British Army at home September 1940

[phylo_roadking]

However, in a fight against enemy troops on foot and without effective AT weapons, when regarded as a machine gun carrier they would have certain advantages when used intelligently, such as firepower, mobility, protection (up to 14 mm armour), and the capacity to carry more ammunition than a squad of soldiers.

I see nothing in his passage that describes the Vickers Mk VIB as "heavily-armoured". He instead describes the armor as it was - 14mm

Actually - it wasn't; only it's frontal surfaces were 15mm (in the VIB)- side, rear and top was 4mm.

I thought the conversation was about Milforce and September 1940 rather than Crete a year later? In that case, the Mark VIB, at least the dozen gotten ashore by the King's Own Hussars, had been in position for just two days. They had little idea where they were, what the terrain was, what units they were to support, and worst of all, they had no communications - all their radios had gone TU in getting the tanks off the sunken Dalesman. How does that "equal" Milforce?

Actually - no; the conversation has been about their use and "invulnerability" against one particular foe...

...despite the fact that a year later they proved not to have said advantages, and against the same foe.

"That's "Vickers Light tanks" as in Vickers Light tanks. Had I been talking about anything else I would have named it."

...in answer to Gooner's similar attempt to widen the goalposts. I have already made the point -

However, in a fight against enemy troops on foot and without effective AT weapons, when regarded as a machine gun carrier they would have certain advantages when used intelligently, such as firepower, mobility, protection (up to 14 mm armour), and the capacity to carry more ammunition than a squad of soldiers.

That's the position they were in when lost to the FJ around Galatas...

....that ALL I was replying to was THIS statement...

By W.E. a Divisional Cavalry Squadron would contain 8 Light Tanks and 14 Carriers. An M.G. Company 12 Vickers MMG.
This is a powerful force, I'd imagine Custance would be rather shamefaced if an FJ battalion, no doubt reduced, would be sufficient to cause him to deploy for covering the debussing of 5th NZ Bde.

- by saying -

Perhaps this is the point at which I should refer the two posters above to the various histories of events on Crete a year later....and how Vickers Light tanks proved to be susceptible to being immobilized by stick grenades blowing off track pinions...and penetrable by MG34s?

This particular topic of conversation has ONLY been about the New Zealander's Divisional Cavalry Squadron and its Vickers Light Tanks.


Moving on...

Still believing in this impenetrable biplane laid smoke screen

Just a minor historical note - but the Hs 126 isn't a biplane :roll: And there's something about the British Army and the Hs 126 that you're not aware of...

Also - at two minutes after dawn it doesn't exactly NEED to be impenetrable...but add it to the dawn gloom as well and...

[phylo_roadking]

13mm armour was generally considered safe from SmK ammunition.

I PM'd Urmel on this aspect last night when the thread was closed - but the above is not quite the case; According to Tony Williams - both on tank-net and here on AHF when I looked around - "S.m.K." steel-cored 7.92x57 Mauser would actually penetrate 13mms of rolled homogenous armour at a 90-degree angle from 100 metres one time in very three...

But a little further looking around last night, and more today, has revealed that the improved "S.m.K.H." tungsten carbide-cored 7.92x57 Mauser round introduced in 1939 would penetrate 18mms of RHA at 100 metres...

This was a rare round due to the cost, obviously - but "rare" is a relative thing; just over 8 million rounds of it was produced in 1939 alone compared to around ten times that in S.m.K.. I've found some comments that it was "mostly" supplied to Pz.I crews to make some use of that vehicle once war came - but since finding those I've also found confirmation here on AHF that every landser was issued ten S.m.K.H. rounds in the first two years of the war, both for personal use in their K98, and also to contribute to their squad's MG34.

By 1942-43, this "expensive" round had been withdrawn from service as armoured vehicles began to pass that 18mm boundary...and gradually they were stripped and their tungsten carbide cores salvaged to re-use in newer, larger calibre tungsten-cored A/T rounds...

But in 1940 it still gave the average landser some capability against light armour, even with his own battle rifle...

For comparison to the Vickers Light tanks' 14mm(15mm in the MkVIB) frontal armour and only 4mm side armour - the gun shield of the 2 pdr A/T gun was 7.9mm thick...and the Bren Gun Carrier 7-10mm depending on the location on the vehicle.

So I'm afraid -

However, in a fight against enemy troops on foot and without effective AT weapons, when regarded as a machine gun carrier they would have certain advantages when used intelligently, such as firepower, mobility, protection (up to 14 mm armour), and the capacity to carry more ammunition than a squad of soldiers.

...those certain advantates are disappearing fast; try a dug-in enemy fighting from cover with an A/T capability effective against ALL the armoured vehicles of the Divisonal Cavalry squadron, bren gun carriers as well as tanks...

It would be interesting to know what range the S.m.K.H. round would be effective out to against the bren gun carrier's 10mm armour...


(..and of course there's also the GG-P40 hollow charge K98-fired spigot grenade for anti-tank use...)

[RichTO90]

Actually - it wasn't; only it's frontal surfaces were 15mm (in the VIB)- side, rear and top was 4mm.

Oh, you're right, it was 15mm in the VIB...so why are you now saying that isn't right? Does that mean that a Panther had 80mm or more of armor on its frontal services, but it didn't have 80mm of armor because its turret top was only 16mm?

Actually - no; the conversation has been about their use and "invulnerability" against one particular foe...

Except that you are still the only one that brought up the matter of invulnerability - no one else did.

...in answer to Gooner's similar attempt to widen the goalposts. I have already made the point

The only "goalpost widening" I have seen has been from you...when you haven't been trying to remove the goalposts entirely and trucked them off to an entirely different field.

This particular topic of conversation has ONLY been about the New Zealander's Divisional Cavalry Squadron and its Vickers Light Tanks.

No, it was a conversation about the capabilities of Milforce as a whole, until you tried to narrow it down to just the Vickers Light Tanks. Your point that the Vickers Light Tanks by themselves would be ineffective is likely true.

Moving on...

There's a thought...

[RichTO90]

(..and of course there's also the GG-P40 hollow charge K98-fired spigot grenade for anti-tank use...)

Which may have been handy against the Vickers Mk VIB on Crete, since it was probably first issued for that operation.

[Knouterer]

The British on their part did have a hollow charge AT rifle grenade in service, in limited numbers, in Sept. 1940, the No. 68. It was fired from the same discharger cup as the No. 36M, but it wasn't particularly effective; it had to hit the target at an angle very close to 90° to function properly and penetration was no more than 30 mm. Because of the strong recoil, it could not be fired from the shoulder and the rifle butt had to be rested on the ground (or some other solid surface), which must have made accurate aiming difficult.

[RichTO90]

The British on their part did have a hollow charge AT rifle grenade in service, in limited numbers, in Sept. 1940, the No. 68. It was fired from the same discharger cup as the No. 36M, but it wasn't particularly effective; it had to hit the target at an angle very close to 90° to function properly and penetration was no more than 30 mm. Because of the strong recoil, it could not be fired from the shoulder and the rifle butt had to be rested on the ground (or some other solid surface), which must have made accurate aiming difficult.

They likely would have been as useful as the GG-P40 on Crete...i.e., not much. Looking at the various sources it is unclear to me that any of the Mk. VIB Light Tanks on Crete were knocked out by GG-P40 or to putative "stick grenades". Four of the 16 light tanks sent to Crete were "old crocks" from the R.A.C. School, Cairo, while the other 12 were worn-out veterans of the 3rd KOH campaigns in North Africa, which had also gone through being "sunk" on Dalesman before being got ashore (apparently except for a few "trucks" all the Squadron's 'B' Echelon vehicles were lost in the Dalesman's lower hold). All the wireless were lost as well. Of the 16, three were in repair on 20 May near Galatas and were apparently never put into action and were likely destroyed in place when Galatas was lost.

Of the remaining 13, seven were operational SE of Galatas, three in 2nd Lt. Roy Farran's troop, three in Sgt. Harris's troop, and one with the squadron CO, Maj. Peck. The remaining six operational tanks were at Heraklion. Otherwise, as best as can be made out:

On 20 May, the German pre-attack bombardment and strafing may have knocked out one of the tanks - holing it through the cupola and apparently rendering it unfit for service. Farran's tank lost a track in a hasty turn while avoiding German mortar fire and after repairs that night got tangled in a mess of wire, which would have consequences the next day.
On 21 May, two tanks were knocked out at Pirgos supporting the New Zealander's attempted counterattack on Maleme and Hill 107. One was from Farran's troop, Sgt. Skedgewell's leading tank, which was hit by an "antitank gun" with Skedgewell and his gunner mortally wounded and his driver wounded. Farran's tank lost a bogey due to damage caused by the wire entanglement, but was repaired by using a bogey cannibalized from Skedgewell's tank. A second tank was also knocked out by an "antitank gun". It is possible the "antitank gun" was the two Bofors guns overrun on Hill 107 the previous day.
On 23 May, one tank was lost when it ditched and couldn't be recovered.
On 25 May, Farran's now two-tank troop participated in the counterattack at Galatas and one of his tanks was damaged by AT rifle fire, then after regrouping his tank was knocked out by an AT rifle and he was wounded.
On 26 May, there were two tanks under repair - one was cannibalized to repair the other and was abandoned.
On 28 May, one tank was listed as "missing" when it was cut off by the German advance. Another was immobilized by an "AT gun" and abandoned.
On 29 May, the squadron leader's tank broke down and was abandoned.
On 30 May, one tank was knocked out by gunfire that penetrated its petrol tank. It is possible the gunfire was from the two German Panzer II that had been landed a couple of days earlier (the New Zealand account of this encounter reported they were leading the German advance). Another tank broke down and was abandoned, while the last two were destroyed by their crews at 5 PM.

Overall, the tanks were worn out and in poor repair. Most, if not all, did not have radios. They had only been in place for a few days and had little opportunity to assess the terrain or to coordinate with the infantry they were to support - a problem exacerbated by their lack of radios. They were restricted by the terrain to essentially remaining on the roads (likely also a problem that would have affected Milforce). Their use in three and two-tank troops supporting infantry attacks was not what they were designed for - a point Farran made a number of times - and they were generally unsuccessful at it. After the Galatas attack though they were used to cover the withdrawal and were more or less successful at that.

The 'I' Tanks suffered from some of the same problems. Notoriously, the two at Maleme were unsuccessful when used with the one unable to fire its gun or traverse its turret, which led to its withdrawal. The other went on, but bellied in the riverbed, had its turret jam, and was abandoned by its crew. Eventually they were overrun and at least one was used by the Germans as a bulldozer to clear the airfield of wreckage. The two at Retimo quickly were ditched - they had only driven up a few days earlier as well and didn't know the terrain. Eventually they were recovered, but one was knocked out by an AT gun hit on the side and the other was mined and abandoned. These four were also old crocks like the light tanks, but the three at Heraklion were all new deliveries from England and held up well during the withdrawal.

[Knouterer]

Although slightly off topic, since there was some discussion on where the 4-metre depth mark was where U-Panzer would be launched from the Type B barges, here's a c. 1930 map showing the 25, 50, 75 and 100 feet depths at high water (I presume). South of Dymchurch, the 25 ft /7.6-metre line is about a mile and a half from shore, it seems.
Note also The Varne to the east, one of the obstacles the invasion fleets would have to avoid.

[RichTO90]

Although slightly off topic, since there was some discussion on where the 4-metre depth mark was where U-Panzer would be launched from the Type B barges, here's a c. 1930 map showing the 25, 50, 75 and 100 feet depths at high water (I presume).

If that is an Admiralty chart, the depth indications should be lowest water, not highest water IIRC.

[Knouterer]

I should like your opinion on what Schenk says about Transport fleet C? He's very mixed up about their timetable On page 207, for instance, he has this diagram, which shows the fleet being outside Calais at S-10
Incidentally, following this movement, the tides would have made the fleet travel 1-1.5 knots faster.
Transport Fleet C would be 14-15 km long and 1-2 km wide (P206)
He says on p. 205 that Fleets B and C would have crossed the Dover Straits by daylight, but then he also says that Fleet C would leave port at S- 8.5 hours and he has the above diagram showing S-10 hours as the departure time. If S hour was 6 am then that would mean departing Calais at 8 pm or 9.30pm. In some cases, the fleets would start loading supplies on S-9 days (although the troops don't embark until S-1 day in most cases). Schenk gets really confused on page 278 where he says "The transport fleet commander was to board his own command boat at 1300 hrs the next day as the fleet was sailing" and he also seems to indicate on that page. that the fleet would wait off Calais for 9.5 hours before crossing the Channel

All this seems to indicated that for transport fleet "C" at least their movements would be rather hard to conceal. remember there was more than one convoy and the others would have had an easier time

Transport fleet "C" would consist of two parts, the barge fleet sailing from Calais (plus a few from Gravelines), and the transports coming from Antwerp. According to Schenk, bringing out the barges and other vessels from Calais harbour would start
on S-1 at 10h00 - in full view of interested parties with binoculars and telescopes on the cliffs of Dover. By 17h00 at the latest, the fleet would be formed up, and the 4th minesweeper flottila would move out and start clearing the way. The main barge fleet would start to move at S-10.5h., which would be at about 19h30 by my count. By that time, the transports from Rotterdam and Antwerp would also have been visible from Dover.
As noted, the Germans were planning to take advantage of the prevailing currents - the map shows that the current would help them along until between S-5h and S-4h when the tide would turn. This however would require them to keep strictly to the timetable; if bringing the barges out and forming up took longer than expected,or if there were any other unforeseen delays, they would be struggling against the current longer and the time schedule would be completely overthrown
On the subject of timing, by the way: both sides practised "daylight saving time" and it was 1 hour earlier in Britain, if I'm not mistaken, so a landing planned by the Germans at 06h00 would be 05h00 British time.

[RichTO90]

On the subject of timing, by the way: both sides practised "daylight saving time" and it was 1 hour earlier in Britain, if I'm not mistaken, so a landing planned by the Germans at 06h00 would be 05h00 British time.

Not exactly. The British were on Double Summer Time (GMT+2), but the Germans were on Berlin Daylight Savings Time (GMT+2), so it all worked out nicely.

[Knouterer]

For a pessimistic assessment of the German chances of getting across, a couple of pages from Duncan Grinnell-Milne, Silent Victory (1958).
The barge fleet would be moving a bit faster than he assumes, but it would indeed be a problem that on the British side all the normal aids to navigation (lighthouses, lightships, harbour lights, buoys ...) would be absent, or deliberately misplaced. Lighthouses on the French side would be in operation for the occasion.
Clearly, much would depend on the navigational and other skills of the junior Kriegsmarine officers who had to herd the unwieldy formations along and guide them through their turns at the right moment.

[Knouterer]

On the subject of timing, by the way: both sides practised "daylight saving time" and it was 1 hour earlier in Britain, if I'm not mistaken, so a landing planned by the Germans at 06h00 would be 05h00 British time.

Not exactly. The British were on Double Summer Time (GMT+2), but the Germans were on Berlin Daylight Savings Time (GMT+2), so it all worked out nicely.

Are you sure about that? I have a book about the cross-channel guns (Hans Sakkers and Marc Machielse, Artillerieduel der Fernkampfgeschütze am Pas de Calais 1940-1944), and it seems that in Sept. 1940 the British consistently reported the same events (eg start of shelling) as being one hour earlier than in German reports. I may be wrong of course.

[RichTO90]

Are you sure about that? I have a book about the cross-channel guns (Hans Sakkers and Marc Machielse, Artillerieduel der Fernkampfgeschütze am Pas de Calais 1940-1944), and it seems that in Sept. 1940 the British consistently reported the same events (eg start of shelling) as being one hour earlier than in German reports. I may be wrong of course.

Well, the British were certainly on DBST and German field forces used Berlin Time (we did quite an investigation on the matter when putting together the Kursk Data Base) and the Germans followed the Summer Time routine during the war in order to extend daylight working hours, so...

[phylo_roadking]

Oh, you're right, it was 15mm in the VIB...so why are you now saying that isn't right? Does that mean that a Panther had 80mm or more of armor on its frontal services, but it didn't have 80mm of armor because its turret top was only 16mm?

No, what I'm saying is that the rest of the Mark VIB was grossly vulnerable to even S.m.K steel-cored ammunition, let alone S.m.K.H....but the couple of times that one poster has mentioned its armour as being "up to 14mm" doesn't adequately emphasise how weak the rest of the "armoured perambulator" was...

And for the record - that's ALL I'm saying; so please don't apply that answer to any other flight of fancy about Panthers, or whatever you think I should be referring to...

This particular topic of conversation has ONLY been about the New Zealander's Divisional Cavalry Squadron and its Vickers Light Tanks.

No, it was a conversation about the capabilities of Milforce as a whole, until you tried to narrow it down to just the Vickers Light Tanks. Your point that the Vickers Light Tanks by themselves would be ineffective is likely true.

However, in a fight against enemy troops on foot and without effective AT weapons, when regarded as a machine gun carrier they would have certain advantages when used intelligently, such as firepower, mobility, protection (up to 14 mm armour), and the capacity to carry more ammunition than a squad of soldiers

No; and sadly the site rules don't permit me to call that statement of yours for what it is - given that I've already noted perfectly clearly that my reply...

Perhaps this is the point at which I should refer the two posters above to the various histories of events on Crete a year later....and how Vickers Light tanks proved to be susceptible to being immobilized by stick grenades blowing off track pinions...and penetrable by MG34s?

...was strictly and ONLY about the above statement. Believe it or not, it's entirely possible to take exception with only PART of a statement...

I'll deal with the Crete issue before moving on to other issues...

Looking at the various sources it is unclear to me that any of the Mk. VIB Light Tanks on Crete were knocked out by GG-P40 or to putative "stick grenades".

I'll be coming back to this, for it applies directly to TWO of my next points...

Otherwise, as best as can be made out:
On 20 May, the German pre-attack bombardment and strafing may have knocked out one of the tanks - holing it through the cupola and apparently rendering it unfit for service. Farran's tank lost a track in a hasty turn while avoiding German mortar fire...

...hastily conceived; on the morning of the 20th as the squadron observed the Germans beginning to land they scrambled for their tanks - and Farran found himself with one of the squadron's gunners in his tank's driving seat!

His tank shed its track immediately after the incident when he accidently shot and wounded a Cretan woman...whom he shot at thinking she was a German in a greatcoat while under MG fire from a couple of concealed MGs. His "driver" was apparently "so excited by it all" that when Farran ordered him to turn round he pulled the tiller too hard to one side!

...and after repairs that night got tangled in a mess of wire, which would have consequences the next day.

To be fair - and this has some bearing on the grenade statement above - a lot more happened to Farran's tank at that point than just getting tangled in barbed wire! Just after getting free his tank was subjected to a "shower of grenades" rolling off the side of the tank but "causing no damage"...which as Farran later admits himself was not the case...

On 21 May, two tanks were knocked out at Pirgos supporting the New Zealander's attempted counterattack on Maleme and Hill 107. One was from Farran's troop, Sgt. Skedgewell's leading tank, which was hit by an "antitank gun" with Skedgewell and his gunner mortally wounded and his driver wounded. Farran's tank lost a bogey due to damage caused by the wire entanglement, but was repaired by using a bogey cannibalized from Skedgewell's tank. A second tank was also knocked out by an "antitank gun". It is possible the "antitank gun" was the two Bofors guns overrun on Hill 107 the previous day.

I'm not sure this is the case; during his briefng by Brigadier Hergest for that day's action, he was told the captured Bofors were near Maleme village - but he encountered the "antitank guns" right in the village square, hidden in the churchyard.

It's just after this encounter that he took his unfortunate detour through a stand of bamboo - quite common on Crete - to hide from a posse of Bf109s that attacked the two surviving tanks...at which point one of his bogey wheels collapsed...which he does put down partly to the barbed wire encounter - but ALSO says...

"It collapsed as though it had been made of cardboard, having also been damaged by a grenade[/b], and there were were as immobile as the Rock of Gibraltar."

Remember the "shower of grenades"?

Vickers Light bogey wheels are relatively strong steel forgings about five to six inches wide, and the same as those used on Bren Gun Carriers, and with a solid rubber "tyre" on them. I don't see how barbed wire could actually damage one that much - but a "shower of grenades"?

On 23 May, one tank was lost when it ditched and couldn't be recovered.
On 25 May, Farran's now two-tank troop participated in the counterattack at Galatas and one of his tanks was damaged by AT rifle fire, then after regrouping his tank was knocked out by an AT rifle and he was wounded.

To be fair - Farran's description of the "fatal blow" was...

"...a blinding flash inside the tank and my gunner sank groaning to the bottom of the turret. He said that he ahd been hit. I felt a sort of burn in my thigh and thought it probable that I had also been woundedI told the driver to turn round. but as we swung broadside to the enemy (my emphasis) we were hit again. My driver was wounded in the shoulder and in consequencepulled the tiller too hard, putting us into the ditch."

Farran's tank wasn't knocked out by antitank rifle fire....the crew was knocked out by something - and the injured driver drove the tank off the road into the ditch where it was never to to be recovered. Same as the loss the day before. From cover, over the next few hours, Farran THEN watched antitank rifle fire drill holes in it!

From the description of the initial hit - and possibly the KOH war diary, I'll have to check sometime - Beevor put this hit down to an "anti tank grenade".

I'd also note that your list doesn't make any distinction between actual antitank rifles - the PzB 38 and 39 - and plain old K98s firing S.m.K.H....

Their use in three and two-tank troops supporting infantry attacks was not what they were designed for - a point Farran made a number of times - and they were generally unsuccessful at it.

...not least to Hergests' face! "Armoured perambulators" was Farran's term for the Mark VIB in that conversation!

Hopefully however, now that you'd said it too, Knouterer will take the point on board and leave aside his idea that the NewZealanders' Divisional Cavalry would use theirs as "machine gun carriers" supporting an infantry attack...which is where I came in.

[phylo_roadking]

Although slightly off topic, since there was some discussion on where the 4-metre depth mark was where U-Panzer would be launched from the Type B barges, here's a c. 1930 map showing the 25, 50, 75 and 100 feet depths at high water (I presume). South of Dymchurch, the 25 ft /7.6-metre line is about a mile and a half from shore, it seems.

If that is an Admiralty chart, the depth indications should be lowest water, not highest water IIRC.

Rich is quite right - and unfortunately the 12 foot line (approx. four metres) isn't marked on that map...

here's a c. 1930 map

And is there ANY point in me referring you back to the number of times I mentioned about the northern drift along the shore from south to north, which also happens to frequently alter depths and undersea countours inshore? :roll: Today, the Admiralty re-surveys the Channel from Dungeness to Dover and beyond every three weeks because sandbars and countours can change height and location that rapidly...