Operation Matador

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Zaf1
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Operation Matador

#1

Post by Zaf1 » 22 Aug 2009, 11:54

Hi,

The British had a secret plan to occupy southern Thailand to prevent the Japanese from making beach head and attack Singapore through a back door. However the British unable to undertake such operation which involve occupying neutral Thailand which might brand them as an aggressor.

Had Sir Brooke-Popham ordered such operation might the Japanese landings at Singora and Pattani after the convoy spotted on December 6 ended in fiasco and might have saved Singapore from invasion?

Thanks

Zaf

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Re: Operation Matador

#2

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Aug 2009, 16:21

I've never read very much on MATADOR...but I'm not sure exactly how much THAT was a motive for not carrying it out :wink: More likely it was a fear that a Norway-style situation would occur - that planning and carrying out such an operation would actually bring on a fight that it was intended to pre-empt. Certainly there was a window AFTER the Japanese occupation in the summer of 1941, when they COULD have done so without being branded interantionally as an aggressor....given that the US and others had branded JAPAN a belligerent for their ocupation :wink: They COULD have brought on the war in the Far East early however....but at least on a front the Japanese weren't prepared for at THAT point...and it COULD at least have moved the point-of-engagement eastwards from Malaya.

There are also other examples of Britain being prepared to endure the (limited) international opbjections to occupying Neutrals....such as the mid-1941 invasion of Syria/Lebanon :wink:


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Re: Operation Matador

#3

Post by Zaf1 » 23 Aug 2009, 18:27

Thanks. This means the British had been in such situation before. I wonder if the US branded the British as an aggressor for occupying Syria and did it had any effect to the US-British relation, like losing US support for Britain.

The US did take action against the Japanese for occupying French Indo-China which led to economic embargo and eventually led to war.

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Re: Operation Matador

#4

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Aug 2009, 19:15

I wonder if the US branded the British as an aggressor for occupying Syria and did it had any effect to the US-British relation, like losing US support for Britain
This particular item has come up for discussion before - no and no IIRC.

"Aggressor" wasn't of any material interest as a status - those that WERE important to nations were "belligerent" and "neutral"...the two Hague Convention definitions in time of war...

(Public Opinion however, that was something else)

...with the additional U.S.-only wrinkle of the President being free to determine who would or would NOT be provided with American military aid - his "exceptions lists" under the Neutrality Act. The default was NO military aid...and the President was allowed to specify exceptions....like Britain and Fance in 1939/40 :wink: And aid to Britain under Lend Lease didn't falter after the invasion of Syria...

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Re: Operation Matador

#5

Post by Andy H » 24 Aug 2009, 20:19

Had this snippet in an old file.
The Prime Minister thought that, in view
of the assurances given in paragraphs 4 and 5,
f instructions could now he given to the Commander-rin-Chief ,
Par East, to put Operation MATADOR into effect, if the
circumstances made this necessary.

Slam. . . It was clear that President Roosevelt was
anxious to make some communication to the Government of
Siam in order to stiffen their resistance to Japanese
,aggression. Some objection, however, was seen to the
first suggestion in paragraph 7, on the ground of probable
leakage of our intention to Japan; while neither
suggestion was hardly consistent with our proposal to
carry out a forestalling operation in certain circumstances.

The.position in regard to Siam would require
further consideration,, The suggestion favoured was an
offer of help from both ourselves and the United States
in the event of attack by Japan, without, howevert
indicating very precisely what form that help would take.

The Prime Minister summing up the discussion,
suggested that the War Cabinet should take the following
provisional decisions

a) That we could now say to the Dutch that in the
event of attack on them by Japan we should at
once come to their aid0
(b) That instructions should now be given to, our
Commanders to put Operation MATADOR into
effect either as a forestalling measure, if a
Japanese attack on the Kra Isthmus was plainly
imminent, or if Japan invaded Siam,
(c) That we should give some joint assurance with
the United States to the Government of Siara,
The decisions taken would have to be embodied
in telegrams
(l) To our Ambassador at Washington:
(2) To our Minister at Bangkok,;
(3) To the Commander -in-Chief in the Par East:
(4) To Admiral Phillips, Commander-in-Chief,
Eastern. Fleet,.who.was now.at Manila, tQ
acquaint him with the position.
(5) To the Prime Ministers of the Dominion Governments
acquainting them with the position.
These, telegrams would reauire careful drafting,
- and the drafts should no ouhraitted to him (the Prime.
Minister;.
The War Cabinet agreed to this procedure^

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Re: Operation Matador

#6

Post by Andy H » 24 Aug 2009, 20:30

and this from a despatch by Air Chief Marshal SIR ROBERT BROOKE-POPHAM G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.G.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, FAR EAST (17th October, 1940-27th December, 1941)
Operation " Matador."
50. The importance of the Southern end of the Kra Isthmus, especially the
neighbourhood of Singora, has already been referred to (see paragraph 12 above).
The possibility of an advance into this Isthmus, in order to hold a position
North of Haad Yai Junction, was considered soon after the formation of General
Headquarters, Far East.(1 3) Detailed plans for carrying out this operation were
prepared, and the code word '' Matador " was eventually given to it. It was
from the start realised that the essential feature of this operation was forestalling
the Japanese on a position near Singora; see, for instance, my telegram
of the 22nd March, 1941, to the Chiefs of Staff through the War Office,j") in
which it is stated : " The success of this plan would depend on rapidity of
execution in order to forestall the Japanese on the Songhla l i n e ' ' ; also my
telegram of the 21st November, 1941,(15) from which the following is an extract:
" I wish to emphasise the fact that the forestalling of the Japanese in Singora
area is essential to the success of ' Matador.' ''
This necessitated at least twenty-four hours' start before the Japanese
landed, and rapid movement of our force once the order was given. It was
realised all along that, if these conditions could not be fulfillled, then the
Matador operation would be impracticable. The psychological value of
offensive movement at the start of the war and the possibility of thereby upsetting
the Japanese plans were fully realised, but had to be weighed against the fact
that we should be leaving prepared ground with which the troops were familiar,
and that, unless we forestalled the enemy, the fighting would be in the nature
of an encounter battle, quite possibly against superior numbers. Further, the
attitude of the Siamese was uncertain, and questions of secrecy precluded any
attempt to get prior agreement from Bangkok. Orders were issued that, should
Matador be ordered, any opposition from the Siamese was to be overcome at
once, but we could never be certain in advance how much delay might be caused to
our movements by obstacles, destruction of bridges or active resistance. A margin
of time was necessary.
A total of thirty officers, two or three at a time, were sent over as visitors to
the area in plain clothes in order to collect information, especially on the topography
of the country, and to have some individuals familiar with it.
The preparations were completed before the Autumn of 1941 as far as could
be foreseen, including maps, arrangements for the distribution of rice to the
population, the collection of a quantity of Siamese money, and writing, ready
for translation and printing, pamphlets of three varieties to suit the different
attitudes which might be adopted by the Siamese Government. For reasons of
secrecy, knowledge of the plans was confined to a minimum number of
individuals, and for the same reason certain steps could not be taken in advance.
For instance, it was considered dangerous to translate or print the pamphlets
before the operation was ordered.
51. Up to the 5th December, Matador was not to be carried out without
reference to the War Cabinet, but on that date a telegram(1 6) was sent to the effect
that I could order it without reference to London in either of the followingcontingencies
:—
(a) If I had information that the Japanese expedition was advancing with
the apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus; or
(&).'If the Japanese violated any other part of Thailand (Siam).
A few days earlier it had been impressed on me that carrying out Matador
if the Japanese intended to make a landing in Southern Siam would almost
certainly mean war with Japan,(1 7 ) and in view of this I considered it my duty
to be scrupulously careful in acting on the telegram of the 5th December
Regards

Andy H

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Re: Operation Matador

#7

Post by phylo_roadking » 24 Aug 2009, 21:33

Andy - that all reads as if they were VERY determined on MATADOR...but set up pending a "tripwire"?

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Re: Operation Matador

#8

Post by Zaf1 » 25 Aug 2009, 00:39

Why didn't Brooke-Popham launch 'Operation Mataodor'? I think even Percival was somewhat surprised that it wasn't implemented.

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Re: Operation Matador

#9

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Aug 2009, 00:53

Well - Percival of all people should have known why; he was one of the three people - the others were Sir Shenton Thomas and the CinC Brooke-Popham - at the meeting on the 6th of December when Percival recommended it be activated...but by the END of the meeting it had been decided not to.

As it turned out - the Japanese had a counter worked out. They would use Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern Siam to establish air cover, and then invade from the Kra Isthmus. I wonder if the three faces at the 6th December meeting were aware of this?

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Re: Operation Matador

#10

Post by phylo_roadking » 25 Aug 2009, 01:03

Looking round the Net I found THIS -

http://www.fepow-community.org.uk/arthu ... lities.htm
It gave us in fact freedom from the control of London for which we had been pressing for so long and made MATADOR look a possible operation. Up to that time it had never really seemed likely that we should get the necessary permission in time. It was not, however, all plain sailing because the Carrying out of MATADOR would almost certainly mean war with Japan and it was still the policy of His Majesty’s Government to avoid war if possible. It was therefore a very difficult decision that the Commander-in.Chief had to make. In fact the whole future of our Empire might have depended upon what he did.I felt that this change in the situation was so vital that I decided to go to Kuala Lumpur the following day, Saturday, 6 December, to discuss it with Heath. I travelled by the Civil Air Line plane which left Singapore daily early in the morning and returned the same evening. Shortly before 3 p.m., when I was at the head-quarters of the Federated Malay States Volunteers in company with Heath, we received a message to the effect that the morning air reconnaissance which was watching the approaches to the Gulf of Thailand, had at about 11.30 a.m. that day reported having sighted two Japanese convoys, Consisting of warships and transports, approximately eighty miles ESE. of Point Camo, the most southerly point of Jndo-China, steaming westward. A reference to the map showed us that, if they continued on the same course, these convoys would strike the coast of South Thailand somewhere about Singora. So after all, it seemed, we had got the news in time and should be able to put MATADOR into operation. Heath immediately ordered his Corps to assume the first degree of readiness and, in anticipation of MATADOR being ordered, instructed Murray Lyon to be prepared to move forward the i ith Indian Division at short notice. After discussing plans in further detail I left Kuala Lumpur at 4.30 p.m. for the return journey to Singapore. It was a curious sensation seeing everybody going about their business in the ordinary way quite oblivious of the bedlam that seemed certain to break loose in a day or two’s time. One longed to tell them the news but of course that was out of the question.

On returning to my headquarters at about 6.30 p.m., I was informed that one convoy consisted of twenty-two 10,000-ton merchant vessels escorted by one battleship, five cruisers and seven destroyers and the other of twenty-one merchant ships escorted by two cruisers and seven destroyers. Obviously this was a big expedition and I was a little surprised to find that MATADOR had not yet been ordered. But the Commander-in-Chief had information which I had not got, i.e. that another small convoy, consisting of one cruiser and three merchant ships, had been sighted farther west but steering north-west. At a conference between the Commander-in-Chief Far East, Admiral Layton and Admiral Sir Tom Phillips’s Chief of Staff (the Admiral himself was then at Manila visiting the Commander of the American Asiatic Fleet) it was decided that the probability was against the main convoys continuing their course due west and that they were more likely to follow the small leading convoy round Point Camo, possibly making for a good anchorage at Koh Rong on the west coast of Indo-China which could be used as a base for the next move against Thailand. Bearing in mind the policy of avoiding war with Japan if possible, Brooke-Popham decided that he would not be justified in ordering MATADOR on the information he had up to date but impressed upon Pulford the vital importance of maintaining contact with the convoys. during the night. As this flying-boat failed to make contact, a second Catalina was sent out early on 7 December and instructed that, if no contact was established, a search was to be made off the west coast of Indo-China in case the convoys had, as anticipated, concentrated in the Koh Rong area. No reports were received from this boat and, from information published in the Japanese press when we were prisoners-of-war, it seems certain that it was shot down.
...and thus the overall situation ran away from them in the skies over Hawaii. They just ran out of wiggle-time to make the decision for themselves on the "stand-alone" Matador, as opposed to the entire Pacific War breaking out.
Sunday, 7 December, was a day of suspense. We were all ready waiting for the flag to fall and, like runners in a race, feeling a bit impatient. Lunch-time came and still not a word from our reconnaissance aircraft. Further reconnaissances sent out in the afternoon only sighted a few single merchant vessels in the Gulf of Thailand. We began to wonder whether our conviction that we were on the eve of war was really false and whether after all this was only a demonstration against Thailand after the Hitlerian fashion. The evening passed and still no word came. But at a little before 8 p.m.—I cannot remember the exact time—we got our answer. At 6.48 p.m., a Hudson aircraft on reconnaissance in the Gulf of Thailand and flying low in very bad weather had sighted four small Japanese vessels, which looked like destroyers, about seventy miles off Singora steaming south. We also learnt Contact had been made by Hudson aircraft of No. 1 Royal Australian Air Force squadron at the limit of their patrolling range. This made it impossible for them to remain in contact until relieved, so a Catalina flying-boat was sent out to shadow directed against the aerodromes but a few fell in the very centre of the town and did some damage. For some reason the headquarters of the civil A.R.P. organization had not been manned and lights were still on in some of the streets when the aeroplanes arrived—not that this really made much difference for there was no mistaking the water-front at Singapore even at night. It must be admitted that this raid came as rather a surprise for the nearest Japanese aerodromes were ~oo miles from Singapore, which was a considerable distance at that stage of the war though nothing later on, and we hardly expected the Japanese to have any very long-range aircraft. It was a bold enterprise on their part. It was also the first indication most of the citizens of Singapore had that war had broken out.

One of the first decisions which the A.O.C. and I had to take jointly was how best to use our air force. The Hudsons of No.1 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force, based on the Kota Bharu aerodrome, were already attacLing the Japanese ships and landing-craft off that coast, and the Vickers-Vildebeeste torpedo-bombers, operating from east coast aerodromes, had joined in the attack. One ship, which is believed to have carried tanks, was set on fire and sunk. It was claimed by both the air force and the gunners. Perhaps they both had a finger in the pie. There were other bomber aircraft on the Kedah and Province Wellesley aerodromes and we decided to send these across the mountains to attack the enemy shipping off Kota Bharu at dawn. When they got there they couldn’t find the enemy ships—they had probably withdrawn by then—so went on to Patani in South Thailand where they were met by enemy fighters. Some bombs were dropped on enemy ships but probably without result. On return to their aerodromes some of our aircraft were attacked by Japanese bombers and fighters and considerable losses were sustained. The rapidity with which the Japanese got their air attacks going against our aerodromes was quite remarkable. Practically all the aerodromes in Kelantan, Kedah, Province Wellesley, and Penang, were attacked on that day and in most cases the bombers were escorted by fighters. There is little doubt that these fighters were operating from the aerodromes in South Thailand which had been got ready for their use and where stocks of fuel and other necessaries had already been accumulated. To allay suspicion the grass was allowed to grow on the Patani aerodrome right up to the last minute, but reports received by us, unfortunately just too late, showed that it was all ready for the reception of the Japanese aircraft, with drums of petrol hidden under the trees, the day before the invasion took place. The performance of Japanese aircraft of all types and the accuracy of their bombing came as an unpleasant surprise. By the evening of the eighth our own air force had already been seriously weakened.One of the most urgent requirements was to find out as soon as we could just what the enemy was doing. So air reconnaissances were sent to Singora and Patani at dawn. They reported that the enemy had landed at both those places and that the aerodromes were already in use. It was obviously too late know to put MATADOR into operation...
In effect, therefore, they only had a forty-eight-hour window to revamp plans, make the decison, and actually action the invasion of a "neutral" nation - whereas as we NOW know, the Japanese plans against them were both fully developed, decided on, and in operation.

That's the problem with "tripwire" scenarios; they can be SO finely parameter'd that they're actually quite inflexible. You end up bound tightly into the tripwire criteria YOU have set up - and have no room to allow for any creative thinking on the part of the enemy...and thus loose the initiative.

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Re: Operation Matador

#11

Post by Peter H » 25 Aug 2009, 07:11

Didn't pick this up until now but we have an Operation Matador discussion going on as well in our Pacific War Section:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=157057

Please ensure in future duplicate topic subjects are kept to a minimum.

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Re: Operation Matador

#12

Post by Zaf1 » 26 Aug 2009, 00:08

The main defence stratergy of the British in Malaya was the warships of the Royal Navy. The British made a big news about the arrival of HMS Prince of Wales at Singapore on 2nd December as a deterrence to the Japanese. Why didn't these ships went northward instead HMS Repulse went away south towards Australia until it was recalled to Singapore later? If Force Z went northward towards the Gulf of Siam the Japanese might deterred from making a landing.

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Re: Operation Matador

#13

Post by phylo_roadking » 26 Aug 2009, 00:24

If Force Z went northward towards the Gulf of Siam the Japanese might deterred from making a landing.
WOULD they :wink:
The rapidity with which the Japanese got their air attacks going against our aerodromes was quite remarkable. Practically all the aerodromes in Kelantan, Kedah, Province Wellesley, and Penang, were attacked on that day and in most cases the bombers were escorted by fighters. There is little doubt that these fighters were operating from the aerodromes in South Thailand which had been got ready for their use and where stocks of fuel and other necessaries had already been accumulated. To allay suspicion the grass was allowed to grow on the Patani aerodrome right up to the last minute, but reports received by us, unfortunately just too late, showed that it was all ready for the reception of the Japanese aircraft, with drums of petrol hidden under the trees, the day before the invasion took place
Or would Force Z have encountered the air attack it later did - earlier??? 8O It would have taken less time to stage bombers through to Suth Thailand than it would have done for the RN to get there...

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Re: Operation Matador

#14

Post by Zaf1 » 26 Aug 2009, 00:47

The air attack on Force Z could have been avoided if their aircraft carrier had not ran aground in Jamaica earlier. The A/A guns aboard the warships were already heavy and the HMS Prince of Wales design were meant to be unsinkable, but the a Japanese torpedo managed to make a lucky hit on the propeller shaft that also connected the electrical generator system and the A/A guns. The result was some main A/A guns were immediately shut down and unable to defend itself much. The Australian Buffalo fighter squadron was on stand by in Singapore just to provide air cover that could have shield them but Vice-Admiral Phillips never asked for this.

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Re: Operation Matador

#15

Post by phylo_roadking » 26 Aug 2009, 01:06

This isn't a WI thread...
The air attack on Force Z could have been avoided if their aircraft carrier had not ran aground in Jamaica earlier.
...but you can't reckon in or reckon out an "Act of God" POD. It happened BEFORE this - so would still apply here, wherever Force Z was deployed.
The Australian Buffalo fighter squadron was on stand by in Singapore just to provide air cover that could have shield them
Questionable. How long could they actually have spent over Force Z? :wink: If the survivors went back to refuel/rearm...the damage could simply have been done while they were away. Or - of course - with air cover, Force Z COULD have decided to press on...even further under the Japanese air umbrella... 8O

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