far off. Reconnaissance had failed to spot that the concentration of 'soft' vehicles that could be seen on the horizon were in fact well dug in and disguised anti-tank defences plus some similarly entrenched M.13 tanks.
The dashing cavalry type charge with which the 4th CLY went into battle may have seemed heroic when read about in the newspapers, but with historical hindsight it can be seen to have been ill-advised. Our tanks were soon overrunning the Italian trenches whose occupants were surrendering in droves, but we had no supporting infantry to take them over so they took up their weapons again as soon as we had passed through. Several 'C' Squadron 4th CLY and 'G' Squadron2nd RGH tanks were knocked out in that way. The Gubi defences had been well prepared in advance right down to the apparently haphazard groups of empty oil drums which in fact were range markers at 500 metres, 1000 metres etc. 'C' Squadron lost three Troop Leaders that day. The tanks of Lt.P.G.C.Somerville and Count John de Bendem were knocked out almost on top of Italian gun emplacements. Lt.J.S.Hankey and his operator Tpr.N.J.Davison were killed by anti-tank fire after their tank had been immobilised in a collision with a 2nd RGH tank. Lt.Hankey's troop sergeant Sgt.D.Cardy was also killed as was Tpr.W.Appleyard who was driving Sgt.Tony Reeves's tank.
Only three of the eleven 'C' Squadron tanks that went into action were able to respond to then Colonel's recall message late in the afternoon. 'C' Squadron had lost five complete tank crews one Officer, one Sergeant and two Troopers killed and the following taken prisoner :-
Lt.Count John de Bendern.Lt.P.G.C.Somerville, Sgt.A.Reeves, Sgt.P.R.Shurmur,Cpl.W.E.Cooper
Cpl.P. J.Turner, Cpl.Franklin, L/Cpl.L.B.Ephgrave, L/CpI.E.Evans, Tpr.L.Davis Tpr R D Elliott'
Tpr.R.P.Frith, Tpr.R.F.H.Cawston, Tpr.G.Clarke, Tpr.N.F.Druce, Tpr.L.V.Colombe and
Tpr.R.O.Gulliver.
The Brigade's tank losses were estimated as forty, twenty of which belonged to 2nd RGH. The Regiment's tank losses would have been even more serious had it not been for the initiative of Sgt.M. Seaward of 'B' Squadron in towing several 'A' and 'B' Squadron tanks to safety when they ran out of petrol. For this prompt and gallant action he was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Before the order to withdraw had been given a group of Italian M.ISs came within range of 4th C.L. Y. Adjutant's tank whose gunner set one of them on fire and stopped two others before the rest hurriedly returned whence they came.
That first Regimental leaguer in action was a very anxious time for the Colonel because only seven tanks had rallied within half an hour of the recall. But eventually, in ones and twos tanks began to arrive and it was well into the evening before all the survivors of the action had
returned to the fold. This situation gave rise to an amusing incident involving Major George Kidston, 4th C.L. Y. second in command who in trying to rally the stragglers, said over the air "On the count of three I will fire a RED Very light" - and promptly fired a GREEN one!
The Axis wireless communique on the day's fighting referred to the "... annihilation of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade." Momentarily disorganised perhaps, but for many months to come the Brigade was to give such an account of itself that this lie was well and truly nailed. Certainly the Commanders of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions were well aware of its continued existence."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is a caption from a Crusader tank photo.
------------------------------------------------------
The sleek lines and low profile of the A 15 Cruiser
tank or 'Crusader' are apparent, but this did not compensate for the fact that with its 2 Pounder gun and Besa machine gun it was normally outgunned by its
German opposite numbers. Another glaring deficiency which became immediately apparent as soon as we went into action was that we were supplied with only
armour piercing (A.P.) ammunition for the 2 Pdr- no high explosive (H.E.) being available to us. What would have happened if....?
"Bir el Gubi
---------------
The 22nd Armoured Brigade had moved up by train to the open desert area south of Mersa Matruh at the end of October 1941 where 'shakedown' exercises continued until 16th November when Brigadier Scott-Cockbum summoned his Commanding Officers to receive orders for the advance into Libya on 18th November. The "Dogs of War" were about to be unleashed.
On the night of 17th/18th as a kind of Wagnerian prelude, a storm of tropical proportions broke at the precise moment these orders were being relayed to Troop Leaders by their respective Squadron Leaders. However, by 0900 hrs on 18th November when the advance began the weather had cleared.
The Brigade advanced through the previously created gaps in the frontier wire, 2nd RGH in the centre with 4th CLVto the left and 3rd CLY to the right. By the end of the day they had reached a position some 20 miles south-east of Bir el Gubi. The next morning 19th November, 4th CLY had 'A' Squadron in the lead with 'B' Squadron and 'C' Squadron echeloned back to left and right respectively. On 'C' Squadron's right was 'G' Squadron of 2nd RGH. The approach march of someeighty miles had taken its toll of the Regiment's Crusaders, due in part to inherent weaknesses in their design, but also to the inexcusable failure of the manufacturers to make various essential modifications when asked for well before we left England. So no Squadron was at full strength at this crucial moment - 'C' Squadron for example went into battle with only eleven tanks.
It was known that Bir el Gubi was an enemy strong point and that the Italian Ariete Division was in the vicinity. Wisdom passed down to us from Brigade Intelligence was that the Italian M13 tank would present us with no difficulties, nor would the German Mk.11 and 111 tanks. As for the German MkJV there were only twenty of those in North Africa'. We almost felt sorry for the enemy, but the rude awakening was not far off. Reconnaissance had failed to spot that the concentration of 'soft' vehicles that could be seen on the horizon were in fact well dug in and disguised anti-tank defences plus some similarly entrenched M.13 tanks.
The dashing cavalry type charge with which the 4th CLY went into battle may have seemed heroic when read about in the newspapers, but with historical hindsight it can be seen to have been ill-advised. Our tanks were soon overrunning the Italian trenches whose occupants were surrendering in droves, but we had no supporting infantry to take them over so they took up their weapons again as soon as we had passed through. Several 'C' Squadron 4th CLY and 'G' Squadron2nd RGH tanks were knocked out in that way. The Gubi defences had been well prepared in advance right down to the apparently haphazard groups of empty oil drums which in fact were range markers at 500 metres, 1000 metres etc. 'C' Squadron lost three Troop Leaders that day. The tanks of Lt.P.G.C.Somerville and Count John de Bendem were knocked out almost on top of Italian gun emplacements. Lt.J.S.Hankey and his operator Tpr.N.J.Davison were killed by anti-tank fire after their tank had been immobilised in a collision with a 2nd RGH tank. Lt.Hankey's troop sergeant Sgt.D.Cardy was also killed as was Tpr.W.Appleyard who was driving Sgt.Tony Reeves's tank.
Only three of the eleven 'C' Squadron tanks that went into action were able to respond to then Colonel's recall message late in the afternoon. 'C' Squadron had lost five complete tank crews one Officer, one Sergeant and two Troopers killed and the following taken prisoner :-
Lt.Count John de Bendern.Lt.P.G.C.Somerville, Sgt.A.Reeves, Sgt.P.R.Shurmur,Cpl.W.E.Cooper
Cpl.P. J.Turner, Cpl.Franklin, L/Cpl.L.B.Ephgrave, L/CpI.E.Evans, Tpr.L.Davis Tpr R D Elliott'
Tpr.R.P.Frith, Tpr.R.F.H.Cawston, Tpr.G.Clarke, Tpr.N.F.Druce, Tpr.L.V.Colombe and
Tpr.R.O.Gulliver.
The Brigade's tank losses were estimated as forty, twenty of which belonged to 2nd RGH. The Regiment's tank losses would have been even more serious had it not been for the initiative of Sgt.M. Seaward of 'B' Squadron in towing several 'A' and 'B' Squadron tanks to safety when they ran out of petrol. For this prompt and gallant action he was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
Before the order to withdraw had been given a group of Italian M.ISs came within range of 4th C.L. Y. Adjutant's tank whose gunner set one of them on fire and stopped two others before the rest hurriedly returned whence they came.
That first Regimental leaguer in action was a very anxious time for the Colonel because only seven tanks had rallied within half an hour of the recall. But eventually, in ones and twos tanks began to arrive and it was well into the evening before all the survivors of the action had
returned to the fold. This situation gave rise to an amusing incident involving Major George Kidston, 4th C.L. Y. second in command who in trying to rally the stragglers, said over the air "On the count of three I will fire a RED Very light" - and promptly fired a GREEN one!
The Axis wireless communique on the day's fighting referred to the "... annihilation of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade." Momentarily disorganised perhaps, but for many months to come the Brigade was to give such an account of itself that this lie was well and truly nailed. Certainly the Commanders of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions were well aware of its continued existence."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is a caption from a Crusader tank photo.
------------------------------------------------------
The sleek lines and low profile of the A 15 Cruiser
tank or 'Crusader' are apparent, but this did not compensate for the fact that with its 2 Pounder gun and Besa machine gun it was normally outgunned by its
German opposite numbers. Another glaring deficiency which became immediately apparent as soon as we went into action was that we were supplied with only
armour piercing (A.P.) ammunition for the 2 Pdr- no high explosive (H.E.) being available to us. What would have happened if....?
In a broad-scoped essay about the Italian war effort entitled 'Understanding Defeat', James Sadkovich gives 22nd Armoured Brigade losses at Bir El Gubi as 25 tanks lost, plus 30 'or so' lost due to breakdowns - perhaps reflecting that Ariete held their ground and many of the British tanks ran out of fuel. He also makes reference to the Italian official history, which gives Ariete tank losses as 34 for that day.
-
Michael Kenny
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more general information:
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paters ... es1941.htm
"The heaviest losses on the 19th were suffered by 2nd RGH who started to advance continued at 07:00 with 11th Hussars as screen. Their 'H' Squadron was leading, 'F' Squadron on the right and 'G' Squadron the left. At 09:30, 4 enemy tanks (identified as 4 Italian M13s) Northwest of Pt181 were reported by 11th Hussars. These were dealt with by 'H' Squadron. 11th Hussars then reported 18 tanks with artillery to the North, and 'H' Squadron knocked out 6 of these, too. At 10:30 Regiment was ordered to advance towards Bir El Gubi and here a large amount of enemy transport and guns was encountered by the leading Squadron. There was no opposition and a considerable number of Italians gave themselves up. Shortly after this a force of M13s was encountered the regiments left flank and these were successfully dealt with by 'G' and 'H' Squadrons. At 13:00, 3rd CLY were ordered to assist 2 RGH on its right flank and at 13:30 the regiment had advanced 3 miles North of Bir El Gubi and two Squadrons became engaged with a very large force of enemy tanks estimated to number between 140 and 160, plus numerous concealed anti-tank positions. 'H' Squadron was held up by strong anti-tank and artillery positions on the left and did not join until late in the afternoon. Wireless communication with 22nd Armoured Brigade HQ broke down at 15:30hrs and was not restored until 16:30hrs. For at least 2½ hours heavy fighting ensued and at 16:30 2 RGH withdrew to reorganise two miles South of Bir El Gubi. While they were withdrawing through Gubi anti-tank fire was encountered from the Italian personnel who had previously surrendered but had now re-manned anti-tank guns mounted on lorries, engaged 2 RGH tanks from the rear. By 17:30 all 'runner's had been withdrawn and a close leaguer was formed for the night were the regiment replenished petrol and ammunition. At the start of the day the regiments tank strength had been 46 tanks, but by 15:30 this was reduced to just 16. By the morning of 19th November this had been increased to 19 battle worthy tanks, but this still mean the regiment as at less than half strength. By the evening of 19th November 1941, 22nd Armoured Brigade had lost half their tanks, with about fifty being lost to the Ariete Division and over thirty to mechanical faults and breakdowns. The Axis wireless communiqué that night claimed "the annihilation of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade". However the battered brigade was ordered east to join up with 4th Armoured Brigade on the 20th. However, due to petrol shortages it did not make contact with 4th Armoured Brigade until late on the 20th"
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paters ... es1941.htm
"The heaviest losses on the 19th were suffered by 2nd RGH who started to advance continued at 07:00 with 11th Hussars as screen. Their 'H' Squadron was leading, 'F' Squadron on the right and 'G' Squadron the left. At 09:30, 4 enemy tanks (identified as 4 Italian M13s) Northwest of Pt181 were reported by 11th Hussars. These were dealt with by 'H' Squadron. 11th Hussars then reported 18 tanks with artillery to the North, and 'H' Squadron knocked out 6 of these, too. At 10:30 Regiment was ordered to advance towards Bir El Gubi and here a large amount of enemy transport and guns was encountered by the leading Squadron. There was no opposition and a considerable number of Italians gave themselves up. Shortly after this a force of M13s was encountered the regiments left flank and these were successfully dealt with by 'G' and 'H' Squadrons. At 13:00, 3rd CLY were ordered to assist 2 RGH on its right flank and at 13:30 the regiment had advanced 3 miles North of Bir El Gubi and two Squadrons became engaged with a very large force of enemy tanks estimated to number between 140 and 160, plus numerous concealed anti-tank positions. 'H' Squadron was held up by strong anti-tank and artillery positions on the left and did not join until late in the afternoon. Wireless communication with 22nd Armoured Brigade HQ broke down at 15:30hrs and was not restored until 16:30hrs. For at least 2½ hours heavy fighting ensued and at 16:30 2 RGH withdrew to reorganise two miles South of Bir El Gubi. While they were withdrawing through Gubi anti-tank fire was encountered from the Italian personnel who had previously surrendered but had now re-manned anti-tank guns mounted on lorries, engaged 2 RGH tanks from the rear. By 17:30 all 'runner's had been withdrawn and a close leaguer was formed for the night were the regiment replenished petrol and ammunition. At the start of the day the regiments tank strength had been 46 tanks, but by 15:30 this was reduced to just 16. By the morning of 19th November this had been increased to 19 battle worthy tanks, but this still mean the regiment as at less than half strength. By the evening of 19th November 1941, 22nd Armoured Brigade had lost half their tanks, with about fifty being lost to the Ariete Division and over thirty to mechanical faults and breakdowns. The Axis wireless communiqué that night claimed "the annihilation of the British 22nd Armoured Brigade". However the battered brigade was ordered east to join up with 4th Armoured Brigade on the 20th. However, due to petrol shortages it did not make contact with 4th Armoured Brigade until late on the 20th"
-
Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 22nd Armoured Brigade losses on 19 November 1941
For 4th CLY losses on 19 November, the book "Men and Sand" by the Earl of Onslow (then OC of "C" Sqn, 4 CLY) states that the Sqn went into the attack only 11 tanks strong due to breakdowns on the approach march and that it lost 7 tanks on 19 Nov and these were the only tanks the Regt lost on that day.
Regards
Tom
Regards
Tom
Re: 22nd Armoured Brigade losses on 19 November 1941
Most of the losses were in 2 RGH though.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 22nd Armoured Brigade losses on 19 November 1941
Andreas,
True, but I guess I was pointing out that some writers have tended to suggest that the Brigade as a whole was decimated, whereas losses due to enemy action seem mainly to have been in the RGH, whilst many of the Brigade losses as a whole were due to unreliabiity rather than tactical incompetence.
The other aspect brought out in "Men and Sand" is the lack of unit training that was undertaken in UK before leaving for Middle East. This factor does make me question if 22 Armd Bde was the most appropriate to send out at this time.
Regards
Tom
True, but I guess I was pointing out that some writers have tended to suggest that the Brigade as a whole was decimated, whereas losses due to enemy action seem mainly to have been in the RGH, whilst many of the Brigade losses as a whole were due to unreliabiity rather than tactical incompetence.
The other aspect brought out in "Men and Sand" is the lack of unit training that was undertaken in UK before leaving for Middle East. This factor does make me question if 22 Armd Bde was the most appropriate to send out at this time.
Regards
Tom
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
[Moved from "A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior."]
For example, here's a passage from "Raising Churchill's Army" by David French:
Well, it may have been, but once you've read some of the painful episodes that the Armoured Brigades inflicted on themselves, you start to realise how comparatively less important the technical differences were.phylo_roadking wrote:But on the other hand - the problem of relative penetration ranges etc. was a real, historical issue too
For example, here's a passage from "Raising Churchill's Army" by David French:
How the tanks were used is a more important issue than the technical differences, and is crucial to understanding why they gained their various reputations. Reducing the tanks to a "hardware" issue only serves to inhibit understanding. What failed was a British system, and to isolate tanks as a particularly blameworthy component of that system is an error this thread should be serving to correct.On 19 November 1941, for example, 22nd Armoured Brigade suffered heavy losses, when, unsupported by friendly infantry, it attacked an Italian anti-tank gun screen at El Gubi. The tanks passed through the Italian positions but were unable to take prisoner the many Italians who wanted to surrender because they were not accompanied by any infantry. They then encountered a large body of hostile tanks, who forced them back through the Italian positions, where they discovered that the anti-tank gun crews they had overran had still not been mopped up and had manned their guns and opened fire on them again.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
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phylo_roadking
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- Location: Belfast
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
Not necessarilyFor example, here's a passage from "Raising Churchill's Army" by David French:
How the tanks were used is a more important issue than the technical differences, and is crucial to understanding why they gained their various reputations. Reducing the tanks to a "hardware" issue only serves to inhibit understanding. What failed was a British system, and to isolate tanks as a particularly blameworthy component of that system is an error this thread should be serving to correct.On 19 November 1941, for example, 22nd Armoured Brigade suffered heavy losses, when, unsupported by friendly infantry, it attacked an Italian anti-tank gun screen at El Gubi. The tanks passed through the Italian positions but were unable to take prisoner the many Italians who wanted to surrender because they were not accompanied by any infantry. They then encountered a large body of hostile tanks, who forced them back through the Italian positions, where they discovered that the anti-tank gun crews they had overran had still not been mopped up and had manned their guns and opened fire on them again.
Read that account again...By the way, did you read the whole of this thread???
Now - this is what I mean...and it has already been discussed in this thread AND in the two regarding the use of HE - or not! - by early-war tanks....
YOU are seeing a failure of "combined arms" doctrine...what I'M seeing is 2pdr-armed tanks having to drive head-on against an A/T screen to "close the gap" and allow them to use their MGs against the gun crews in the absence of any HE capability...THEN being caught out by not having been abale to deal effectively with the A/T screenOn 19 November 1941, for example, 22nd Armoured Brigade suffered heavy losses, when, unsupported by friendly infantry, it attacked an Italian anti-tank gun screen at El Gubi. The tanks passed through the Italian positions but were unable to take prisoner the many Italians who wanted to surrender because they were not accompanied by any infantry. They then encountered a large body of hostile tanks, who forced them back through the Italian positions, where they discovered that the anti-tank gun crews they had overran had still not been mopped up and had manned their guns and opened fire on them again
I.E. "unsuitable" tanks hadn't been able to deal effectively with the GUNS, not just the gun crews...TWO YEARS after the same issues...the inability to lob HE...had caught them out in France.They HAD to attack the A/T screen head-on, the "classic" cavalry charge of British armour in North Africa in 1940 and 1941...because it the was the ONLY tactic against A/T guns the tanks had!
WE see it as a tactical failure because WE can see when they started getting it right later in the war; but as of then...19/11/1941...is it really a "failure" when it's the only tactic you have?
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
Why is it the job of tanks to tackle anti-tank guns, exactly?phylo_roadking wrote: YOU are seeing a failure of "combined arms" doctrine...what I'M seeing is 2pdr-armed tanks having to drive head-on against an A/T screen to "close the gap" and allow them to use their MGs against the gun crews in the absence of any HE capability...THEN being caught out by not having been abale to deal effectively with the A/T screen
TWO YEARS after the same issues...the inability to lob HE...had caught them out in France.They HAD to attack the A/T screen head-on, the "classic" cavalry charge of British armour in North Africa in 1940 and 1941...because it the was the ONLY tactic against A/T guns the tanks had!
WE see it as a tactical failure because WE can see when they started getting it right later in the war; but as of then...19/11/1941...is it really a "failure" when it's the only tactic you have?
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
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phylo_roadking
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- Location: Belfast
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
On 19 November 1941, for example, 22nd Armoured Brigade suffered heavy losses, when, unsupported by friendly infantry, it attacked an Italian anti-tank gun screen at El Gubi.
Because they were there???Why is it the job of tanks to tackle anti-tank guns, exactly?
What do we know of the run-up to that engagement?
Was there for instance any possibility of Commonwealth infantry arriving?P.S. they weren't the ONLY party to make that "mistake" that day...
The tanks passed through the Italian positions but were unable to take prisoner the many Italians who wanted to surrender because they were not accompanied by any infantry. They then encountered a large body of hostile tanks,...
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
I think you've misread it a bit - there were no missing infantry on the Italian side - the British couldn't take the Italians prisoner because the British Armour didn't have any motorised infantry attached to them. Also, the whole attack should have had co-ordinated artillery support.
You should get hold of the book and read the arguments French makes about combined arms for yourself. It's pretty complex and doesn't lend itself to the who's-got-the-biggest-death-phallus-wins kind of arguments that internet forum discussions usually boil down to on this subject.
You should get hold of the book and read the arguments French makes about combined arms for yourself. It's pretty complex and doesn't lend itself to the who's-got-the-biggest-death-phallus-wins kind of arguments that internet forum discussions usually boil down to on this subject.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941
Re: A view on why Britsh tanks were so inferior.
I thought that French was generally convincing as were Place and Buckley but that they were being anachronistic in their complaints about lack of "doctrine" and its importance. I think it's a red herring.Don Juan wrote:I think you've misread it a bit - there were no missing infantry on the Italian side - the British couldn't take the Italians prisoner because the British Armour didn't have any motorised infantry attached to them. Also, the whole attack should have had co-ordinated artillery support.
You should get hold of the book and read the arguments French makes about combined arms for yourself. It's pretty complex and doesn't lend itself to the who's-got-the-biggest-death-phallus-wins kind of arguments that internet forum discussions usually boil down to on this subject.