British Army & CW ad-hoc 'Force' formations

[Andy H]

1) Brett Force (Col Paddy Brett)
2) 1st Recce Regt/1st Infantry Division-though briefly under direct US 5th Army Command
3) 21/05/44
4) ?/06/44
5) RHQ & B Sqn 1st Recce Regt (+several Trps), A Coy US 805th TD Btn plus Dets from 3coys of 894th TD Btn and 36th Engineer Combat Regt (- 1 Coy)
6) ?
7) To breakout of the Anzio BH on the coastal sector west of Littorio and link up with the main US 5th Army forces to the south, alternatively the force was to link up with US AB forces drop in the Sezza area east of Highway 7.
8.) Only the Enemy In Front by Richard Doherty, published by Tom Donovan Publishing, 1994

1) Brett Force (Col Paddy Brett)
2) 1st Recce Regt/1st Infantry Division
3) 18/11/44
4) ?
5) 1st Recce Regt plus Btn sized grouping of Sappers and gunners as infantry
6) ?
7) Defence of the Rigano feature if the enemy overan Monte Grande
8.) Only the Enemy In Front by Richard Doherty, published by Tom Donovan Publishing, 1994

[Graham Clayton]

1)Name: Maroubra Force
2)2/39th AIF; 2/53rd AIF; 21st Brigade AIF
3)21/06/42
4)01/43
5) Papuan Infantry Battalion; 2/14th AIF; 2/16th AIF; 2/27th AIF; 2/39th AIF; 2/53rd AIF
6) Rifles, machine guns
7) Unit fought against the Japanese on the Kokoda Track
8) Peter McInnis "Kokoda Track - 101 Days", Black Dog Books, Melbourne, Australia 2007
Bill James "Field Guide to the Kokoda Track", Tower Books, Lane Cove, Australia 2006
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maroubra_Force
http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-battles/ww2/maroubra.htm

[Andy H]

1) Rusty Force (Major-General Eastwood)
2) ?
3) 25/05/40
4) ?/?/40
5) 2nd, 23rd, 44th & 46th Infantry Divisions plus 1Brigade from 48th Infantry Division
6) ?
7) This force was the result of a wide ranging re-org following the retreat of the BEF towards Dunkirk
8.) CAB/66/8/15

[Andy H]

1) X Force
2) BEF
3) 1939
4) ?
5) HQ, 10 Field Companies, 2 Field Park Companies and 1 Works MT Company
6) ?
7) I believe this was an administrative grouping of the above Royal Engineer units
8.) CAB/66/3/6

Regards

Andy H

[A.C.E. van T.]

1)CLARKEFORCE. Commander unkn.
2)34 Armoured Brigade
3)17 Oct 1944
4)29 Oct 1944
5)"H.Q. 34 Armoured Brigade; 107 Regt. R.A.C.; 49 (WR) Div. Recce Regt; One troop Fife and Forfar Yeomanry (Crocodiles); D Company 1 Leicestershire Regt; One troop S.P. Anti‑tank battery, R.A.; Two Sections, R.E.; 191 Field Regt. R.A., (under command with O.C. acting as C.R.A's representative)",[i] "7 Duke of Wellington's Regt.; 1/4 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; Two troops S.P. Anti‑tank, R.A. (M 10s)"[/i] (Placed under command later).
6) Unkn other than unit IDs and their TOEs at the time.
7) "Its role was to launch through a gap, NORTH of St. LEONARD, to be made by 49 (West Riding) Division, advance Northward (in order to protect the right flank of the 4 Canadian Armoured Division) and to gain ground as a spearhead to 49 (West Riding) Division whose main bulk would follow up and take over as opportunity occurred. The Divisional Commander's briefing was wide in its terms and gave the O.C. Force the fullest freedom to operate over a generous area of country to the EAST of where the Canadians right flank was expected to move. Provided thrust was maintained he promised his fullest backing; in the event some desperate fighting ensued on the part of the Division purely in keeping open our Lines of Communication, and we never once had to look over our shoulder no matter what we by‑passed. The village of LOENHOUT, the area of STONE BRIDGE, WUESTWEZEL(=Wuustwezel) and the woods to the North of it all saw actions close behind CLARKEFORCE, but this did not involve the fighting part of it which could concentrate its energies on the main object. This was mainly due the speed with which the Force advanced.
It was in the woods to the North West of WUESTWEZEL that the 107 Regt. R.A.C. echelon vehicles were captured. They were eventually released after suffering casualties including the loss of their R.S.M., Mr Gregg, and several vehicles.
In the operations which took place CLARKEFORCE performed as envisaged, launching through a hole made by 9 R.T.R., supporting 56 Infantry Brigade, who speeded the Force with all possible help. Thereafter a somewhat tenuous Line of Communication connecting the Force and the rest of 49 (West Riding) Division was subjected to fierce counter‑attack from the EAST by enemy infantry and armour, and only maintained on 21 October by infantry from the following Brigade, supported by 147 Regt. R.A.C., fighting heavily all one day. Thus in Operation REBOUND (19 to 24 October) all the Brigade (less 7 R.T.R.) were heavily involved.
In Operation THRUSTER (26 to 29 October) the HALLAMS with 9 R.T. R. came up on the right flank of CLARKEFORCE and then 9 R.T.R. were used fully in capturing ROOSENDAAL; 147 Regt. R.A.C. operated even further EAST to cover their flank, under command 104 (Timberwolf) Division U.S. Army (who had come under I Corps for about a month and were having their initial blooding).
CLARKEFORCE existed for 12 days, and fought on nine of those days with its Armoured Regt. (107 Regt. R.A.C.) involved in two very exhausting and continuous spasms of five and four days. There were less than three non‑fighting days between in which some rest and real maintenance were possible, although in this pause two short moves had to be made and all planning and orders done for the second operation. The Regt. fought successful actions involving all its Squadrons at NIEUMOER(Nieuwmoer), VIESSEHENHEUVEL and EAST of ESSCHEN(Essen) in the first advance, and at BREMBOSCH(Brembos), WARBERGSHE BRIDGE, COSTLAR and WOUW in the second drive forward. Early on it was found that the Recce Regt. could not lead, resistance never softening up enough, so that Churchills were used in the forefront of the advance after the first 24 hours. This helped to keep down the Recce Regt. casualties, which were serious enough in any case from the mines and enemy S.P. guns. This was a heavy strain on 107 Regt. R.A.C. but all had started fresh and morale was such at the finish after capturing WOUW that nothing would have seemed impossible to them."
8)The Story of 34 Armoured Brigade,Independently Published,1945

regards
A

I made some corrections,although names (like Esschen)were propably correct at that time.
Will look at german and current maps and give corrections ASAP.

regards A.C.E.

[Aufklarung]

Hi A.C.E.

Thanks for that.

The names I gave were certainly taken directly from the source. More than likely the source was in error and transcribing phonetically prounounced names or perhaps even repeating original errors from the map sheets of the day.

As my entry is "verbatim" from the source, I won't correct them but your addition (correct) names is very welcome.

regards
A

[Andy H]

1) Emu Force
2) ?
3) 1939
4) ?
5) ?
6) ?
7) This was a reinforcement cover name similar to Heron Force, but I have no idea at present of its composition
8.) CAB24/288

Andy H

[Andy H]

1) Saar Force
2) BEF
3) 27/11/39
4) 25/02/40?
5) See Below
6) Various but all arms associated with Infantry Brigade formations.
7) As soon as units of the BEF landed in France ways were found to gainfully employ them and also to give them some 'frontline experience' before any major defensive or offensive operations were undertook. One these was to employ a Brigade Group within French forces within the Maginot Line. Each Brigade Group would spend a week in reserve with the French and then two weeks on the line. Within the aformentioned timespan the 3rd, 12th, 4th, 8th, 15th and Guards Infantry Brigade Groups were to be employed within Saar Force.
8.) WO197/33

Regards

Andy H

[Andy H]

1) Grey Force Lt-Col C.E.Grenville-Grey
2) ?
3) 27/05/1942
4) 01/06/1942
5) 9th Btn KRRC & 9th Btn Rifle Brigade
6) ?
7) Thew force ws to relieve the French at Bir Hacheim to enable them to concentrate and advance north west on Segnali
8.) Swift and Bold, the history of the KRRC in WW2

Regards

Andy H

[Urmel]

1)Bencol (Benghazi Column)
2)22 Guards Brigade
3)1 Dec 41
4)30 Jan 42 (est)
5)
22 Guards Brigade HQ (102 men, 23 trucks, 9 motorcycles)
Spec. Signals Section (85men, 8 trucks, 14 motorcycles)
3 infantry battalions with LADs (2 Scots Guards, 3 Coldstream Guards, 1 Worcesters) (2,376 men, 459 trucks, 36 motorcycles, 132 carriers)
One Armd. Car Rgt. (11 Hussars) (582 men, 91 trucks, 7 motorcycles, 58 armoured cars)
One 25-pdr Field Regiment (51 Fd Rgt) (24×25-pdr) (697 men, 145 trucks, 6 motorcycles)
One A/Tk battery (73 A/Tk Bty) (123 men, 39 trucks, 8 motorcycles)
One Lt. AA Rgt. (1 LAA Rgt) (12 40mm guns) (281 men, 57 trucks, 8 motorcycles)
Bde. Coy RASC (400 men, 189 trucks)
Supply Column (5.5 motor transport companies, 2 water tank companies) (1,575 men, 919 trucks & 428 men, 158 tankers)
Total: 6,649 men, 2,088 trucks, 88 motor cycles, 132 carriers, 58 armoured cars, with weekly supply requirements of about 1,000 tons.

6) See above
7) Combat with DAK near Antelat, Dec 41
8)National Archives and CRUSADER PROJECT

[Urmel]

1)Whitforce
2) Bencol
3) 1 Dec 41 (est)
4) 30 Jan 42 (est)
5)
HQ No. 258 WIng
No. 2 (SAAF)
No.4 (SAAF) (both Curtiss Tomahawks)
No.33 (ground attack Hurricanes) and
No.250 Squadrons (Curtiss Tomahawks)
Light and heavy AA
No. 2 Armoured Car Regiment
various maintenance and supply units.
6) See above
7) Unknown
8)National Archives and CRUSADER PROJECT

[Andy H]

1) P Force Lt-Col Roger Peake
2) 4th Indian Division
3) 27/01/42
4) ?
5) 8th Royal Tank Regiment, 1Bty 7th (Medium) Regt RA, 4th South African Field Regt RA, 2 Coys Welch Regt, 2 Bty's 57th Light AA Regiment and a carrier Sqn Central India Horse
6) ?
7) The force was formed for the purpose of defending Benghazi against enemy forces which might strike across the escarpment or along the fair weather road from Barce. Also look here:-
viewtopic.php?f=114&t=170391
8.) Fourth Indian Division by Lt-Col G.R.Stevens

Regards

Andy H

[Urmel]

1) Leocol (Maj L.D.Gleeson)
2) 3/2 Punjab
3) 15/01/42
4) 20/01/42
5) D Coy 3/2 Punjab, 2 Troops 7 SA Recce Rgt, One Section 6 LAA Rgt, One Section 73 AT Rgt
6) Unavailable
7) To relieve LEATHERCOL (this was not done), and demonstrating around Gasr es Sahabi. Also maybe to act as advance part for Force E in the march on Gasr es Sahadi, but while war diary 3/2 Punjab states this, warning order to LEOCOL does not. Not in action with enemy.
8.) Indian Army Historical Branch Report on Force E

[Urmel]

1) Leathercol or Leatherdalecol (Maj V.W.S. Leatherdale 3/2 Punjab)
2) 3/2 Punjab
3) 5/01/42
4) 22/01/42
5) 2 platoons 3/2 Punjab, 1 Squadron 7 SA Recce Rgt, One Section 2 SA Fd Rgt, One Section 6 LAA Rgt, One Section 73 AT Rgt
6) Unavailable
7) To act as reserve around el Haselat. In contact with enemy on 21 Jan and withdrew east to Gasr es Sahadi. Relieved by column from 1 Sp Grp.
8.) Indian Army Historical Branch Report on Force E

[Andy H]

1) Martin Force Lt Col GNC Martin
2) 18th Field Regt RA
3) 15/05/40
4) 17/05/40(?)
5) HQ Coy 18th Field Regt RA, 94/95 Fd Bty-1Tp, Z AT/TK Bty, 4th Cheshire Regt-1Coy
6) ?
7) To defend a sector of the hinge through which the BEF was retreating near Hal till 0930hrs the next day.
8.) The Years of Retreat 1939-41 (History of the Royal Regiment if Artillery by Gen Sir Martin Farndale

Regards

Andy H