Lancaster Bomber

[bf109 emil]

but for all the tonnage dropped by the USAAF and the RAF, Germans munition industry comtinued to turn out arms and munitions, planes, etc

Ah,, but the production figures show that production DID spiral down in 1943 from the bombing damage, until the replacement underground factories etc. started coming online in 1944.. Again...all built at a cost to the German coffers

yes...but this is what I mean...neither strategic nor precision was a knock out blow to Germany...thus we have to ask what was a bigger burden upon the German ability to make war...Destroying an entire city which must be replaced along with infrastructure or bombing a munition plant which could readily be fixed at a cheaper cost and arms turned out?

With hindsight we now know, destroying Germany's ability to refine or make synthetic oil was a key, as plants and tank farms etc. where not easily to disperse nor be hidden. Other the the V-3 sights every German munition plant was able to continue or weapons continued to be used, but as you point out, to a lesser degree until Speer ran his magic.

[Attrition]

The oil offensive affected the Wehrmacht but about 90% of the economy was fuelled by coal. That was most effectively attacked by the Transport Offensive. Mierzejewski goes into this in detail in 'The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944-1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway'.

[marka]

Ok – it seems, just like with the bomber offensive we are discussing, all restrictions have been removed!!!

BF109 emil, I really struggle with your contention that the USAAF offensive was ineffective. There are many examples of extremely effective bombing by the USAAF and I will happily cite them, if you wish. Yes they, like everyone else, believed that there may be quick fixes (ball bearings spring to mind) and they, like everyone else approached the offensive believing that strategic bombing alone could end the war.

However, I return to that word ‘efficient.’ I understand what you are saying Hop and Phylo, the RAFs offensive made lots of workers homeless, it destroyed their homes – it sought to fatally weaken the enemy’s capacity to wage war. But again, let’s be quite clear what we are talking about – many, many workers were not made homeless. They were incinerated, melted and atomised – along with their families – from the most senior citizen to the babe in arms. Wars are horrible things (and goodness, why don’t politicians ever learn that). The fact that the strategic 'area' offensive achieved more (and actually I don't know if I would argue that) is neither here nor there. If I have a mole on my arm, you could remove my arm – that would cure it. It wouldn’t make it a successful operation!

If we can operate in a moral vacuum, then yes – strategic area bombing was the ‘best.’ But I hope we never can. That is why we now have ‘alleged’ smart weapons – precisely because we realised that in the later war years we in the west, went beyond the pale.

This is not a swipe at the brave men of bomber command and the efforts they made to bring the war to a swift conclusion. The neglect of their sacrifice is a shame to this nation. However, let us also please not criticise the 8th Air Force who tried to abide by the principle of restricting bombing to military targets. It may seem naïve in hindsight – but it tried to abide by principles I think we all know, in our hearts, to be right

Respectfully

Mark

[Hop]

However, let us also please not criticise the 8th Air Force who tried to abide by the principle of restricting bombing to military targets.

Whilst the 8th AF carried out less area bombing attacks on city centres, as a proportion of overall effort, it's wrong to say they avoided them altogether.

The 8th AF began area bombing in late summer 1943. In 1944 they stopped recording area bombing attacks as such, and instead used the euphemism "marshalling yards", but they were still area bombing in intent, as well as in fact.

[marka]

Hop,

I didn’t say they avoided area bombing attacks! I said that the 8th tried to abide by their injunction – and they did. Yes, bombing a marshalling yard, using H2X, through solid undercast is not going to produce pin point results. However the 8th sought the military – not the city – target. I am sorry but it is not correct to say they started area bombing with ‘intent’ – they did not. I would be grateful for your sources to support such a claim. They dropped their requirement for visual identification of the target and yes, that did result in area bombing. However, they did not change their policy to encompass the targeting of civilian population centres

Mark

[Hop]

However the 8th sought the military – not the city – target. I am sorry but it is not correct to say they started area bombing with ‘intent’ – they did not. I would be grateful for your sources to support such a claim.

From American Bombardment Policy Against Germany, by Richard G Davis:

The first area raid noted in Eighth Air Force
records occurred on August 12, 1943, when 106
bombers attacked the city of Bonn, visually, as a
target of opportunity.
15
The Eighth’s first ordered
city or area raid occurred on September 27 1943
when it dropped, through complete overcast, 506
tons on an objective specified as the ‘city of
Emden.’ This was also the first raid in which the
Eighth employed radar-bombing techniques

Within a span of
two weeks after the introduction of a mere six sets
of radar for the entire force, the Eighth went from
a command that had never authorized a city area
raid to one that would launch more than one such
raid a week, on average, until the end of the war.
On October 10 the Eighth, employing visual sight-
ing struck the city of Munster as a primary target
and the German city of Coesfeld and the Dutch
city of Enschede as targets of last resort.
18
The day
after this raid the Commander of VIII Bomber
Command, General Anderson, outlined American
target priorities, ‘first destruction of the Luftwaffe,
its factories and planes; second essential German
industries, and third, the cities themselves.’
19
Anderson also introduced another change in
Eighth Air Force policy. It began to take effect at
the same time as the introduction of H2S - a large
increase in use of incendiary bombs. Anderson
had begun to encourage greater use of firebombs,
in July 1943.
20
The September 27 Emden mission
was the first of the Eighth’s mission to load more
than 20% incendiaries, while the October 2 mission
against Emden was the Eighth’s first strike to
deliver more than 100 tons of fire bombs on a sin-
gle target. Henceforth, the Eighth would not only
conduct intentional area bombing, it would do so
using area bombing techniques.

After the Second Battle of Schweinfurt bombing
policy changed. On the next mission, October 18,
the Eighth instructed its bombers to hit as their
primary ‘Duren, Center of City,’ and as their sec-
ondary ‘Any German city which may be bombed
using visual methods without disrupting fighter
support.’
21
On October 30 the Eighth amended the
bombing instructions for secondary targets to,
‘Any German city which may be bombed without
disrupting the Fighter Support.’
22
On November
30, 1943 the formulation became ‘Any industrial
city positively identified in Germany.’ The term
‘industrial’ tended to be a distinction without dif-
ference as almost any city in Germany qualified as
such. By the end of Lt. General Ira C. Eaker’s
tenure with the Eighth, the formulation for sec-
ondary city targets had reverted to ‘Any city posi-
tively identified as being in Germany which can be
attacked without disrupting fighter support.’
23
The
exact wording of the field orders may have
changed from mission to mission, but the Eighth’s
intent to authorize area bombing in a broad range
of circumstances remained constant.

You can see the intent in the bomb loads, too. Marshalling yards were not a good target for incendiaries. When the RAF went after marshalling yards incendiaries made up 2.14% of the bomb load. The 15th AF used 2.21% incendiaries. The 8th AF used a bomb load made up of 17.16% incendiaries.

[marka]

Hop

Thank you (sincerely) for your response – it is very informative. I am still going to dispute the intent though! Oddly in the 8th AF records, none of those raids you cite are listed as ‘city targets.’

12th August 1943 Bonn was hit as a target of opportunity.

27th September 1943 Emden: ‘Industrial Area.’

10th October 1943 Munster: ‘Railroad Yards’

18th October 1943 – The 8th carried out no bomber missions (The Duren mission was cancelled)

I am clearly going to have to get hold of a copy of that article, as that quote attributed to Anderson is new to me – but even that I would say does not provide proof of a US change of policy to targeting civilians. The reality is that (as with Bonn above) if you are carrying a load of ordnance over Germany in broad daylight it is ‘better’ to use it ‘somewhere.’ As to the contention that they were using ‘area bombing techniques’ I really must continue to disagree. The 8th chose specific military targets as their primary targets - not a distinctive feature within the city - which was often chosen as the aiming point for RAF night raids. I know that industrial areas is rather euphemistic – but it is still an attempt to hit a specific objective – not an attempt to wipe the city off the map.

As to incendiaries - even if they aren’t good at breaking rails, they are good at setting rolling stock and station facilities on fire. Again, I don’t think this proves a change of policy

I know I am splitting hairs! However, I still see a difference between pursuing a policy which says try to hit a specific military target and if not, then hit an industrial area – or even an area and that which says hit the area! And I know it is legalistic, but I don’t think that this shows intent. It is a recognition of operational reality. The intent was and remained the destruction of specific strategic facilities.

Respectfully

Mark

[bf109 emil]

The 8th chose specific military targets as their primary targets - not a distinctive feature within the city - which was often chosen as the aiming point for RAF night raids.

source? what specifically was the primary target in Dresden the 14/15 of February?
was not the Reichstag an aiming point for USAAF on various trips to Berlin?

[Hop]

Oddly in the 8th AF records, none of those raids you cite are listed as ‘city targets.’

That's the point, the USAAF didn't often admit to area bombing.

There's no doubt they did, though. From The Combined Bomber Offensive, April Through December 1943, USAF Historical Study 119:

Most of the operations performed by the United Kingdom-based US strategic bombers are best classified as area raids of industrial towns.

From The Army Air Forces in WW2 by Craven and Cate:

There had, indeed, been a tendency on
the part of American air planners in the theater during early fall to
look upon the forthcoming radar-bombing campaign as a highly de-
sirable, if temporary, shift from pinpoint bombing of specific factories
to the British technique of area devastation in districts of industrial
concentration. Like the work done by RAF Bomber Command, such a
project would supplement the precision objectives of the POINT-
BLANK plan. Not only would property, and much of it of immediate
value to the war machine, be destroyed but the constant clearance and
reconstruction would have to be done by manpower taken directly or
indirectly from the war effort. Aside from its effect on civilian morale,
such bombing would constitute a direct attack on manpower, which
was naturally (though exaggeratedly) considered a critical factor in
the German war economy.

The reality is that (as with Bonn above) if you are carrying a load of ordnance over Germany in broad daylight it is ‘better’ to use it ‘somewhere.

That is area bombing. If you tell your crews that if they can't find the aircraft factory, unload over the nearest town, that's authorised, deliberate, area bombing.

As to the contention that they were using ‘area bombing techniques’ I really must continue to disagree. The 8th chose specific military targets as their primary targets

Not always. They frequently sent out bombers with a primary target as the centre of a German city. That declined in 1944, but the euphemism "marshalling yards" was used instead. But if marshalling yards were really the target, why use incendiaries?

On 22 February 1945 the USAAF carried out Operation Clarion, a series of attacks on rail transport in Germany. 35 marshalling yards were attacked. It was a deliberate attack on rail transport, not a cover for area bombing. Attacks were carried out at low level for maximum accuracy. 3,121 tons of HE were dropped, 1.3 tons of incendiaries. I make that 0.04%

But in their typical attacks on "marshalling yards", the 8th dropped from high level, using radar, and with a high proportion of incendiaries. Those are tactics designed to damage the city, not the marshalling yard.

As to incendiaries - even if they aren’t good at breaking rails, they are good at setting rolling stock and station facilities on fire. Again, I don’t think this proves a change of policy

I don't think they are very good at setting rolling stock on fire. Bomber Command must have thought the same, because they didn't use incendiaries to any great extent in attacks on marshalling yards. Neither did the 15th AF. And even the 8th, when on deliberate operations like Clarion, didn't use many incendiaries.

They didn't use many incendiaries over France, either. In attacks on marshalling yards in France the 8th used just 0.67% incendiaries. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 1% incendiaries. In Germany, 18.6%.

Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the air war in Europe:

A further look at Eighth Air Force operations has revealed two egregious
examples of the gap between bombing practice and stated bombing policy: the
target categories “city areas” and “marshaling yards.” The two most cited Eighth
Air Force statistical summaries that cover the entire war do not list a target cate-
gory “city areas” or “towns and cities.” Both summaries were prepared from
the same set of data within a month of the end of the war in Europe.
Monthly statistical summaries of the Eighth’s operations prepared during the
war, almost contemporaneously with the events they recorded, tell a different
story. The Eighth Air Force Monthly Statistical Summary of Operations, gener-
ated at the end of each month from May 1944 to April 1945, listed a “city areas”
target category. For calendar year 1944, the summary reported that the Eighth
dropped 43,611 tons on “city areas.” Nor did these reports make any bones
about their targets. The report for the May 8, 1944, Berlin raid baldly states,
“Berlin city area attacked. Bombing raid done through 10/10 undercast on PFF
markers. Believed that the center of Berlin was well hit.” After reaching a
high of 9,886 tons (41 percent incendiaries) in July 1944, when the Eighth con-
ducted a series of H2X raids on Munich, the monthly “city area” totals steadily
declined to 383 tons in December.
A summary in a working paper from a USSTAF file, “Review of Bombing
Results,” shows a similar dichotomy according to time period. From January
1944 through January 1945, the Eighth dropped 45,036 tons on “towns and
cities.” From February 1945 through the end of the war, this summary
showed not a single ton of bombs falling on a city area. Unless the Eighth had
developed a perfect technique for bombing through overcast, such a result was
simply impossible. Obviously, the word had come down to deemphasize reports
on civilian damage. For instance, when Anderson cabled Arnold about USSTAF’s
press policy on the Dresden controversy in February 1945, he noted, “Public rela-
tions officers have been advised to take exceptional care that the military nature
of targets attacked in the future be specified and emphasized in all cases. As in
the past the statement that an attack was made on such and such a city will be
avoided; specific targets will be described.”
The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, although not explicitly listing a target
category such as cities or towns, had an interesting definition of “industrial
areas.” The survey placed three types of targets in “industrial areas”: (1) cities,
towns, and urban areas; (2) public utilities (electric, gas, water, and telephone
companies); and (3) government buildings. Given that definition the survey even
managed to describe RAF area raids as strikes against “industrial targets.”l79
The target category “marshaling yards” received more of the Eighth’s bomb
tonnage than any other, somewhere between 175,000 and 200,000 tons of bombs.180
At least 25 percent of all the Eighth Air Force bombs dropped over Europe fell on
“marshaling yards.” One-third of the American incendiary bombs dropped over
Germany fell on the same system. As a matter of directive and policy for most
of the period between September 1944 and April 1945, the same period in which
the Eighth delivered 90 percent of the total tonnage dropped on the system, mar-
shaling yards had the highest nonvisual bombing priority. During that period the
Eighth Air Force dropped 168,038 tons of bombs, 70 percent (117,816 tons)
blind and 30 percent (50,222 tons) visually.181 Postwar research showed that
only 2 percent of bombs dropped by nonvisual means landed within 1,000 feet
of their aiming points.182 Rail yards as such, however, were poor targets for
incendiaries. If the fire bombs landed directly on or near rail cars, they destroyed
or damaged them; otherwise, they could do little harm to the heavy equipment or
trackage. The Eighth realized this. Of the 9,042 tons of bombs dropped on
French rail yards, mostly during the pre-OVERLORD transportation bombing
phase, when the Americans took scrupulous care to avoid French civilian casual-
ties, 90 percent were visually sighted and only 33 tons were incendiaries.183
Even over Germany itself, during Operation CLARION, when the Eighth bombed
dozens of small yards and junctions in lesser German towns, it dropped, over a
two-day period of visual conditions, 7,164 tons of bombs in all, but less than 3
tons of fire bombs.
In contrast, using H2X, the Eighth pummeled marshaling yards and rail sta-
tions in large German cities with high percentages of incendiary bombs. For
example, rail targets in at least four major cities garnered the following percent-
ages of fire bombs out of all bombs dropped on them: Cologne, 27 percent;
Nuremberg, 30 percent; Berlin, 37 percent; and Munich, 41 percent.
“Marshaling yards” undoubtedly served as a euphemism for city areas. Because
the yards themselves were not good targets for incendiaries, the prime purpose
in employing such weapons was to take advantage of the known inaccuracy of
H2X bombing in order to maximize the destruction of warehouses, commercial
buildings, and residences in the general vicinity of the target. Large numbers of
planes scattering their bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aim-
ing points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures
located nearby.

I know I am splitting hairs! However, I still see a difference between pursuing a policy which says try to hit a specific military target and if not, then hit an industrial area – or even an area and that which says hit the area! And I know it is legalistic, but I don’t think that this shows intent.

I can't see how you can say a deliberate order to bomb a city, even if as a secondary target, isn't intent. If you issue orders to kill person A, if he can't be found kill person B, good luck in court arguing you didn't intend to kill person B.

I am clearly going to have to get hold of a copy of that article

It's available here: http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/airpowerreview.cfm

2003, Autumn issue.

[marka]

Sincere thanks for all of the above – it really does make most interesting and compelling reading. I wish I had more time to take each aspect and debate it point by point, but sadly I do not.

I don’t know – maybe I am just ‘way off’ but I still see something of a difference! (Please be patient with me) The 8th may well have decided to go over to area bombing and call it ‘marshalling yards’ etc. But it always seems reluctant – the publicity issue cited above actually seems to support this; as if they know its wrong. And maybe again I am wrong, but looking at the bomb load proportions over the last year of the war, there seems to be a ‘weighting’ towards HE whenever the target justifies it. From this I would posit that the 8th planners always sought to return to what the strategic planners and the American public believed in. (Yes, I know – supposition)

Maybe you would call it more honest – perhaps – but RAF Bomber Command didn’t seem to have that same ‘distaste.’ It honestly promoted the wiping out of German cities.

And Hop – as the deliberate targeting of civilians is now outlawed under the Geneva conventions, we really shouldn’t go down the road of what would stand up in a court of law! It is legally wrong now, it was morally wrong then. War is an un-necessary evil – end of. So if bomber crews of what ever nationality drop their bombs on a city target rather than carry them back in overloaded aeroplanes through hostile skies in broad daylight – it may cause moral indignation, yet is (within the context of war) understandable

Mark

[Attrition]

~~~~~I don’t know – maybe I am just ‘way off’ but I still see something of a difference! (Please be patient with me) The 8th may well have decided to go over to area bombing and call it ‘marshalling yards’ etc. But it always seems reluctant – the publicity issue cited above actually seems to support this; as if they know its wrong. And maybe again I am wrong, but looking at the bomb load proportions over the last year of the war, there seems to be a ‘weighting’ towards HE whenever the target justifies it. From this I would posit that the 8th planners always sought to return to what the strategic planners and the American public believed in. (Yes, I know – supposition)~~~~~

Is this the ethics of bombing or the bombing of ethics?

[phylo_roadking]

Is this the ethics of bombing or the bombing of ethics?

Bombing Ethics? Isn't that next-door to County Thuthex?

[Attrition]

[Ostkatze]

Essexually you guys are just being Sussexually mean now.
Seeing as marka came out of the closet, finally, on the transluscent message...
In all honesty, Harris's protestations, at the time, to his boss Portal's constant letters about his failure to attach a higher priority to oil targets reveal a sometimes juvenile list of excuses.
A line against a series of quick fixes claiming that this would be the answer, now!, against his aim of an ever growing demolition of the basis of a functioning nation. He lists a number of reasons, but finally, and for the purpose of this thread, most pertinent, he complains to Portal that ordering raids on oil targets would result in the misses achieving nothing.
Sounds trivial.
From my understanding, the synthetic oil program growth came after '36; I'm guessing the plants were not put in old city centres. Harris was probably well aware of the reality of percentages of probable accuracy. His final, and most convincing argument being that misses on these targets achieved nothing. Again, this was his line AT THE TIME.

Letter to Portal, 28.12.44 " I throw doubt on the oil policy because, as I say, I put no reliance whatever on the estimate by the Ministry of Economics Warfare. Subsequent discoveries of other sources of fuel and power, and of unsuspected sources of oil such as new plants, coupled with essential diversions in aid of the Army and the Navy, etc., etc., all fill me with doubts as to the possibility of bringing the plan to the conclusion hoped for. Furthermore, it is par excellence a plan which if it fails achieves nothing else whatever. If you miss an oil plant, you hit nothing, and by their nature they are easy enough to miss. "
In deference to Twain's remark on what you can do with the "truth' after you learn it, isn't the purpose of AHF to get beyond pop history? Not here to defend Harris, but after all the massive efforts to improve accurate delivery, at least he appears sanguine enough in the final months to offer his resignation to Portal if his views were seen as out of line. Neil.

Bomber Harris, The Story of Sir Arthur Harris, by Dudley Saward. Contains a ton of the letters between Harris and Portal on this subject.

[Hop]

The 8th may well have decided to go over to area bombing and call it ‘marshalling yards’ etc. But it always seems reluctant – the publicity issue cited above actually seems to support this; as if they know its wrong.

I think you see the same progression in the RAF, and to some extent the Luftwaffe.

The RAF, for example, didn't bomb Germany at all until May 1940 for fear of causing collateral damage. From May they started attacking precise targets, with orders to bring their bombs back, or jettison them at sea, if they couldn't find the target. Late September, with the Blitz on London underway for a couple of weeks, they were allowed to seek out targets of opportunity. Mid December the RAF carried out its first area raid, as a reprisal for Coventry. It wasn't until 1942 that the area bombing offensive really got under way.

And maybe again I am wrong, but looking at the bomb load proportions over the last year of the war, there seems to be a ‘weighting’ towards HE whenever the target justifies it. From this I would posit that the 8th planners always sought to return to what the strategic planners and the American public believed in. (Yes, I know – supposition)

In March 1945 the 8th dropped nearly 26,000 tons on "marshalling yards", with almost 21% incendiaries.

It dropped right down in April, but then BC ended major area bombing raids in March, too.

And Hop – as the deliberate targeting of civilians is now outlawed under the Geneva conventions, we really shouldn’t go down the road of what would stand up in a court of law!

That was just an example about intent. A backup plan is still intent.