Hi
During the height of the invasion scare(s) of the summer of 1940 fears about the fate of the Fleet were rife, especially in America.
Churchill among many others assured those fearing for the fate of the Fleet, that it would continue fighting from its Empire bases such those in Canada. As such some 'active preparations had been made to receive it. Does anyone have any info on just what were these 'active preparations' were?
Regards
Andy H
British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
Re: British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
http://www.warmuseum.ca/education/onlin ... e]Canada’s navy in September 1939 included only 3500 personnel, both regular force and reserve, and six ocean-going warships, the ‘River’ class destroyers His Majesty’s Canadian Ships (HMCS) Fraser, Ottawa, Restigouche, Saguenay, St Laurent, and Skeena. A seventh ‘River,’ HMCS Assiniboine joined the fleet in October. All these ships were British built, Saguenay and Skeena according to special Canadian specifications. Destroyers were among the smallest full-fledged, ocean-going warships, but the ‘River’ class were thoroughly modern — fast and powerfully armed. In the early months of the war, the Canadian destroyers escorted the convoys, and also large Allied warships, within Canadian coastal waters.
Both British and Canadian authorities believed in 1939 that Canada’s navy could expand on only a modest scale, and mainly for operations along the North American seabord. In early 1940, the government placed orders for the construction of 92 small warships: 64 ‘corvettes’, depth-charge-armed anti-submarine escorts, and 28 ‘Bangor’ class minesweepers. These rather slow and simple vessels were all Canada’s limited shipbuilding industry could produce, but they were adequate to patrol the entrance to ports and along coastal routes, where enemy submarines could most readily find ships to attack.
The German offensives in the spring of 1940 that conquered most of western Europe, and Italy’s entry into the war at Germany’s side in June of that year, transformed the war, not least at sea. From bases in France and Norway, right on Britain’s doorstep, the German submarine fleet, augmented by submarines from Italy, Germany’s Axis partner, launched devastating attacks against the overseas shipping on which Britain now wholly depended for survival. Canada rushed four of the ‘River’ class destroyers to British waters, and these protected convoys off the western shores of the British Isles against intense attacks by enemy submarines and aircraft.
Meanwhile, in the fall of 1940 the Canadian government embarked on full-scale naval expansion, laying down additional corvettes and Bangors as soon as the first ones were launched. Canada also began to produce merchant ships. The Royal Canadian Navy further assisted the short-handed Royal Navy by taking over seven of the fifty First World War-era destroyers the still-neutral United States made available to Britain. Canada, although its coasts were now almost unprotected, dispatched the four best of these old destroyers to British waters, together with the first ten corvettes to come from Canadian shipyards. It soon became clear that the old American ships and the new, only partly equipped, corvettes, crewed by former merchant seamen who had had only basic naval training and raw recruits, would need considerable work and time to become fully effective.
There was no time. By 1941, the Germans, encountering stronger defences in British waters, developed highly successful techniques for intercepting convoys at mid-ocean, where they were weakly escorted, if at all, and far from help. Air cover did not extend across the Atlantic, and the mid-ocean area beyond range of patrolling Allied aircraft became a killing ground for the U-boats. The submarines patrolled in long lines and, when one sighted a convoy, shadowed it, summoning the other submarines. They then attacked in a group – a ‘wolfpack’ – at night and on the surface, when their low proffles were nearly invisible to the escorting warships. The U-boats were much faster on the surface than underwater, and they were therefore able to move rapidly through a convoy, making multiple attacks, sometimes sinking with torpedoes three and four ships apiece.
In response to Britain’s call for help, Canada, starting in May 1941, took the lead in building a new naval base at St John’s, Newfoundland, and in supplying most of the warships that escorted convoys across the 3000 kilometres of ocean between Newfoundland and the British Isles. All of the Canadian warships that had been operating in British waters came to Newfoundland and, as additional corvettes were completed at Canadian shipyards, these, with incomplete equipment and virtually untrained crews, launched into the harrowing transatlantic escort mission. Small ships designed for calm coastal waters, with some crews unqualified even for that duty, had to face massed enemy attacks in some of the most stormy open ocean waters in the world.
The great demands on Canadian east coast ports increased rapidly. Growing numbers of ships flowed into the convoy system, and many of these were old vessels in need of constant repair and special services. These vessels had to be attended to even though Halifax, Sydney (since 1940 a major convoy port as busy as Halifax), Saint John, Pictou, and other smaller centres were already swamped with repair work for merchant vessels and warships that had been damaged by the enemy or by the heavy seas. All the while the Halifax base had the additional responsibility of equipping and crewing the scores of new Bangers and corvettes that arrived from builders along the St. Lawrence and on the Great Lakes. The old, cramped Royal Navy dockyard mushroomed with temporary buildings, and the navy took over adjacent army and municipal properties, which almost instantly became overcrowded as well.
[/quote]
Both British and Canadian authorities believed in 1939 that Canada’s navy could expand on only a modest scale, and mainly for operations along the North American seabord. In early 1940, the government placed orders for the construction of 92 small warships: 64 ‘corvettes’, depth-charge-armed anti-submarine escorts, and 28 ‘Bangor’ class minesweepers. These rather slow and simple vessels were all Canada’s limited shipbuilding industry could produce, but they were adequate to patrol the entrance to ports and along coastal routes, where enemy submarines could most readily find ships to attack.
The German offensives in the spring of 1940 that conquered most of western Europe, and Italy’s entry into the war at Germany’s side in June of that year, transformed the war, not least at sea. From bases in France and Norway, right on Britain’s doorstep, the German submarine fleet, augmented by submarines from Italy, Germany’s Axis partner, launched devastating attacks against the overseas shipping on which Britain now wholly depended for survival. Canada rushed four of the ‘River’ class destroyers to British waters, and these protected convoys off the western shores of the British Isles against intense attacks by enemy submarines and aircraft.
Meanwhile, in the fall of 1940 the Canadian government embarked on full-scale naval expansion, laying down additional corvettes and Bangors as soon as the first ones were launched. Canada also began to produce merchant ships. The Royal Canadian Navy further assisted the short-handed Royal Navy by taking over seven of the fifty First World War-era destroyers the still-neutral United States made available to Britain. Canada, although its coasts were now almost unprotected, dispatched the four best of these old destroyers to British waters, together with the first ten corvettes to come from Canadian shipyards. It soon became clear that the old American ships and the new, only partly equipped, corvettes, crewed by former merchant seamen who had had only basic naval training and raw recruits, would need considerable work and time to become fully effective.
There was no time. By 1941, the Germans, encountering stronger defences in British waters, developed highly successful techniques for intercepting convoys at mid-ocean, where they were weakly escorted, if at all, and far from help. Air cover did not extend across the Atlantic, and the mid-ocean area beyond range of patrolling Allied aircraft became a killing ground for the U-boats. The submarines patrolled in long lines and, when one sighted a convoy, shadowed it, summoning the other submarines. They then attacked in a group – a ‘wolfpack’ – at night and on the surface, when their low proffles were nearly invisible to the escorting warships. The U-boats were much faster on the surface than underwater, and they were therefore able to move rapidly through a convoy, making multiple attacks, sometimes sinking with torpedoes three and four ships apiece.
In response to Britain’s call for help, Canada, starting in May 1941, took the lead in building a new naval base at St John’s, Newfoundland, and in supplying most of the warships that escorted convoys across the 3000 kilometres of ocean between Newfoundland and the British Isles. All of the Canadian warships that had been operating in British waters came to Newfoundland and, as additional corvettes were completed at Canadian shipyards, these, with incomplete equipment and virtually untrained crews, launched into the harrowing transatlantic escort mission. Small ships designed for calm coastal waters, with some crews unqualified even for that duty, had to face massed enemy attacks in some of the most stormy open ocean waters in the world.
The great demands on Canadian east coast ports increased rapidly. Growing numbers of ships flowed into the convoy system, and many of these were old vessels in need of constant repair and special services. These vessels had to be attended to even though Halifax, Sydney (since 1940 a major convoy port as busy as Halifax), Saint John, Pictou, and other smaller centres were already swamped with repair work for merchant vessels and warships that had been damaged by the enemy or by the heavy seas. All the while the Halifax base had the additional responsibility of equipping and crewing the scores of new Bangers and corvettes that arrived from builders along the St. Lawrence and on the Great Lakes. The old, cramped Royal Navy dockyard mushroomed with temporary buildings, and the navy took over adjacent army and municipal properties, which almost instantly became overcrowded as well.
[/quote]
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Rob Stuart
- Member
- Posts: 1200
- Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
- Location: Ottawa
Re: British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
Andy,Andy H wrote:Hi
During the height of the invasion scare(s) of the summer of 1940 fears about the fate of the Fleet were rife, especially in America.
Churchill among many others assured those fearing for the fate of the Fleet, that it would continue fighting from its Empire bases such those in Canada. As such some 'active preparations had been made to receive it. Does anyone have any info on just what were these 'active preparations' were?
Regards
Andy H
I have the RCN official history and I don't see any reference in it to preparations being made specifically to host an orphaned RN. For example, I know of no effort having been made to build and stock depots with spare barrels for 15-inch and other guns, weapons and spares for FAA aircraft, submarine gear (the RCN had no subs), etc.
Re: British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
One big problem is that if the British Fleet is evacuated it will only be after fighting to stop a German invasion so that many ships will be damaged or at the very least low on ammo, fuel and other supplies. As far as I know Canada did not have repair and resupply facilities to handle more then a few of the smaller ships. The British sent a lot of ships to the US for repair once the US allowed it in 1941, I don’t remember them sending large warships to Canada for repairs. And any resources going to support a British Fleet in Canada will subtract from Canadian efforts to build and supply new ships
And the British bases in rest of the America’s don’t seem to be any better prepared since I don’t think the British spent much money on them prior to the war and why the British were happy to do the Destroyer for Bases deal which got the US to spend lots of money improving the bases and then supplying ships and planes to use them.
And the British bases in rest of the America’s don’t seem to be any better prepared since I don’t think the British spent much money on them prior to the war and why the British were happy to do the Destroyer for Bases deal which got the US to spend lots of money improving the bases and then supplying ships and planes to use them.
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Rob Stuart
- Member
- Posts: 1200
- Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
- Location: Ottawa
Re: British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
Hoist40,
I agree with your comments about the limitations of Canada's shipbuilding and ship repair facilities. (Even without having to host a large RN contingent, a few RCN corvettes were sent to the US for major refits, e.g., HMCS Mayflower to Charleston in 1941-42.) Furthermore, a bunch of the yards which built corvettes and minesweepers were on the Great Lakes. Ice made these shipyards inaccessible from around December to March, and the limited size of the canals and locks meant that even when there was no ice only small vessels could reach these yards. Also, in 1940 much of the equipment for Canadian-built ships came from the UK.
Outside of the UK, the best equipped RN base was Singapore, which could probably repair anything, but it was rather far away for a war with Germany. Malta was well equipped too, but its proximity to Italy made it unusable as a capital ship base. Alexandria had very limited facilities, Gibraltar was limited in size, etc. If the British government escaped to Canada and all British territories remained loyal to it (i.e., if there were no "Vichy British" colonies or forces), then the orphaned RN fleets would still be fairly powerful but they would be as dependent on US support to remain operational as the exiled remnants of the Polish, Norwegian, Dutch and Free French fleets were historically dependent on the British.
I would point out that Churchill stated that "if ... this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle" in a 4 June speech, before France had surrendered, and by the end of September it was clear that the battle of Britain had been won. While some planning may have been undetaking during he summer, I doubt that much if any active preparation was done by the latter date, and after that nothing would have been done.
I agree with your comments about the limitations of Canada's shipbuilding and ship repair facilities. (Even without having to host a large RN contingent, a few RCN corvettes were sent to the US for major refits, e.g., HMCS Mayflower to Charleston in 1941-42.) Furthermore, a bunch of the yards which built corvettes and minesweepers were on the Great Lakes. Ice made these shipyards inaccessible from around December to March, and the limited size of the canals and locks meant that even when there was no ice only small vessels could reach these yards. Also, in 1940 much of the equipment for Canadian-built ships came from the UK.
Outside of the UK, the best equipped RN base was Singapore, which could probably repair anything, but it was rather far away for a war with Germany. Malta was well equipped too, but its proximity to Italy made it unusable as a capital ship base. Alexandria had very limited facilities, Gibraltar was limited in size, etc. If the British government escaped to Canada and all British territories remained loyal to it (i.e., if there were no "Vichy British" colonies or forces), then the orphaned RN fleets would still be fairly powerful but they would be as dependent on US support to remain operational as the exiled remnants of the Polish, Norwegian, Dutch and Free French fleets were historically dependent on the British.
I would point out that Churchill stated that "if ... this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle" in a 4 June speech, before France had surrendered, and by the end of September it was clear that the battle of Britain had been won. While some planning may have been undetaking during he summer, I doubt that much if any active preparation was done by the latter date, and after that nothing would have been done.
Re: British Fleet preparations in Canada 1940
Hi
Thanks to all that have so far contributed to this thread.
Canada at the outbreak of the war and from there on in, developed several bases along its east coast. Those more famous ones such as Halifax & St Johns plus the US base at Argentia, being the most notable. However it also developed bases & facilities in places such as Shelburne, Sydney, Gaspe and Quebec etc.
Despite all this building, in all these different locations, I've yet to find any specific detail, that suggests that X was built/developed etc for the sole purpose of homeless British Fleet being based there. Yes there are records showing that bases were developed as part of earlier strategy, but nothing categorically stating were building this for a displaced British fleet.
I've searched through both volumes of the Naval Service of Canada histories and drawn a blank, and the same with HMSO Official UK histories. The only hint is a brief line in Tracking the Enemy by A.H.Bath that was the starting point for this thread.
Regards
Thanks to all that have so far contributed to this thread.
Canada at the outbreak of the war and from there on in, developed several bases along its east coast. Those more famous ones such as Halifax & St Johns plus the US base at Argentia, being the most notable. However it also developed bases & facilities in places such as Shelburne, Sydney, Gaspe and Quebec etc.
Despite all this building, in all these different locations, I've yet to find any specific detail, that suggests that X was built/developed etc for the sole purpose of homeless British Fleet being based there. Yes there are records showing that bases were developed as part of earlier strategy, but nothing categorically stating were building this for a displaced British fleet.
I've searched through both volumes of the Naval Service of Canada histories and drawn a blank, and the same with HMSO Official UK histories. The only hint is a brief line in Tracking the Enemy by A.H.Bath that was the starting point for this thread.
Regards