Ross Rifle

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Armeiro
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Ross Rifle

#1

Post by Armeiro » 25 Aug 2008, 23:20

The ross rifle,what was the problem with it?
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Armeiro
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Re: Ross Rifle

#3

Post by Armeiro » 27 Aug 2008, 19:08

http://www.canadahistory.ca/vimy/Backgr ... srifle.htm
During the South African War of 1899-1902, the Canadian government had experienced serious problems in obtaining weapons from Britain, on whom it relied for its supplies. In particular the .303 Lee-Enfield rifle was unavailable, and efforts to persuade Birmingham Small Arms Company to set up a branch factory in Canada to manufacture the rifle were unsuccessful. Sir Wilfred Laurier, then the Prime Minister, was persuaded by his Militia Minister, Sir Frederick Borden, that Canada would have to make its own rifle. A new rifle, developed by Sir Charles Ross, had recently appeared on the market. It was a fine target and sporting weapon. Ross came to Ottawa and met with a committee set up to evaluate his rifle. One of the committee members was Sam Hughes, who immediately liked the weapon. It was put through a series of tests, including comparison tests with the Lee-Enfield. In spite of the fact that the Ross jammed and often misfired, the committee recommended its adoption and manufacture in Canada. What "small problems" there were, Sir Charles Ross assured them, could be eliminated with the appropriate modifications. Sam Hughes steadfastly defended the Ross rifle in the House of Commons and was opposed to replacing it. Events were to show that he was tragically wrong.

In trench conditions, surrounded by mud and filth, and when it was essential to have a reliable weapon, the Ross was definitely out of place. It had a long barrel and was difficult to use in the trench's confined spaces, and it frequently jammed. It was indeed a fine weapon - on a firing range under controlled conditions. But the First Division's stand at Ypres in the face of a gas attack, Canadian soldiers threw away their Ross rifles in despair and frustration, and picked up Lee-Enfields from dead British soldiers on the battlefield.

In spite of this, the Second Division went to France with Ross rifles and again the results were much the same, with solders throwing away jammed weapons. By July 1916 Sir Douglas Haig, the new Commander-in-Chief, had ordered the replacement of all Ross rifles by the Lee-Enfield, then becoming widely available. To the end, Hughes refused to accept that there were problems with the Ross, and it took the intervention of many influential people to persuade him otherwise. In November 1916, Hughes resigned, after Sir Robert Borden's decision to appoint a Minister of Overseas Forces. He died in 1921 at the age of 69.
Ross 1914 Handbook Part II.jpg
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Re: Ross Rifle

#4

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Sep 2008, 19:13

The problem was simple. The Ross was a "straight-pull" bolt...which requires very precise machining for reliable working - and of course no dirt or mud LOL. Now, the establishment of the Ross production line in Canada was paralleled by the first production of Canadian-manufactured .303 ammunition - on new tooling and to very precise measurements.

When the CEF arrived in Europe it brought a quantity of its own Canadian-made ammunition with it...but only around two and a half months supply, NOT factoring in training. Once the Canadian-made .303 was exhausted, the CEF began using BRITISH-MADE .303...

...which was made on older machinery to nothing like the manufacturing tolerances in Canada. The Lee-Enfield bolt and breech could take the unevenly headspaced BRITISH .303 rounds...BUT the far more-closely machined Ross couldn't....not with the random factor of dirt and mud AS WELL.

In order to facilitate the eventual changeover from Ross to SMLE the British government actually BOUGHT the produced Ross Rifles from canada...thus subsidizing the creation of the Lee Enfield production line. And mothballed the Ross' A considerable number were cleaned and issued to second-;line security and civil service staff in Ireland in the War of Independence - Coast Guards, bank staff etc. - but were as useless on BRITISH .303 as they had been a couple of years earlier. The IRA frequently raided these establishments as well as Police barracks for arms....and threw away Ross Rifles when they got their hands on Lee Enfields!!! :lol: :lol: :lol:

The clock rolls forward 20 years....and during WWII the British government supplies the remaining Ross rifles to the Irish Government to arm its home guards in Eire...having issued Long Lees, and P14 and P17s to the BRITISH Home Guard! :lol: ....however, supplied AGAIN with BRITISH-made .303 ammunition, these "Irish" Ross' rifles showed the SAME disastrous jamming rate as they had with British ammo in WWI!!!

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Re: Ross Rifle

#5

Post by mike peters » 04 Sep 2008, 21:52

Phylo's right ...The British 303 was a problem but , it had other issues as well.

I did find another interesting Letter from 1916 that clearly states the problem was with British Ammo
Here it is ---
This is a letter from William E. Rundle of the National Trust Company from London on July 20, 1916, addressed to Sir Joseph Flavelle (appointed chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board in late 1915). The letter is concerning the ineffectiveness of the government sponsored Ross Rifle. Canadian officers and troops are growing impatient with the weapon and many refuse to continue using it. The Ross Rifle is said to be a good target rifle but is a very poor service rifle. The Ross Rifle showed a dangerous tendency to jam when it was used in heavy mud and when used with British ammunition. During heavy fighting soldiers often had to kick the bolt open to release the jam. If the rifle was assembled incorrectly the bolt could fly off and severely injure the soldier's face. This letter is an attempt to make the government aware of the potential embarrassment that this situation may cause if Canadian soldiers continue to die because of the ineffectiveness of a government sponsored weapon.
Punch up this site and scroll down to the last 2 letters.
http://archives.queensu.ca/wwi/technol.html

Here are several links regarding the Ammo --
Here's one clip --
It could not hold up to dirty battle conditions, could not fire dirty ammunition, and it's .303 (7.7mm) chamber was supposed to accept British .303 ammunition but surprised soldiers and commanders during battle when it did not. http://home.sandiego.edu/~wilsons-07/WWI/allied.html

And another --
The Canadians occupied St. Eloi, but the Canadian Army had been given the Ross Rifle Mark III, not the British Enfield, and would not accept British ammunition, and tended to jam frequently.
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/ww1/1915d.html

And another --
From the beginning it was plagued with developmental and design problems. The main thing being a tendency to jam using British made ammunition, whose loose tolerences caused extraction problems in the Ross' tighter chamber. Canadian made cartridges functioned just fine, but as the Canadian Expeditionary Force would find out a few years later during WWI, they could not be guaranteed a steady supply. http://www3.sympatico.ca/shooters/Best303.htm
Last edited by mike peters on 04 Sep 2008, 21:57, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Ross Rifle

#6

Post by mike peters » 04 Sep 2008, 21:54

I already posted this on another Ross Topic but ..it's well worth the read --

This was also very interesting --

THE CANADIAN WORLD WAR ONE MOBILIZATION:
A COMPLICATED MATTER
November 2002

"The Canadian World War One mobilization was needlessly complicated by the personal interference of Militia Minister, Sir Sam Hughes. In addition, Hughes’ political cronies, with the help of the minister, would be responsible for selling defective equipment that would endanger the lives of Canadian troops at the Front. Hughes would be fired in 1916 after becoming too confrontational with the Government of which he was a part.

Sir Sam Hughes was a firm believer in what Granatstein bluntly put as the “Militia Myth: a belief that colonists and citizens provide their own defence,”(1) and thus there was no need for a permanent military force. To Hughes, the Militia, a large group of poorly trained average citizens, who did not know much of military drill, could solve any problem of Canada’s.

When war was declared in 1914, Hughes was determined to keep the proud militia myth alive. He scrapped the mobilization plan of the Permanent Force, known as Gawtkin’s Plan, and proceeded to take over control of the mobilization personally.(2) This personal control of the mobilization gave Hughes the power to organize the military as he saw fit and to appoint the officers of units. According to Hay****, Hughes did this so that “no Hutton-Style manipulation of government would take place in the new war.” (3)

Hughes chose to concentrate the troops at Valcartier, Quebec. This was a large, undeveloped piece of land with no military installations. While the construction of a military base in a thirty day period was an amazing accomplishment, Valcartier’s ongoing construction caused confusion amongst the soldiers. As it was expected that the soldiers would only be at Valcartier for a short time, before being shipped to Britain for further training, the short amount of time at the base would be used to give the troops organization, medicals and various other procedures.(4)

The mobilization of troops at Valcartier, being already confusing with the ongoing construction, was made even worse by Hughes’ personally taking over the planning of the mobilization, specifically, the unit structures.

The selection of officers, traditionally a free-for-all for government members to get their most loyal cronies into a powerful position (being in the military with a high rank at the time was still popular for the public image of a man), was taken over by Hughes. Hughes believed that he knew the military capability of every single person. In many cases, the most capable leaders, who were trusted and respected by their men, lost their commands to officers with minimal military knowledge and experience. Ministerial appointments caused much confusion when Hughes made the Adjutant-General of the Militia, Colonel Victor Williams, into the Valcartier Camp Commandant. The Adjutant-General position, a critical administrative slot, would remain unfilled for five months.(5) Another time, one provisional battalion ended up with four commanding officers, while another had none.(6) Hughes also tended to issue organizational orders at will, and countermand them almost instantly. A friend of Hughes’ son, Garnet Hughes, known as Arthur Currie, would be appointed as an officer because of his relationship with Garnet, and this would be one of the few times that Hughes’ appointments produced a great military leader and commander.

Hughes primary interest in the military was in the fields of infantry and cavalry. How unfortunate for those units. These units became the target of the Hughes’ System of Confusing Military Structures. Units were constantly formed, disbanded, reformed, and disbanded again. Luckily for the support trades, Hughes didn’t have a keen interest in them, so those units were able to organize effectively. Hughes’ personal touch on the mobilization effort at Valcartier deprived units of the time they required to effectively organize. Eventually, however, Hughes was able to sort out the mess he had created at the Camp. The first contingent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was now ready to go overseas – at least organizationally it was. The preparedness of the contingent’s made in Canada equipment was another story.

Hughes was the master of many bad equipment purchases. The most major mess-up of Hughes’ was the Ross Rifle. This rifle, designed by Sir Charles Ross, a friend of Hughes, and manufactured in Quebec City, was the first rifle designed and built in Canada. Hughes belief in the effectiveness of the Ross Rifle would blind him to the deficiencies of the weapon, so much to the point that he would make it’s creator an honorary colonel along with the rest of his political allies.

In September 1913, the Ross Rifle was fielded by the Royal Canadian Regiment for tests. The Regiment reported that the Rifle had many flaws, including a badly constructed magazine, a poor feeding mechanism, and a safety catch that would cut the thumb of the soldier using the rifle. The Regiment did file a full report on the rifle, however, as its conclusions did not agree with the opinions of higher powers, the report, and the flaws of the rifle were largely ignored.(7) The straight pull-lever of the Ross Rifle would also easily jam with heavy usage or under dirty conditions. (8)

With its many defects still existent, the Ross would be deployed overseas with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914, since Hughes believed in it, and also because Canadian commanders were unable to get any rifles from the British, who were short on supplies.

The troops were not fans of the Ross Rifle. One army driver commented, “To hell with the [Ross Rifle]. I’ll take a club,” (9) as well as another comment that accused the government of nothing less than murder for not replacing the weapon. The commanding officer of the Canadian Corps in 1915, Sir Edwin Alderson, agreed with his men on the performance of the rifle. He withdrew the Ross from service without the consent of Hughes on the grounds that the rifle was a danger to the safety of the men using it. The rifles were replaced with the British Lee Enfield.

Upon hearing of the move to the British weapon, Hughes was outraged and called the reasons put forth by Alderson for the removal of the Ross from service as “absolutely absurd and ridiculous.” (10) In essence, Hughes ignorance to the truth about the Ross can be contributed to his lack of use of the rifle. Hughes, despite dressing up like a military officer while being Minister of the Militia, was nothing more than a civilian. Therefore, he never did have to use the rifle in combat.

In 1916, the Ross Rifle was no longer in service with the Canadian military, with the exception of snipers, which was the only thing that the Ross was good for. It would leave service with its major defects, despite over eighty modifications to the design of the rifle.

The Ross Rifle, being the most critical foul up by Hughes, was not the only one when it came to the soldier’s kit, and other military equipment.

The most notable of the other kit problems was an invention by Hughes’ young secretary, conjured up while observing war games in Switzerland in 1913. This invention, the MacAdam shield-shovel, was seen as Hughes as a “Canadian-designed miracle.” (11) It was so much of miracle that the Canadian Army would have to purchase it, despite the major defects in the design. These major defects, and major is an understatement, was that the shield-shovel had no handle, was heavy, and could not stop a bullet at all. It was a completely useless piece of equipment, and was soon replaced by Canadian commanders upon arrival in Britain.

Such innovations as the MacAdam shield-shovel were common place during World War One, just as innovations are during any conflict. However, the only successful innovations would be the ones made by those who had the ability to see the big picture. This was an ability that Sir Sam Hughes did, in fact, lack. His endorsement of a useless shield-shovel that had no use in battle, except to rust in a pile, was testimony to that. Not to mention his brilliant idea to cut a hole into the shield-shovel so that the troops could observe the enemy while being safe from incoming enemy fire, theoretically safe of course. In the end, the Canadian Army, by order of Sir Sam Hughes, would purchase almost 25,000 shield-shovel units; appropriately, they would all be sold for scrap.

It was the spring of 1916, the Canadian and British Militaries were in grave need of more rifle ammunition. J. Wesley Allison, an ally of Hughes who recently was made into an honorary colonel, was in the position to exploit war contracts due to the written endorsements of none other than Sir Sam Hughes. (12) That spring, Allison would sell five million rounds of rifle ammunition to the British and Canadian militaries at a price of $15 less than what they would have to pay to the United States for the same amount. (13) There was only one problem with the ammunition – it was obsolete. With Hughes’ written endorsement, Allison had ripped off the British and Canadian militaries and collected a handsome commission for himself from the contract. The militaries were left in the situation of having no useful ammunition, while Hughes’ allies once again got away with selling useless tools, to their financial benefit, to the military with Hughes’ recommendations.


Hughes political interference in the tendering process (i.e. making sure that Canadian products were purchased, not necessarily the best equipment for the job), and his blind faith in the equipment made by his allies, endangered the lives of Canadian soldiers on the front lines. Hughes was responsible for the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of Canadian soldiers because of his interference in the equipment-procuring process. Hughes was evidentially more concerned with being a politician by putting his political allies first, instead of the men, who were under his command as Minister of Militia and risking their lives at the Front.

While the Canadian Expeditionary Force was working up in Britain and fighting on the front lines in France, the flagship of Canada’s Permanent Army, the Royal Canadian Regiment – the nation’s professional, properly trained infantry – we’re living the damned life as a garrison unit in Bermuda. Why was this? As previously mentioned, Hughes was a strong believer in the militia myth. The Royal Canadian Regiment became the first infantry unit in Canada’s young permanent army in 1883 (the RCR was referred to as the Infantry School Corps at that time). Hughes, being the militia supporter he was, saw a professional infantry unit as an insult and threat to the militia infantryman, who had laid down life and limb for Canada over the past centuries without needing the assistance of regular forces (which is absolute bull since it was the British Regulars that defended Canada with the Militia in the backseat). Yet, this was the effect of the militia myth. The deployment of the RCR for garrison duty in Bermuda was not motivated by a tactical plan, or the strategic situation, it was motivated by pure prejudice. Hughes wanted to keep the myth alive by having the militia win the war without any noticeable contribution by the Permanent Force. The exiling of the RCR to Bermuda was a stupid move. The Canadian Expeditionary Force now had to go overseas without the presence of the most qualified army trainers in Canada for the infantry. "
The rest of this Article can be found here --
http://www.cdnmilitary.ca/articles/worl ... zation.htm

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Re: Ross Rifle

#7

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Sep 2008, 22:02

One thing I found a long time ago when surfing was how many snipers during the war and targetshooting sportsmen AFTER the war actually favoured the Ross when fitted with a scope. I presume that in "perfect" competition conditions, or in the pampering hands of a sniper...when dirt in the mechanism, speed of fire etc. were no longer an issue...that it at least didn't suffer from the SMLE's "wandering zero", which was never truly eradicated!!!

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Re: Ross Rifle

#8

Post by mike peters » 04 Sep 2008, 22:05

My example ..found here in NY
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Re: Ross Rifle

#9

Post by mike peters » 04 Sep 2008, 22:08

As you can see from the stock ..it's been reissued a couple of times
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Re: Ross Rifle

#10

Post by mike peters » 04 Sep 2008, 22:19

phylo_roadking wrote:One thing I found a long time ago when surfing was how many snipers during the war and targetshooting sportsmen AFTER the war actually favoured the Ross when fitted with a scope. I presume that in "perfect" competition conditions, or in the pampering hands of a sniper...when dirt in the mechanism, speed of fire etc. were no longer an issue...that it at least didn't suffer from the SMLE's "wandering zero", which was never truly eradicated!!!
I agree ..I've also seen many fav comments regarding it's Sniper role. However , no matter how accurate a Rifle may be ...once Soldiers start reporting problems and hear of the Bolt coming back in your face , it's done. What's also troubling is how the Militia Minister, (Sir Sam Hughes) seemed to go out of his way to cover the problems instead of addressing them . Maybe there was some Money involved ??

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Re: Ross Rifle

#11

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Sep 2008, 22:28

Or the LACK of money? The Canadians weren't prepared to change over "officially" to the Lee Enfield until the British government came up with their thinly-disguised subsidy...

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Re: Ross Rifle

#12

Post by mike peters » 05 Sep 2008, 14:09

I was wondering if Mr Hughs owned Stock or had invested in the Ross Co ..that would explain his defending it the way he did.

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Re: Ross Rifle

#13

Post by Michael Dorosh » 06 Sep 2008, 05:58

mike peters wrote: However , no matter how accurate a Rifle may be ...once Soldiers start reporting problems and hear of the Bolt coming back in your face , it's done.
Is that why they were reissued for the Second World War?

Nonsense. Soldiers reported problems with the Sten Gun too, and despite all the whining in the field, the Canadian Army stood firm and kept it as the official machine carbine from 1942 to the mid 1950s. Official reports during the Second World War attributed the problems of the Sten to user error, though they did make some minor changes, including a casing deflector and, significantly, an improved safety catch. But soldier complaints rarely EVER lead to acquisition changes. If they did, well, ask the guys who had to drive the LSVW about that one... ;)

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Re: Ross Rifle

#14

Post by mike peters » 06 Sep 2008, 06:56

"This is a letter from William E. Rundle of the National Trust Company from London on July 20, 1916, addressed to Sir Joseph Flavelle (appointed chairman of the Imperial Munitions Board in late 1915). The letter is concerning the ineffectiveness of the government sponsored Ross Rifle. Canadian officers and troops are growing impatient with the weapon and many refuse to continue using it. The Ross Rifle is said to be a good target rifle but is a very poor service rifle. The Ross Rifle showed a dangerous tendency to jam when it was used in heavy mud and when used with British ammunition. During heavy fighting soldiers often had to kick the bolt open to release the jam. If the rifle was assembled incorrectly the bolt could fly off and severely injure the soldier's face.
"The troops were not fans of the Ross Rifle. One army driver commented, “To hell with the [Ross Rifle]. I’ll take a club,” (9) as well as another comment that accused the government of nothing less than murder for not replacing the weapon. The commanding officer of the Canadian Corps in 1915, Sir Edwin Alderson, agreed with his men on the performance of the rifle. He withdrew the Ross from service without the consent of Hughes on the grounds that the rifle was a danger to the safety of the men using it. The rifles were replaced with the British Lee Enfield."


The Sten was not known to have parts "fly off" and injure ones face ...whole different animal. Whether deserved or not ..the Ross reputation stuck.
It was not trusted in the Trenches and was replaced ...bottom line

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Re: Ross Rifle

#15

Post by Michael Dorosh » 06 Sep 2008, 14:23

mike peters wrote: It was not trusted in the Trenches and was replaced ...bottom line
Except for the fact that it wasn't. Not right away, in any event. Lee Enfields collected during the 2nd Battle of Ypres were ordered out of the hands of those Canadians that had them, and replaced with - you guessed it - Ross Rifles. New divisions formed and sent to Europe were equipped with Ross rifles. Units training in Canada were equipped with Ross rifles, as were training units in England.

In April 1916 - a full year after the fighting at St. Julien - the 2nd Division published Routine Order 2052, stating:
For the future, Company Commanders of Infantry and Officers Commanding other Units of the 2nd Canadian Division will be held personally responsible that there are no unauthorised Lee-Enfield rifles in the possession of their units. All salved Lee-Enfield rifles will be immediately returned to Ordnance Stores. Neglect of this order will be treated as a direct breach of discipline.
In fact, those Ross rifles that were considered "too dangerous to use" were in official use by all the Canadians for well over a year of trench service past their initial entry into combat. I direct you to the book A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE by Colonel A.F. Duguid (reprinted by Service Publications, ISBN 1-894581-00-8). Page 46 notes that the 2nd and 3rd Divisions did not re-arm with the SMLE until August 1916, and the 4th in September, almost a year and a half after 2nd Ypres.

It wasn't until late 1916 that the Ross was finally replaced, though not totally, as it continued in use by snipers, as pointed out. In total, the Canadian government acquired 342,040 Ross rifles, of which 129,780 were used by the CEF. Of these, 22,871 were returned to Canada, and 95,674 were taken into British hands.

Point being - troops rarely ever have much say into what they get to fight with, and when they do, the effects are rarely immediate. The problem in the case of the Ross was that it was not universally disliked. One company at Hooge, for example, reported that their Ross rifle worked flawlessly, but of course, their OC had been on the Bisley competition team. In May 1916, the Canadian Corps commander polled 63 officers for opinions, 25 were favourable, 13 had no answer, and 25 were adverse - 50/50 in other words. The 3rd Division - much newer to the trenches - all reported adversely on the other hand, and especially those under "Batty Mac".

Was the SMLE a better rifle for use under service conditions? Undeniably. But like the Sten Gun, reports of the shortcomings of the Ross sometimes grow in the telling. Duguid reports that there is only one "authentic case of fatal casualty to the firer of a Ross military rifle." (p.17)

The guy or guys responsible for reporting this to the overbearing Minister and convincing him that the Ross had to go had all this conflicting data to present. The words of some "mere" private soldiers...doubtful it counted for much. If their own battalion commanders in the 2nd Division weren't listening, it's not difficult to understand why it took over a year for other people to start to get the message.
Last edited by Michael Dorosh on 06 Sep 2008, 14:48, edited 1 time in total.

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