Early war artillery doctrine

[David W]

Within the time frame of 1939 - 1942 was it possible to have forward observers "observed fire" of British "Corps level" or "independent" artillery strikes in a form of "under command" relationship?
Similar to that possible within the divisional structure and its organic forward observers.

I hope the above makes some sort of sense. (I know what I mean!)

[gambadier]

It depends whet you mean. If you are referring to a planned target that had been circulated throughout a corps then in theory yes, although I doubt that planned targets were circulated at this level, except very rarely, apart from in a major fireplan.

If you are referring to engaging an opportunity target, ie one that was not planned and circulated, then the answer is no. Prior to the introduction in late 1942 of the effective massed fire procedures against opportunity targets any opportunity massing above regiment was pretty much unheard of, and even at regimental level seems to have been very rare.

[David W]

Thanks, you seem to have understood my question perfectly in spite of the wording!

Given that within the fore mentioned timeframe opportunity targets at even Regimental level were very rare, what do you have to say about opportunity targets at battery level?

[gambadier]

No shortage. However, in the 1940 campaign in France there appears to have been only one regimental opportunity target engaged (tanks refuelling in a wood - a good target). Not unsurprisingly the CO of the regt was one Lt Col HJ Parham, who subsequently was the main architect of the procedures to mass fire from many regiments onto an opportunity target.

[Sheldrake]

gambardier has given your the short answer to your first question. No. He has also, rightly highlighted the role HJ Parham played in demonstrating that wireless communications could allow an observer to control the fire or many batteries and that this formed the core of the techniques which allowed the British Army to centralise the command of artillery at the highest level while decentralising control of it tom very junior levels.

The British Army had planned to fight as a small highly mobile force based on the kind of thinking embodied in the armoured warfare experiments - but for which procurement lagged behind. It went to war as a junior partner of the French who were going to fight a methodical battle on the lines or 1918. So the BEF dug trenches, dusted down manuals and practised ways to fire dog legged creeping barrages.

They did not practice mobile operations. Nor out of excessive fears for security did not practice using wireless. (except for Parham's 9 Fd regiment) In May when it was all mobile operations , no one (apart from Parham's Regiment) were able to make wireless sets work consistently. Read Retreat to Dunkirk by Gun Buster for an FOO's account of the problems supporting the tank attack at Arras.

At battery level the observers used wireless when they could, telephone lines when they could be laid and fell back on dispatch riders when these failed. Obviously an opportunity target might be lost by then.

The Gunners went to war with a structure which did not help. Field Regiments had 24 guns in two batteries of twelve guns organised in three troops of four. Medioum Regiments had two batteries of eight guns @ four per troop. One of the main reasons for the Two batteries @ three troops was to make the relatively small number of trained Majors and Captains, and scare radio sets go futher while expanding the army. A field regiment with two batteries only needs two majors , and only four OP Parties , as the third troop in each 12 gun battery did not have its own OP. So a brigade of three battaliosn only had two battery commanders and four OP parties. This is only 2/3 of the numbers after the reorganisation in 1941. Soi there were fewer eyes to observe opportunity targets in 1940. There was also a shortage of maps. The Army had expected to fight in Belgium. When after the germans advanced behind the BEF, the BEF back to France. Few maps were available to allow for accurate shooting. I have the notes from 9 Field Regiment officers complaining about drawing a sketch map based on a michelin road map.


The Medium and heavy artillery was in theory under the command of the Commander Corps Medium Artillery, with responsibility for counter bombardment of enemy guns and engagement of depth targets. The nature of the 1940 campaign precluded much Counter bombardment after falling back from the Dyle. The RAF could not fly Arty/R sorties and flash spotting and sound ranging units had been overlooked when wireless was introduced. http://nigelef.tripod.com/

[gambadier]

It's worth noting that while the scale of wireless was reasonable in arty regts, the period of the phoney war put tight constraints on use of wireless in training. The sets of the period also required quite a lot of user skill and experience to get full benefits, easy to use sets didn't really appear until the US VHF AN/PRC 25 in the early 1960s (and the Brit Army wasn't smart enough to adopt this, didn't really catch up until 1980!). Lack of opportunity to use the new HF sets in 1939/40 meant that most units were not competent with wireless, and once the war got moving line was generally useless because it couldn't be recovered hence stocks ran out fairly quickly.

The technical gunnery procedures of the period were focussed on getting the three troops of a battery shooting together at opportunity targets, little (being generous) consideration had been given to regimental procedures and none to anything higher for opportunity targets. The basic doctrine and procedures was in AT Vol II 1934 (renumbered to Vol III and with several amendments).

[David W]

Thank you Gentlemen. I have learned a lot from that. Not least, the lack of an OP for the third troop of each battery prior to the reorganisation in 1941.
A couple of supplementary questions please.
Firstly, all your real life examples cited above, came from the BEF. Is there anything else to know about the logistics used by the R.A in North Africa in this same time frame?
Secondly, at what point in 1941 did the fore mentioned re=organisation take place?

Thanks in advance,
David.

[Urmel]

I think the only place where you would have seen massed fire was the Tobruk siege line. Everywhere else there probably was too much dispersion both for the regiments as well as the targets.

[Sheldrake]

Thank you Gentlemen. I have learned a lot from that. Not least, the lack of an OP for the third troop of each battery prior to the reorganisation in 1941.
A couple of supplementary questions please.
Firstly, all your real life examples cited above, came from the BEF. Is there anything else to know about the logistics used by the R.A in North Africa in this same time frame?
Secondly, at what point in 1941 did the fore mentioned re=organisation take place?

Thanks in advance,
David.

Shelford Bidwell's "Gunners at War" is an excellent study of the Artillery in the world wars. It has chapters covering the war in North Africa. Second hand copies can be purchased for less than £4. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Gunners-War-Tac ... 0853680299

It is considerably cheaper than Farndale's "Years of Defeat" the Gunner official history.

The Western Desert Force concentrated its limited artillery to support the attacks on the Italian desert forts at Sidi Barrani in 1940 by 4th Indian Division on 9th Dec 1940 and against Bardia and Tobruk by the 6th Australian Division. The attack on the Italian forts was planned by General Beresford Pierce GOC 4 Indian Division who had been CRA of the division and a renowned artillery trainer. His CRA was Brigadier Mirlees who controlled for fire of the divisional artillery and 7 Medium Regiment, totalling 56 x 24 Pdrs , 8 x 6 " howitzers and 8 x 60 pdr guns from the three field and one medium regiment. The Divisional plan was to assult the most southerly fort Nibeiwa and then the next biggest to the North Tuma West and then "play it by ear". To support this operation Mirlees decided to deploy the guns in one group and supporting the attacks on each of the four forts.

By 1944 HQRA of an infantry divisions was established with 20 vehicles including a tank or armoured CP and as staff including a major, two captains and a Warrent officer supported by 40 gunners and signallers. http://www.ww2f.com/truxmodels.co.uk/page39.html In 1940 Mirlees
borrowed a single radio vehicle with one set. He and his Brigade Major Geoffrey Harding Baker (the future Field Marshal and CGS) in his single radio van went in turn to the HQ of each assaulting brigade.

By the early hours of 9th Dec Mirlees was about 3,000 yards west of the first fort and the guns in action 6,000 yards off the to the South East, with 50 rounds per gun dumped on the position. at 0700 the guns started to register. At 07.15 the programme opened and the RTR attacked supported by machine gun carriers from the Cameron highlanders and a battery detached from 25 Field Regiment which cam into action on the tanks axis of advance over open sights and at short range to "shoot in" the tanks using a mixture of smoke and HE. by 7.20 the tanks were in the camp and the lorried troops of the Cameron highlnaders drove up to 500 yards from the camp, debussed and assaulted. The timed programme was process was repeated at Tumar West, with the gun group redeploying for the attack. Durign this attack the Italians made a sortie from the next fort Tumar East. Mirless left one battery for close support and switched the fire of the remainder to Tumar East to break up the sortie.

The assaults on Bardia and Tobruk were supported by a fire plan along the same lines as that employed at El Alemein two years later. These were the unfashionable methods taught at Larkhill, drawing on the lessons of 1918; harassing fire, creeping barrages and a heavy counter battery programme from the 166 guns now available with 300 rounds per gun. Similar methods were used by 4th and 5th Indian Divisions in their battles in Eritria.

Bidwell highlighted this action because the following year the policy of centralising artillery was reversed as unsuitable for desert warfare and artillery decentralised to brigades and then battalions - until centralised command was restored with the arrival of Montgomery and Kirkman as his Brigadier RA.

Re 2.The Regimental structure of two batteries each of three troops of four guns was not fully or uniformly implemented in the Middle East. Some regiments did adopt this structure, while others had two batteries each of two troops of four guns and some had two batteries each of two troops of six guns. For example, at Sidi Barrani the three regiments of 4th Indian Division had a total of 56 x 18/25 Pdrs - sixteen guns in two batteries of eight guns. The uniformity had been sacrificed to make the best use of men and equipment.

In Oct 1940 authority was given by the War Office for field regiments to convert from two batteries to three. In practice, this change took place over a period of many months as it took time to find the trained NCOs and specialists for the third battery who had to be shipped from the UK.

[David W]

So post re-organisation there were still only 4 OP for the 24 guns in the Regiment?

[Sheldrake]

So post re-organisation there were still only 4 OP for the 24 guns in the Regiment?

Sorry, missed that bit out.

The three battery six troop structure authorised in October 1940 included an extra BC and two extra Troop Commander FOOs (and a regimental survery party and a battery command post with its clever TARAs) Thus each infantry battalion or armoured Regiment in a triangular Brigade would have its own artillery in Direct Support manifested by the presence of a BC plus two OP Parties and their artillery communications. Finding the people and wireless sets for these people was not easy in some theatres of war.

The communications was also strengthened to add a no 18 set so the Gunners could man the Infantry net as well as the Gunner Net and the adoption of tanks as OP vehicles to support armoured units. Eventually each armoured brigade had eight OP tanks on their establishment to mount OPs from medium and towed field regiments which did not have tanks of their own.

More here about organisation and structure here
http://nigelef.tripod.com/maindoc.htm#ORGANISATION AND GROUPING
and real detail on 1944 establishments here http://ww2talk.com/forums/forum/94-artillery/

[Gooner1]

I think the only place where you would have seen massed fire was the Tobruk siege line. Everywhere else there probably was too much dispersion both for the regiments as well as the targets.

Battle of the Ypres–Comines Canal?

[Urmel]

Not sure where those are in North Africa.

[Gooner1]

Funny guy :roll:

For those a bit more in the know, I wonder if the Ypres-Comines canal battle between 26th and 28th May 1940 where the British managed to have a lot of Medium artillery, which were probably critical in stopping the German attacks, might shed some light on David W's question?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... ines_Canal

[Urmel]

Funny guy :roll:

For those a bit more in the know, I wonder if the Ypres-Comines canal battle between 26th and 28th May 1940 where the British managed to have a lot of Medium artillery, which were probably critical in stopping the German attacks, might shed some light on David W's question?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... ines_Canal

The question I responded to was on 1941 specifically.