The inmediate response of Chamberlain after the Occupation in 15 March 1939, was to elude any responsibility, and declare that the Independence of Slovakia broken the Münich agreement. He greeted the news, apparently. He send a letter to Hitler, via an intermediary, and explained that he was in agreement with that decission. it could not say it in Public, for the reason that he would be the target of Attacks by Churchill and others. That was a week after!
But on 17 March, he condemned the German Occupation, in his Speech at the House of the Commons. The English public opinion was totally against this new move.
So, it appears that he reacted to the public opinion, not to German move, because in private, he agreed with Hitler.
Sources
- http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cg ... 8907257552
- http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0 ... 0.CO%3B2-P
- http://www.users.bigpond.com/battlefora ... nches.html
- David Irving "El Camino de la Guerra" (Barcelona: Planeta, 1990), p. 228
Regards
Chamberlain Changing view of German Occupation of Czechia
A funny way to agree with something, no?
One must give Chamberlain some credit for having common sense - he was trying to negotiate with a total nutcase that could set Europe alight at any moment. Chamberlain wasn't a magician, and didn't know at the time whether or not Hitler would or wouldn't behave himself in a fashion that could see peace through a dangerous time. So rather than blow things up for no particular reason, the British Prime Minister tried to walk a fine line with Hitler, to keep him within acceptable bounds without plunging Britain into war.
This does not, in any way whatever, mean that Chamberlain 'wanted' Hitler to commit aggression against any of his neighbours.
One must give Chamberlain some credit for having common sense - he was trying to negotiate with a total nutcase that could set Europe alight at any moment. Chamberlain wasn't a magician, and didn't know at the time whether or not Hitler would or wouldn't behave himself in a fashion that could see peace through a dangerous time. So rather than blow things up for no particular reason, the British Prime Minister tried to walk a fine line with Hitler, to keep him within acceptable bounds without plunging Britain into war.
This does not, in any way whatever, mean that Chamberlain 'wanted' Hitler to commit aggression against any of his neighbours.
The British Army was in no position to fight as early as spring 1939 and the essential mechanization by the War Department, paid for by hug spending increases year on year, although under way by late 1938 did not really start until the spring of 1939 and actual deliveries only really started by the spring as well given the delay between placing orders and issuing to units. It is interesting to note at the time as well various efforts involving the US to try and offer an economic solution to armed conflict. If you can't fight them bribe them! I suppose also Chamberlain thought that a deal could also be struck with the Soviets but when the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed, that put paid to that!
Well......I believe this one has been discussed before, and the authors do not seem to make a very strong case IMO. To quote from the review you linked to:
cheers
The authors' single most original contribution and the interpretative cornerstone of the book is their claim that at Godesberg Hitler and Chamberlain struck an explicit "deal". The only evidence for this deal is seven sentences from the memoirs of Dr. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf Diplomatischer Buhne 1923-45 (Bonn, 1949). Schmidt was Hitler's translator and the only witness to the Chamberlain-Hitler conversations.
Still, what exactly does it prove? It certainly suggests that Hitler was dangling some seductive bait before Chamberlain. But the critical question is: did Chamberlain bite? Alas, there is not one whit of evidence in Schmidt to suggest that he did. The only thing Schmidt says about Chamberlain (in the sentence immediately following the passage cited by the authors) is that he caught a flight back to London.
Also, this source mentions nothing about any letter from Chamberlain to Hitler following the takeover of Bohemia and Moravia, it just contains a brief and rather dismissive description of Finkel and Leibovitz's theories on the point. The JSTOR article can only be accessed if you have JSTOR authorisation. I've no idea what your third link is, but some unidentified bloke who's written something on the internet isn't much of a source.The authors are likely to make few converts if only because where they are convincing they are unoriginal and where they are original they are utterly unconvincing.
cheers
Thanks all
Qvist, the first reaction of Chamberlain was on 15 March, in the House of the Commons, the second was 2 days after. What changed? This is the question.
Irving Source is a letter by the daughter of HACHA to Hitler, in Bundesarchiv, NS 10/18 "Persönliche Adjutantur des Führers und Reichskanzlers"
Im searching for the Chamberlain speech of 15 March.
Boby,
Qvist, the first reaction of Chamberlain was on 15 March, in the House of the Commons, the second was 2 days after. What changed? This is the question.
Irving Source is a letter by the daughter of HACHA to Hitler, in Bundesarchiv, NS 10/18 "Persönliche Adjutantur des Führers und Reichskanzlers"
Im searching for the Chamberlain speech of 15 March.
Boby,
Churchill in The Gathering Storm has a few quotes from Chamberlain's speech to the commons:
"Bitterly regret what has now occurred" seems very different from "greeting the news".On March 15, Mr. Chamberlain had to say to the House: “The occupation of Bohemia by German military forces began at six o'clock this morning. The Czech people have been ordered by their Government not to offer resistance.” He then proceeded to state that the guarantee he had given Czechoslovakia no longer in his opinion had validity. After Munich, five months before, the Dominions Secretary, Sir Thomas Inskip, had said of this guarantee: “His Majesty's Government feel under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to keep the guarantee [as though it were technically in force]. In the event, therefore, of an act of unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia, His Majesty's Government would certainly be bound to take all steps in their power to see that the integrity of Czechoslovakia is preserved.” “That,” said the Prime Minister, “remained the position until yesterday. But the position has altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves bound by this obligation.”
This seemed decisive. “It is natural,” he said, in conclusion, “that I should bitterly regret what has now occurred, but do not let us on that account be deflected from our course. Let us remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains concentrated on the hopes of peace.”
Short answer – nothing. During any period of extreme stress brought about by confrontation, it is common for people to be indecisive or of several minds as to what to do next. This can find expression in the consideration or vocalization of radically different courses of action within the same timeframe. On March 15th Chamberlain was probably thinking that he might be able to carry on with his cooperation-deterrence policy of Munich. By the 17th, he’d come to the conclusion that stronger measures were necessary. None of the processes implied by these opinions imply in any way shape or form that Hitler was doing something that Chamberlain wished Hitler to do. The British Prime Minister understood (far better than Churchill, IMO), that Britain really, really didn’t wish to get mixed up with a lunatic in charge of a European powerhouse.Qvist, the first reaction of Chamberlain was on 15 March, in the House of the Commons, the second was 2 days after. What changed? This is the question.
This is true.So, it appears that he reacted to the public opinion, not to German move, because in private, he agreed with Hitler.
The explanation is here:
...The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was not much of a surprise to either the Milner or Chamberlain groups; both accepted it, but the former tried to use it as a propaganda device to help get conscription, while the latter soon discovered that, whatever their real thoughts, they must publicly condemn it in order to satisfy the outraged moral feelings of the British electorate.
It is this which explains the change in tone between Chamberlain’s speech of 15 March in Commons and his speech of 17 March in Birmingham. The former was what he thought; the latter was what he thought the voters wanted...
...It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant.
The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue. The Milner Group was anti-appeasement after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia...
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_01.html
Rumsfeld wrote:This is true.So, it appears that he reacted to the public opinion, not to German move, because in private, he agreed with Hitler.
The explanation is here:
...The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was not much of a surprise to either the Milner or Chamberlain groups; both accepted it, but the former tried to use it as a propaganda device to help get conscription, while the latter soon discovered that, whatever their real thoughts, they must publicly condemn it in order to satisfy the outraged moral feelings of the British electorate.
It is this which explains the change in tone between Chamberlain’s speech of 15 March in Commons and his speech of 17 March in Birmingham. The former was what he thought; the latter was what he thought the voters wanted...
...It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant.
The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue. The Milner Group was anti-appeasement after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia...
...The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.
These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany. These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis.
One of these offers revolved around a semi-official economic agreement under which British and German industrialists would form cartel agreements in all fields to fix prices of their products and divide up the world’s market. The Milner Group apparently objected to this on the grounds that it was aimed, or could be aimed, at the United States. Nevertheless, the agreements continued; a master agreement, negotiated at Dusseldorf between representatives of British and German industry, was signed in London on 16 March 1939.
A British government mission to Berlin to help Germany exploit the newly acquired areas of eastern Europe was postponed the same day because of the strength of public feeling against Germany.
As soon as this had died down, secret efforts were made through R.S. Hudson, secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, to negotiate with Helmuth Wohlthat, Reich Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, who was in London to negotiate an international whaling agreement.
Although Wholthat had no powers, he listened to Hudson and later to Sir Horace Wilson, but refused to discuss the matter with Chamberlain. Wilson offered:
(1) a non-aggression pact with Germany;
(2) a delimitation of spheres among the Great Powers;
(3) colonial concessions in Africa along the lines previously mentioned; (4) an economic agreement.
These conversations, reported to Berlin by Ambassador Dirksen in a dispatch of 21 July 1939, would have involved giving Germany a free hand in eastern Europe and bringing her into collision with Russia.
One sentence of Dirksen’s says: “Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would enable Britian to rid herself of her commitments vis-a-vis Poland.” In another report, three days later, Dirksen said: “Public opinion is so inflamed, and the warmongers and intriguers are so much in the ascendancy, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to become public they would immediately be torpedoed by Churchill and other incendiaries with the cry 'No second Munich !' ”...
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_01.html
This is true.Rumsfeld wrote:Rumsfeld wrote:So, it appears that he reacted to the public opinion, not to German move, because in private, he agreed with Hitler.
The explanation is here:
...The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was not much of a surprise to either the Milner or Chamberlain groups; both accepted it, but the former tried to use it as a propaganda device to help get conscription, while the latter soon discovered that, whatever their real thoughts, they must publicly condemn it in order to satisfy the outraged moral feelings of the British electorate.
It is this which explains the change in tone between Chamberlain’s speech of 15 March in Commons and his speech of 17 March in Birmingham. The former was what he thought; the latter was what he thought the voters wanted...
...It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant.
The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue. The Milner Group was anti-appeasement after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia...
...The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.
These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany. These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis.
One of these offers revolved around a semi-official economic agreement under which British and German industrialists would form cartel agreements in all fields to fix prices of their products and divide up the world’s market. The Milner Group apparently objected to this on the grounds that it was aimed, or could be aimed, at the United States. Nevertheless, the agreements continued; a master agreement, negotiated at Dusseldorf between representatives of British and German industry, was signed in London on 16 March 1939.
A British government mission to Berlin to help Germany exploit the newly acquired areas of eastern Europe was postponed the same day because of the strength of public feeling against Germany.
As soon as this had died down, secret efforts were made through R.S. Hudson, secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, to negotiate with Helmuth Wohlthat, Reich Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, who was in London to negotiate an international whaling agreement.
Although Wholthat had no powers, he listened to Hudson and later to Sir Horace Wilson, but refused to discuss the matter with Chamberlain. Wilson offered:
(1) a non-aggression pact with Germany;
(2) a delimitation of spheres among the Great Powers;
(3) colonial concessions in Africa along the lines previously mentioned; (4) an economic agreement.
These conversations, reported to Berlin by Ambassador Dirksen in a dispatch of 21 July 1939, would have involved giving Germany a free hand in eastern Europe and bringing her into collision with Russia.
One sentence of Dirksen’s says: “Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would enable Britian to rid herself of her commitments vis-a-vis Poland.” In another report, three days later, Dirksen said: “Public opinion is so inflamed, and the warmongers and intriguers are so much in the ascendancy, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to become public they would immediately be torpedoed by Churchill and other incendiaries with the cry 'No second Munich !' ”...
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_01.html
It appears that "bitterly regret" is indeed what Chamberlain said.Boby wrote:Any have the complete Speech by Chamberlain? Or a Cabinet file?
I not take in face value the words by Churchill, until we have more info, Sorry.
Link
There would be no cabinet file, since it was in an address to the house, so if anywhere it would be in the records of the house. If you indeed believe that he greeted the news, then instead of questioning Churchill's accuracy, maybe you should make an effort to find support for your belief. So far you have not done so.
I do agree with Hop that "bitterly regret" is not equivalent to greeting the news.
The 17 March speech was not in the house, but in Birmingham.
All the best
Andreas
All the best
Andreas
Refusing to accept what Churchill attributed as a quote by Chamberlain seems odd considering what you do seem to accept as valid sources.I not take in face value the words by Churchill, until we have more info, Sorry.
However, I've done some digging, and this is from In Search of Peace, by Chamberlain. It was published in 1939. I've snipped bits about financial aid to the Czechs to reduce the length. I've highlighted what I believe is the crucial part of the speech, where Chamberlain gives his opinion of what has happened. Sorry for any OCR errors that creep through.
"I THINK the House will desire that I should begin my statement this afternoon with a recital of the facts about the change in the situation in Czechoslovakia, as far as I k now it. On 10th March the President of the Czechoslovak Republic dismissed certain members of the Slovak Government, including the Prime Minister, Dr. Tiso, on the ground that certain factors in the Slovak Government bad not been showing sufficient resistance to subversive activities, and that the Federal interests of the State were thereby threatened. On 11th March a new Slovak Government was appointed, under the Premiership of M. Sidor, former Slovak representative in the Central Government at Prague. Dr. Tiso appealed to Herr Hider and received an official invitauon to go to Berlin. He had an interview with Herr Hitler on 13th March, after which he returned to Bratislava to attend a special session of die Slovak Diet, which had been called for 14th March. At the conclusion of this session the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed, with the approval of the Diet, and a new Slovak Government was constituted under Dr. Tiso, including M. Sidor.
"Yesterday afternoon me President of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Foreign Minister left for Berlin. They had an interview with Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop, at the conclusion of which a signed communique was issued. This communique stated that the serious situation which had arisen as the result of events of the past week in what was hitherto Czechoslovak territory had been closely and frankly examined. Both sides gave expression to their mutual conviction that the aim of all efforts in this part of Central Europe should be the safeguarding of calm, order and peace. The Czechoslovak President declared that, in order to serve this purpose, and in order to secure final pacification, he placed the destinies of the Czech people and country with confidence in the hands of die German Reich. Herr Hitler accepted this declaration and expressed bis determination to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and to guarantee to it the autonomous development of its national life in accordance with its particular characteristics.
"The occupation of Bohemia by German military force* began at six o'clock this morning. The Czech people have been ordered by their Government not to offer resistance. The President of the Czechoslovak Republic has returned to Prague. Herr Hitler issued an order to the German armed forces this morning to the effect that German military detachments had crossed the frontier of Czech territory in order to assume impartial control of the safely of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the country. Every German soldier must regard himself not as a foe but as a representative of the German Government to restore a tolerable order. Where opposition was offered to the march it was co be broken down at once by all available methods. The armed forces were to bear in mind that they were treading on Czech soil as the representatives of great Germany. Meanwhile on 14th March, as a result of incidents on the frontier between Ruthenia and Hungary. Hungarian troops crossed the border and occupied a Czech village. Thereafter the Hungarian Government sent an ultimatum to Prague demanding, among other things, die withdrawal of Czech troops from Ruthenia, the release of Hungarian prisoners, and freedom for persons of Hungarian nationality and race in Ruthenia to arm and to organise. This ultimatum expired this morning, but I have not yet
received official reports on the way in which the situation is developing.
"That completes my account of the facts as far as they are known to me. To a large extent the information which I have given to the House is based on Press reports, and while I have very little reason to think that the general effect is not as I have described it to be, final judgement on all the details should await further confirmation. I must deal with three matters which arise out of the circumstances I have described. In the first place, hon. Members will want to know how they affect the guarantee which was described by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Dominions on ath October last in the following words:
" The question has been raised whether our guarantee to Czechoslovakia is already in operation. The House will realise that the formal Treaty of guarantee has yet to be drawn up and completed in the normal way, and, as die Foreign Secretary has stated in another place, there are some matters which must await settlement between the Governments concerned. Until diat has been done, technically the guarantee cannot be said to be in force. His Majesty's Government, however, feel under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force. In the event, therefore, of an act of unprovoked aggression against Czechoslovakia. His Majesty's Government would certainly feel bound to take all steps in their power to sec that the integrity of Czechoslovakia is preserved.'— [Official Riport, 4th October, 1918; col. 305, Vol. 539.]
"That remained the position until yesterday, and I may say that recently His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to come to an agreement with the other Governments represented at Munich on the scope and terms of such a guarantee, but up to the present we have been unable to reach any such agreement. In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee and, accordingly, the condition of affairs described by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Dominions, which was always regarded by us as being only of a transitory nature, has now ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.
"In the second place, I think the House would like to know the position as regards the financial assistance to the former Government of Czechoslovakia authorised by the Act of Parliament passed last month.
<snip bits about payments of up to £10 million
When reading this, it's important to bear in mind Chamberlain is addressing parliament, ie both his supporters and political opponents. He was doing so as news of what had happened was breaking, and without being in full possession of the facts."In considering these events and their relation to the events which preceded them, we must remember dial at Munich, and at the discussion which went on before it, we were not dealing with a situation which had just been created. We were dealing with events and with a set of circumstances which had resulted from forces set in motion twenty years earlier. I may remind the House that in July of last year, when it was apparent that a deadlock had taken place in the negotiations between the Chechoslovakian Government and the Sudeten Germans, and that if the deadlock were not speedily broken, the German Government might intervene in the dispute, we were confronted with three alternative courses: we could have threatened to go to war with Germany if she attacked Czechoslovakia, or we could stand aside and let matters take their course, or, finally, we could attempt to find a peaceful solution through mediation. The first course was rejected, and I do not believe there was then, or that there is now. any considerable body of opinion in this country which would have been prepared to support any other decision. We had no treaty liabilities to Czechoslovakia; we had always refused to accept any such
obligations.
"The second alternative was also repugnant to us, and, realising that once hostilities had broken out they might spread very far, we felt it our duty to do anything in out power to find means of avoiding conflict, and, accordingly, we adopted the third course, that of mediation. I need not recall all the circumstances which led up to the final settlement arrived at on 29th September at Munich. I would only say that in the conditions of that time, and having regard to the alternatives open to us, I have no doubt that the course we took was right, and I believe it has received the approval of the vast majority of world opinion. The settlement has not proved to be final. The State which under that settlement we hoped might begin a new and more stable career, has become disintegrated. The attempt to preserve a State containing Czechs, Slovaks, as well as minorities of other nationalities, was liable to the same possibilities of change as was the Constitution which was drafted when the State was originally framed under the Treaty of Versailles. And it has not survived. That may or may not have been inevitable, and I have so often heard charges of breach of faith bandied about which did not seem to me to be founded upon sufficient premises, that I do not wish to associate myself to-day with any charges of that character.
"But I am bound to say that 1 cannot believe that anything of the kind which has now taken place was contemplated by any of the signatories to the Munich Agreement at the time of its signature. The Munich Agreement constituted a settlement, accepted by the four Powers and Czechoslovakia, of the Czechoslovak question. It provided for the fixation of the future frontiers of Czechoslovakia which has been enacted, and laid down the limits of the German occupation, which the German Government accepted. They have now, without, so far as 1 know, any communication with the other three signatories to the Munich Agreement, sent their troops beyond the frontier there laid down. But even though it may now be claimed that what has taken place has occurred with the acquiescence of the Czech Government, I cannot regard the manner and the method by which these changes have been brought about as in accord with the spirit of the Munich Agreement.
"A further point which I would make is this: Hitherto the German Government in extending the area of their military control have defended their action by the contention that they were only incorporating in the Reich neighbouring masses of people of German race. Now for the first time they are effecting a military occupation of territory inhabited by people with whom they have no racial connection. These events cannot fail to be a came of disturbance to the international situation. They are bound to administer a shock to confidence, all the more regrettable because confidence was beginning to revive and to offer a prospect of concrete measures which would be of general benefit
"In a speech which I made at Birmingham on 30th January last I pointed out that we ought to define our aims and altitude, namely, our determination to search for peace. I added that I felt it was time now that others should make their contribution to a result which would over-flow in benefits to many besides those immediately concerned. It is natural, therefore, that I should bitterly regret what has now occurred. But do not let us on that account be deflected from our course. Let us remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains concentrated on the hopes of peace and a return to the atmosphere of understanding and good will which has so often been disturbed. The aim of this Government is now, as it has always been, to promote that desire and to substitute the method of discussion for the method of force in the settlement of differences. Though we may have to suffer checks and disappointments, from time to time, the object that we have in mind is of too great significance to the happiness of mankind for us lightly to give it up or set it on one side."
In those circumstances it's hardly surprising that he failed to proclaim appeasement dead. It had been his policy for years, and had been shown to fail only that morning. Few politicians can change the entire thrust of their policies in an afternoon.
But it's perfectly clear that Chamberlain did not "welcome" the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I can't seen a single sentence of welcome in that speech, or even acceptance of the German right to invade. Instead Chamberlain used phrases like:
They have now, without, so far as
1 know, any communication with the other three signatories to the Munich Agreement, sent their troops beyond the frontier there laid down. But even though it may now be claimed that what has taken place has occurred with the acquiescence of the Czech Government, I cannot regard the manner and the method by which these changes have been brought about as in accord with the spirit of the Munich Agreement.
Now for the first time they are effecting a military occupation of territory inhabited by people with whom they have no racial connection. These events cannot fail to be a came of disturbance to the international situation. They are bound to administer a shock to confidence,
It is natural, therefore, that I should bitterly regret what has now occurred
Thanks for the corrections, Andreas.
But you don't underastand me. I not used the 15 March speech to said that he "greeted the news" No. I said that Irving quote a letter from the daughter of Hacha to Hitler, and Chamberlain words apper in it. ¿Why would Chamberlain send a letter via an intermediary?
The Churchill quote doesn't prove anything. That was Chamberlain public words (much different from the others, 2 days after), and Churchill interpretation of that words. ¿Is Churchill the whole truth? Well, for his fans, im sure that it was.
Im open to all possible interpretations, you know.
PD: The link not work.
Boby,
But you don't underastand me. I not used the 15 March speech to said that he "greeted the news" No. I said that Irving quote a letter from the daughter of Hacha to Hitler, and Chamberlain words apper in it. ¿Why would Chamberlain send a letter via an intermediary?
The Churchill quote doesn't prove anything. That was Chamberlain public words (much different from the others, 2 days after), and Churchill interpretation of that words. ¿Is Churchill the whole truth? Well, for his fans, im sure that it was.
Im open to all possible interpretations, you know.
PD: The link not work.
Boby,