British Army at home September 1940

[phylo_roadking]

Anyway the notes I made:
"Super Heavy Artillery on railway mountings under command 12 Corps September 1940.
(Excluding three 13.5" railway guns of the Royal Marines Siege Regiment)

Two 12" Hows - Shepherds Well.
Two 12" Hows - Eythorne.
Two 12" Hows - Lyminge.

One 9.2" Gun - Bridge (Canadians)
Two 9.2" Guns - Hythe and Folkestone
Two 9.2" Guns - Littlestone (Canadians)
One 9.2" Gun - Golden Wood (Canadians)

Two 12" Howitzers sited on the Canterbury - Ramsgate railway would become operational about 29th September, a further two 12" Howitzers on the Ashford - Hythe Railway about 15th October whilst two 9.2" guns just awaited manning."

Gooner, that pretty much confirms that "X" Super Heavy Battery at Golden Wood was indeed outside the scope of this thread as I noted above.

I have to say....having also seen the comments around the net on the disposition of railway guns etc. in the UK in 1940, that "...Two 9.2" Guns - Littlestone (Canadians)..." doesn't make much sense - how were they to get there??? The RH&DR is narrow gauge...

The unit formating there around its HQ - which most references note was at Littlestone, rather than the actual guns - before being assigned their guns and made operational in mid-October makes more sense. Shelldrake, not the fm the book on Canadian museums and artillery monuments/gate guardians by Harold Skaarup, notes that the call for personnel for forming super heavy batteries only went out to Canadian units in the UK in the first week of September...the problem being finding "enough men with training on medium, heavy or coastal equipment" to activate all the dormant railway guns sitting in depots since 1918...

[phylo_roadking]

Yes, the submarine detector loop station - really. It would appear you know very little about the events in the Channel 194-18, and the constant struggle and battle of wills to keep German U-boats from transiting the Channel to the Western Approaches. This was one of the major naval "campaigns" of WWI, and hence also the exaggerated role of Dover Command RN. The uboat problem in the Channel was constant worry for Whitehall once the submarine campaign began in WWI, leading to a major concentration of RN strength in Dover, constant patrolling of the Narrows...even the construction of monitors etc. in an attempt to take the battle to the enemy by attacking the ports they operated uboats from...finally culminating, after a thankful change in command from the hapless Adm. Bacon to Roger Keyes, in the Zeebruge Raid. Through the interwar years and the first year of the war the Admiralty was as concerned about uboats running the Narrows as they had been in WWI - hence the construction of the detector loop station there, the laying of the undersea detector loop cable, the laying of the remote-controlled minefields controlled from Dover etc..

Now that I think about it, I believe I read somewhere that those indicator loops were switched off in the summer of 1940 after they became pointless because they covered only part of the Channel entrance and any U-boats wishing to pass through could do so (relatively) safely on the French side ...

I would love to see a cheackable source for that - because switching them off doesn't make much sense...given that surface shipping passing over indicator loops also set off a signal onshore, requiring visual checking/confirmation. Given that every method of detecting shipping movements would have been invaluable in the summer and autumn of 1940...

(Just as an aside - the RN lifted the Sangatte indicator loop on the french side of the Channel at the start of the last week in May 1940...)

[Knouterer]

(Just as an aside - the RN lifted the Sangatte indicator loop on the french side of the Channel at the start of the last week in May 1940...)

That's what I meant. Not much point in leaving it switched on on the British side if it's gone on the French side where German shipping movements were.

[phylo_roadking]

...except for the minor fact that the Dover loop would have indicated shipping approaching the UK Channel coast...! At least along the coast at Dover. After all -

on the French side where German shipping movements were

...to reach UK shores, it would have to come across to the British side of the Channel eventually. By the end of August 1940 we may have known that Sealion was heading for Kent/Sussex, not Essex/Norfolk...but we didn't YET know that the German invasion frontage had shrunk so much as to leave Dover out of the landing equation.

[Knouterer]

Incidently, there also seems to be something amiss with the parent formation - 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA - with respect to the scope of this thread -

http://www.ra39-45.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/shvy/page3.html and http://nigelef.tripod.com/regtsumm.htm#shyregt

...in that it didn't exist until November 1940.

Regarding the railroad guns, the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment was certainly already in existence in Sept., even if the otherwise very useful but also very incomplete RA1939-45 website says November. In fact,it was even in France with the BEF.

(As I believe I mentioned about two pages ago, it's not such a good idea to accept whatever comes up first in Google as fact, without looking any further ... but I magnanimously concede that we can all stumble, so I won't start yelling about "undocumented claims"; "fabrications", "red herrings", etc. etc. etc. )


My starting point railroad gun list is the one from After the Battle magazine from some years back, which so far I have not been able to fault.

According to that list, in Sept. there were in Kent:

2nd Super Heavy Regiment:
5th SH Battery, 2x12in RR howitzers at Shepherdswell (CLEO and SHEBA)

3rd Super Heavy Regiment:
4th SH Battery, 2x9.2in RR guns at Folkestone/Hythe
13th SH Battery, 2x12in RR howitzers at Sellindge/Hollybush
X SH Battery, 2x9.2in RR guns at Golden Wood
Y SH Battery, 2x 9.2in RR guns at Grove Ferry/Canterbury

Not all gun crews seemed to have completely mastered their weapons yet, see incident related below. I was inclined to take it with a pinch of salt but the WD of the unit confirms it. In general, that battery does not seem to have been well run.
Picture is from Roy Humphries, Target Folkestone (1990), which contains rather more useful info (for our purposes) than many other local histories.

[Dunserving]

...no mention of my local railway gun.....? Bishopsbourne.

[Knouterer]

...except for the minor fact that the Dover loop would have indicated shipping approaching the UK Channel coast...! At least along the coast at Dover. After all -

on the French side where German shipping movements were

...to reach UK shores, it would have to come across to the British side of the Channel eventually. By the end of August 1940 we may have known that Sealion was heading for Kent/Sussex, not Essex/Norfolk...but we didn't YET know that the German invasion frontage had shrunk so much as to leave Dover out of the landing equation.

Fine. But since the approach of the German invasion fleet could and would have been detected in about half a dozen different other ways as well - including the Mark I Eyeball - I think we can now agree that there was absolutely no need for this indicator loop station, assuming it was operating, to be guarded by 500 Commandos. Or even just 50.

I'm glad we got that out of the way.

[Knouterer]

...no mention of my local railway gun.....? Bishopsbourne.

Ah, you mean the Bochebuster? I hate to disappoint you, but I believe it became operational only much later, February 1941 or so. Apart from that, it had only (very) limited traverse and could not have been brought to bear on the invaders, I think (without checking).

Sorry

[Dunserving]

It was on a curved section of track, so had rather more traverse than the carriage allowed..... Some lovely pictures of it displayed in the Mermaid pub in the village.

[phylo_roadking]

Fine. But since the approach of the German invasion fleet could and would have been detected in about half a dozen different other ways as well - including the Mark I Eyeball - I think we can now agree that there was absolutely no need for this indicator loop station, assuming it was operating, to be guarded by 500 Commandos. Or even just 50.

I'm glad we got that out of the way.

You can decide whatever you want for yourself, but it will remain just your unsupported opinion as you haven't yet proved - no matter how many times you assert it - that the indicator loop was switched off. Your statement above about the need for it...or not...flys in the face of everything written in Newbold and so many other places about the Royal Navy stating it would not be able to guarantee the level of early warning of invasion required. Given what it said, the assertion that they switched off one of their detection methods requires evidence.

And a date...particularly a date, given the timing issues revealed by the X Super Heavy Battery issue.

My starting point railroad gun list is the one from After the Battle magazine from some years back, which so far I have not been able to fault.

According to that list, in Sept. there were in Kent:

2nd Super Heavy Regiment:
5th SH Battery, 2x12in RR howitzers at Shepherdswell (CLEO and SHEBA)

3rd Super Heavy Regiment:
4th SH Battery, 2x9.2in RR guns at Folkestone/Hythe
13th SH Battery, 2x12in RR howitzers at Sellindge/Hollybush
X SH Battery, 2x9.2in RR guns at Golden Wood
Y SH Battery, 2x 9.2in RR guns at Grove Ferry/Canterbury

YOU may not have been able to fault it - but as we've seen various Canadian sources have now faulted it. And in enough detail, and detail that cross-corroborates.

Which particular issue of ATB, so I can check for myself what it says? And where it sourced its material from...

As for this...

Regarding the railroad guns, the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment was certainly already in existence in Sept., even if the otherwise very useful but also very incomplete RA1939-45 website says November.

That would be all well and good...IF it was the only site on the Royal Artillery saying so - which it clearly isn't. You forgot the other site...

[Clive Mortimore]

I have to say....having also seen the comments around the net on the disposition of railway guns etc. in the UK in 1940, that "...Two 9.2" Guns - Littlestone (Canadians)..." doesn't make much sense - how were they to get there??? The RH&DR is narrow gauge...

.

Hi Phylo

Please check your maps. New Romney and Littlestone on Sea station, Southern Railway (4ft 8 1/2 ins) was next door to New Romney Station, Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch Railway (15inch). Oddly enough both stations are/were in Littlestone. There was a lovely article in a 1962 Model Railway Constructor with full drawings of New Romney and Littlestone on Sea station , Southern Railway, sadly on one of my downsizing of railway mags I gave it to the dustman.

see http://www.disused-stations.org.uk/n/ne ... ndex.shtml

Please do not call the RHDR a narrow gauge railway it is a miniature railway.

Clive

[phylo_roadking]

Hi Phylo

Please check your maps. New Romney and Littlestone on Sea station, Southern Railway (4ft 8 1/2 ins) was next door to New Romney Station, Romney, Hythe and Dymchurch Railway (15inch). Oddly enough both stations are/were in Littlestone. There was a lovely article in a 1962 Model Railway Constructor with full drawings of New Romney and Littlestone on Sea station , Southern Railway, sadly on one of my downsizing of railway mags I gave it to the dustman.

Clive, that's excellent, thanks for that correction. At least it puts some sense at last into them being at Littlestone

EDIT: ...AND them getting the hell out of that open, flat terrain!

Now, if only we had dates for them being there, and moving to Kingsnorth etc. Unfortunately any war diary is going to be in Canada! Unless, as a constituent unit of 3rd Super Heavy Regt RA, there's some mention in its war diary.

[phylo_roadking]

As for this...

Regarding the railroad guns, the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment was certainly already in existence in Sept., even if the otherwise very useful but also very incomplete RA1939-45 website says November.

That would be all well and good...IF it was the only site on the Royal Artillery saying so - which it clearly isn't. You forgot the other site...

...and the 3rd Super Heavy Regt RA's war diary, which for the 1st of November 1940 has the following entry...

"A number of Super Heavy Railway Artillery Batteries had been in existence for some time and it was decided by higher authority to form some of these into Regiments for purposes of operational control and co-ordination of training. On this date the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Super Heavy Regiments R.A. were formed, and the following batteries were placed under command of 3rd Super Heavy Regiment...."

..followed by the list of constituent batteries we know. That couldn't be any clearer; I'm trying now to find out what happened to the 3rd between the Battle of France and the 1st of November 1940.

[sitalkes]

I note that the Folkestone gun was positioned just west of the short tunnel leading to the coastal line to Dover - what would be the chances of getting it into that tunnel in the event of an air attack? Could any of these guns fire, retreat into a tunnel to reload, and then come out again to fire, or does that result in the jumping off the rails problem?

[Clive Mortimore]

I note that the Folkestone gun was positioned just west of the short tunnel leading to the coastal line to Dover - what would be the chances of getting it into that tunnel in the event of an air attack? Could any of these guns fire, retreat into a tunnel to reload, and then come out again to fire, or does that result in the jumping off the rails problem?

Why would they jump off the rails? They are designed to fire on the rails, with the 13.5 inch guns and the 18 inch howitzer there is a small amount of recoil along the track but most of the recoil is taken up in the design of the gun carriage and mounting, as it is in guns on road wheels, on ships or fixed barbettes.