British Army at home September 1940

[gambadier]

A commanding view is one thing, being able to exploit it is another. Without observation naval gunfire would have been useless, and the distance suggests field artillery would have been unable to attack the beachhead, in fact unlikely to have been in range until at least half-way across the levels. That leaves the handful of railway guns and RAF, and the latter were not noted for their ground attack skills at this stage of the war and the former were not suited to anything smacking of opportunity targets, and probably limited to predicted fire but given the poor quality of meteor data provided by the RAF (unless they could provided sonde based data in UK) would probably have been ineffective at the ranges involved. The good news is that German arty around the beachhead would also be out of range to the hills.

[Clive Mortimore]

Looking at a map of Romney Marsh, I am at a loss to how field artillery would not be in range. The RHDR is 12 miles long and runs along the length of the "invasion beaches". Using that to scale distances, a 25 pdr with a range of 7.5 miles could command the whole marsh from the hills over looking it.

[gambadier]

1. Post #308 states 16km from beach to hills.
2. In 1940 there were hardly any 25-pr, the first regt (Canadian) had only received the new ones (ie Mk 2 gun on Mk 1 carriage) in May IIRC.
3. The 18/25-pr, most of which had been lost in France, was limited to Charge 3, ie could not fire charge Super, max range was 11,800 yds (ie approx. 10.8 km.
4. Not forgetting the gun line would have been at 1000-2000 metres behind the ridge line (more if the 'Line to Shoot Down To' was close to the ridge, depending on the altitudes behind the ridge).
5. Given lots of guns and hence relatively narrow arcs of fire, deploying behind the ridge then a range of at least 18km was needed to engage the beachhead. Of course planning max rg (allowing for worn guns and unfavourable meteor) was usually 10% less than RT max so call it 20km planning range, UK did have such a capability in 1944, but only in the handful of heavy regts.
6. If you wanted wider arcs, say 35 degrees L & R to cover the beach front, then obviously you needed yet greater range.
7. All pretty simple really.

[Gooner1]

...leaving aside the fact that there's two alternatives specified, which takes them in a wholly different direction to Rye and Romney Marsh...
...and the fact that their holding area is across country some 40 CROW miles from Rye let alone the landings on the other side of Romney Marsh...
...that by the time they ever managed to get there most of the crossings over the RMC would already have been destroyed by the (previous) defenders...
...and that if they're going to be diverted anywhere from the Pevensey Levels it was indeed likely to be Hastings rather than Rye...?

And your point is? The order still stands that they were to operate in any part of the Divisonal area as required by the Divisional Command with reference to 12 Corps. The British didn't realise the Germans were so daft as to make the Pett Levels and Rye a heavy point in their landings.

Anyway the full order

"136 Inf Bde, which may not be committed without reference to
12 Corps, will be prepared to carry out any one of the following
tasks, with 60 A. Fd. Regt (area CUCKFIELD - HAYWARDS HEATH)
and 13 Motor Coach Coy probably under comd:-

(a) Under comd. H.Q. BROCFORCE (later West Sussex Area)

(i) To recapture SHOREHAM
(ii) To recapture that part of NEWHAVEN which lies on
the right bank of R. OUSE.

(b) Under Comd 45 Div.

(i) To recapture that part of NEWHAVEN which lies on
the left bank of the R. OUSE.
(ii) To operate in any part of Div. area as required
by Div. Comd; in particular to be prepared to
destroy any enemy who penetrate into the
PEVENSEY LEVELS; alternately to block the
Northern and Western exits from the PEVENSEY
LEVELS.

(c) Under direction 12 Corps, to occupy any part (on frontage)
of about 10 miles) of the Corps (ROTHER) line.
"

After all - we've already been told that the Home Guard was very thin on the ground in the area...AND the only "ready reaction" forces were a couple of dozen men on bicycles...

Who told you that? If you haven't noticed by now the whole area was thick with British troops. Some of those planned drop zones are positively Kamikaze.

[Clive Mortimore]

1. Post #308 states 16km from beach to hills.
2. In 1940 there were hardly any 25-pr, the first regt (Canadian) had only received the new ones (ie Mk 2 gun on Mk 1 carriage) in May IIRC.
3. The 18/25-pr, most of which had been lost in France, was limited to Charge 3, ie could not fire charge Super, max range was 11,800 yds (ie approx. 10.8 km.
4. Not forgetting the gun line would have been at 1000-2000 metres behind the ridge line (more if the 'Line to Shoot Down To' was close to the ridge, depending on the altitudes behind the ridge).
5. Given lots of guns and hence relatively narrow arcs of fire, deploying behind the ridge then a range of at least 18km was needed to engage the beachhead. Of course planning max rg (allowing for worn guns and unfavourable meteor) was usually 10% less than RT max so call it 20km planning range, UK did have such a capability in 1944, but only in the handful of heavy regts.
6. If you wanted wider arcs, say 35 degrees L & R to cover the beach front, then obviously you needed yet greater range.
7. All pretty simple really.

Please do look at a map, the escarpment starts yards behind the Royal Military Canal.

Had they landed at Dungerness, then to join with the FJ at Lympne it would be 16 Km north-eastwards across the longest part of marsh. If they landed at Dymchurch (as been stated) then it is 5 Km to Lympne. Well in the range of the 18 pdr, 25 pdr MkI, 25 pdr MkII, 6 inch how, 60 pdr gun, 4.5inch gun Mk1, 8 inch How and 6 inch gun.

Trouble with Dungerness it was next door to the ranges at Lydd. Every possible target had been ranged, time and time again.

[phylo_roadking]

How long would Forbes been in his job had Churchill ordered him to sail to the landing area and he stopped at Great Yarmouth? Minutes? Hours? Days? Weeks? Months? You have to be at the right beach to "Fight them on beaches".

...which was why the Navy instead mustered its c.36 destroyers and 3-4 light cruisers in three "anti-invasion flotillas"- at the medway, Portsmouth and Plymouth I.E the size and draught of ships that had recently proved their ability to manouver to avoid fall-of-shot from attacking aircraft etc. off Norway

Do you not think that Winston of ALL people realised and appreciated the issues with trying to ram capital ships through a narrow channel even partly dominated by shore artillery? See under...Dardanelles...

Lympne Hill, with the very narrow bridge crossing the RMC at West Hythe Road. That would still be standing? Or would the parachutist who landed at Lympne Airdrome captured it as Major Howard did the bridge over the Orme?

As noted previously, there were to be at least two subsidiary drops south of the RMC at EXACTLY that point - Kampfgruppe Meindl and a smaller drop. It was one of the two battalion sized drops north of the ridge line that was to invest Lympne airfield.

Again Lymne Hill is not a major road to get the main thrust of the panzer landing up the quite steep escarpment to Lympne airdrome where the FJ are.

That's of course one of the main issues with a LOT of the areas the Germans intended to land - the limited opportunities to debouche from the landing beaches and zones And the fact that the defenders including the RAF knew them well...

However - who said anything about the main armoured thrust up from the beach going that way? Taking or circumnavigating the defenders at Hythe gives you wider and better roads to Ashford and Canterbury. But it really wouldn't take much armour at all to reinforce the FJ....particuarly their roadblock at Sellinge.

A commanding view is one thing, being able to exploit it is another. Without observation naval gunfire would have been useless...

...remembering that the RN didn't train or exercise with the Army during the summer of 1940 at all for this eventuality.

Looking at a map of Romney Marsh, I am at a loss to how field artillery would not be in range. The RHDR is 12 miles long and runs along the length of the "invasion beaches". Using that to scale distances, a 25 pdr with a range of 7.5 miles could command the whole marsh from the hills over looking it.

...except - there weren't IIRC any there as I noted previously... and of course there would be a LOT for any battery to do that managed to get into position there - certainly enough targets over many square miles for their efforts to not go unnoticed by the Germans...

The good news is that German arty around the beachhead would also be out of range to the hills

....and their gullwinged "flying artillery"

1. Post #308 states 16km from beach to hills.
2. In 1940 there were hardly any 25-pr, the first regt (Canadian) had only received the new ones (ie Mk 2 gun on Mk 1 carriage) in May IIRC.
3. The 18/25-pr, most of which had been lost in France, was limited to Charge 3, ie could not fire charge Super, max range was 11,800 yds (ie approx. 10.8 km.
4. Not forgetting the gun line would have been at 1000-2000 metres behind the ridge line (more if the 'Line to Shoot Down To' was close to the ridge, depending on the altitudes behind the ridge).
5. Given lots of guns and hence relatively narrow arcs of fire, deploying behind the ridge then a range of at least 18km was needed to engage the beachhead. Of course planning max rg (allowing for worn guns and unfavourable meteor) was usually 10% less than RT max so call it 20km planning range, UK did have such a capability in 1944, but only in the handful of heavy regts.
6. If you wanted wider arcs, say 35 degrees L & R to cover the beach front, then obviously you needed yet greater range.
7. All pretty simple really.

....and remembering that what there was in the area was mostly down on the lowlands supporting the defenders in the crust!

[phylo_roadking]

And your point is? The order still stands that they were to operate in any part of the Divisonal area as required by the Divisional Command with reference to 12 Corps. The British didn't realise the Germans were so daft as to make the Pett Levels and Rye a heavy point in their landings.

Anyway the full order

"136 Inf Bde, which may not be committed without reference to
12 Corps, will be prepared to carry out any one of the following
tasks, with 60 A. Fd. Regt (area CUCKFIELD - HAYWARDS HEATH)
and 13 Motor Coach Coy probably under comd:-

(a) Under comd. H.Q. BROCFORCE (later West Sussex Area)

(i) To recapture SHOREHAM
(ii) To recapture that part of NEWHAVEN which lies on
the right bank of R. OUSE.

(b) Under Comd 45 Div.

(i) To recapture that part of NEWHAVEN which lies on
the left bank of the R. OUSE.
(ii) To operate in any part of Div. area as required
by Div. Comd; in particular to be prepared to
destroy any enemy who penetrate into the
PEVENSEY LEVELS; alternately to block the
Northern and Western exits from the PEVENSEY
LEVELS.

(c) Under direction 12 Corps, to occupy any part (on frontage)
of about 10 miles) of the Corps (ROTHER) line.

My point is that I asked you if there was any unit or formation specifically tasked in their orders for the relief of or counterattack into Romney Marsh I.E. the defenders of Dungeness, Lydd, Dymchurch, Burmarsh etc. Not a location up to 40 miles away with a set of orders that takes them nowhere near even Rye let alone any points east or south-east of it. Do youy REALLY not appreciate the distance away - and the likely prior calls on them in Sussex alone - their holding area "CUCKFIELD - HAYWARDS HEATH" was from Romney marsh?

Who told you that?

Knouterer, several pages ago. Check back.

If you haven't noticed by now the whole area was thick with British troops. Some of those planned drop zones are positively Kamikaze.

The area behind the ridge line wasn't; the only "concentrations" of regular troops in the general area of the two battalion drops were the defenders of RAF Lympne! It would also be interesting to find out more about the number of Home Guard in the area - Knouterer's material would indicate only two Home Guard units in the area Dymchurch-Burmarsh....and possibly Lympne-Bonnington! It looks - in the old 1940 pics - to have been a quite sparsely populated area outside the villages and towns. A further problem would be that if any Home Guard in the area of Lympne were integrated into the airfield defence - then once "stood to" they'd be there...not the surrounding countryside.

The drops south of the RMC look dubious - but the defenders can't in in two places at once....and if everything went to plan they'd be stood to in their anti-invasion positions looking seawards. There are also plenty of period examples of the FJ dropping right amongst armed and prepared defenders who shouldn't have been suprised and beating them - most recently in Holland and Belgium...

[gambadier]

1. Post #308 states 16km from beach to hills.
Had they landed at Dungerness, then to join with the FJ at Lympne it would be 16 Km north-eastwards across the longest part of marsh. If they landed at Dymchurch (as been stated) then it is 5 Km to Lympne. Well in the range of the 18 pdr, 25 pdr MkI, 25 pdr MkII, 6 inch how, 60 pdr gun, 4.5inch gun Mk1, 8 inch How and 6 inch gun.

Trouble with Dungerness it was next door to the ranges at Lydd. Every possible target had been ranged, time and time again.

Dealing with the last joke first, having ranged a point on the ground during training is totally irrelevant to engaging it again. Knowing a 6 or even 8 figure grid reference does not mean the guns will hit it. It depends on such matters as the calibration state and the currency and quality of the meteor data. The only good news is that the areas used by batteries for live fire practice probably had a liberal dose of BPs, which would have helped because in Sep 1940 the regts had still not recovered their survey sections removed in the 1938 reorganisation. Of course at shorter ranges calibration and meteor accuracy were less of a concern, and in any case most shoots were ranged.

The number of guns available was not huge. See the table at http://nigelef.tripod.com/gunsintro.htm giving numbers for Aug/Sep 1940. The largest qty was 4.5-in How, planning max range 5400 metres. If you total the field guns you get 786, if you then total the field regts in Farndale, Years of Defeat Annex D, exclude the Canadians assuming they brought a full set with them, you find 90 regts, that's slightly less than 9 guns per regt. No doubt there was some prioritisation in resource allocation, not forgetting that officially the establishment was still 24 guns per field regt in two btys (ie UE 2160). The interesting question is when did the 75mm start arriving from the US?

You can do the same with medium guns (113 and 25 regts, UE 16 per regt) and heavy (34 guns and 4 regts, UE 16 per regt), I've ignored the super heavy regts & btys. Interestingly there was only one heavy regt in Southern Command.
Just to help, other planning max ranges were (these reflect any improvements after WW1):
18/25-pr - 9800 m
25-pr - 11000 m
18-pr - 9100 m
4.5-in H - 5400 m
6-in H - 9400 m
60-pr - 12400 m



Gun

BEF Losses

Held in UK

Held Overseas

Expected Increases




18-pdr

216

126

130

63




18/25-pdr

704

269

146

299

25-pdr Mk 1


25-pdr

0

90

0

276

25-pdr Mk 2, production figures (below) suggest the increase may have been considerably greater (unless barrel production lagged).


3.7-inch How

0

?

?

?

114 existed in British units in UK and the Middle East and colonial units in Hong Kong, Singapore and Ceylon. The number held by the Indian Army is unclear.


4.5-inch How

96

321

82

158




60-pdr

19

14

0

120




4.5-inch/60-pdr

32

5

0

26

4.5-inch Gun Mk 1


6-inch How

221

94

40

254




6-inch Gun

13

20

0

51




8-inch How

13

14

?

0




9.2-inch How

27

39

0

39

Siege mounting


9.2-inch Gun

2

?

?

?

Railway mounting


12-inch How

4

29 ?

?

?

Railway and siege mountings

[Clive Mortimore]

1. Post #308 states 16km from beach to hills.
Had they landed at Dungerness, then to join with the FJ at Lympne it would be 16 Km north-eastwards across the longest part of marsh. If they landed at Dymchurch (as been stated) then it is 5 Km to Lympne. Well in the range of the 18 pdr, 25 pdr MkI, 25 pdr MkII, 6 inch how, 60 pdr gun, 4.5inch gun Mk1, 8 inch How and 6 inch gun.

Trouble with Dungerness it was next door to the ranges at Lydd. Every possible target had been ranged, time and time again.

Dealing with the last joke first, having ranged a point on the ground during training is totally irrelevant to engaging it again. Knowing a 6 or even 8 figure grid reference does not mean the guns will hit it. It depends on such matters as the calibration state and the currency and quality of the meteor data. The only good news is that the areas used by batteries for live fire practice probably had a liberal dose of BPs, which would have helped because in Sep 1940 the regts had still not recovered their survey sections removed in the 1938 reorganisation. Of course at shorter ranges calibration and meteor accuracy were less of a concern, and in any case most shoots were ranged.

The number of guns available was not huge. See the table at http://nigelef.tripod.com/gunsintro.htm giving numbers for Aug/Sep 1940. The largest qty was 4.5-in How, planning max range 5400 metres. If you total the field guns you get 786, if you then total the field regts in Farndale, Years of Defeat Annex D, exclude the Canadians assuming they brought a full set with them, you find 90 regts, that's slightly less than 9 guns per regt. No doubt there was some prioritisation in resource allocation, not forgetting that officially the establishment was still 24 guns per field regt in two btys (ie UE 2160). The interesting question is when did the 75mm start arriving from the US?

You can do the same with medium guns (113 and 25 regts, UE 16 per regt) and heavy (34 guns and 4 regts, UE 16 per regt), I've ignored the super heavy regts & btys. Interestingly there was only one heavy regt in Southern Command.
Just to help, other planning max ranges were (these reflect any improvements after WW1):
18/25-pr - 9800 m
25-pr - 11000 m
18-pr - 9100 m
4.5-in H - 5400 m
6-in H - 9400 m
60-pr - 12400 m



Gun

BEF Losses

Held in UK

Held Overseas

Expected Increases




18-pdr

216

126

130

63




18/25-pdr

704

269

146

299

25-pdr Mk 1


25-pdr

0

90

0

276

25-pdr Mk 2, production figures (below) suggest the increase may have been considerably greater (unless barrel production lagged).


3.7-inch How

0

?

?

?

114 existed in British units in UK and the Middle East and colonial units in Hong Kong, Singapore and Ceylon. The number held by the Indian Army is unclear.


4.5-inch How

96

321

82

158




60-pdr

19

14

0

120




4.5-inch/60-pdr

32

5

0

26

4.5-inch Gun Mk 1


6-inch How

221

94

40

254




6-inch Gun

13

20

0

51




8-inch How

13

14

?

0




9.2-inch How

27

39

0

39

Siege mounting


9.2-inch Gun

2

?

?

?

Railway mounting


12-inch How

4

29 ?

?

?

Railway and siege mountings

Hi Gambadier

All very interesting.

Have you ever been a gunner?

Yes knowing where the target is, is a starting point. From that and the information you know about your own guns, barrel wear, the ammunition, and as much information about the weather as possible are all calculated before the gun is loaded. After it has fired the observer, who could be the gun number one in direct firing, will work out any corrections that may be needed. Which makes you frist paragraph pointless.

As for the rest of the information, am sure Nigel's figures are correct.

None of it changes that had the Germans landed on Romney Marsh they would have been in a very exposed position, under observation and in range of the Royal Artillery.

Attached are some photos of the marsh I took in 1983 when visiting the RHDR. The first set show the Hythe end, two looking towards the RMC, one at the houses on the coast road at Dymchurch. The train crossing the drainage ditch is a post card in my collection, it shows how wide and deep some of these ditches are. The second set are around Dungerness.

[Knouterer]

Interesting pictures ... here's one taken a couple of decades later (judging by the vehicles in the foreground), from a point just SW of Dymchurch Redoubt if I'm not mistaken. It shows one of the tide gates used to regulate the water level in the Marsh.

Regarding arty covering landing zone B, I'm working on it. As noted many pages back there were two 6in guns (range about 20.000 m) at Westenhanger covering the east side of Dungeness, and also two 9.2in howitzers at Adlington presumably trained on the beach. Plus a few super heavy railway guns scattered about the landscape. Although by the way the gun crews do not seem to have fully mastered their weapons as yet; the 9.2in railway gun at Hythe was fired in anger for the first time on 8 Oct (I think, don't have my notes with me) at some E-boats apparently (sounds like a waste of ammo) and jumped the rails. It took a day to put it back on.

As noted the field arty supporting 135 Bde was down in the Marsh. Medium artillery: not much of it around. The 5th Medium Regt had lost its guns in France and was manning the 6pdrs on the Medway line near Maidstone as far as I can make out. The 74th MR was at Ash (couple miles east of Deal) and was it seems fully equipped, one bty with 8 x 60pdrs and one with 8 x 6in howitzers. Presumably this regt would first have been brought into action against the Fallschirmjäger.

[phylo_roadking]

The 74th MR was at Ash (couple miles east of Deal) and was it seems fully equipped, one bty with 8 x 60pdrs and one with 8 x 6in howitzers. Presumably this regt would first have been brought into action against the Fallschirmjäger.

Is that the "Ash" that's a mile west of Sandwich, north-northwest of Deal? 'Cos a "couple miles east of Deal" is actually in the North Sea...

If it is, it's at least 20 crow miles across some complicated country to Lympne - and I'd think there was more chance it would be ordered into action against the German division inconveniently threatening Folkestone than the FJ...ONCE it became clear that there was no threat against Deal itself, or Dover

[gambadier]

I'm confident of the planning ranges I previously quote, RT max less about 10%, source is http://nigelef.tripod.com/gunsintro.htm which you will note references post WW1 Range Tables in most cases, most authors refer to WW1 data (whether they realise it or not - and I suspect a lot do not). Another issue would have been 18-pr with limited max elevation and needing to be sufficiently far behind a crest. Obviously the gun line would not be on the hilltops overlooking the ground to the beach, a km or two behind would have been the deployment area. Of course the German problem would have been deploying a counter-battery target acquisition capability reasonably quickly after getting ashore, I'm not sure that they would have been very good at this. Be that as it may the British problem was that getting on for half their available artillery was the very short range 4.5-in H.

[Gooner1]

My point is that I asked you if there was any unit or formation specifically tasked in their orders for the relief of or counterattack into Romney Marsh I.E. the defenders of Dungeness, Lydd, Dymchurch, Burmarsh etc.

What part don't you understand of he reserve Brigade of 45th Division having orders to be able to operate anywhere in the divisional area. Why would the British limit their orders to include only the Romney Marsh?

Any sensible appreciation would see that Newhaven, being the only decent port in 45th Div. must receive priority. After that stopping the enemy on the good beaches of Pevensey again seems the good idea. In contrast to the good beaches between Bexhill and Eastbourne, the easy terrain after the Levels and the good road network, the beaches at Rye were terrible, the country behind difficult and partially flooded and with no good roads leading out.

If you read the Rye Defence Scheme they were not expecting the counter-offensive to take place in their sector but were confident of their ability to defend it, as they should have been.

[Knouterer]

The 74th MR was at Ash (couple miles east of Deal) and was it seems fully equipped, one bty with 8 x 60pdrs and one with 8 x 6in howitzers. Presumably this regt would first have been brought into action against the Fallschirmjäger.

Is that the "Ash" that's a mile west of Sandwich, north-northwest of Deal? 'Cos a "couple miles east of Deal" is actually in the North Sea...

If it is, it's at least 20 crow miles across some complicated country to Lympne - and I'd think there was more chance it would be ordered into action against the German division inconveniently threatening Folkestone than the FJ...ONCE it became clear that there was no threat against Deal itself, or Dover

West of Sandwich of course, sorry - I shouln't try to work and post at the same time. 20 miles isn't very far, the gunners didn't actually have to pull the guns themselves, they had AEC Matador trucks for that. So assuming those in command had correctly assessed the main threat(s) by say 8 or 9 o'clock, I don't see why the guns couldn't have been in action by about noon. From where exactly they would fire must remain a matter of pure speculation. I could imagine one battery would be left behind just in case anything developed on that part of the coast.

[Gooner1]

Quick measure on Google Earth shows the distance to the beaches from Bilsington as 9,000 yards; Appledore to Greatstone-on-Sea about 15,500.