British Army at home September 1940

Discussions on all aspects of the The United Kingdom & its Empire and Commonwealth during the Inter-War era and Second World War. Hosted by Andy H
Locked
Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#811

Post by Knouterer » 26 Aug 2014, 11:57

To sum up, as far as the Emergency Batteries are concerned: they would undoubtedly have put a dent in the invasion fleets. How big a dent is of course a matter of opinion; personally I think they could have wrought a serious amount of destruction, firing at (very) close range at slow or even stationary targets.
The gunners may not have been at the highest pitch of training, but then they would hardly be required to demonstrate traditional coast artillery skills, i.e. hitting a fast-moving target at long range with the first shot. In any case, there is no reason to think they would have done much worse than the territorials at Hartlepool in December 1914, who managed to land quite a few hits on the German battlecruisers.

We do not know exactly how much ammunition the EBs had - part of the problem is that the Fort Record Books are mostly missing, at least they're not in the NA - but from various bits of info 75-100 rounds per gun seems a reasonable estimate. Obviously, if it had been much less, installing the batteries would hardly have been worth the trouble. Some batteries, such as those equipped with 5.5in guns recently removed from HMS Hood, may have had more. Usually there were some 15-20 ready rounds in the gunhouse itself, and the rest in the magazine below (see drawings from a couple of pages back).
If we assume a hit probability of say 1 in 3 overall, and considering that it would not take more than one or two solid hits to sink or disable (in the sense that it could not be unloaded) a barge, German losses might have been considerable.

A trained gun crew could achieve a rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute with the standard Mk VII 6in gun, but of course it is not likely that this could be maintained under combat conditions. During the Hartlepool affair, the guns suffered various electrical and mechanical failures which in the end reduced the rate of fire during the engagement to not much more than 1 rpm on average, IIRC.

As regards effects: Phylo will now try to confuse the issue with a lot of talk about ineffective near misses, but near misses do not really enter into it. A gun close to the waterline (as most guns covering the invasion beaches were) firing at a barge (or minesweeper or Vorpostenboot) at a range of 1000-2000 yards would have a flat trajectory. That means, provided that the aim is not too far off to the right or the left, one of the following things happens:
- the range is correct, a 100 lb shell slams into the vessel, blowing a big hole in it and causing death and destruction;
- the round falls short, ricochets and slams into the vessel, with the same results;
- the round falls short, ricochets and goes over the vessel;
- the round goes over, gunners correct their aim for the next shot.

As an aside, apart from the few concrete-armoured barges, not many of the vessels in the invasion fleet had armour protection, as far as I know. The M35 class minesweepers had some 8 mm plating protecting vulnerable parts of the ship such as the ammunition magazine. The five Schwere Artillerieträger protecting the left (western) flank of the invasion were partially armoured with 20 mm plates.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

User avatar
sitalkes
Member
Posts: 471
Joined: 18 Feb 2013, 01:23

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#812

Post by sitalkes » 27 Aug 2014, 01:42

Those diagrams are terrific but this assumes that the batteries were still operational after the Luftwaffe bombardment that was due to start at S-10 - possible since the locations of some were unknown to the Germans but they could have been hit by a general beach area bombing anyway (many look quite vulnerable to air attack). Everything I've read so far says that ammunition was in short supply and the emergency batteries were given, in effect, orders to "don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes". OK not quite that bad but certainly at a reduced range. 100 rounds at 6 rounds per minute? 17 minutes of shooting then the guns fall silent.

The barges might have been slow but were not necessarily "underpowered". They would have been carrying much less than their normal load e.g. a full load of three tanks might be 50-60 tons for a 600 ton capacity barge. No idea what a load of troops, vehicles and/or guns or horses would weigh but probably also much less than 100 tons.


pugsville
Member
Posts: 1016
Joined: 17 Aug 2011, 05:40

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#813

Post by pugsville » 27 Aug 2014, 09:40

The invasion barges would be highly vulnerable targets to a almost all threats. Slow, barely seaworthy, often towing other barges only 1/3 had engines, with a pitiful escort. British Submarines (as they could out run the barges underwater submarines would be only limited by their torpedoes), Motor gun boats or torpedo boats, (hell armed trawlers would have been a significant threat) , Gun batteries. The Germans needed a lot of things to go very very right. Bad weather could sink most of their invasion fleet. Submarines, Destroyers , and numerous RN small craft were a huge threat.

The Luftwaffe would have a lot to do, protect the invasion fleet, suppress RAF, escort paratroopers, attack invasion beaches, Almost every task was critical in that failure would resort in large losses. Yes they could suppress gun batteries. bUt hardly the full Luftwaffe strength would be available.

While the British Army in 1940 was hardly well equipped and struggling to fit out much heavy weapons to much better than 50% of establishment strength it was never going to face the full brunt of the German army.

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#814

Post by Knouterer » 27 Aug 2014, 12:35

The barges were "underpowered" in the sense that none of them could make it across under their own power within a reasonable time frame - all had to be towed by tugs or trawlers. I know there are Youtube videos of river barges crossing the Channel, but if you look a little closer you will see that those were fitted with more powerful engines than any barges in the Sealion fleet.

Speaking of videos of barges, this is an interesting one - at 65 ft the barge is of course rather smaller than the Sealion barges. But imagine what say 50 men plus 4 horses trapped in the hold would go through ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kg_QweiLy0&gl=BE
Last edited by Knouterer on 27 Aug 2014, 15:29, edited 1 time in total.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2776
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#815

Post by Gooner1 » 27 Aug 2014, 14:24

sitalkes wrote:Those diagrams are terrific but this assumes that the batteries were still operational after the Luftwaffe bombardment that was due to start at S-10
On S-10 the Luftwaffe was supposed to target naval bases. Pretty obvious why bombing the beaches ten days in advance of intending to land there would be counter productive.
- possible since the locations of some were unknown to the Germans but they could have been hit by a general beach area bombing anyway (many look quite vulnerable to air attack).
Clutching at straws. In all the thousands of tons of bombs dropped on Malta the coastal artillery there suffered one gun put of action - even that was probably only temporary.

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2776
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#816

Post by Gooner1 » 27 Aug 2014, 14:45

[quote="Knouterer"][/quote]

None of those barges appear to have protected rudders.
Attachments
GrönerBarges 001.jpg
GrönerBarges 001.jpg (44.46 KiB) Viewed 1581 times

User avatar
sitalkes
Member
Posts: 471
Joined: 18 Feb 2013, 01:23

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#817

Post by sitalkes » 28 Aug 2014, 06:51

The Franz Christian.JPG
The Franz Christian is similar to the barges in the videos and travelled under its own power while being used in the Baltic in WW2
The Franz Christian.JPG (36.46 KiB) Viewed 1552 times
The barges in the videos had different engines from the barges to be used for Sealin, eh? This is an actual barge converted for Sealion and it has the same engine capacity.

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#818

Post by Knouterer » 28 Aug 2014, 09:40

Well, in the Baltic the barges would not normally have to cope with such strong currents as in the Channel I think. Anyway, the whole discussion about whether some barges could or could not have crossed under their own power is moot: the Kriegsmarine decided that they could not - within a reasonable time frame - and they would all have been towed.

That decision was probably also influenced by the fact that the crews manning the Dutch, Belgian and French barges had received only minimal training - the crews of the German Rhine barges had (for a good part) been commandeered with their vessels.

Also, there is a big difference between one barge crossing the Channel and 200 of them crossing in formation.

But we're getting away from the subject of this thread I think.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#819

Post by Knouterer » 28 Aug 2014, 12:06

Regarding the Franz Christian in particular, according to this website when launched in 1929 she was fitted with a "small and economical" diesel engine providing 70 hp, and in 1953 she was lengthened (by 4 m) and refitted with a 180 hp engine.
http://www.medienwerkstatt-online.de/lw ... hp?id=3000

I'm not an expert, but 70 hp seems a bit marginal for the open sea, for a vessel this size.

As an aside, IIRC (don't have my library with me) Schenk mentions that the barges with engines all had to be fitted with a different type of screw for use at sea.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#820

Post by Knouterer » 28 Aug 2014, 13:07

One further thought on the barge engines: it must have been hard enough for barge owners/operators to make a living in the 1920s and 1930s, in particular during the Depression.

They would therefore have tried to keep fuel bills to the minimum, and they would have selected the smallest and most economical engines available that would still propel the barge forward on a canal, or a relatively calm river like the Rhine, Meuse or Seine.
(The speed limit was and is generally very low in any case, not more than 8km/h on many canals for obvious reasons)

It stands to reason - in my non-expert opinion, which however seems to have been shared by the Kriegsmarine - that such engines did not have the necessary power reserve to cope with adverse conditions at sea, such as the strong currents in the Channel.
Last edited by Knouterer on 28 Aug 2014, 16:43, edited 3 times in total.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#821

Post by Knouterer » 28 Aug 2014, 14:09

Oh and before somebody starts on that: I KNOW that hp is not exactly the same thing as PS (Pferdestärke), but the difference is negligible, certainly for the purposes of this discussion.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
Member
Posts: 1661
Joined: 15 Mar 2012, 18:19

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#822

Post by Knouterer » 28 Aug 2014, 20:44

Knouterer wrote: As an aside, IIRC (don't have my library with me) Schenk mentions that the barges with engines all had to be fitted with a different type of screw for use at sea.
Correction: it was not the screws, but the rudder blades that had to be reduced in size.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#823

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Aug 2014, 22:52

Since Phylo seems to have great difficulty grasping the basic concept (it would if course help if he actually read other people's posts before commenting on them, but I guess that's asking too much ...), let's see if a rapid little sketch of what things MIGHT have looked like can clarify things.

So: no boom: wire nets held horizontally near the surface by kapok-filled tubes (that's probably where the "sausage nets" got their name from), as the Official History says. Whether vessels cross it fast or slowly would probably make little difference.
Nice diagram....but do you realise what happens when the first vessel(s) contact the "edge" of the net I.E. the FIRST line of kapok-filled floats along the "offshore" edge that have to be secured together SOMEHOW??? The chains or wires holding the floats togther will part...and THEN what happens to that edge of the net???

Hint - it certainly doesn't remain horizontal...
As the Official History also indicates, it must have been difficult to keep such nets in place over longer periods and in bad weather.
And there was PLENTY of that in September 1940...

Interestingly the Official History doesn't I see say how BIG the breaks in the net "barrier" were... :wink:
Apart from that, if the smokescreen had been where according to your notions it would be, a mile or so offshore, then yes, the invasion fleet might well have sailed right into into the nets without seeing them.
Afraid not- you've got a problem with your event scheduling again...
Oh really. What is your fanciful schedule now? The smokescreen is put down only AFTER the Vorausabteilungen have landed? Or perhaps only after the coastal batteries have expended all their ammunition, which would take 20-30 minutes or so?
According to Klee, the smokescreen was to be laid at 6:00AM (weather permitting)...and looking at Schenk's schedule for the 35th ID, the Vorausabteilungen and Pz.Abt (U)D were to go ashore at 6:00...I.E. the smokescreen is to cover the shipping offshore and the NEXT series of barges coming all the way ashore - from 6:30 on (See Schenk P. 261). The mooring up of the barges just offshore carrying the S-panzers would be under cover of the very last pre-dawn gloom.
To sum up, as far as the Emergency Batteries are concerned: they would undoubtedly have put a dent in the invasion fleets. How big a dent is of course a matter of opinion; personally I think they could have wrought a serious amount of destruction, firing at (very) close range at slow or even stationary targets.
The gunners may not have been at the highest pitch of training, but then they would hardly be required to demonstrate traditional coast artillery skills, i.e. hitting a fast-moving target at long range with the first shot.
Er...given how badly BOTH sides' coastal artillery was at managing THAT during WWII, not even the "traditional coast artillery" had traditional coast artillery skills!
If we assume a hit probability of say 1 in 3 overall, and considering that it would not take more than one or two solid hits to sink or disable (in the sense that it could not be unloaded) a barge, German losses might have been considerable.
In the dawn light, with a smokescreen in the way, and under air attack almost immediately??? 8O You're hopeful!

And don't underestimate the ability of air attack to disrupt the Emergency Batteries; as already shown, they don't have THAT much protection against bombs or splinters...and if you take the example of the Mlawa Line in Poland on September 2nd 1939, when a line of full-coverage concrete anti-tank bunkers...FAR better protected than the EBs...suffered protracted two Stuka attacks that didn't even score a single hit - but the bunkers and crews were rendered unable to fire for some hours due to the disruption caused...

And as well as much "practice" in between :wink: the LW's Stukas were sent off for extra training to improve their point attack accuracy during August 1940 specifically in preparation for the Close Air Support role for Sealion...
During the Hartlepool affair, the guns suffered various electrical and mechanical failures which in the end reduced the rate of fire during the engagement to not much more than 1 rpm on average, IIRC.
If you care to look back at the single war diary entry for an Emergency Battery you've posted up - you'll note that the Battery concerned only managed three (3) practice shoots between going "live" and the end of September (both Fleming and Lavery note the lack of ammunition to spare fopr practice). I would hazard that they certainly didn't have enough live firing practice to shake out ALL the electrical and mechanical problems...let alone whatever they'd THEN suffer under bombardment.
As regards effects: Phylo will now try to confuse the issue with a lot of talk about ineffective near misses, but near misses do not really enter into it. A gun close to the waterline (as most guns covering the invasion beaches were) firing at a barge (or minesweeper or Vorpostenboot) at a range of 1000-2000 yards would have a flat trajectory.
I don't suppose you're actually going to bother bringing some PROOF of that assumption to the thread??? These aren't HV antitank guns, you know...
That means, provided that the aim is not too far off to the right or the left, one of the following things happens:
- the range is correct, a 100 lb shell slams into the vessel, blowing a big hole in it and causing death and destruction;
...1-2,000 yards off shore - which would be in how many feet of water?
- the round falls short, ricochets and slams into the vessel, with the same results;
- the round falls short, ricochets and goes over the vessel;
Do you honestly think that ALL shots that fall short will riccochet??? 8O
- the round goes over, gunners correct their aim for the next shot.
In other words - they miss.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#824

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Aug 2014, 22:56

Those diagrams are terrific but this assumes that the batteries were still operational after the Luftwaffe bombardment that was due to start at S-10 - possible since the locations of some were unknown to the Germans but they could have been hit by a general beach area bombing anyway (many look quite vulnerable to air attack). Everything I've read so far says that ammunition was in short supply and the emergency batteries were given, in effect, orders to "don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes". OK not quite that bad but certainly at a reduced range. 100 rounds at 6 rounds per minute? 17 minutes of shooting then the guns fall silent.

And of course - they're going to get an awful lot of LW attention in seventeen minutes...! 8O
The barges might have been slow but were not necessarily "underpowered". They would have been carrying much less than their normal load e.g. a full load of three tanks might be 50-60 tons for a 600 ton capacity barge. No idea what a load of troops, vehicles and/or guns or horses would weigh but probably also much less than 100 tons.
The barges were "underpowered" in the sense that none of them could make it across under their own power within a reasonable time frame - all had to be towed by tugs or trawlers. I know there are Youtube videos of river barges crossing the Channel, but if you look a little closer you will see that those were fitted with more powerful engines than any barges in the Sealion fleet.
"Underpowered", maybe.....but when it comes to "barriers" like wire nets and line of floats they have weight and thus MOMENTUM... :wink:
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: British Army at home September 1940

#825

Post by phylo_roadking » 28 Aug 2014, 23:07

Pugsville...

The invasion barges would be highly vulnerable targets to a almost all threats. Slow, barely seaworthy, often towing other barges only 1/3 had engines, with a pitiful escort. British Submarines (as they could out run the barges underwater submarines would be only limited by their torpedoes),
See the thread on this;

1/ the very very few we had seaworthy in Home Waters were busy watching Continental ports...and

2/ they can't operate in the shallow waters of the northern third of the Channel, the so-called "Narrows"; , they'd have very little depth, or sea room to manouver - samer as the KM's u-boats, which for very good reasons were to cluster halfway down the Channel in the northernmost deep water.
Motor gun boats or torpedo boats, (hell armed trawlers would have been a significant threat) ,
Do you realise how few MTBs we had in 1940? ANd how few proper MGBs?

And of course - lines of nets are going to restrict THEM operating inshore....!
The Germans needed a lot of things to go very very right. Bad weather could sink most of their invasion fleet.
1/ if the weather was VERY bad Sealion wouldn't even be launched...but -

2/ As we've found out already in this thread, as Schenk notes the extra bracing and concrete and steel-reinforced ballasting meant that the barges were far more open sea-worthy than previously!
The Luftwaffe would have a lot to do, protect the invasion fleet, suppress RAF, escort paratroopers, attack invasion beaches, Almost every task was critical in that failure would resort in large losses. Yes they could suppress gun batteries. bUt hardly the full Luftwaffe strength would be available.
More than the RAF - as Sealion wouldn't be launched UNLESS the BoB had gone so bad for Fighter Command that it had lost at least local air superiority over the beaches. And the RAF was going to have to multitask every bit as much as the Luftwaffe - MORE so because of its previous combat losses.
While the British Army in 1940 was hardly well equipped and struggling to fit out much heavy weapons to much better than 50% of establishment strength it was never going to face the full brunt of the German army.
The problem was that gurt big chunks of it were up in Scotland, in Northern Ireland, and in East Anglia waiting at the OTHER set of putative invasion beaches!

A successful beachead is achieved by getting ashore and beating what forces the defender can immediately bring to bear...
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

Locked

Return to “The United Kingdom & its Empire and Commonwealth 1919-45”