Personally I think he was 90% failure.
Montgomery
Montgomery
Was Bernard Montgomery really that great commander or was his actions overrated???
Personally I think he was 90% failure.
Personally I think he was 90% failure.
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Tim Walker
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Michael Kenny
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So it was Monty who prevented Patton from closing the Falaise Gap, hmmm... I thought that it was feared the Germans would simply trample all over Patton and escape anyway. He was prevented from closing the gap because it was feared he would be demolished in the stampede. End of the Patton reputation then eh?.
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Musashi
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Polish 1st Armoured Division closed the Falaise gap. It was a "bottlecork"Michael Kenny wrote:So it was Monty who prevented Patton from closing the Falaise Gap, hmmm... I thought that it was feared the Germans would simply trample all over Patton and escape anyway. He was prevented from closing the gap because it was feared he would be demolished in the stampede. End of the Patton reputation then eh?.
Regards
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Aufklarung
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Musashi is right. They did; by disobeying orders and leaving a Cdn Unit in the lurch. But who cares now. 1 Polish Armd Div(correct name in OrBat) was under 1 Cdn Army command and a loose command at that. The Cdns and Poles fought cutthroat battles to close the gap and no one, not even Montgomery "Held us back". It is a fact the weight and strength of the Germans were attacking against the Cdns and not merely holding against the not very aggressive US forces of Bradley. Once his Cobra suceeded in piercing the defensive German ring before him; he set loose Patton to ride unopposed(compared to closing the gap in the north) to supposed glory. Tractable and Totalize dragged under this weight and Montgomery had to finally allow US forces to cross a formerly sacrosant Army boundry and meet the Poles at Chambois on 19 Aug '44. Thus the gap was closed.
It is a common myth among Americans and Brits that Monty was "let down" by the Cdns in his efforts to close the Falaise Gap.(Notice it's not called "The Argentan Gap" ) There are many reasons why this was believed but foremost was those two were not set against the forces 1 Cdn Army was. Granted the US was not allowed across the Army boundry on Montys orderdue to personality conflict with Bradley and Patton. I believe he had a plan of Cdn Hammer and US Anvil tho and not just being spiteful. The Germans knew the threat was where the Cdns were coming from and found their delaying and holding actions against the timid Brit and static US forces working. Therefore they concentrated all they had in our path. Plus Monty didn't help much with his command style of controlling the battle at a stategic level. Arbitrary boundries and inflexible procedures were just some command features that bear his mark.
I see I've rambled. So I'll close with ; Monty was as bad as any of them.
Regards
A
It is a common myth among Americans and Brits that Monty was "let down" by the Cdns in his efforts to close the Falaise Gap.(Notice it's not called "The Argentan Gap"
) There are many reasons why this was believed but foremost was those two were not set against the forces 1 Cdn Army was. Granted the US was not allowed across the Army boundry on Montys orderdue to personality conflict with Bradley and Patton. I believe he had a plan of Cdn Hammer and US Anvil tho and not just being spiteful. The Germans knew the threat was where the Cdns were coming from and found their delaying and holding actions against the timid Brit and static US forces working. Therefore they concentrated all they had in our path. Plus Monty didn't help much with his command style of controlling the battle at a stategic level. Arbitrary boundries and inflexible procedures were just some command features that bear his mark. I see I've rambled. So I'll close with ; Monty was as bad as any of them.
Regards
A
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Musashi
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Polish 1st Armoured Division lost many tanks during the battle, because British-made tanks were useless against German Panthers. However losses in men were not so serious. German losses were also very serious (for example at least 6000 POWs). One of Polish tank battalions has been called "Bloody shirts" by the Canadians because of its commander who drived his tank wearing a bloody shirt.
Regards
Regards
The pro/versus Monty discussion IMO ranks as one of the silliest in WWII historiography, not because the question isn't worth discussing or because Montgomerys achievements are beyond debate, but because the discussion is so perenially plagued by obviously unreasonable exaggerations on both sides. The article at Pattonuncovered is a nice case in point, what rubbish, an absolute insult to human intelligence. Who does he think he's writing for, children? Does he expect to be taken seriously with that? Montgomery's "obviously doomed strategy" was in fact essentially the one unanimously agreed before the invasion started. Thus, it was neither Montgomery's nor doomed (as later events made clear).
The controversy ultimately stems from the two generals themselves, who disliked each other intensely. Both were good if not brilliant generals (though my preference would perhaps be for Patton), and both had hyperdeveloped egoes and shared a passion for imbuing their name with grandeur. Why a form of discussion rooted in a character shortcoming in these two men should be accepted and taken over by posterity is a bit of a mystery to me. For a reasonable perspective, I recommend Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy". Patton's rambling against Montgomery's implementation of strategy stands up to close scrutiny no better than Montgomerys rather lame attempts to trivialize the failure of Goodwood, f.e.
My opinion of Montgomery, in short - Montgomery was a good - not great - commander who did some things well and others less well, as evidenced by f.e. the battle of El-Alamein - first crushing victory through logistic build-up and a carefully fought set-piece battle, then a flawed pursuit due to overcautiousness. His command decisions in Normandy, while not universally beyond reproach, were IMO generally sound and also not likely very different from those any other commander would have had to make.
cheers
The controversy ultimately stems from the two generals themselves, who disliked each other intensely. Both were good if not brilliant generals (though my preference would perhaps be for Patton), and both had hyperdeveloped egoes and shared a passion for imbuing their name with grandeur. Why a form of discussion rooted in a character shortcoming in these two men should be accepted and taken over by posterity is a bit of a mystery to me. For a reasonable perspective, I recommend Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy". Patton's rambling against Montgomery's implementation of strategy stands up to close scrutiny no better than Montgomerys rather lame attempts to trivialize the failure of Goodwood, f.e.
My opinion of Montgomery, in short - Montgomery was a good - not great - commander who did some things well and others less well, as evidenced by f.e. the battle of El-Alamein - first crushing victory through logistic build-up and a carefully fought set-piece battle, then a flawed pursuit due to overcautiousness. His command decisions in Normandy, while not universally beyond reproach, were IMO generally sound and also not likely very different from those any other commander would have had to make.
cheers
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Aufklarung
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So you're saying that Market Garden was a failure? That would mean that the two US drops and bridge /riverXings were failures too.I think four words sums it up the best....A Bridge too Far......
Americans seem to focus on their missions of MG and attach fault because the Bits failed in theirs. "Oh, Monty was stupid. Montys plan was unsound. Oh, oh, MG was a terrible idea."If you think for a second you'll see that since MG was a success for the US but not the Brits, the plan was 2/3s successful. It was all his plan so he gets credit where credit is due for the victories...no, success's of 101st and 82nd AB Divs.
"Good job, Monty, getting those Yanks to win.""Now don't be sad....'cause two outta three ain't bad."
Regards
A
There's nothing like the throwing in of a red herring to get an argument going! People just love to bad mouth controversial generals. If I may digress to an earlier war, a few years ago, a major British tabloid was demanding that we take down "Butcher" Haig's statue from Whitehall. Which moves me to ask, "If he was such a bad man, why did they erect it in the first place and reward him so well monetarily?"
One of the reasons that Haig comes in for such bad press, is that the Prime Minister at the time, Lloyd George, hated him and after the war he wrote his war memoirs, condemning him. It reads like an indictment: “I never met a man in such high position who was so utterly devoid of imagination” etc but anybody who bothers to study Haig’s career can see that this is absolutely not true. Many years before the war, Haig was talking about a citizen’s army of 900,000. Unprecedented! Devoid of imagination?
This character assassination was carried on in the writings of Liddel-Hart, in the 1920s and later in such works as “The Donkeys” by Alan Clark and many others. So the damage had been done and the myth created. This was aired in Blackadder Goes Forth when Capt Blackadder mentions the forthcoming attack being just so “Sir Douglas Haig can move his drinks cabinet a few inches closer to Berlin!” and another gem.
The General (Addressing Private Baldric)
“Don’t worry, my man. Captain Darling and I are right behind you!”
Capt Blackadder (aside)
“About 35 miles behind!”
The truth is rather different.
Haig is mainly remembered for the debacle on July 1st 1916, the first day of the Somme battle, when there were 60,000 British casualties, 20,000 of whom were dead. The tragedy of the Newfoundland Regiment who lost 95% of their battalion strength, in the first 20 minutes, at Beaumont Hamel and the Accrington Pals (East Lancs Regt) who suffered similarly at Serre. But it was a one off. It never happened again. Lessons were learned. The other great debacle was Passchendaele, which might have turned out rather differently, had it not rained almost continuously, at a time of the year when one could usually expect it to be reasonably dry!
For comparison. During one week, in June 1916, the Austro-Hungarians lost 300,000.
The French lost 211,000 in the last two weeks of August, 1914.
The Germans lost 348,000 in the 6 weeks between 21/3/18 and 30/4/18.
The Italian dead on their northern front almost equalled in three years, British losses on the Western front in 4 years.
In 1915, Russia lost two million!
The French dead amounted to 3.5% of their population, the Germans 2.9% and the British 1.9%. Yet Haig and his generals are falsely accused of causing their men to lose more heavily than the other armies, which faced the same problems at the same time!
It was the last 100 days that were the long awaited breakthrough for Haig. After four long years of doing their bit (along with the French) of gutting the German Army in the field, the real turn about came on August 8th 1918, at the Battle of Amiens (the “Black day of the German Army.”- Ludendorff).The climax came between 27th September and August 5th –the breaking of the Hindenburg line, during which 35,000 prisoners and 380 heavy guns were taken. It ended with the Battle of the Sambre between 1st and 11th of November, culminating in Armistice Day.
Between 8 August 1918 and Nov 11th the British Army took 188,700 prisoners and 2,480 heavy guns. During this period, the rest of our allies took 196,700 prisoners and 3,775 guns. Therefore, our army, which had manned only about 45 miles of a Front over 400 miles long had taken just under 50% of the prisoners and 40% of the guns! It was an unparalleled achievement in the History of the British Army. Everybody knows about the first day of the Somme and Passchendaele and Sir Douglas Haig’s detractors have made sure that that is all he will be remembered for. But the truth is different. Not only did he and his generals achieve us a Victory, it was a great one.
It was General Slim who when asked to define the role of a general said:
"To provide a Victory. He has no other function."
Well, following both the Great War and WW2, no German army of occupation was stationed on the Thames, the Humber or the Tyne. I think this is a fair reflection of the quality of our generals.
As for Monty - I've read his memoirs. He was human like everybody else. OK, he was on an ego trip. I get the impression that some of his better coups are relatively unknown. It was General Allenbrooke (later Lord Allenbrooke, CIGS) and Monty who between them co-ordinated the withdrawal of the BEF from a line stretching from Roubaix, westwards, to Dunkirk. This, in itself was an amazing feat and without it, there would have been no miracle of Dunkirk.
Monty gets hammered for Operation Market Garden. Too many things went wrong. If we had been a bit luckier, he would have been just about beyond criticism. C'est la Guerre.
One of the reasons that Haig comes in for such bad press, is that the Prime Minister at the time, Lloyd George, hated him and after the war he wrote his war memoirs, condemning him. It reads like an indictment: “I never met a man in such high position who was so utterly devoid of imagination” etc but anybody who bothers to study Haig’s career can see that this is absolutely not true. Many years before the war, Haig was talking about a citizen’s army of 900,000. Unprecedented! Devoid of imagination?
This character assassination was carried on in the writings of Liddel-Hart, in the 1920s and later in such works as “The Donkeys” by Alan Clark and many others. So the damage had been done and the myth created. This was aired in Blackadder Goes Forth when Capt Blackadder mentions the forthcoming attack being just so “Sir Douglas Haig can move his drinks cabinet a few inches closer to Berlin!” and another gem.
The General (Addressing Private Baldric)
“Don’t worry, my man. Captain Darling and I are right behind you!”
Capt Blackadder (aside)
“About 35 miles behind!”
The truth is rather different.
Haig is mainly remembered for the debacle on July 1st 1916, the first day of the Somme battle, when there were 60,000 British casualties, 20,000 of whom were dead. The tragedy of the Newfoundland Regiment who lost 95% of their battalion strength, in the first 20 minutes, at Beaumont Hamel and the Accrington Pals (East Lancs Regt) who suffered similarly at Serre. But it was a one off. It never happened again. Lessons were learned. The other great debacle was Passchendaele, which might have turned out rather differently, had it not rained almost continuously, at a time of the year when one could usually expect it to be reasonably dry!
For comparison. During one week, in June 1916, the Austro-Hungarians lost 300,000.
The French lost 211,000 in the last two weeks of August, 1914.
The Germans lost 348,000 in the 6 weeks between 21/3/18 and 30/4/18.
The Italian dead on their northern front almost equalled in three years, British losses on the Western front in 4 years.
In 1915, Russia lost two million!
The French dead amounted to 3.5% of their population, the Germans 2.9% and the British 1.9%. Yet Haig and his generals are falsely accused of causing their men to lose more heavily than the other armies, which faced the same problems at the same time!
It was the last 100 days that were the long awaited breakthrough for Haig. After four long years of doing their bit (along with the French) of gutting the German Army in the field, the real turn about came on August 8th 1918, at the Battle of Amiens (the “Black day of the German Army.”- Ludendorff).The climax came between 27th September and August 5th –the breaking of the Hindenburg line, during which 35,000 prisoners and 380 heavy guns were taken. It ended with the Battle of the Sambre between 1st and 11th of November, culminating in Armistice Day.
Between 8 August 1918 and Nov 11th the British Army took 188,700 prisoners and 2,480 heavy guns. During this period, the rest of our allies took 196,700 prisoners and 3,775 guns. Therefore, our army, which had manned only about 45 miles of a Front over 400 miles long had taken just under 50% of the prisoners and 40% of the guns! It was an unparalleled achievement in the History of the British Army. Everybody knows about the first day of the Somme and Passchendaele and Sir Douglas Haig’s detractors have made sure that that is all he will be remembered for. But the truth is different. Not only did he and his generals achieve us a Victory, it was a great one.
It was General Slim who when asked to define the role of a general said:
"To provide a Victory. He has no other function."
Well, following both the Great War and WW2, no German army of occupation was stationed on the Thames, the Humber or the Tyne. I think this is a fair reflection of the quality of our generals.
As for Monty - I've read his memoirs. He was human like everybody else. OK, he was on an ego trip. I get the impression that some of his better coups are relatively unknown. It was General Allenbrooke (later Lord Allenbrooke, CIGS) and Monty who between them co-ordinated the withdrawal of the BEF from a line stretching from Roubaix, westwards, to Dunkirk. This, in itself was an amazing feat and without it, there would have been no miracle of Dunkirk.
Monty gets hammered for Operation Market Garden. Too many things went wrong. If we had been a bit luckier, he would have been just about beyond criticism. C'est la Guerre.
"So you're saying that Market Garden was a failure?"
It WAS a failure. The strategic objective was to seize and exploit a crossing of the Rhine River. That didn't happen.
But the failure wasn't due to the US units involved. They fulfilled their assigned missions.
The failure was due directly to the British 30th Corps not fulfilling its assigned mission.
It WAS a failure. The strategic objective was to seize and exploit a crossing of the Rhine River. That didn't happen.
But the failure wasn't due to the US units involved. They fulfilled their assigned missions.
The failure was due directly to the British 30th Corps not fulfilling its assigned mission.
I agree Galahad. The bridges over the Waal and the Maas were succesfully taken and held by the 82nd and 101st Airborne. But it wasn't just the failure of XXX corps to make progress along Hells Highway. They would have got there eventually. It was Bittrich's 2nd SS Panzer, they were underestimated, drop zones in the wrong places, supplies falling into German hands, wrong timings and a host of other things.
Radios that didn't work and ignoring their own intelligence estimates also hurt the Red Devils.
But hoping to push an entire corps down a two lane highway on the deadline given was perhaps a bit of fantasizing on Monty's part. Especially since they kept stopping for tea and their commander showed no sense of understanding that urgency was inherrent in his assignment.
But hoping to push an entire corps down a two lane highway on the deadline given was perhaps a bit of fantasizing on Monty's part. Especially since they kept stopping for tea and their commander showed no sense of understanding that urgency was inherrent in his assignment.