After the debacle of the Norwegian campaign the writing was on the wall for the British Army(BA). The BA only once during the war faced the main mass of the German Army when in 1940 it was swept out of Europe without providing any serious problems for the Germans.
"For two years - between the evacuation of the BEF from France and the early summer of 1942 in Africa - only four British divisions fought the Germans: 1st, 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions and 70th Division. There were independent brigades, army and corps troops, and British units in Indian formations. But apart from these the fighting in North Africa and East Africa, Greece, Crete and Syria was carried out by two Indian, three Australian, one New Zealand and two South African Divisions". (1)
In 1916 over the course of the Battle of the Somme the B.E.F. identified 95 German divisions in action. The German Panzer Armee Afrika never ammounted to more than four weak divisions plus a parachute brigade when the BA won its only unaided major land victory against the German Army. There be little doubt as to the outcome if at any time during WW2 the BA had ever faced 95 German divisions alone. Churchill rightly recoiled from mass casualties at WW1 levels and this view shared by many high ranking officers "led to a system of war which could be described as - all hostilities short of battle-a world of private armies (Popski`s, Jock Columns, SAS, Airborne Forces, Commandos, Chindits in Burma, and more besides) performing deeds of undoubted derring do, but not actual battles against the German Army" On the return to France in 1944 about a third of the German Army was engaged in co-operation with the Americans. The British element in this battle would soon be heavily outweighed by the Americans. (2)
The Americans believed the British wanted to avoid meeting the main German Army and were always looking for alternatives such as Italy or a Balkan invasion. A memorandom prepared for the U.S. Chiefs of Staff autumn of 1943 said that the British were hoping for a German collapse and that "The conclusion that the forces being built up in the United Kingdom will never be used for a military offensive against Western Europe, but are intended as a gigantic deception plan and an occupying force, is inescapable" (3)
The performance of the BA against the Japanese untill 1944 was abysmal with the majority of the forces used throughout this war being non British. General Pownall Chief of Staff to Wavell would write of the Malaya/Singapore campaign "We were frankly out generaled, outwitted and outfought..........from the beginning to the end of this campaign we have been outmatched by better soldiers". Though the war against the Japanese is always regarded as a victory for the British Empire in fact the Japanese were still in controll of their most valued conquests from the British Empire at the end. (1)
There can be no doubt that the performance of the BA for the first three years of the war was poor the phrase "brave but baffled" used by a writer comes to mind. From El Alamain onwards it certainly improved to the point when it could be described as generaly good with the bulk of the fighting now being done by British troops. One reason for Montgomeries slow methodical way of fighting never taking risks could be that he understood that the army he commanded though brave was not as professional as its opponent and he could not take chances only risking battle when he had built up a large superiority.
The post is largely drawn from the following
(1) David Fraser- And We Shall Shock Them - The British Army in the 2nd World War
(2) Article by John Terraine in World War 11 a weekly publication
(3) Max Hastings- Overlord
Brave But Baffled or Incompetent - The British Army In WW2
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Hi
Overall I would agree with your post.
For all the Allied Armies, especially the Reds, it was a fast learning curve against a "better" military. This a failing of pre-war thinkings on war in general by those that became the Allies. The preponderance of men and material were the Allies winning hand and really never became the Army that the Germans had in 1940-1 (technelogical advances should be, of course, factored in). Draft and conscription were required to keep their ground forces up to strength.
WRT the PTO, well Guadacanal was certainly not a clean US victory considering the state of the foe. The Japanese had a real 30's army in WW2 and never really got better. Considering the casualties at places like Tarawa and Iwo Jima for the return in destroying a starving desperate enemy, the US didn't do so hot either.
Finally consider the population numbers and you'll see that the British couldn't compete with the US manpower base.
regards
A
Overall I would agree with your post.
But I would also agree that the US Army (and all others) could not have fought toe to toe and won against the German Army in the first 3 years of their war either. Let us not single out the British. Kasserine and Anzio come to mind. The Poles and Canadians in Normandy.There can be no doubt that the performance of the BA for the first three years of the war was poor
For all the Allied Armies, especially the Reds, it was a fast learning curve against a "better" military. This a failing of pre-war thinkings on war in general by those that became the Allies. The preponderance of men and material were the Allies winning hand and really never became the Army that the Germans had in 1940-1 (technelogical advances should be, of course, factored in). Draft and conscription were required to keep their ground forces up to strength.
WRT the PTO, well Guadacanal was certainly not a clean US victory considering the state of the foe. The Japanese had a real 30's army in WW2 and never really got better. Considering the casualties at places like Tarawa and Iwo Jima for the return in destroying a starving desperate enemy, the US didn't do so hot either.
Finally consider the population numbers and you'll see that the British couldn't compete with the US manpower base.
regards
A
I also agree in what you have posted, but the context is rather misleading I think.
Andy H
Well given that after Dunkirk the majority of British 'Division's were home based and TA in nature, its not surprising that the numbers available for oversea's commitment were limited. Those UK Divisions were awaiting any proposed German invasion. and off course undergoing re-org's or refit's etc. The 1st Cavalry Division did see action in Syria I believe. Also 3 Divisions were in the Far East and 1 on Iceland as Occupation troops."For two years - between the evacuation of the BEF from France and the early summer of 1942 in Africa - only four British divisions fought the Germans: 1st, 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions and 70th Division. There were independent brigades, army and corps troops, and British units in Indian formations. But apart from these the fighting in North Africa and East Africa, Greece, Crete and Syria was carried out by two Indian, three Australian, one New Zealand and two South African Divisions".
And? . Though 3 were vaunted Motorised German Divisions.German Panzer Armee Afrika never ammounted to more than four weak divisions plus a parachute brigade when the BA won its only unaided major land victory against the German Army
Given that its 1943, I would presume quite rightly so. The British Army was in no shape to take on the main German Army in France, and neither were the Americans. Thankfully the British talked the Americans out of a cross channel attack in 1943. Also what is wrong for hoping that your enemy collapse's before you meet in battle. Seems a worthwhile goal, rather than any sign of inferiority complex. In fact the Germans rated the British soldier as the most stubborn & best defender's they ever met during WW2.The Americans believed the British wanted to avoid meeting the main German Army and were always looking for alternatives such as Italy or a Balkan invasion. A memorandom prepared for the U.S. Chiefs of Staff autumn of 1943 said that the British were hoping for a German collapse and that "The conclusion that the forces being built up in the United Kingdom will never be used for a military offensive against Western Europe, but are intended as a gigantic deception plan and an occupying force, is inescapable"
I would agree to a point but I would say from 1943 the tables started to turn, and the Japanese failed in there attempts to progress into India.The performance of the BA against the Japanese untill 1944 was abysmal with the majority of the forces used throughout this war being non British. General Pownall Chief of Staff to Wavell would write of the Malaya/Singapore campaign "We were frankly out generaled, outwitted and outfought..........from the beginning to the end of this campaign we have been outmatched by better soldiers". Though the war against the Japanese is always regarded as a victory for the British Empire in fact the Japanese were still in controll of their most valued conquests from the British Empire at the end
Andy H
So as we approach the 60th anniversary of VE-Day, someone takes the time and trouble to piece together a critique of the British Army at war from three authors that seems to suppose 'you Tommies didn't do much did you, when you think about it?'
As someone who does truly believe in constructive dialogue rather than mud slinging arguments that belong in the primary school playground, I'll supress my urge to respond in the manner of the latter. The two responses already posted point out the flaws in the argument. In the late 1930s, the British Army was by no means top of the political agenda. The Royal Navy was still seen as the senior service, the Royal Air Force was beginning to gain in status as some more far sighted people realised the growing importance of air power, leaving the Army at a disadvantage in terms of funding, research and development. It's no secret that the government of the day regarded the French Army as the key to containing any Nazi expansionism in Western Europe. In their mind the British Army would provide a strong contingent to fight alongside the French, rather than mobilising a massive Great War style 'new army' with scores of divisions. That decision would have far reaching effects for the British Army over the first half of the Second World War.
Both the RN and RAF had major manpower requirements, the former for the Atlantic war, the latter for the air war, initially in British airspace, before heading back over the Channel. There was also the need to secure key interests, such as the Suez Canal in Egypt and the threat of Japanese agression in the Far East. And there was also the minor matter of defending the south coast against possible German attack (the veracity of which did certainly diminish as time went on, but you still don't leave your doors unlocked because no one's been burgled in your street for a few months).
There was certainly no shortage of military incompetence on any side during WW2. The fact that the Germans were still able to stun different nations with Blitzkreig well into 1941, over two years since its debut, is evidence of that. The Red Army continually lost hundreds of thousands of men in huge encirclement battles in the early stages of the war on the Eastern Front. The US Army, some of who's senior members who were derisory of British involvement, found calls for the immediate invasion of France in 1942 somewhat tempered by actual experience in North Africa. There's even a nasty rumour that the German Army made a few mistakes of its own (OK, one childish dig, sorry).
Right, I'll wrap up now, just couldn't let this one go. Bottom line, the British Army made mistakes throughout the war, on both the strategic and tactical levels. So did every bugger else that fought. War is as much about mistakes as it is about successes, you just hope that in the end you have more of these. If you put a list of the battles the British fought in, it lost quite a few, I'd suggest they won rather more though. The British Army always fought as part of an allied effort, be it with the French in 1940, the Americans in 1942-45, or the Commonwealth nations and free European troops throughout the war, just has always been the case (Great War, Penninsula war, the Hundred Days, and so on). It got the job done, some times despite, not because of, the directions of its senior leaders, both military and political. It didn't win the war on its own, but my God I'm bloody pleased it did it's bit.
As someone who does truly believe in constructive dialogue rather than mud slinging arguments that belong in the primary school playground, I'll supress my urge to respond in the manner of the latter. The two responses already posted point out the flaws in the argument. In the late 1930s, the British Army was by no means top of the political agenda. The Royal Navy was still seen as the senior service, the Royal Air Force was beginning to gain in status as some more far sighted people realised the growing importance of air power, leaving the Army at a disadvantage in terms of funding, research and development. It's no secret that the government of the day regarded the French Army as the key to containing any Nazi expansionism in Western Europe. In their mind the British Army would provide a strong contingent to fight alongside the French, rather than mobilising a massive Great War style 'new army' with scores of divisions. That decision would have far reaching effects for the British Army over the first half of the Second World War.
Both the RN and RAF had major manpower requirements, the former for the Atlantic war, the latter for the air war, initially in British airspace, before heading back over the Channel. There was also the need to secure key interests, such as the Suez Canal in Egypt and the threat of Japanese agression in the Far East. And there was also the minor matter of defending the south coast against possible German attack (the veracity of which did certainly diminish as time went on, but you still don't leave your doors unlocked because no one's been burgled in your street for a few months).
There was certainly no shortage of military incompetence on any side during WW2. The fact that the Germans were still able to stun different nations with Blitzkreig well into 1941, over two years since its debut, is evidence of that. The Red Army continually lost hundreds of thousands of men in huge encirclement battles in the early stages of the war on the Eastern Front. The US Army, some of who's senior members who were derisory of British involvement, found calls for the immediate invasion of France in 1942 somewhat tempered by actual experience in North Africa. There's even a nasty rumour that the German Army made a few mistakes of its own (OK, one childish dig, sorry).
Right, I'll wrap up now, just couldn't let this one go. Bottom line, the British Army made mistakes throughout the war, on both the strategic and tactical levels. So did every bugger else that fought. War is as much about mistakes as it is about successes, you just hope that in the end you have more of these. If you put a list of the battles the British fought in, it lost quite a few, I'd suggest they won rather more though. The British Army always fought as part of an allied effort, be it with the French in 1940, the Americans in 1942-45, or the Commonwealth nations and free European troops throughout the war, just has always been the case (Great War, Penninsula war, the Hundred Days, and so on). It got the job done, some times despite, not because of, the directions of its senior leaders, both military and political. It didn't win the war on its own, but my God I'm bloody pleased it did it's bit.
All armies in WW2 went through a learning process but in the British Army (BA) this seems to have taken longer. Two years after the Americans entered combat against the Germans they were beating them in the battle of the Bulge two years after the BA first engaged in major combat operations in May 1940 they were hammered by an inferior force in North Africa. Part of the problem with the BA was its training and officer selection, training was improved slowly and there was a major change in officer selection in mid 42?. A remark made during the Parlimentary debate on the fall of Tobruk? that Rommel if he had been in the BA would have been a sergeant has a grain of truth.
The number of BA divisions available for overseas commitment was indeed small after 1940 suprisingly small. The British probably knew in late 1940 or early 41 through Ultra about the redeployment of the german army to the east so there was no reason for very large forces to stay in the UK. There was certainly a re-equipment problem and Alanbrooke would write in his diary that it was only in the autumn of 41 that new technical equipment would start to flow from the factories. Even making allowances for training and re-equipment is is odd that the dominions prior to summer 1942 were probably making a bigger commitment of fighting forces than the mother country.
The Americans were correct in their argument that the quickest way to end the war was to engage the mass of the German army and defeat it. If the Americans had listened to the British they would probably have been bogged down in a Balkan side show like Italy but this time with a backward Turkish army that needed complete re-equipment. There is a definite reluctance on the part of the British to engage large German forces. When Alanbrooke was asked directly about British commitment to Overlord he replied "Yes if the enemy were engaged continuously on other fronts" meaning the Germans would never be able to concentrate against the Anglo American forces, a very sensible man.
I agree the BA did not mean to fight a repeat of the 1st world war and was hoping that it "would provide a strong contingent to fight alongside the French" did they explain this to the French though?. The Germans certainly made mistakes but they did not make so many when it came to the training both of men and officers and in particular NCOs and junior officers. It is also extremely difficult to believe that a German force would have persevered with the type of tactics the British armoured formations continuously used with no success in North Africa prior to Monty taking charge which can be summed up as coming on in the same old way and being shot to pieces in the same old way.
The number of BA divisions available for overseas commitment was indeed small after 1940 suprisingly small. The British probably knew in late 1940 or early 41 through Ultra about the redeployment of the german army to the east so there was no reason for very large forces to stay in the UK. There was certainly a re-equipment problem and Alanbrooke would write in his diary that it was only in the autumn of 41 that new technical equipment would start to flow from the factories. Even making allowances for training and re-equipment is is odd that the dominions prior to summer 1942 were probably making a bigger commitment of fighting forces than the mother country.
The Americans were correct in their argument that the quickest way to end the war was to engage the mass of the German army and defeat it. If the Americans had listened to the British they would probably have been bogged down in a Balkan side show like Italy but this time with a backward Turkish army that needed complete re-equipment. There is a definite reluctance on the part of the British to engage large German forces. When Alanbrooke was asked directly about British commitment to Overlord he replied "Yes if the enemy were engaged continuously on other fronts" meaning the Germans would never be able to concentrate against the Anglo American forces, a very sensible man.
I agree the BA did not mean to fight a repeat of the 1st world war and was hoping that it "would provide a strong contingent to fight alongside the French" did they explain this to the French though?. The Germans certainly made mistakes but they did not make so many when it came to the training both of men and officers and in particular NCOs and junior officers. It is also extremely difficult to believe that a German force would have persevered with the type of tactics the British armoured formations continuously used with no success in North Africa prior to Monty taking charge which can be summed up as coming on in the same old way and being shot to pieces in the same old way.
The Americans did win the finally at the 'Battle of the Bulge', just like the British did in Africa.but in the British Army (BA) this seems to have taken longer. Two years after the Americans entered combat against the Germans they were beating them in the battle of the Bulge two years after the BA first engaged in major combat operations in May 1940 they were hammered by an inferior force in North Africa.
The Americans were defeated in several smaller battles within the whole BOTB, just like the Germans were prior to El Alamien
Also you need to take into account that the Americans learn't from our mistakes before they came involved and still with all that knowledge and training they were 'defeated or beaten'
Well maybe in terms of actual land fighting units in contact with the enemy, but the manpower tied up within the RN & RAF far outnumbered any Commonwealth country's combined. You can only slice a pie so many ways.Even making allowances for training and re-equipment is is odd that the dominions prior to summer 1942 were probably making a bigger commitment of fighting forces than the mother country.
The Italian sideshow was a prime requirement within the ABC1 Conference in which the US agreed that knocking Italy out of the Axis would weaken the Axis posistion, which it did.If the Americans had listened to the British they would probably have been bogged down in a Balkan side show like Italy
Also if the British had listened to the Americans in 1943, then there's a very good chance that the 2nd front would have been pushed into the sea.
There is a definite reluctance on the part of the British to engage large German forces. When Alanbrooke was asked directly about British commitment to Overlord he replied "Yes if the enemy were engaged continuously on other fronts" meaning the Germans would never be able to concentrate against the Anglo American forces, a very sensible man.
Again that sounds like common sense. The US Army also couldn't beat the German Army by itself. It needed Russia and the British/Commonwealth forces etc. Britain had limited resources which it had to use to its best advantage.
So the British never beat the Germans till Monty arrivedIt is also extremely difficult to believe that a German force would have persevered with the type of tactics the British armoured formations continuously used with no success in North Africa prior to Monty
Example's pleaseThe Germans certainly made mistakes but they did not make so many when it came to the training both of men and officers and in particular NCOs and junior officers
Regards
Andy H
Few quick thoughts.
Firstly, re the number of British Divisions deployed overseas, you have to take into account the availability of shipping. The US army had grand designs to raise close on 200 Divisions, but for a variety of reasons stripped this back to just 89. One of those reasons was the problem in moving such numbers of men and material across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Indeed they ended up reducing the strength and transport of the formations they did raise to ease shipping problems. Those same obstacles existed for British formations into 1942 when the U-boats were playing havoc with allied merchantmen. By the end of the war some 5 Armd, 15 Inf and 2 Abn Divs had seen active service in Europe between mid 1943 and VE-Day, a total of 22, not too bad when compared to the 67 (IIRC) US Divs in the same theatre in the same period, considering the greater US manpower resources available.
Secondly, the French Army felt they were perfectly capable of defending France without the need for vast numbers of British troops to aid them. That they were unable to do so was due to unrealistic expectations of the Maginot Line and there own problems with lack of investment in the armed forces in the previous decades.
I also think you're under estimating the qualities of many Subalterns and NCOs on the British side. I wouldn't argue too harshly the merits of senior British commanders, but in my humble opinion the failings of certain of these were in stark contrast to the resourcefulness of the men they lead. That is the tragic irony.
I don't think there is any basis for the seeming suggestion that the British were looking to avoid full scale contact with the Germans. I would suggest the matter was that those senior officers who had lived through May 1940 and had actually learned from it determined that when they did go back, they should not have to fight under resourced and over stretched again.
Firstly, re the number of British Divisions deployed overseas, you have to take into account the availability of shipping. The US army had grand designs to raise close on 200 Divisions, but for a variety of reasons stripped this back to just 89. One of those reasons was the problem in moving such numbers of men and material across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Indeed they ended up reducing the strength and transport of the formations they did raise to ease shipping problems. Those same obstacles existed for British formations into 1942 when the U-boats were playing havoc with allied merchantmen. By the end of the war some 5 Armd, 15 Inf and 2 Abn Divs had seen active service in Europe between mid 1943 and VE-Day, a total of 22, not too bad when compared to the 67 (IIRC) US Divs in the same theatre in the same period, considering the greater US manpower resources available.
Secondly, the French Army felt they were perfectly capable of defending France without the need for vast numbers of British troops to aid them. That they were unable to do so was due to unrealistic expectations of the Maginot Line and there own problems with lack of investment in the armed forces in the previous decades.
I also think you're under estimating the qualities of many Subalterns and NCOs on the British side. I wouldn't argue too harshly the merits of senior British commanders, but in my humble opinion the failings of certain of these were in stark contrast to the resourcefulness of the men they lead. That is the tragic irony.
I don't think there is any basis for the seeming suggestion that the British were looking to avoid full scale contact with the Germans. I would suggest the matter was that those senior officers who had lived through May 1940 and had actually learned from it determined that when they did go back, they should not have to fight under resourced and over stretched again.
Hi,
Interesting to read. Many viewpoints have been expressed with good posts.
One thing: It is practical impossibily of people from any other country to make even this long thread about such issue without going to personalities and insults.
I raise my hat to all participants. There must be something about drinking water where you live... OK - one commentator from Empire, but that does not change the fact...
Regards, Mark V
Interesting to read. Many viewpoints have been expressed with good posts.
One thing: It is practical impossibily of people from any other country to make even this long thread about such issue without going to personalities and insults.
I raise my hat to all participants. There must be something about drinking water where you live... OK - one commentator from Empire, but that does not change the fact...
Regards, Mark V
First of all I should say and have said that I regard the manpower of the British Army as in no way inferior to any other countries. The problem as I see it is the organisation they entered into which I consider to have been deeply flawed and though some of these flaws were remedied others would become masked by the enormous superiority the Allies would enjoy in the later years.
I would have thought the superiority of German tactics and their NCOs and junior officers over the Allies was self evident for how else can you explain the performance of the German army from early 43 when faced with Western Allied air superiority, manpower superiority and huge material superiority.
It would seem the British army had an officer to men ratio of around 14 to 1 giving an officer ratio of about 7% with a troop or platoon of men usually commanded by an officer (1). Interestingly the USA army also had an officer to man ratio of 7% (2). Officers in the German army made up about 3% of the total (2). From this it can be seen that the Germans must have had a higher percentage of NCOs than the western Allies and these would lead larger units than allied NCOs. "German leadership at corps level and above was often little better than that of the Allies, and sometimes markedly worse. But at regimental level and below it was superb............ and of NCOs capable of directing the defence of an entire sector of the front ". The German Army laid particular emphasis on NCO leadership (2).
Eventualy even the B/A would recognise that there was something wrong with its officers
and though probably second only to the Japanese army in its conservatism decided to do something about it. "The philosophy of the German army ..... was scrutinised. The Germans were known to subject candidates not simply to interview but to several days of personality tests, whereby their behaviour, their initiative, their power of communicating with and inspiring others, their speed of perception, as well as their courage and intelligence, were all rigorously assesed. The Germans were also known to make extensive use of psychology and of trained psychologists in their selection process. Thus early in 1942 the War Office, with much the same philosophy, set up an experimental board on similar lines, with two more following by mid-summer. Carefull steps were taken to monitor there product. The reports were entirely favourable". (1)
The general philosophy behind this metod would become standard in officer recruitment.
The slowness of the B/A to change tactics even after four years of war can be seen in Normandy where infantry battalions would advance in straightforward open order, two companies forward. The Germans would be astonished by these tactics as their own tactics had moved on a long way. That these tactics were being employed as late as 44 shows something radically wrong both in doctrine and junior leader training. It was said that every German soldier carried in his knapsack a Field Marshalls baton (or something like that) which illustrates the emphasis the Germans placed on initiative rather than blind obediance. The B/As lack of professionalism especialy in the early years and resistance to change may have stemmed from the class ridden society of pre war Britain.
View of Adolf Hitler on the B/A written to Mussolini on the 25th May 1940.
"The British soldier has retained the characteristics which he had in WW1. Very brave and tenacious in defence, unskilful in attack, wretchedly commanded. Weapons and equipment are of the highest order, but the overall organisation is bad". Not a lot would change in the next five years.
I rest my case.
(1) And We Shall Shock Them - David Fraser
(2) Overlord - Max Hastings
I would have thought the superiority of German tactics and their NCOs and junior officers over the Allies was self evident for how else can you explain the performance of the German army from early 43 when faced with Western Allied air superiority, manpower superiority and huge material superiority.
It would seem the British army had an officer to men ratio of around 14 to 1 giving an officer ratio of about 7% with a troop or platoon of men usually commanded by an officer (1). Interestingly the USA army also had an officer to man ratio of 7% (2). Officers in the German army made up about 3% of the total (2). From this it can be seen that the Germans must have had a higher percentage of NCOs than the western Allies and these would lead larger units than allied NCOs. "German leadership at corps level and above was often little better than that of the Allies, and sometimes markedly worse. But at regimental level and below it was superb............ and of NCOs capable of directing the defence of an entire sector of the front ". The German Army laid particular emphasis on NCO leadership (2).
Eventualy even the B/A would recognise that there was something wrong with its officers
and though probably second only to the Japanese army in its conservatism decided to do something about it. "The philosophy of the German army ..... was scrutinised. The Germans were known to subject candidates not simply to interview but to several days of personality tests, whereby their behaviour, their initiative, their power of communicating with and inspiring others, their speed of perception, as well as their courage and intelligence, were all rigorously assesed. The Germans were also known to make extensive use of psychology and of trained psychologists in their selection process. Thus early in 1942 the War Office, with much the same philosophy, set up an experimental board on similar lines, with two more following by mid-summer. Carefull steps were taken to monitor there product. The reports were entirely favourable". (1)
The general philosophy behind this metod would become standard in officer recruitment.
The slowness of the B/A to change tactics even after four years of war can be seen in Normandy where infantry battalions would advance in straightforward open order, two companies forward. The Germans would be astonished by these tactics as their own tactics had moved on a long way. That these tactics were being employed as late as 44 shows something radically wrong both in doctrine and junior leader training. It was said that every German soldier carried in his knapsack a Field Marshalls baton (or something like that) which illustrates the emphasis the Germans placed on initiative rather than blind obediance. The B/As lack of professionalism especialy in the early years and resistance to change may have stemmed from the class ridden society of pre war Britain.
View of Adolf Hitler on the B/A written to Mussolini on the 25th May 1940.
"The British soldier has retained the characteristics which he had in WW1. Very brave and tenacious in defence, unskilful in attack, wretchedly commanded. Weapons and equipment are of the highest order, but the overall organisation is bad". Not a lot would change in the next five years.
I rest my case.
(1) And We Shall Shock Them - David Fraser
(2) Overlord - Max Hastings
I wouldn't put your case down juat yet, though the legal terminology is quite apt considering the adversarial manner in which you've approached the argument.
On the matter of German NCOs being of such extreme calibre that they were able to lead units reserved for officers in allied armies. At th beginning of the war, all three platoons in German rifle companies were lead by officers. This remained the case well into 1941. At the outset of war there existed in the British Army the rank of Warrant Officer III, or Platoon Sergeant Major. Two of the three platoons in British rifle companies were lead by WOIIIs, the other by a Subaltern. Post Dunkirk it was decided that all platoons should be commanded by officers, with many existing WOIIIs simply being commissioned accordingly. Probably beginning 1942 (probably earlier, but I'm sure others would know more precisely) the German Army adopted a system akin to that used by the British, in that two platoons would now be commanded by a senior NCO of the Oberfeldwebel or Stabsfeldwebel rank, roughly equivalent to the Warrant Officer of British and American use. One of the motivations for this was the need to fill out ever more divisions and replace the dreadful losses of the Eastern Front. It was not necessarily an indication that German NCOs were so appreciably better than there allied counterparts that they could lead platoons on their own, but more an admission that there were ever fewer men of junior officer material to recruit and train.
The two company up tactic you mention was common to both British and US forces. One company was the main effort unit, the other intended to act as a diversion to prevent the enemy from concentrating all their fire at the point of attack. It did prove unworkable in Normandy and was dropped by both armies in favour of a single company front with a large degree of firepower to support it.
The German's ability to resist the allies in the west and the Red Army steamroller in the east is certainly an enigma in many respects. I do wish I had the time and resources to explore it more fully and professionally. There are though a few points that can be made. Most importantly, the assertion that the Germans were continuing to operate at superior level than the allied powers into late 1943, early 1944 is shaky at best. The Germans were in continual retreat on all fronts throughout 1944, the allies in equally continual advance. To suggest that the allies were still somehow inferior flies not only in the face of logic but physics as well. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction; in this case the opposite reaction was the German Army giving ground, not the allies.
I have no problem in saying that the Wehrmacht was a formidable, effective fighting force for much of the war, if it hadn't been we wouldn't be having this conversation now. Equally, if it had been as all conquering as is sometimes suggested by post-war authors, we still wouldn't be having this conversation because they would have won. They didn't. Why? Lots of reasons, many due to mistakes they made. They invaded Russia in mid summer without having planned for combat in winter, just a few months away, assuming that they would be in Moscow before autumn. Wrong, and their men paid a high price for it. They ceased R&D work into new weapons and equipment and sent a good number of their researchers off to fight in the East as early as 1942. Bad choice that cost them dearly in the arms race. They lost 600,000 men at Stalingrad. Irreplaceable. They shunned the simple expedient of mass producing the T34 from captured models, or at least a reasonable facsimilie, for months of design work on the Panther, which was so god awful at Kursk it could well have had a British engine in it. By the time it was sorted the allies had been able to produce so many tanks of lesser ability that the relatively few Panthers in service were never going to able to turn the tide. So next they designed even bigger tanks, which they made fewer of and used vastly more fuel that they could scarcely afford to waste. I'm still looking for the genius in these decisions.
When the German Army went to war in 1939-41 they combined good tactics and equipment with a large degree of smoke and mirrors to continually keep their opponents physcologically off balance. It was not a feat they wer ever able to accomplish again during the latter part of the war. Few of the nations they invaded even knew they were at war until the Luftwaffe appeared overhead, and had little time to mobilise before the Panzers were deep into their territory. There was a high degree of risk in every Blitzkrieg attack, because large numbers of enemy troops were by-passed by the armoured spearhead to be dealt with by the following 'landser' infantry. If these troops could rally they had the potential to disrupt German plans as was shown at Arras. Because each German invasion was launched from a secure land route, the following infantry had secure lines of communication and were able to contain the encircled forces. The flaws in the tactic began to appear in the east as these lines became extended and vulnerable to attack. The supply system also began to suffer, another basic tenant of military practice that began to unravel in the German Army as the war progressed.
The old chesnut of the allies have more men and material than the Germans is one that, quite frankly, brings a wry smile to my face these days. Of course they bloody did, that was the plan! Why is it a bad idea to have more men, more tanks, more guns than your enemy before you attack? Three to one superiority is the generally accepted basic for a successful attack to be launched against an entrenched, pre warned defender. War is not a game. You do not give the enemy a sporting chance. You take every precaution possible to ensure victory, you hit them as hard as you can, as fast as you can and kill as many of them as you can as swiftly as you can. The German did not outnumber the French and Russian armies they engaged in a straightforward bean count. They did though ensure they struck at the weakest part of the enemy line with as much force as possible to guarantee local superiority. So why berate the allies for doing the same? Unlike the Germans, the western allies had to force a landing on a hostile coast in Siciliy, Italy and Normandy. The Germans knew they were coming, the only question was when and precisely where. At Caen one figure gives 21 Army Group 150,000 men and 1350 tanks, 7th Army 100,000 men and 670 tanks. That gives roughly a 1.5 to 1 personnel and 2 to 1 tank advantage to the British/Canadian troops, markedly below the 3 to 1 mentioned above. They still won though, and inflicted severe casualties on the Germans they could not replace.
Right my tea is nearly ready, so the argument now passes back to you as to why the British Army was inferior to the foe it bested.
On the matter of German NCOs being of such extreme calibre that they were able to lead units reserved for officers in allied armies. At th beginning of the war, all three platoons in German rifle companies were lead by officers. This remained the case well into 1941. At the outset of war there existed in the British Army the rank of Warrant Officer III, or Platoon Sergeant Major. Two of the three platoons in British rifle companies were lead by WOIIIs, the other by a Subaltern. Post Dunkirk it was decided that all platoons should be commanded by officers, with many existing WOIIIs simply being commissioned accordingly. Probably beginning 1942 (probably earlier, but I'm sure others would know more precisely) the German Army adopted a system akin to that used by the British, in that two platoons would now be commanded by a senior NCO of the Oberfeldwebel or Stabsfeldwebel rank, roughly equivalent to the Warrant Officer of British and American use. One of the motivations for this was the need to fill out ever more divisions and replace the dreadful losses of the Eastern Front. It was not necessarily an indication that German NCOs were so appreciably better than there allied counterparts that they could lead platoons on their own, but more an admission that there were ever fewer men of junior officer material to recruit and train.
The two company up tactic you mention was common to both British and US forces. One company was the main effort unit, the other intended to act as a diversion to prevent the enemy from concentrating all their fire at the point of attack. It did prove unworkable in Normandy and was dropped by both armies in favour of a single company front with a large degree of firepower to support it.
The German's ability to resist the allies in the west and the Red Army steamroller in the east is certainly an enigma in many respects. I do wish I had the time and resources to explore it more fully and professionally. There are though a few points that can be made. Most importantly, the assertion that the Germans were continuing to operate at superior level than the allied powers into late 1943, early 1944 is shaky at best. The Germans were in continual retreat on all fronts throughout 1944, the allies in equally continual advance. To suggest that the allies were still somehow inferior flies not only in the face of logic but physics as well. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction; in this case the opposite reaction was the German Army giving ground, not the allies.
I have no problem in saying that the Wehrmacht was a formidable, effective fighting force for much of the war, if it hadn't been we wouldn't be having this conversation now. Equally, if it had been as all conquering as is sometimes suggested by post-war authors, we still wouldn't be having this conversation because they would have won. They didn't. Why? Lots of reasons, many due to mistakes they made. They invaded Russia in mid summer without having planned for combat in winter, just a few months away, assuming that they would be in Moscow before autumn. Wrong, and their men paid a high price for it. They ceased R&D work into new weapons and equipment and sent a good number of their researchers off to fight in the East as early as 1942. Bad choice that cost them dearly in the arms race. They lost 600,000 men at Stalingrad. Irreplaceable. They shunned the simple expedient of mass producing the T34 from captured models, or at least a reasonable facsimilie, for months of design work on the Panther, which was so god awful at Kursk it could well have had a British engine in it. By the time it was sorted the allies had been able to produce so many tanks of lesser ability that the relatively few Panthers in service were never going to able to turn the tide. So next they designed even bigger tanks, which they made fewer of and used vastly more fuel that they could scarcely afford to waste. I'm still looking for the genius in these decisions.
When the German Army went to war in 1939-41 they combined good tactics and equipment with a large degree of smoke and mirrors to continually keep their opponents physcologically off balance. It was not a feat they wer ever able to accomplish again during the latter part of the war. Few of the nations they invaded even knew they were at war until the Luftwaffe appeared overhead, and had little time to mobilise before the Panzers were deep into their territory. There was a high degree of risk in every Blitzkrieg attack, because large numbers of enemy troops were by-passed by the armoured spearhead to be dealt with by the following 'landser' infantry. If these troops could rally they had the potential to disrupt German plans as was shown at Arras. Because each German invasion was launched from a secure land route, the following infantry had secure lines of communication and were able to contain the encircled forces. The flaws in the tactic began to appear in the east as these lines became extended and vulnerable to attack. The supply system also began to suffer, another basic tenant of military practice that began to unravel in the German Army as the war progressed.
The old chesnut of the allies have more men and material than the Germans is one that, quite frankly, brings a wry smile to my face these days. Of course they bloody did, that was the plan! Why is it a bad idea to have more men, more tanks, more guns than your enemy before you attack? Three to one superiority is the generally accepted basic for a successful attack to be launched against an entrenched, pre warned defender. War is not a game. You do not give the enemy a sporting chance. You take every precaution possible to ensure victory, you hit them as hard as you can, as fast as you can and kill as many of them as you can as swiftly as you can. The German did not outnumber the French and Russian armies they engaged in a straightforward bean count. They did though ensure they struck at the weakest part of the enemy line with as much force as possible to guarantee local superiority. So why berate the allies for doing the same? Unlike the Germans, the western allies had to force a landing on a hostile coast in Siciliy, Italy and Normandy. The Germans knew they were coming, the only question was when and precisely where. At Caen one figure gives 21 Army Group 150,000 men and 1350 tanks, 7th Army 100,000 men and 670 tanks. That gives roughly a 1.5 to 1 personnel and 2 to 1 tank advantage to the British/Canadian troops, markedly below the 3 to 1 mentioned above. They still won though, and inflicted severe casualties on the Germans they could not replace.
Right my tea is nearly ready, so the argument now passes back to you as to why the British Army was inferior to the foe it bested.
When comparing the performance of the German army in the west and its western opponents we are talking about a very small proportion of the army in 1941 rising to aproximately a third in 1944. I would contend that when all things were roughly equel the Germans would usualy beat their western opponents and even when outnumbered put up an excellent performance though as the war neared its end its performance declined.
An example of this is the Greek Island of Leros in November 43 against the British when both sides had aprox. equel numbers.
Sicily is an example of the speed at which the Germans could move compared to the Allies. Three German divisions faced twelve allied ones (from memory) and even though it became clear the Germans were going to stage a mini Dunkirk and Alexander wrote to his air and naval commanders on August 3rd"....... by using full weight of navy and air power. You have no doubt coordinated plans to meet this emergency" the Germans still with no serious molestation evacuated the Island between 11 and 17 August.
The 20 month German retreat in Italy against a superior foe has to be counted an exceptional defensive campaign. It is highly likely a greater proportion of the allied strength was tied up in this campaign than the German. Kesselring would write"......the front collapsed with heavy losses (1945). That was not in itself a disaster, however, in so far as the campaign had helped the general war situation, as the following positive factors show: The Italian theatre pinned down Allied forces which, if they had been engaged on decisive fronts, might have powerfully influenced events in the east or in the west adversely for Germany.........will be seen as the maximum obtainable result by any objective student of history" was he wrong?.
"Goodwood" in July before Caen is a good example of how the British army was able at this late stage in the war to mask its inadequacies with material superiority. When General Roberts of 11th armoured division realised that the armour and infantry had been given different objectives he put his feelings into writing and got nowhere. They then tried to push at least 10,000 vehicles over six narrow bridges and through minefields some of which had been laid by British troops. The loss of some 270 tanks at this stage of the war meant nothing and they were replaced in 36 hours.
A German report from Italy at this time is very interesting "The conduct of the battle by the Americans and English was, taken all round, very methodical. Local successes were seldom exploited....British attacking formations were split up into large numbers of assault squads commanded by officers. NCOs were rarely in the "big picture", so that if the officer became a casualty they were unable to act in accordance with the main plan. The result was that in a quickly changing situation the junior commanders showed insufficient flexibility. For instance, when an objective was reached, the enemy would neglect to exploit and dig in for defence. The conclusion is: as far as possible go for the enemy officers. Then seize the initiative yourself" From Overlord by Max Hastings page 177
I should add in case anyone has formed the opinion that my hobby could be watching films of panzers sweeping over Russian steppes with German martial music as a background that I am in fact a great fan of the Red Army.
An example of this is the Greek Island of Leros in November 43 against the British when both sides had aprox. equel numbers.
Sicily is an example of the speed at which the Germans could move compared to the Allies. Three German divisions faced twelve allied ones (from memory) and even though it became clear the Germans were going to stage a mini Dunkirk and Alexander wrote to his air and naval commanders on August 3rd"....... by using full weight of navy and air power. You have no doubt coordinated plans to meet this emergency" the Germans still with no serious molestation evacuated the Island between 11 and 17 August.
The 20 month German retreat in Italy against a superior foe has to be counted an exceptional defensive campaign. It is highly likely a greater proportion of the allied strength was tied up in this campaign than the German. Kesselring would write"......the front collapsed with heavy losses (1945). That was not in itself a disaster, however, in so far as the campaign had helped the general war situation, as the following positive factors show: The Italian theatre pinned down Allied forces which, if they had been engaged on decisive fronts, might have powerfully influenced events in the east or in the west adversely for Germany.........will be seen as the maximum obtainable result by any objective student of history" was he wrong?.
"Goodwood" in July before Caen is a good example of how the British army was able at this late stage in the war to mask its inadequacies with material superiority. When General Roberts of 11th armoured division realised that the armour and infantry had been given different objectives he put his feelings into writing and got nowhere. They then tried to push at least 10,000 vehicles over six narrow bridges and through minefields some of which had been laid by British troops. The loss of some 270 tanks at this stage of the war meant nothing and they were replaced in 36 hours.
A German report from Italy at this time is very interesting "The conduct of the battle by the Americans and English was, taken all round, very methodical. Local successes were seldom exploited....British attacking formations were split up into large numbers of assault squads commanded by officers. NCOs were rarely in the "big picture", so that if the officer became a casualty they were unable to act in accordance with the main plan. The result was that in a quickly changing situation the junior commanders showed insufficient flexibility. For instance, when an objective was reached, the enemy would neglect to exploit and dig in for defence. The conclusion is: as far as possible go for the enemy officers. Then seize the initiative yourself" From Overlord by Max Hastings page 177
I should add in case anyone has formed the opinion that my hobby could be watching films of panzers sweeping over Russian steppes with German martial music as a background that I am in fact a great fan of the Red Army.
Can you provide a source for that? From what I have read in discussions over time that is actually not correct over the whole time frame, and once north of Rome the Allied numerical superiority was no longer there, so that in fact the Italian theatre turned out to tie up more Germans than Allies.Steve wrote:The 20 month German retreat in Italy against a superior foe has to be counted an exceptional defensive campaign. It is highly likely a greater proportion of the allied strength was tied up in this campaign than the German.
Okay, just checked on the National Army Museum website: http://www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/p ... Italy.html
According to this the Germans had higher battle casualties in Italy than the allies, and employed more divisions there - both of these are clearly not very good indicators, since it does not tell us anything on actual strength employed, and it is not certain if the battle casualties include the POW made after surrender, from what I can tell.
Anyway, it is a bit more of an indicator than 'it is highly likely'. Judging from these figures, I'd say it is highly likely that the Germans lost more by holding on to Italy than they gained in terms of tieing down the British and Americans. Whether the British and Americans could have actually used more divisions in the west, given their supply constraints, is another question. After these eased in late 1944, units were transferred to build the 1st Canadian Army, IIRC, in early 1945.
Strategically, Italy also provided units to rapidly intervene in Greece when the Germans withdrew. The country may otherwise have become part of the Communist block like all other South-East European countries involved in the war, I believe.
According to this the Germans had higher battle casualties in Italy than the allies, and employed more divisions there - both of these are clearly not very good indicators, since it does not tell us anything on actual strength employed, and it is not certain if the battle casualties include the POW made after surrender, from what I can tell.
Anyway, it is a bit more of an indicator than 'it is highly likely'. Judging from these figures, I'd say it is highly likely that the Germans lost more by holding on to Italy than they gained in terms of tieing down the British and Americans. Whether the British and Americans could have actually used more divisions in the west, given their supply constraints, is another question. After these eased in late 1944, units were transferred to build the 1st Canadian Army, IIRC, in early 1945.
Strategically, Italy also provided units to rapidly intervene in Greece when the Germans withdrew. The country may otherwise have become part of the Communist block like all other South-East European countries involved in the war, I believe.
It is this dismissive attitude to the actions of allied soldiers that does tend to lead the red mist to descend in most forum debate, and is something I have become prone to myself. However, there are still real points to be made so I shall attempt to make them.
Firstly, if the debate is to focus specifically on the contest between the western allied forces and the Germans in Europe between 1943-45, certain factors have to be tken into account, one of which is terrain. The German defence in Italy is cited as a particularly masterful exercise, to which I would contend that given the nature of the country they occupied it would have been hard for a professional army not to put up a 'good show'. On mainland Italy the Germans used a series of well prepared, deep defensive lines, anchored on terrain that favoured the defender and disadvantaged the attacker. In Normandy, the countryside beyond the beacheads was claustrophobic and impeded unopposed movement, let alone under fire.
In both cases I would argue the Germans had the advantage of defending terrain that was in several key respects tailor made for them. Yet in both cases they proved incapable of defending these lines indefinitely. The allied soldiers they faced had excellent supplies of material, but the flesh and blood resources to use them were not endless. The casualties suffered in several key battles took time to replace, while in the interim the survivors still had to do the same job as before with less men, something for which they seem to be berated not congratulated. Until the Ardennes offensive of Dec 1944 there were no major retreats by any allied troops in either Italy or the West. Even then the Ardennes sector was stablised and turned quickly into a significant defeat of the last vestiges of major German combat power in the sector. So again I ask, how does this make the averge German soldier of the day markedly superior to the average British, US, Canadian, Indian, Australian, New Zealand, South African or free European soldier who faced him?
Let me also again try to explore the German defensive reputation. From 1943 to 1945 the Germans were able to base their defences on well prepared lines. They enjoyed good equipment, such as the MG34 and MG42 machine guns, the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck infantry anti-tank weapons, the 7.5 cm and 8.8 cm Pak and Flak guns, 8 cm mortars, Nebelwerfers and traditional barrelled artilliery pieces. They were not short in respects of the numbers of these weapons in any appreciable sense. I would argue that defending a line against an attacking enemy, when you have had often ample time to prepare, identify likely forming up points, zero in pre-arranged artillery fire, site anti-tank guns in well concealed positions and have well defined MG zones, plus have terrain advantages, is not in itself a position that would give most commanders cause for concern. By the same argument overcoming well entrenched, forewarned defenders while fighting uphill in Italy or hacking through the Norman Bocage is hardly a cake walk. Again I have to ask, why should the victors in both these encounters be viewed as lesser soldiers?
The lack of truly significant counterattacks by the Germans throughout the period in the west is also a factor. Those conducted in Normandy failed. The Ardennes failed. The one which perhaps came the closest was against the Anzio beachead. It failed. Why then are the allied defenders, who in several of these cases had no choice but to dig in where they stood and fight for their lives not be viewed on a par with their German adversaries? The one major defeat for the allies in 1944 was of course the tradgedy at Arnhem. Again I would argue that the blame resides largely with senior staff officers, not the ground troops. It took several SS Panzer Divs some 8 days(?) to finally reduce a British Airborne Div that was fighting largley unsupported.
The fighting against the German Army in the West was not simply a matter of a Blitzkrieg style dash. The German Army had to be physically destroyed, not hurt, not dented, nit put of balance, but destroyed. The allies had to push several hundred miles into Germany, liberating occupied nations on the way. I can't think of the divisional count between the two off the top of my head, but I believe it wasn't until late 1944 that the allies finally began to achieve the 3 to 1 requirement. Before that they had been fighting a well equipped enemy who knew they were coming every single time and sometimes were fighting even or only slightly over. They were fighting deep defensive lines that had to be rolled up, not outflanked or left for later, they had to be dealt with fully.
What kept the average German in his foxhole is always a matter of debate. Some were undoubtedly brave soldiers, some were dedicated Nazis who were willing to die for the cause, others were only too aware of the battle police behind the frontlines who would shoot anyone falling back. The threat of reprisals to loved ones at home for successful deserters would also have been a factor for some. On the Eastern Front, surrender was rarely a realistic option of course. German defensive tactics were also costly in terms of men and material, neither of which they could afford to lose. Those at the very front were often deemed expendable, not something allied commanders could afford to do. Again, not to me at least the hallmark of military genius.
Steve's arguments do remind me of the opinion I have come to over the years as regards the allies view of the German Army. In many cases, I think the former gave the latter too much respect. The German ability to pull something unexpected out of the hat diminshed as the war progressed, yet allied commanders still seemed to believe there was something big the Germans were waiting to throw at them. Chances to exploit were lost, the Germans were given the chance to regroup and dig in when they should have harried, but caution became the norm. Over the years I would argue that these shortcomings have added to the reputation of the German Army in a not entirely deserved way. As I've said before, anyone trying to view military history in a logical way has to agree that the Germany Army was good. But I would equally say that condemning the allied forces, specifically the British in this debate as 'baffled or incompetent' is at best naive and at worst downright bloody insulting. They did overcome the German Army. They didn't do it by having a monumental numerical superiority. They often did by hard fought infantry actions were they proved the better of their foes more times that not. They did it by fighting technically inferior tanks against German models that would sometimes be impervious to their fire. They did it the hard way. There was not an easy way to dislodge some 50 (?) German Divs from western Europe. It does astonish me that their achievements can be dismissed so easily.
Firstly, if the debate is to focus specifically on the contest between the western allied forces and the Germans in Europe between 1943-45, certain factors have to be tken into account, one of which is terrain. The German defence in Italy is cited as a particularly masterful exercise, to which I would contend that given the nature of the country they occupied it would have been hard for a professional army not to put up a 'good show'. On mainland Italy the Germans used a series of well prepared, deep defensive lines, anchored on terrain that favoured the defender and disadvantaged the attacker. In Normandy, the countryside beyond the beacheads was claustrophobic and impeded unopposed movement, let alone under fire.
In both cases I would argue the Germans had the advantage of defending terrain that was in several key respects tailor made for them. Yet in both cases they proved incapable of defending these lines indefinitely. The allied soldiers they faced had excellent supplies of material, but the flesh and blood resources to use them were not endless. The casualties suffered in several key battles took time to replace, while in the interim the survivors still had to do the same job as before with less men, something for which they seem to be berated not congratulated. Until the Ardennes offensive of Dec 1944 there were no major retreats by any allied troops in either Italy or the West. Even then the Ardennes sector was stablised and turned quickly into a significant defeat of the last vestiges of major German combat power in the sector. So again I ask, how does this make the averge German soldier of the day markedly superior to the average British, US, Canadian, Indian, Australian, New Zealand, South African or free European soldier who faced him?
Let me also again try to explore the German defensive reputation. From 1943 to 1945 the Germans were able to base their defences on well prepared lines. They enjoyed good equipment, such as the MG34 and MG42 machine guns, the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck infantry anti-tank weapons, the 7.5 cm and 8.8 cm Pak and Flak guns, 8 cm mortars, Nebelwerfers and traditional barrelled artilliery pieces. They were not short in respects of the numbers of these weapons in any appreciable sense. I would argue that defending a line against an attacking enemy, when you have had often ample time to prepare, identify likely forming up points, zero in pre-arranged artillery fire, site anti-tank guns in well concealed positions and have well defined MG zones, plus have terrain advantages, is not in itself a position that would give most commanders cause for concern. By the same argument overcoming well entrenched, forewarned defenders while fighting uphill in Italy or hacking through the Norman Bocage is hardly a cake walk. Again I have to ask, why should the victors in both these encounters be viewed as lesser soldiers?
The lack of truly significant counterattacks by the Germans throughout the period in the west is also a factor. Those conducted in Normandy failed. The Ardennes failed. The one which perhaps came the closest was against the Anzio beachead. It failed. Why then are the allied defenders, who in several of these cases had no choice but to dig in where they stood and fight for their lives not be viewed on a par with their German adversaries? The one major defeat for the allies in 1944 was of course the tradgedy at Arnhem. Again I would argue that the blame resides largely with senior staff officers, not the ground troops. It took several SS Panzer Divs some 8 days(?) to finally reduce a British Airborne Div that was fighting largley unsupported.
The fighting against the German Army in the West was not simply a matter of a Blitzkrieg style dash. The German Army had to be physically destroyed, not hurt, not dented, nit put of balance, but destroyed. The allies had to push several hundred miles into Germany, liberating occupied nations on the way. I can't think of the divisional count between the two off the top of my head, but I believe it wasn't until late 1944 that the allies finally began to achieve the 3 to 1 requirement. Before that they had been fighting a well equipped enemy who knew they were coming every single time and sometimes were fighting even or only slightly over. They were fighting deep defensive lines that had to be rolled up, not outflanked or left for later, they had to be dealt with fully.
What kept the average German in his foxhole is always a matter of debate. Some were undoubtedly brave soldiers, some were dedicated Nazis who were willing to die for the cause, others were only too aware of the battle police behind the frontlines who would shoot anyone falling back. The threat of reprisals to loved ones at home for successful deserters would also have been a factor for some. On the Eastern Front, surrender was rarely a realistic option of course. German defensive tactics were also costly in terms of men and material, neither of which they could afford to lose. Those at the very front were often deemed expendable, not something allied commanders could afford to do. Again, not to me at least the hallmark of military genius.
Steve's arguments do remind me of the opinion I have come to over the years as regards the allies view of the German Army. In many cases, I think the former gave the latter too much respect. The German ability to pull something unexpected out of the hat diminshed as the war progressed, yet allied commanders still seemed to believe there was something big the Germans were waiting to throw at them. Chances to exploit were lost, the Germans were given the chance to regroup and dig in when they should have harried, but caution became the norm. Over the years I would argue that these shortcomings have added to the reputation of the German Army in a not entirely deserved way. As I've said before, anyone trying to view military history in a logical way has to agree that the Germany Army was good. But I would equally say that condemning the allied forces, specifically the British in this debate as 'baffled or incompetent' is at best naive and at worst downright bloody insulting. They did overcome the German Army. They didn't do it by having a monumental numerical superiority. They often did by hard fought infantry actions were they proved the better of their foes more times that not. They did it by fighting technically inferior tanks against German models that would sometimes be impervious to their fire. They did it the hard way. There was not an easy way to dislodge some 50 (?) German Divs from western Europe. It does astonish me that their achievements can be dismissed so easily.
Actually no, it is a very bad example, because it was a very special situation. The Germans pretty much had air superiority, and the British forces were at the end of a very tenous supply line. The forces used by the British were also not experienced, they all came from the Malta garrison, except for 1st King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancs) that was a composite battalion made up of remnants of battalions that were destroyed in the desert. According to the DCLI history it had a very rocky start when it was formed. The British commander seems to have been unstable too. OTOH, the German forces were paratroopers and Brandenburgers - special forces, who presumably had been in combat against Greek partisans throughout. (see 'Churchill's Folly' by Anthony Rogers)Steve wrote:An example of this is the Greek Island of Leros in November 43 against the British when both sides had aprox. equel numbers.
To base any wider conclusions about comparative performance on this battle is fraught with dangers.