Indeed...and to get back to that question after our interesting excursion, yes, indeed the decision made WRT the two major minor Allied troop contingentsRob Stuart wrote:The original question read in part "What divisions used Commonwealth instead of US equipment and where were they deployed at?" I suspect that the Polish 1st Armoured Division, which fought in Western Europe with 1st Canadian Army, and the Polish II Corps, which fought in Italy, had Commonwealth equipment, except for having US tanks. The 1st Belgian Infantry Brigade, the Prinses Irene Brigade and the 1st Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade likewise had British-pattern equipment. On the other hand, I think that the French divisions which fought in Italy and France 1943-45 had US and French equipment. Earlier in the war the smaller French formations which fought with the British had mostly British pattern equipment, for example the 1st Free French Brigade at Bir Hakeim.
- Poland and France - was that French forces would use primarily U.S. arms, equipment, and organizational patterns (with variations), while the Polish forces would use British. It does get complicated WRT the Polish use of armored vehicles though. Those were supplied by the British from Lend-Lease stocks they had been allocated. But for the French forces, their equipment was done as a direct shipment negotiated peer-to-peer between U.S. and French representatives. Similar decisions were made WRT the minor Allied contingents, almost all of whom had their equipment supplied through the British including items of American kit supplied to the British through Lend-Lease. (The sources for weapons and equipment of the reconstituted Dutch colonial forces sent to the Netherlands East Indies is an interesting subject of its own.)Further, there were a number of different types of Lend-Lease transactions complicating things.
The primary one, direct shipments, were what most of us think of as "Lend-Lease". Those were "shipments from depots or other facilities in the Continental U.S. that were consigned to foreign governments or their authorized representatives." They were negotiated through the various protocols completed between the peer government officials and constituted roughly 79% of the total Lend-Lease dollar value.
The second type were commanding general shipments. Those were "shipments that were consigned through regular Army shipping channels to commanding generals of U.S. oversea theaters of operation for transfer under lend-lease to a foreign government after arrival in the theater." Those exchanges were apparently usually negotiated between peer military representatives to cover shortfalls in items between protocols and they were subject to sequestration by the theater commanding general for U.S. use in an emergency. They constituted about 4% of the total dollar value.
The third were theater transfers. Those were "transfers to lend-lease foreign governments made by commanding generals of U.S. Army forces in oversea theaters of operation or separate bases. They consisted of articles transferred from Army stocks or services furnished to foreign governments. Such transactions were authorized in cases of emergency or under special conditions or circumstances." Perhaps surprisingly, these less formalized transfers constituted the second largest part of the Lend-Lease flow, roughly 14% of the total dollar value.
The fourth form of Lend-Lease transfers were "Facilities and equipment for use in the manufacture or production of defense articles", primarily in the U.S., but also as we have seen, in Canada. They accounted for just over 2% of the dollar total (the remainder is accounted for by rounding).
Reverse Lend-Lease took many forms and amounted to a total of $7.819 billion allocated against the total $50.2 billion supplied by the U.S. There the largest value received was from Great Britain, $6.752 billion Reverse lend-Lease against a net of $14.087399 billion Lend-Lease distributed (not including facilities and equipment costs).
In comparison, the net to French Forces was $1.928340 billion Lend-Lease distributed against a Reverse Lend-Lease of $868 million. Actual Lend-Lease to Polish forces was tiny in comparison, only $2.122 million net total Lend-Lease.
BTW, one other bit of Reverse Lend-Lease that had some substantial impact was 57mm APDS. No APDS was produced by U.S. Army Ordnance, so all supplies came from British stocks. In First Army that amounted to roughly 10 r.p.g. and figured into the stand of the 26th Infantry at Dom Butgenbach and the 2nd and 99th Division actions at Krinkelt-Rocherath and Elsenborn. Likewise, the emergency allocation of medium tanks and temporary loan of 25pdr guns and ammunition to replace lost 105mm howitzers in the aftermath of the Bulge also had a substantial effect.
Also BTW, note that these are all War Department shipments only. They do not include Lend-Lease processed through the Navy Department or any other U.S. Government agencies. Thus, they account for just over $24 billion of the $50.2 billion distributed through Lend-Lease.