3" CS Howitzer - how inaccurate was it?

[phylo_roadking]

There wasn't much wrong with the ordnance itself, apart from being mounted in a tank turret with limited space for recoil mechanisms. The use of Howitzers as a close support weapon for a tank force is fine. One of the problems with the SP Birch gun was that it was a gun and could not be used to seek out an enemy in dead ground. Nor was the solution very different from the low velocity 75mm gun in the Pz IV. The Germans used the combination of howitzer equipped PzIV and cannon equipped lighter tanks to great tactical effect in 1939-41. But the Germans grouped their howitzer equipped tanks into Heavy platoons in the medium companies, and gave them a sensible role. Furthermore, the Panzer units were part of a panzer Division of all arms including anti tank, AA and field artillery giving German commanders a far wider range of tools to tackle tactical problems.

Well, as I noted up far the thread, the Germans simply didn't play from the same doctrinal rulebook...one that was simply not as far attenuated as -

The problems were in the thinking of the extremist armoured corps enthusiasts who dominated after they fell out with the Gunners and Lindsey, Broad and Pile left for other appointments. There obsession with the idea of the role of tanks in the pursuit, the essence of Blitzkrieg blinded them to the need for tanks formations to be able to operate in other phases of war where a combination of arms might be needed.

...all that "successful" experimenting and theory testing in the late '20s and early '30s in the UK having "proved" the theories. The two experiences developed from different starting points, however - the Germans' from having to make the best of what they'd have...the 1920s British armoured warfare theorists starting from the premise of what they'd like to see armoured and combined arms units doing! Of course the two results would be different.

However...

...There obsession with the idea of the role of tanks in the pursuit, the essence of Blitzkrieg blinded them to the need for tanks formations to be able to operate in other phases of war where a combination of arms might be needed.

There was little thought given to how tanks would work with other arms or training in combining them. As has been pointed out, no great priority had been given to providing HE ammunition. As late as 1941/2 the War Office released a film show casing how tanks were used in battle, showing an armoured brigade ambushing a German tank force. Apart for an RAF aircraft which spotted the location of the enemy column no other arms were involved.

I'm not sure this is the case. There might have been "little though given" by the Royal Armoured Corps...for some reason a lot more "rivet counter" study has gone into the cruiser tanks...the vehicles themselves and their use - but nowhere near as much into who/when/where the idea of dedicated "I" tanks came from for the initial assault/breakthrough battles ...but that's one for a separate thread.

[Don Juan]

As noted previously you could indeed fire 2in infantry mortar rounds from the Bomb thrower - and it's range would be reduced by the same percentage as the range of the smoke rounds was reduced in the bomb thrower. Have you found out or worked out why yet?

And why no British tankers recall firing H.E. from the bomb thrower, or even having it on board...and that the stowage details don't mention H.E. on board, only smoke?

Or why the Germans removed as similar H.E. throwing device from their Tiger tanks?

No. I'm clueless as to your specific-sounding hints. You'll have to be more explicit.

[phylo_roadking]

More explicit?

Let's see now...

That the Soviets used different ammunition is irrelevant - it would hardly have required an engineering effort on the scale of the Manhattan Project for the British to develop a munition that had similar properties to the Soviet one.

...perhaps if you were to go and find out more about the Soviet PGM-38/39/40 50mm H.E. mortar round...and the ML 2in H.E. mortar round....you might learn something of interest. I did. And it's actually VERY relevant to the above statement.

Gone to find out any more Soviet references to using this?

Gone to find out anything about the British Army using it in the tank "bomb throwers"

The 2in bomb thrower never had a range of 500 yards; go and re-read your Russian reference again - AFTER going and finding out a bit more about how mortars work It was...as I've said repeatedly...the ML 2in infantry mortar that had an effective range of 500 yards.

Go find out EXACTLY what the Soviets meant in that reference, go find out more about the ML 2in infantry mortar vs the 2in bomb thrower, and go and find out more about those Soviet 50mm PGM-38, 39 or 40 mortar rounds....

...have you carried out any of those very explicit suggestions yet?

[Don Juan]

No. I've been listening to "Street Hassle" by Lou Reed. Somehow appropriate, but I'm not sure why.

Tell me about the Soviet PGM-38...

[Gooner1]

No. It is a lot more complicated. There is nothing that suggests that RA did not want to be part of a mechanised formation. The idea oif a close support SP artillery piece was sound, but the Birch gun was the wrong ordinance on the wrong carriage.

The "mechanised group" included Gunners Broad, Milne and Pile. Neither the War Office, the Armoured school nor the Royal artillery comes out well from this episode. Hobart's insensitivity (Royal Tank Artillery) and long and sterile feud with a senior gunner officer did not help. Bidwell's comment is that "It is a sad and striking example of what happens when sectarian interests and bald assertions are used as a substitute for objective reasoning and experiment. As a result the army went to war either a self propelled gun or a tank with a 15 pdr or any other weapon to fire high explosive shell, and when operations began in earnest there was an immediate demand for fire support which could only be supplied by the 25 pdr gun, from which flowed a number of disagreeable consequences.

This is all good for another thread, but I think its worth pointing out that the total number of gun armed tanks built by the British in the 1930s prior to the outbreak of war was about 80 (eighty).
Which helps put the 'sectarian' divide into perspective.

[phylo_roadking]

This is all good for another thread, but I think its worth pointing out that the total number of gun armed tanks built by the British in the 1930s prior to the outbreak of war was about 80 (eighty).
Which helps put the 'sectarian' divide into perspective.

Built, yes...but remember both the atrociously-long lead times for tanks designs in the 1930s - four years in the case of the A.10 (MkII) from John Carden beginning work on it and the first production contract being placed)...

...and that the doctrinal differences between Cruiser and "I", RTC and Artillery etc. influenced the details of the specificiations issued for tanks throughout the 1930s; which included Covenanter, the Crusader, the Matilda, the Valentine...so the performance of literally thousands of tanks in the early years of the war were prejudiced by the experimental work done in the late 1920s that fed into FSR (1935)...and all the debates/arguments - even feuds? - that Sheldrake mentions above.

[Sheldrake]

Exactly - this is a different thread, with a very different scope to that of the inaccuracy of the 3" Howitzer.

[Sheldrake]

As a final point to this thread. One of the actions taken by HQ Arty 2nd Army in early 1944 when the RMASG was formed was for the Royal School of Artillery to produce a range table for the 95mm Howitzer. This implies that this was not readily available from the RAC. The 95mm Howitzer was the third WW2 CS howitzer. If there was no Range table for the 95mm there was likely there was none for the earlier 3" or 3.7". Without these there can be no question of any scientific gunnery or indeed accuracy.

[ChristopherPerrien]

As a final point to this thread. One of the actions taken by HQ Arty 2nd Army in early 1944 when the RMASG was formed was for the Royal School of Artillery to produce a range table for the 95mm Howitzer. This implies that this was not readily available from the RAC. The 95mm Howitzer was the third WW2 CS howitzer. If there was no Range table for the 95mm there was likely there was none for the earlier 3" or 3.7". Without these there can be no question of any scientific gunnery or indeed accuracy.

SOP's are re-written and re-done repetitiously by all bureaucracies, OFTEN . Accounting for the fact that this HQ ARTY 2nd Army was, a. (government), X b. (military), X c. (British), its a wonder they weren't still sitting in the mud on the Somme , developing this thing.

[phylo_roadking]

As a final point to this thread. One of the actions taken by HQ Arty 2nd Army in early 1944 when the RMASG was formed was for the Royal School of Artillery to produce a range table for the 95mm Howitzer. This implies that this was not readily available from the RAC. The 95mm Howitzer was the third WW2 CS howitzer. If there was no Range table for the 95mm there was likely there was none for the earlier 3" or 3.7". Without these there can be no question of any scientific gunnery or indeed accuracy.

...and our old friends the stowage lists for the Churchill MkI and MkII do not list them as being stored anwhere in the vehicles. They list everything else - but not range tables.

[Sheldrake]

As a final point to this thread. One of the actions taken by HQ Arty 2nd Army in early 1944 when the RMASG was formed was for the Royal School of Artillery to produce a range table for the 95mm Howitzer. This implies that this was not readily available from the RAC. The 95mm Howitzer was the third WW2 CS howitzer. If there was no Range table for the 95mm there was likely there was none for the earlier 3" or 3.7". Without these there can be no question of any scientific gunnery or indeed accuracy.

SOP's are re-written and re-done repetitiously by all bureaucracies, OFTEN . Accounting for the fact that this HQ ARTY 2nd Army was, a. (government), X b. (military), X c. (British), its a wonder they weren't still sitting in the mud on the Somme , developing this thing.

Whoa...

HQ Arty 2 Army was a whirlwind of activity between Feb and June 1944. Its small staff operating with the minimum of bureaucracy to make the D Day fire-plan and artillery operations work.

"Range tables" are not part of "Standard Operating Procedures" but the key technical data used for the calculations for indirect and semi indirect artillery fire. These are the elevations, times of flight and probable errors of range for each range and charge, and derived on proof ranges. These were urgently needed by the Royal Marine Armoured Support Group which would fight on D Day as five SP gun batteries @ 16 x Centaur CS tanks, modified by the addition of dial sights. You can still see some of these in Normandy usually misidentified as "tanks".

Come and hear about it on Tuesday 18th March 2014 in London
http://www.justgiving.com/Normandygunners1944

Or at the RAHS meeting 8th April at Larkhill

[Clive Mortimore]

The role of the CS tanks was to support those gun tanks in their own squadron and were direct fire weapons. They did not need range tables but used the graticules on their sights.

The RMASG used naval fire methods on the run in on 6th June 1944. When used in the indirect fire role once they landed the range tables would be required as they would not be in direct line of sight with the target.

edit Whoops should have read Sheldrake's post.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Whoa...

HQ Arty 2 Army was a whirlwind of activity between Feb and June 1944. Its small staff operating with the minimum of bureaucracy to make the D Day fire-plan and artillery operations work.

"Range tables" are not part of "Standard Operating Procedures" but the key technical data used for the calculations for indirect and semi indirect artillery fire. These are the elevations, times of flight and probable errors of range for each range and charge, and derived on proof ranges. These were urgently needed by the Royal Marine Armoured Support Group which would fight on D Day as five SP gun batteries @ 16 x Centaur CS tanks, modified by the addition of dial sights. You can still see some of these in Normandy usually misidentified as "tanks".

Come and hear about it on Tuesday 18th March 2014 in London
http://www.justgiving.com/Normandygunners1944

Or at the RAHS meeting 8th April at Larkhill

Stuck in the same "pamphet bag", AFAIwasC. . The actual ballistic flight patterns are done when a weapon is proofed and accepted. How such original range tables are integrated and reprinted into every SOP afterward for a weapon is what I what was talking about; No great reach of effort there. From my own POV, the indirect fire tables for an M60A3 were no different from the M60A1, in various "SOP's ; As they both used the same fine M10/L7 cannon, as did early M1's.

I do wish , I could be in England/europe next week, as I love "slam dancing" with British Tankers , and talking tanks/WWII with people, same as me, would be great fun too.
I will be there when I can; Hopefully before I am dead again.

However , I note , we may be able to figure out how inaccurate this cannon really was if you actually have the range tables and the commentary behind it for this 3" gun/mortar/smoke launcher/whatever as done by this 2nd Army HQ.

[Sheldrake]

However , I note , we may be able to figure out how inaccurate this cannon really was if you actually have the range tables and the commentary behind it for this 3" gun/mortar/smoke launcher/whatever as done by this 2nd Army HQ.

Sorry, I may not have been 1200% clear. 2nd Army called for range tables to be published for the 95mm CS howitzer fitted to CS versions of the Centaur tank to be used as SP artillery in the Normandy landings. This implies that such tables were NOT customarily published for CS tanks, and therefore that there may never have been range tables published for the 3.7" and 3" howitzers fitted to earlier CS tanks.