Mosquito queries and LNSF strength

[Pips]

There's something about this aircraft that just captures my admiration. Looks? Certainly. Mission range? Yes. Versatility? Absolutely.

But there are some aspects that confuse me somewhat too. For example it's speed. It has the reputation for being all but uncatchable. Yet when you compare the speeds of the Mossie (bomber) at various alitudes to most models of the Bf 109G and the (later) Fw 190A's there isn't any significant advantage. So why was the Mossie so hard to catch? Was it due to that it fly in small numbers and so was hard to detect on radar? Or was it more to the fact that it was in and out before aircraft could scramble?

Maneuverability is another issue. Many pilots comment of it being light and responsive on controls, easy to throw around and fly on one engine. But how did it compare to other twins eg Bf110, Beaufighter, P-38, P-61, A-20? Or Bf109 for that matter?

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Wooden construction made it hard to detect on radar. Flying altitude & speed combination gave a big advantage if German fighters were not by chance at the same altitude.

If I remember right, Saburo Sakai wrote that if fighters were on the ground when pilots saw a B-17, it was hopeless to try to catch the bomber.

[phylo_roadking]

Yet when you compare the speeds of the Mossie (bomber) at various alitudes to most models of the Bf 109G and the (later) Fw 190A's there isn't any significant advantage. So why was the Mossie so hard to catch? Was it due to that it fly in small numbers and so was hard to detect on radar? Or was it more to the fact that it was in and out before aircraft could scramble?

It's the same idea as the principle behind Barnes Wallis' "Victory Bomber" idea, and the hi-altitude Wellington prototytpes mid-war.

If you enter enemy detection/airspace at 350 mph at altitude, say....

1/ you have to be detected, and information passed down the chain;
2/ fighters have to scramble in daylight, or available nightfighters in the appropriate Kammhuber Box be vectored onto it;
3/ they have to CLIMB to the same altitude...
4/ and then they have to either be able to out-accelerate it .....or carry out a rear attack at ~the same speed

In other words - LW fighters not only had to be capable of catching a Mossie...they had to be capable of out-performing it! It was the same idea that allowed Bomber Command to gradually cut down the defensive armament of fast, hi-altitude aircraft to rear armament only...or none at all...and that allowed Lancaster pilots to evade pursuit so many times simply by throwing their aircraft into a spin - pursuing fighters just couldn't build up enough extra speed to catch it again AND outmanouver it!

[willi_klingel]

I am in complete agreement with your comments Phylo. The altitude was a major factor in the Mosquito's success and to a lesser degree its speed. I am attaching a little article from Michael Armitage's excellent book 'The Royal Airforce'.
Only if an interceptor was already flying at 40,000 ft and travelling at a speed faster than 415 mph would he have any chance of catching the Mossie and then only if the distance was reasonably close.
Regards,
Willi K.

Quote from Michael Armitage .jpg (75.13 KiB) Viewed 1284 times

Mk XVI of 571 Squadron.JPG (22.63 KiB) Viewed 1284 times

[Pips]

Ok, so the key factor's were:
1/ you have to be detected, and information passed down the chain;
2/ fighters have to scramble in daylight, or available nightfighters in the appropriate Kammhuber Box be vectored onto it;
3/ they have to CLIMB to the same altitude...
4/ and then they have to either be able to out-accelerate it .....or carry out a rear attack at ~the same speed .

Thanks, that does indeed make sense. So it would seem that the small numbers operating at great altitude were as much a key factor as was the speed of the Mosquito itself. As perhaps was the fact that it operated in a sky reasonably full of more numerous, larger, slower and lower flying bombers. Which also goes to explain somewhat the lower loss rates of the 9th AF's mediums.

Perhaps the other side of the coin would be if the Mossie became the main strike bomber of Bomber Command, it would to a degree have lost some of those advantages, and have suffered much greater losses? I know that there was a strong case for such argued at times by various members of the Air Ministry and politicans, citing ease and speed of manufacture, cost per unit, lower resources drain (especially in aircrew) and accuracy. Was it in fact a practical consideration?

What about the second part of my question regarding comparative maneuverability of the Mossie as against the Beaufighter, A-20 and Bf110? Any thoughts?

[phylo_roadking]

Perhaps the other side of the coin would be if the Mossie became the main strike bomber of Bomber Command, it would to a degree have lost some of those advantages, and have suffered much greater losses? I know that there was a strong case for such argued at times by various members of the Air Ministry and politicans, citing ease and speed of manufacture, cost per unit, lower resources drain (especially in aircrew) and accuracy. Was it in fact a practical consideration?

By the end of the war, the Mosquito had arguably become Bomber Command's most useful strike bomber; the Heavy Force was a sledgehammer with only a few tactical options in its repetoire - apart from 617 Sqn. If you didn't want to use it in massed night ops - what could you do with the Heavy Force??? On the other hand, the Light Night Stiking Force (aka the FNSF) of ~1,500 Mossies when combined as a maximum was far more useful - and versatile. The example I always cite here is the last of each's bombing ops of WWII....the Heavies were relegated to massed mining of the Skaggerak to dtop the Flensburg government decamping to Norway...but it was the Mossies that were despatched on the last true bombing sorties of the war, a seven-squadron raid on Kiel on the night of the 6th/7th with the same purpose that was recalled in the air.

[Jabberwocky]

On the other hand, the Light Night Stiking Force (aka the FNSF) of ~1,500 Mossies when combined as a maximum was far more useful - and versatile.

I don't think that the LNSF was ever quite that large.

Judging from this:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ ... -may45.jpg

BC had a maximum of about 550-600 Mosquitos on strength at any one time, although maybe half of these would be in the LNSF.

There were as another 150-200 Mosquitos in Fighter Command and another 80-120 in 2TAF. Then there were 100-150 or so split up between Costal Command, recon duties and other tasks.

Maximum effort on any night by BC Mosquitos appears to have topped out at about 250 sorties. A quick search of the Bomber Command campaign diaries finds an all out effort looks something like this:

13/14 February 1945 - 71 Mosquitos to Magdeburg, 16 to Bonn, 8 each to Misburg and Nuremberg and 6 to Dortmund, 65 RCM sorties, 59 Mosquito patrols. No aircraft lost. (233 Mosquito sorties)

21/22 March 1945 - 151 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitos of No 5 Group attacked Hamburg.
131 Lancasters and 12 Mosquitos of Nos 1 and 8 Groups attack benzol plant at Bochum.
142 Mosquitos in 2 attacks on Berlin (with some aircraft making 2 sorties), 3 Mosquitos to Bremen, 26 RCM sorties, 56 Mosquito patrols, 7 Mosquitos of No 5 Group minelaying in Jade Bay and the River Weser. (254 Mosquito sorties)

4/5 April 1945 - 327 Lancasters and 14 Mosquitos of Nos 3, 6 and 8 Groups attacked the synthetic-oil plant at Leuna.
327 aircraft - 277 Halifaxes, 36 Lancasters, 14 Mosquitos - of Nos 4, 6 and 8 Groups attacked the Rhenania oil plant, Harburg.
258 Lancasters and 14 Mosquitos of Nos 1 and 8 Groups attacked the oil refinery at Lützkendorf.
35 Mosquitos to Berlin and 31 to Magdeburg, 70 RCM sorties, 66 Mosquito patrols, 30 Lancasters minelaying in the Oslo Fjord and the Kattegat. 5 aircraft lost. 12 Mosquitos from the Magdeburg raid and 3 Lancasters of No 1 Group from the Kattegat minelaying operation. The 136 aircraft dispatched by No 100 Group on this night were that group's largest effort of the war. (244 Mosquito sorties)

[phylo_roadking]

Jabberwocky, the figure came from a Flypast article on the LNSF a couple of years back, I'll have to find it again.

[redcoat]

On the other hand, the Light Night Stiking Force (aka the FNSF) of ~1,500 Mossies when combined as a maximum was far more useful - and versatile.

Not 1500, but 150.
http://www.aviationclassics.co.uk/news/ ... king-force

[Pips]

Here's a really interesting article on the growth and use of the LNSF (and the common size of it's raids).
http://www.aviationclassics.co.uk/news/ ... king-force