One of the political projects pushed by Neville Chamberlain was a four power pact involving Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
He wanted to combine the Anglo-Franco entente with the Italian-German axis; make peace among the four powers and to form a european bloc so as to exclude Soviet influence from european politics.
Was this a good idea?
...He alluded to a luncheon meeting of 10 May 1938 hosted by Lady Astor, where Chamberlain reportedly communicated to twelve American journalists his secret plans concerning a Four-Power Pact in Europe, with the exclusion of Russia.
The Premier also stated at that time that he was in favor of ceding the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia to the Germans...
http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=KWQ ... ltVqaXhhtg
TIME, Monday, March 14, 1938:
"While we build up Britain's strength, I will strive to remove the causes of war in the world!" Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain promised in the House of Commons this week, as he asked approval for armed forces expenditure this year of $1,758,750,000 (see p. 18). In his house at No. 10 Downing Street, meanwhile, he had given swift impetus last week to negotiations for the Four-Power Pact which Britain, Germany, France and Italy will try to make (TIME, March 7), possibly admitting Poland to make it a Fiver.
Even top correspondents were flatly told by the entourage of Chamberlain & Friends that every effort will be made to keep them from learning any details of the negotiations now begun, until the four Great Powers are ready to issue communiqués (handouts), expected in about six weeks.
Hitler last week was handed what Chamberlain had to say by British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson, who brought the papers personally from London. This week the Führer's reply will be taken to London by the new German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The French Ambassador was messenger boy in London last week for Premier Chautemps. From London this week British Ambassador Lord Perth, onetime Secretary General of the League of Nations, hurried to Premier Mussolini...
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/artic ... 75,00.html
Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
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phylo_roadking
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Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
Only one minor problem; Germany didn't want to keep Russia OUT of Europe - Hitler wanted Europe i.e. Germany...into Russia. And had been quite open about it in Mein Kampf.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
But if peace was made among the four powers and an understanding was reached, Hitler could safely move on towards his aims in the east, knowing that the other three wouldn't oppose him.phylo_roadking wrote:Only one minor problem; Germany didn't want to keep Russia OUT of Europe - Hitler wanted Europe .
Peace in the west, war in the east.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
That would mean Hitler turned down an alliance meant to give him a free hand against Russia.
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phylo_roadking
- Member
- Posts: 17488
- Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
- Location: Belfast
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
....but accepting it would mean accepting Poland as it stood, as its existence was guaranteed by other treaties with several of the other powers involved. If Hitler accepts this - he's setling for NO eastwards movement at all.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
A zero % chance Italy is going to go to war with Germany over Poland.
I think Chamberlain had the guarantee by Italy of the rump Czech state in mind, to get Italy thinking about resisting German penetration into the Danube basin.
I think Chamberlain had the guarantee by Italy of the rump Czech state in mind, to get Italy thinking about resisting German penetration into the Danube basin.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
Why would Chamberlain discuss secret plans with twelve American journalists they would not be secret for long after discussing them with twelve journalists. If such a proposal was going to be put to Hitler it would have to have been arrived at after cabinet discussion and there is no evidence for this.
The British Foreign Policy Committee met on February 3rd 1938 to discuss proposals to be put to Hitler and Henderson the ambassador to Germany was present. He presented the proposals to Hitler and on March 9th Halifax gave Hitlers response to the Cabinet . Nothing in the proposals or reply about a four power bloc. Halifax also said what he intended to discuss with Ribbentrop when they met.
Chamberlain and Halifax had lunch with Ribbentrop on March 11there seems to have been no discussion of four power blocs. On March 13 Chamberlain wrote a long letter to his sister about the situation after the Anschluss and no mention of fourpower blocs.
The British Foreign Policy Committee met on February 3rd 1938 to discuss proposals to be put to Hitler and Henderson the ambassador to Germany was present. He presented the proposals to Hitler and on March 9th Halifax gave Hitlers response to the Cabinet . Nothing in the proposals or reply about a four power bloc. Halifax also said what he intended to discuss with Ribbentrop when they met.
Chamberlain and Halifax had lunch with Ribbentrop on March 11there seems to have been no discussion of four power blocs. On March 13 Chamberlain wrote a long letter to his sister about the situation after the Anschluss and no mention of fourpower blocs.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea
Documentation of diplomatic activity by Chamberlain government regarding anglo-german relations can be found here:
Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer and Reichskanzler and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, in Obersalzberg, Nov. 19, 1937
http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQ ... 1-PA129,M1
Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer (and Reichskanzler) and His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador which took place in the presence of Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop, on March 3, 1938, in Berlin
http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8XX ... 1-PA140,M1
Memorandum of German Ambassador in London Dirksen regarding regarding Wohlthat's Conversations with Wilson and Hudson (July 21 1939)
http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQ ... 1-PA239,M1
See also:
...With the private blessing of Hitler and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, a meeting between Göring and his advisers and the group of seven British businessmen was arranged in a farmhouse on the German Baltic island of Sylt.
The seven made their separate ways to Sylt for the meeting. Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland...
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/ ... 61990.html
...In the meantime the British government, especially the small group controlling foreign policy, had reached a seven-point decision regarding their attitude toward Germany:
1. Hitler Germany was the front-line bulwark against the spread of Communism in Europe.
2. A four-Power pact of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany to exclude all Russian influence from Europe was the ultimate aim; accordingly, Britain had no desire to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis, but regarded it and the Anglo-French Entente as the foundation of a stable Europe.
3. Britain had no objection to German acquisition of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.
4. Germany must not use force to achieve its aims in Europe, as this would precipitate a war in which Britain would have to intervene because of the pressure of public opinion in Britain and the French system of alliances; with patience, Germany could get its aims without using force.
5. Britain wanted an agreement with Germany restricting the numbers and the use of bombing planes.
6. Britain was prepared to give Germany colonial areas in south-central Africa, including the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola if Germany would renounce its desire to recover Tanganyika, which had been taken from Germany in 1919, and if Germany would sign an international agreement to govern these areas with due regard for the rights of the natives, an "open-door" commercial policy, and under some mechanism of international supervision like the mandates.
7. Britain would use pressure on Czechoslovakia and Poland to negotiate with Germany and to be conciliatory to Germany's desires.
To these seven points we should add an eighth: Britain must rearm in order to maintain its position in a "three-bloc world" and to deter Germany from using force in creating its bloc in Europe. This point was supported by Chamberlain, who built up the air force which saved Britain in 1940, and by the Round Table Group led by Lord Lothian, Edward Grigg, and Leopold Amery, who put on a campaign to establish compulsory military service.
The first seven points were reiterated to Germany by various spokesmen from 1937 onward. They are also to be found in many recently published documents, including the captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry, the documents of the British Foreign Office, and various extracts from diaries and other private papers, especially extracts from Neville Chamberlain's diary and his letters to his sister.
Among numerous other occasions these points were covered in the following cases:
(a) in a conversation between Lord Halifax and Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 17, 1937;
(b) in a letter from Neville Chamberlain to his sister on November 26, 1937;
(c) in a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) in Berlin on March 3, 1938;
(d) in a series of conversations involving Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop, Sir Thomas Inskip (British minister of defense), Erich Kordt (Ribbentrop's assistant), and Sir Horace Wilson (Chamberlain's personal representative) in London on March 10-11, 1938; and
(e) in a conference of Neville Chamberlain with various North American journalists held at Lord Astor's house on May 10, 1938. In addition, portions of these seven points were mentioned or discussed in scores of conversations and documents which are now available.
Certain significant features of these should be pointed out. In the first place, in spite of persistent British efforts lasting for more than two years, Hitler rejected Angola or the Congo and insisted on the return of the German colonies which had been lost in 1919.
During 1939 Germany steadily refused to negotiate on this issue and finally refused even to acknowledge the British efforts to discuss it. In the second place, the British throughout these discussions made a sharp distinction between Germany's aims and Germany's methods.
They had no objections to Germany's aims in Europe, but they insisted that Germany must not use force to achieve these aims because of the danger of war.
This distinction was accepted by the German professional diplomats and by the German professional soldiers, who were quite willing to obtain Germany's aims by peaceful means, but this distinction was not accepted by the leaders of the Nazi Party, especially Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Himmler, who were too impatient and who wanted to prove to themselves and the world that Germany was powerful enough to take what it wanted without waiting for anybody's permission.
These wild men were encouraged in this attitude by their belief that Britain and France were so "decadent" that they would stand for anything, and by their failure to see the role played by public opinion in England.
Convinced that the governing group in England wanted Germany to get Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig, they could not understand why there was such an emphasis on using peaceful methods, and they could not see how British public opinion could force the British government to go to war over the methods used when the British government made it perfectly clear that the last thing that they wanted was a war.
This error was based on the fact that these Nazis had no idea of how a democratic government works, had no respect for public opinion or a free press, and were encouraged in their error by the weakness of the British ambassador in Berlin (Henderson) and by Rippentrop's associations with the "Cliveden Set" in England while he had been ambassador there in 1936-1938.
In the third place, the British government could not publicly admit to its own people these "seven points" because they were not acceptable to British public opinion. Accordingly, these points had to remain secret, except for various "trial balloons" issued through The Times, in speeches in the House of Commons or in Chatham House, in articles in The Round Table and by calculated indiscretions to prepare the ground for what was being done.
In order to persuade the British people to accept these points, one by one, as they were achieved, the British government spread the tale that Germany was armed to the teeth and that the opposition to Germany was insignificant...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#44
Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer and Reichskanzler and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, in Obersalzberg, Nov. 19, 1937
http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQ ... 1-PA129,M1
Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer (and Reichskanzler) and His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador which took place in the presence of Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop, on March 3, 1938, in Berlin
http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8XX ... 1-PA140,M1
Memorandum of German Ambassador in London Dirksen regarding regarding Wohlthat's Conversations with Wilson and Hudson (July 21 1939)
http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQ ... 1-PA239,M1
See also:
...With the private blessing of Hitler and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, a meeting between Göring and his advisers and the group of seven British businessmen was arranged in a farmhouse on the German Baltic island of Sylt.
The seven made their separate ways to Sylt for the meeting. Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland...
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/ ... 61990.html
...In the meantime the British government, especially the small group controlling foreign policy, had reached a seven-point decision regarding their attitude toward Germany:
1. Hitler Germany was the front-line bulwark against the spread of Communism in Europe.
2. A four-Power pact of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany to exclude all Russian influence from Europe was the ultimate aim; accordingly, Britain had no desire to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis, but regarded it and the Anglo-French Entente as the foundation of a stable Europe.
3. Britain had no objection to German acquisition of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.
4. Germany must not use force to achieve its aims in Europe, as this would precipitate a war in which Britain would have to intervene because of the pressure of public opinion in Britain and the French system of alliances; with patience, Germany could get its aims without using force.
5. Britain wanted an agreement with Germany restricting the numbers and the use of bombing planes.
6. Britain was prepared to give Germany colonial areas in south-central Africa, including the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola if Germany would renounce its desire to recover Tanganyika, which had been taken from Germany in 1919, and if Germany would sign an international agreement to govern these areas with due regard for the rights of the natives, an "open-door" commercial policy, and under some mechanism of international supervision like the mandates.
7. Britain would use pressure on Czechoslovakia and Poland to negotiate with Germany and to be conciliatory to Germany's desires.
To these seven points we should add an eighth: Britain must rearm in order to maintain its position in a "three-bloc world" and to deter Germany from using force in creating its bloc in Europe. This point was supported by Chamberlain, who built up the air force which saved Britain in 1940, and by the Round Table Group led by Lord Lothian, Edward Grigg, and Leopold Amery, who put on a campaign to establish compulsory military service.
The first seven points were reiterated to Germany by various spokesmen from 1937 onward. They are also to be found in many recently published documents, including the captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry, the documents of the British Foreign Office, and various extracts from diaries and other private papers, especially extracts from Neville Chamberlain's diary and his letters to his sister.
Among numerous other occasions these points were covered in the following cases:
(a) in a conversation between Lord Halifax and Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 17, 1937;
(b) in a letter from Neville Chamberlain to his sister on November 26, 1937;
(c) in a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) in Berlin on March 3, 1938;
(d) in a series of conversations involving Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop, Sir Thomas Inskip (British minister of defense), Erich Kordt (Ribbentrop's assistant), and Sir Horace Wilson (Chamberlain's personal representative) in London on March 10-11, 1938; and
(e) in a conference of Neville Chamberlain with various North American journalists held at Lord Astor's house on May 10, 1938. In addition, portions of these seven points were mentioned or discussed in scores of conversations and documents which are now available.
Certain significant features of these should be pointed out. In the first place, in spite of persistent British efforts lasting for more than two years, Hitler rejected Angola or the Congo and insisted on the return of the German colonies which had been lost in 1919.
During 1939 Germany steadily refused to negotiate on this issue and finally refused even to acknowledge the British efforts to discuss it. In the second place, the British throughout these discussions made a sharp distinction between Germany's aims and Germany's methods.
They had no objections to Germany's aims in Europe, but they insisted that Germany must not use force to achieve these aims because of the danger of war.
This distinction was accepted by the German professional diplomats and by the German professional soldiers, who were quite willing to obtain Germany's aims by peaceful means, but this distinction was not accepted by the leaders of the Nazi Party, especially Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Himmler, who were too impatient and who wanted to prove to themselves and the world that Germany was powerful enough to take what it wanted without waiting for anybody's permission.
These wild men were encouraged in this attitude by their belief that Britain and France were so "decadent" that they would stand for anything, and by their failure to see the role played by public opinion in England.
Convinced that the governing group in England wanted Germany to get Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig, they could not understand why there was such an emphasis on using peaceful methods, and they could not see how British public opinion could force the British government to go to war over the methods used when the British government made it perfectly clear that the last thing that they wanted was a war.
This error was based on the fact that these Nazis had no idea of how a democratic government works, had no respect for public opinion or a free press, and were encouraged in their error by the weakness of the British ambassador in Berlin (Henderson) and by Rippentrop's associations with the "Cliveden Set" in England while he had been ambassador there in 1936-1938.
In the third place, the British government could not publicly admit to its own people these "seven points" because they were not acceptable to British public opinion. Accordingly, these points had to remain secret, except for various "trial balloons" issued through The Times, in speeches in the House of Commons or in Chatham House, in articles in The Round Table and by calculated indiscretions to prepare the ground for what was being done.
In order to persuade the British people to accept these points, one by one, as they were achieved, the British government spread the tale that Germany was armed to the teeth and that the opposition to Germany was insignificant...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#44
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
That is not true.....but accepting it would mean accepting Poland as it stood, as its existence was guaranteed by other treaties with several of the other powers involved. If Hitler accepts this - he's setling for NO eastwards movement at all.
Britain was prepared to let Hitler annex Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig and polish corridor in order to satisfy him and to get him to cooperate in joining a four power pact.
See previous post for sources and documentation.
...Thus, in the negotiations leading up to Munich, November 19, 1937, Lord Halifax told Hitler (as summarized in the third person in the German minutes):
...All other questions could be characterized as relating to changes in the European order, changes that sooner or later would probably take place. To these questions belonged Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. England was only interested that any alterations should be effected by peaceful evolution, so as to avoid methods which might cause far-reaching disturbances, which were not desired either by the Führer or by other countries...
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/ne ... /coben.htm
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
Chamberlain did approach Hitler and Mussolini both with the intention of getting Italy and Germany to guarantee the rump Czech state as part of a 4-power bloc, later in 1938 and early 1939.If such a proposal was going to be put to Hitler it would have to have been arrived at after cabinet discussion and there is no evidence for this.
So creating an Italian obligation to defend Prague against further German aggression was pro-German? Mussolini’s reception of Chamberlain in early 1939 when Chamberlain was pushing the 4-power pact was quite frosty. Chamberlain’s purpose was to use Germany’s territorial ambitions and Italy’s own appetite to drive a wedge in the Axis block in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
If there evidence for that claim?glenn239 wrote:Chamberlain’s purpose was to use Germany’s territorial ambitions and Italy’s own appetite to drive a wedge in the Axis block in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
The only evidence I have seen so far is that Chamberlain wanted to form a four power pact to make peace between the four powers with the aim of excluding Russia from europe.
See Halifax talks with Hitler in 19 Nov 1937 for details.
Record of a Conversation between the Fuhrer and Reichskanzler and Lord Halifax, in the presence of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, in Obersalzberg, Nov. 19, 1937
...If Germany and England were to succeed in reaching an understanding or even in approaching nearer to such an understanding, it would be necessary, in the English view, that those countries which stood politically close to Germany and England should be at the appropriate time brought into our discussions.
One should mention in this context Italy and France, to whom it must be made clear from the beginning that an Anglo-German rapprochement would not mean an attempt to divide France and England.
The impression should not be given that the Berlin-Rome axis or the good relations between London and Paris would be prejudiced by an agreement between England and Germany. After the ground had been prepared by agreement between England and Germany, the four Great Powers of Western Europe must together create the basis upon which a lasting European peace would be built. In no case should one of the four Powers be left outside this collaboration for in that case the situation of insecurity which would arise would never find an end...
http://books.google.com/books?id=8XXVVQ ... 1-PA129,M1
I think Chamberlain's intent was for peace and cooperation among the four powers, not sow discord between Italy and Germany.
He was worried that Russia would exploit any divisions among the four and gain influence in europe, so he pushed for peace.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
Mussolini himself pushed the four power pact in 1933.glenn239 wrote: Mussolini’s reception of Chamberlain in early 1939 when Chamberlain was pushing the 4-power pact was quite frosty.
"No Menace"
Monday, Apr. 10, 1933
Produced by Benito Mussolini, accepted in principle by Ramsay MacDonald, the new Four-Power Peace Plan was presented before publication to the French Government (TIME, March 27). In Paris for three weeks it has been discussed in wordy secret conferences and lengthy telegrams. To the French and British Governments was left the privilege of publishing a translation of the text. This was released last week and the world knew in detail what Mussolini & MacDonald have proposed:
1) Four-power collaboration for peace between Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany.
2) Acceptance of the principle of revision of treaties.
3) In the event of the failure of full disarmament, a pledge to grant gradual arms equality for Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria.
4) A common line of action in world affairs by the four powers.
5) The accord to remain in effect for ten years, then to be automatically renewed unless denounced.
6) The accord to be registered with the League of Nations.
In other words, to preserve the peace of Europe...
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/artic ... 23,00.html
Four-Power Pact
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Power_Pact
Chamberlain's Four power pact:
...Chamberlain’s motives were not bad ones; he wanted peace so that he could devote Britain’s “limited resources” to social welfare; but he was narrow and totally ignorant of the realities of power, convinced that international politics could be conducted in terms of secret deals, as business was, and he was quite ruthless in carrying out his aims, especially in his readiness to sacrifice non-English persons, who, in his eyes, did not count.
In the meantime, both the people and the government were more demoralized in France than in England. The policy of the Right which would have used force against Germany even in the face of British disapproval ended in 1924. When Barthou, who had been one of the chief figures in the 1924 effort, tried to revive it in 1934, it was quite a different thing, and he had constantly to give at least verbal support to Britain's efforts to modify his encirclement of Germany into a Four-Power Pact (of Britain, France, Italy, Germany).
This Four-Power Pact, which was the ultimate goal of the anti-Bolshevik group in England, was really an effort to form a united front of Europe against the Soviet Union and, in the eyes of this group, would have been a capstone to unite in one system the encirclement of France (which was the British answer to Barthou's encirclement of Germany) and the Anti-Comintern Pact (which was the German response to the same project).
The Four-Power Pact reached its fruition at the Munich Conference of September 1938, where these four Powers destroyed Czechoslovakia without consulting Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union.
But the scorn the dictators had for Britain and France as decadent democracies had by this time reached such a pass that the dictators no longer had even that minimum of respect without which the Four-Power Pact could not function. As a consequence, Hitler in 1939 spurned all Chamberlain's frantic efforts to restore the Four-Power Pact along with his equally frantic and even more secret efforts to win Hitler's attention by offers of colonies in Africa and economic support in eastern Europe...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
?If there evidence for that claim
Chamberlain approached Italy and Germany during and after Munich (Sept 1938-Jan 1939) to secure from each a security guarantee of the rump Czech state in conjunction with France and Britain. Now, in actual fact, the only credible threat to Prague was from Germany. So if Italy guaranteed the Czech state as part of a 4-power deal, and Germany invaded the Czech state, legally Italy had to go to war with Germany if Britain and France did as well.
Mussolini was frosty towards Chamberlain in 1939, a date six years later than the one you mention.Mussolini himself pushed the four power pact in 1933.
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea?
So you interpreted this act as Chamberlain's plot to sow discord between Italy and Germany?glenn239 wrote:
Chamberlain approached Italy and Germany during and after Munich (Sept 1938-Jan 1939) to secure from each a security guarantee of the rump Czech state in conjunction with France and Britain. Now, in actual fact, the only credible threat to Prague was from Germany. So if Italy guaranteed the Czech state as part of a 4-power deal, and Germany invaded the Czech state, legally Italy had to go to war with Germany if Britain and France did as well.
I don't think that was Chamberlain's intent.
There is no evidence for that.
I have never seen any information showing Chamberlain wanted to sow discord.
...In the meantime the British had been working out a plan of their own. It involved, as we have said,
(1) separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, probably through the use of a plebiscite or even by outright partition;
(2) neutralization of the rest of Czechoslovakia by revising her treaties with Russia and France, and
(3) guarantee of this rump of Czechoslovakia (but not by Britain).
This plan was outlined to the Czech ambassador in London by Lord Halifax on May 25th, and was worked out in some detail by one of Lord Halifax's subordinates, William (now Lord) Strang, during a visit to Prague and to Berlin in the following week. This was the plan which was picked up by Lord Runciman and presented as his recommendation in his report of September 21, 1938.
It is worthy of note that on September and Lord Runciman sent a personal message by Henlein to Hitler in which he said that he would have a settlement drawn up by September 15th.
What is, perhaps, surprising is that Lord Runciman made no use whatever of the Karlsbad Demands or the extensive concessions to meet them which the Czechs had made during these negotiations, but instead recommended to the British Cabinet on September 16th, and in his written report five days later, the same melange of partition, plebiscites, neutralization, and guarantee which had been in the mind of the British Foreign Office for weeks.
It was this plan which was imposed on the Czechs by the Four-Power Conference at Munich on September 30th.
...The Munich agreement provided that certain designated areas of Czechoslovakia would be occupied by the German Army in four stages from October 1st to October 7th. A fifth area, to be designated by an international commission, would be occupied by October 10th. No property was to be withdrawn from these areas.
The international commission would order plebiscites which must be held before the end of November, the areas designated being occupied by an international force during the interval. The same international commission was to supervise the occupation and draw the final frontier. For six months the populations concerned would have the right of option into and out of the areas transferred under the supervision of a German-Czechoslovak commission.
The rump of Czechoslovakia was to be guaranteed by France and Britain. Germany and Italy would join this guarantee as soon as the Polish and Hungarian minority problems in that state had been settled. If they were not settled in three months, the four Powers would meet again to consider the problem.
The Munich agreement was violated on every point in favor of Germany, so that ultimately the German Army merely occupied the places it wanted. As a result, the Czech economic system was destroyed, and every important railroad or highway was cut or crippled.
This was done by the International Commission, consisting of German Secretary of State Weizsไcker and the French, British, Italian, and Czech diplomatic representatives in Berlin. Under dictation of the German General Staff, this group, by a 4 to 1 vote, accepted every German demand and canceled the plebiscites.
In addition, the guarantee of the rump of Czechoslovakia was never given, although Poland seized areas in which the majority of the population was not Polish on October 2nd and Hungary was given southern Slovakia on November 2nd. The final frontier with Germany was dictated by Germany alone to the Czechs, the other three members of the commission having withdrawn.
Beneš resigned as president of Czechoslovakia under the threat of a German ultimatum on October 5th and was replaced by Emil Hแcha. Slovakia and Ruthenia were given complete autonomy at once. The Soviet alliance was ended, and the Communist Party outlawed. The anti-Nazi refugees from the Sudetenland were rounded up by the Prague government and handed over to the Germans to be destroyed.
All these events showed very clearly the chief result of Munich: Germany was supreme in central Europe, and any possibility of curtailing that power either by a joint policy of the Western Powers with the Soviet Union and Italy or by finding any openly anti-German resistance in central Europe itself was ended.
Since this was exactly what Chamberlain and his friends had wanted, they should have been satisfied...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45
Re: Was Chamberlain's plans of a four power bloc a good idea
The meeting on Sylt is well known Chamberlain and Halifax wanted to keep unofficial lines of communication open maybe mistakenly. Dahlerus seems to have been representing the views of Göring who was thought less extreme than Hitler. Hitler passed his thoughts on through Burckart League of Nations Commissioner to Danzig and these included a free hand in the east, Halifax is reported to have said that if Hitler really wanted to settle Germans in the east to grow wheat he could not see any way of accommodating him.
Chamberlain used a carrot and stick approach to negotiations in 1939 the carrot was an economic agreement as the British knew Germany would soon be in economic difficulties also a deal on colonies the stick was that if Hitler intended to dominate Europe through force Britain would oppose him. Secret talks on economic matters and colonies went on till the occupation of Prague but nothing came of them. They were restarted in Berlin in May 1939 and after June transferred to London and were conducted on the UK side by Wilson, Hudson and Ball. Hitler stopped them after signing the Soviet agreement. Why Hudson wanted to use someone from the Norwegian Whaling Commission as a go between is a complete mystery to me.
German demands had been foreseen years previously and none of then came as any surprise. Would anyone disagree that the situation of Danzig was a legitimate German grievance. It was thought that because of Germany’s size relative to its east European neighbours its domination of the region economically and diplomatically was something that could not be avoided. The threat that Communism posed was never far it seems from Chamberlains mind and given what happened when it arrived in east central Europe in 1945 he was correct.
Another Munich was not possible after the occupation of Prague even if Chamberlain had wanted it. Chamberlain still wanted a settlement with Hitler but giving Hitler Poland was never contemplated. If the Poles had shown readiness to give up Danzig and do a deal on the corridor Chamberlain would have seized it but they were not and pressure was not put on them. British policy in 1939 makes no sense if Britain had decided not to resist an attempt at German European domination by force. Why issue guarantees to countries that stand in the way of German eastern expansion why try to build up an eastern front though Chamberlain could not stomach an alliance with the Communists. Britain was spending massively on armaments clearly not in anticipation of fighting anyone except Germany.
Chamberlain used a carrot and stick approach to negotiations in 1939 the carrot was an economic agreement as the British knew Germany would soon be in economic difficulties also a deal on colonies the stick was that if Hitler intended to dominate Europe through force Britain would oppose him. Secret talks on economic matters and colonies went on till the occupation of Prague but nothing came of them. They were restarted in Berlin in May 1939 and after June transferred to London and were conducted on the UK side by Wilson, Hudson and Ball. Hitler stopped them after signing the Soviet agreement. Why Hudson wanted to use someone from the Norwegian Whaling Commission as a go between is a complete mystery to me.
German demands had been foreseen years previously and none of then came as any surprise. Would anyone disagree that the situation of Danzig was a legitimate German grievance. It was thought that because of Germany’s size relative to its east European neighbours its domination of the region economically and diplomatically was something that could not be avoided. The threat that Communism posed was never far it seems from Chamberlains mind and given what happened when it arrived in east central Europe in 1945 he was correct.
Another Munich was not possible after the occupation of Prague even if Chamberlain had wanted it. Chamberlain still wanted a settlement with Hitler but giving Hitler Poland was never contemplated. If the Poles had shown readiness to give up Danzig and do a deal on the corridor Chamberlain would have seized it but they were not and pressure was not put on them. British policy in 1939 makes no sense if Britain had decided not to resist an attempt at German European domination by force. Why issue guarantees to countries that stand in the way of German eastern expansion why try to build up an eastern front though Chamberlain could not stomach an alliance with the Communists. Britain was spending massively on armaments clearly not in anticipation of fighting anyone except Germany.