Theories as to why there was no postwar German resistance

[Panzermahn]

German military tradition also downgraded irregular warfare and viewed such participants with contempt.Its hard to adjust from an honoured regular service tradition built over generations to what some regarded as thuggery.

Insurgencies also work better with peasant societes.Poor Third World type road infastructure and adequate large isolated wilderness areas are also mandatory as safe havens,base areas.

This isn't entirely accurate. The ones that looked at irregular warfare were those Prussian staff officers reared in the tradional von Moltke-vian outlook in military matters (Richard L. di Nardo, Germany and the Axis Powers) however, not all German officers looked at irregular warfare with contempt. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck utilized irregular warfare against the British in German East Africa successfully during WW1 (He and his unit was the only German unit allowed a victory parade in Berlin at the end of WW1, an honor granted by the Alles in high respect of the von Lettow-Vorbeck and his forces). The same with the generation of Germans (under Rudiger von der Goltz) and the Freikorps as well as streifkorps (raiding detachments) in the East which resulted there is a corp of German officers (concentrated in the tradionalist Abwehr) understanding the need for guerilla warfare despite it was a course that wasn't taught in Kriegsakademie

[Peter H]

Disagree.Prussian tradition called for disciplined troops operating conventionally,knowing the hierarchy of command and their place in it.Enough contempt was shown for Allied commandos let alone franc-tireurs,guerillas.Was highly disciplined German soldiery just not suited at being irregulars in the sense of being guerillas?

There's a difference between being an irregular soldier and an irregular guerilla.The later probably spend most of their time in a civilian role anyway.Taliban operations in Afghanistan close down over winter (its too cold) and the harvests of late spring also impact.Guerilla attacks there always peak in summer.

Oddball types that pushed irregular warfare had a hard enough time in the US after the war,let alone in Europe.Rangers,Special Forces hardly existed until the 60s,70s.Even during the Vietnam War the Special Forces were treated as an unnecessary luxury by the bulk of conventional thinkers in the Pentagon,MACV.

[phylo_roadking]

Insurgencies also work better with peasant societes.Poor Third World type road infastructure and adequate large isolated wilderness areas are also mandatory as safe havens,base areas.

Peter, arguably Germany in the 1940 contained large areas of countryside that approximated to this; one of the issues over membership of the Hitler Youth for example was the distance boys had to travel in the countryside to their nearest branch, in the absence of public transport etc. While "third world" may be stretching the point - isolated parts of the German countryside certainly were!

Disagree.Prussian tradition called for disciplined troops operating conventionally,knowing the hierarchy of command and their place in it.Enough contempt was shown for Allied commandos let alone franc-tireurs,guerillas.

Peter - you might remember a long discussion I ahd last year over this with David Thompson in relation to their behaviour in Crete in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. While there may have been contempt under military law for the rights of francs-tireurs etc....I think this arose out of fear rather than plain "contempt"; Prussian forces in France in 1870-1 suffered greatly at the hands of French francs-tireurs and the Levee-en-masse If anything, what was enshrined in their doctrine was everything they could do to prevent it being used AGAINST them!

Was highly disciplined German soldiery just not suited at being irregulars in the sense of being guerillas?

Actually, I would have thought that Wehrmacht soldiery, better trained in low-level decisionmaking and independence of action at squad level would have been better suited to operating cut off from any chain of authority?

EDIT: I think at this point however we've reached where we need to discriminate between TWO potential kinds of "resistance" ....

1/ the "stay behind" or post-Occupation recruited guerillas/resistors with a modicum of training in handling arms and explosives who were supposed to live in/among the community...but who were essentially motivated civilians...th so-called "Werwolves"...and

2/ Resistors in the sense of cut-off Wehrmacht soldiery refusing to surrender and hiding in inaccessible parts of the country and raiding military or civilian targets for supplies.

From Biddiscombe and other authors we can see that there was an element of the first in "West" Germany, the Western Allies' Occupation Zones...but the second was a more common form of "resistance" in the Soviet Occupation Zone in the East.

[Panzermahn]

Disagree.Prussian tradition called for disciplined troops operating conventionally,knowing the hierarchy of command and their place in it.Enough contempt was shown for Allied commandos let alone franc-tireurs,guerillas.Was highly disciplined German soldiery just not suited at being irregulars in the sense of being guerillas?

There's a difference between being an irregular soldier and an irregular guerilla.The later probably spend most of their time in a civilian role anyway.Taliban operations in Afghanistan close down over winter (its too cold) and the harvests of late spring also impact.Guerilla attacks there always peak in summer.

Oddball types that pushed irregular warfare had a hard enough time in the US after the war,let alone in Europe.Rangers,Special Forces hardly existed until the 60s,70s.Even during the Vietnam War the Special Forces were treated as an unnecessary luxury by the bulk of conventional thinkers in the Pentagon,MACV.

Which I mentioned before that Prussian staff officers in the mold of von Moltke-vian military outlook looked at irregular warfare with contempt but not the generation of German officer corps who faced a different kind of threat to Germany at the end of WW1. Hans-Adolf Prutzmann was the generation of German officers that were involved with the Freikorps and the Streifkorps in the East (especially against Polish irredentism in Silesia).

In fact, during the early years of WW2, the Abwehr actually were involved in unconventional/irregular warfare with the Brandenburgers commandos in the Western and Eastern Front. Later in the war, the SS/SD were getting started to be involved in commando operations where officers like Skorzeny, Karl Radl, Walter Girg, von Foelkersam , Dietrich Witzel, Walter Kraizizek were experts in kleinkrieg (small unit warfare - with Foelkersam as well as other ex-Brandenburgers commandos transferring to SS Jagerbataillon units after the disbandement of the former).

Whereas the Kriegsmarine begin quite late in naval commando actions in the form of KKV units (Kleinkampfverbande) under Admiral Helmuth Heye which actually received training and guidance from the fame Italian naval commandos of the Decima Flottiglia X Mas under Prince Borghese

It is a lesser known fact that the Germans ACTUALLY studied the partisan resistance in the East and West against them (von dem Bach-Zelewski studied the AK uprising in Warsaw 1944 and Prutzmann studied on the Belarusian communist & Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement) because the Germans realized that the partisan movement (especially in the Eastern Front and Balkans) were severely disrupting them

In fact, the United States military forces learned much from the experience of the German veterans of the SS Jagdverband in irregular/unconventional warfare (they were the no 3 in Allied search list for Axis personnel after war criminals and technical specialists/scientists) where officers like Karl Radl and Walter Girg (the latter passed away in 2010) who joined the OSS, the precursor to CIA

[murx]

Military government operations, with few exceptions, were being conducted as they had been during the combat phase, by the local detachments under the supervision of the tactical commands and sometimes in competition with the security troops. Among the exceptions, E1F3, as one of its first acts, appointed a German food and agriculture administrator for Bavaria, thereby recognizing a regional problem though by no means solving it. In two directives affecting the entire US occupied area, 12th Army Group authorized the reuniforming of the German police and the reopening of lower courts. The police, in old Wehrmacht uniforms dyed some color other than field gray, could not be armed but could carry nightsticks. The courts were to make a beginning at clearing up the backlog of ordinary civil and criminal cases accumulated before the surrender, provided judges and lawyers could be found. At least 80 percent of the members of the legal profession had been Nazis. Twenty-five German courts were operating by the end of May. The opening of the German courts did not affect the jurisdiction of military government courts, which had tried 16,000 cases by V-E Day, 70 percent on curfew and circulation charges.

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Upon hearing of the order to let the DPs come and go as they pleased, the detachment in charge of 15,000 in a camp at Wildflecken, Bavaria, observed that considering the marauding and looting which had taken place when only 1 percent a day were allowed to leave, it looked to the future "with great concern." The detachment's apprehension was not unfounded.

DP depredation was the chief reason for rearming the German police in September; until then, they had only, carried nightsticks. Military government recorded 1,300 DP raids against Germans in Bavaria during one week in October, and in some country districts people were afraid to leavet their houses even in the daytime. Many farm communities found a new use for old air raid sirens: to warn of approaching DP bands. In Munich, DPs constituted 4 percent of the population but were responsible for 75 percent of the crimes. Military government courts in Bavaria held 2,700 trials between 1 June and 30 October in which displaced persons were accused of serious crimes, such as murder, robbery, and looting; and in Bremen, a DP population of 6,000-3,500 of them males over fourteen years of age committed 23 murders, 677 robberies, 319 burglaries, and 753 thefts. Organized gangs armed with pistols and automatic weapons operated out of the Bremen camps. When an eight-man gang murdered thirteen Germans during one night in November, soldiers of the 115th Infantry raided the camp from which they had come and uncovered large quantities of illegally slaughtered beef and US property. Afterward, in protest, the DPs flew black flags and placed large signs at the camp entrance reading "American Concentration Camp for Poles."

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Next to the black market and the DPs, German youths were military government's most worrisome concern. Many children were completely adrift, orphaned by the war, unable to find their families, or simply abandoned. All were idle. Schools were closed; youth organizations, other than a few sponsored by the US forces, were prohibited; and entertainment and recreation facilities were requisitioned for the US troops. The worst off'-and most dangerous in the eyes of military government-were those in their late teens. Although too young to have served in the Wehrmacht and experienced the sobering effects of defeat in the field, they were old enough to have absorbed Nazi attitudes. The Freikorps and the Nazi storm troops had found many recruits among a similar group after World War I. Under the occupation, these young people were becoming sidewalk loafers. They could not continue their educations or learn trades, and the only jobs being offered involved cleaning up rubble, which was not enticing in either the short or the long run. So they gathered out of the sight of the Americans, made up bawdy verses about the behavior of the US soldiers and German girls, at times threatened to shear the hair of girls who had soldier friends, and sometimes, military government officers suspected, rigged decapitation wires or attempted acts of sabotage. Their activities were all quite amateurish but might not remain so once enough young, lout more experienced, prisoners of war returned home.

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After the surrender, PWD became suddenly and uncomfortably aware that it had a rival in the east, the Soviet-operated Radio Berlin. The Germans were listening to it more than would have been expected even considering that Radio Berlin was on the air in German nineteen hours a day while Radio Luxembourg's German-language broadcasts were limited to about four hours a day; and PWD listened, too, to find out why. What it heard were variety programs, music, friendly chats with listeners, and announcements of movies and theaters reopening and of alleged special coffee and tea rations. One morning music program was entitled "Let's Start the Day With a Gay Heart," and the announcer advised his listeners, "For greater pleasure, you should listen on your balcony amid flowers." On 22 May, the day the Russians put Berlin on Moscow time, the announcer who read the notice concluded with "Therefore, my dear listeners, you must not forget to set your clock forward an hour before going to sleep." The PWD monitors noted a sharp contrast with US policy announcements and an even sharper contrast in tone. When PWD asked 12th Army Group how extensive the popularity of Radio Berlin was and what could be done about it, the army group replied that the Soviet programs were the main topics of conversation of Germans in all walks of life.

From: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... m#contents

[phylo_roadking]

Murx, thanks for the above - that all highlights that instead of a high level of resistance to the occupation - a lot of effort channelled...in the economic circumstances...into crimes of property and theft instead I meant to mention that last night, but it was late here; the first time I came across that was courtesy of Freddie Forsyth in The Dogs Of War of all things! On several occasions he notes as background that in the years immediately postwar a lot of loose small arms and effort was soaked up not in resistance but in largescale smuggling/blackmarket operations by armed gangs, sometimes very large ones, especially in the "Angle", the heavily-forested area at the conjunction of the Belgian/Luxembourg/German borders

I doubt that was intentional - but I'm sure that on some level the various Western Occupying Powers thanked their lucky stars for this diversion of effort!

[CJK1990]

Phylo, I didn't mean I've never heard of it, I've just never heard that argument used in realtion to the "why was Iraq bungled" debate. It would have been easy to restrict the food supply considering that Iraq has to import a lot of it's food and rationing was already in place before the war began.

I'm using Iraq as a reference point because it's the only time since World War II that the U.S. invaded and occupied a relatively sizable and urbanized country (the Dominican Republic and Panama do not count here). I really don't see anything that would cause and insurgency in Iraq and preclude one in Germany besides the massive casualties the Germans sustained prior to the occupation.

[phylo_roadking]

Phylo, I didn't mean I've never heard of it, I've just never heard that argument used in realtion to the "why was Iraq bungled" debate. It would have been easy to restrict the food supply considering that Iraq has to import a lot of it's food and rationing was already in place before the war began.

Yes, but we were there to IMPROVE their lot - not just occupy the locals' real estate! And I have to say you've got something a bit wrong...

I'm using Iraq as a reference point because it's the only time since World War II that the U.S. invaded and occupied a relatively sizable and urbanized country.

1/ The U.S. didn't invade and occupy Germany, the U.S. and Britain and France and the USSR occupied Germany While there was a certain degre of commonly-agreed policy, there were also a whole host of differences in how the various Powers adminstered their Zones!

2/ The U.S. has never actually faced and faced down a true "resistance" - Iraq was an insurgency not a resistance, the Coalition's problem wasn't a plain Ba'athist resistance! In effect by removing Sadaam, what the Coalition did was rip the controlling lid off a whole can of local worms and pressures that Sadaam had been successfully sitting on top of for decades.

( 2A/ The Coalition wasn't expecting a resistance/insurgency in Iraq to any great degree; they DID however in Germany in 1945, they expected the whole Alpine Redoubt thing underpinning any widespread national resistance)

3/ You have to remember - and look again at the examples I've given of successfully suppressed resistances/insurgencies - which nation it was who employed the correct tactics to achieve those successes NOT the U.S.....what a pity they hadn't copied British methods in Vietnam Vietnam was perfect for repeating the Malayan solution!

[David Thompson]

A rambling, off-topic political post from murx was removed pursuant to many prior warnings - DT.

[Frankfurter]

There are several reasons why there was no real post-war resistence.

First I want to repeat the old news that its a myth that most Germans were Nazis. Many were, but not most, and even the number of real, convinced Nazis shrunk a lot towards the end of the war, through death and disappointment. Many (but never the majority!) have voted Nazi in times of depression and national shame, and more have joined temporarily and opportunistically due to the economical success coming soon after Hitler came to power. But as quick as many became Nazi due to opportunism, as soon they threw it off like an old coat found having holes and fleas. The true, fierce Nazi by will and belief was a minority always.

Then add the shame so many felt when the atriocities were revealed to the majority of people. Even if many may have thought that much of it was set up, there was no doubt most believed at least part of it was true. And then look at the desperate situation of the townfolk, half of the houses in the cities gone. Their daily bread was looking for it. Farmers and countryfolk fared better, but farmers doing well are naturally the least leaning towards rebellion, and at least catholic farmers were mostly anti-Nazi anyway. Also the occupation forces were generally quite well liked and fair (I mean the British and US zone in particular). All old people I know told me so (most from the British Zone). Also note that if a country despises irregular forces, guerilla or the like, its Germany. Even today, but back then it was even stronger. Partisan was a word for evil.
Then add the bad communication, the controlled press and the traditional character of Germans to obey whatever ruler which alone made possible largescale uprisings impossible.

[mikel]

"Resist" Why? To what end? It was over, fini, kaput.
The Nazis who ramped up and ran the whole debacle were dead, locked up or on the run.

Millions were dead, displaced or homeless.
The infrastructure was wrecked and manufacturing abilities were non extant.

A few miserable hateful fanatics in tiny personal enclaves denying reality do not constitute a resistance.
Who would finance, support, quip, train and feed it?
In actual reality who would even consider participating?

The Germans got the chance to rebuild their country better than it ever had been.
Screw world domination, let's just have a good life and a good place to live it.

Not so simple in the east, but they were used to oppressive governments, so got on for a while till the SU caved in on its commie self.

[inapart]

I have no thoughts on why postwar German resistance but I served in Germany for three years in the Army of Occupation, and found the German people to be totally dedicated in rebuilding their country. The people were the hardest working, most industrious people in Europe, in the world, perhaps.

From the beginning of my three year tour, where all that I saw was bombed out cities, to the end of my three years was a marvelous transition. Old bombed out cities became new, beautiful, modern cities.

Perhaps the German people dedicated their efforts towards rebuilding, and that left no room for "resistence".

[JamesL]

The collapse of the German armed forces was complete, Nazi plans for underground activity were still in the formative stage when combat ceased, and the early arrest of members of paramilitary German organizations removed the nucleus of a potential resistance movement. (P. 57)

The US counter-intelligence groups, the German people themselves, and government documents helped in rounding up the dissidents.

The German population as a whole caused no difficulties in regard to the maintenance of law and order. The presence of overwhelming power, the traditional German respect for authority, resignation to loss of the war, and even relief at the overthrow of the Nazi regime were cited by occupation authorities as reasons for the lack of disorder in the early months. Most Germans were interested mainly in finding food and shelter. (p. 58)

THE AMERICAN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY 1945 – 1953.
http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/A ... c45-53.pdf

[stellung]

The heading is inaccurate. Isolated SS units continued to exist in precisely those remote locations mentioned earlier. The British knew where some of them were but hesitated to have a fight. Why resist? For blood and honor. Hitler was still giving out medals to Hitler Youth during the final days. Who was carrying panzerfausts to engage the Americans and the Russians? Would patriotic Americans defend their home state if it was occupied by some foreign power?

SECRET

Weekly Intelligence Summary

No. 1 for week ending 10 Jul 1945


Excerpt:

"The food situation continues to improve..."

Arrests of Werewolves and Jagdverbaende were ongoing, as well as those classified as Renegades. Whatever the OSS was doing, it appears the Counter-Intellingence Corps was the primary group to arrest persons of interest. A full history of CIC activity has yet to be published.

[steve248]

It seems to me there is one essential point missing in the above opinions.
That point is "internment".

Whilst units of the Sipo, SD, HJ may have had plans to form a postwar resistance, they did not reckon on "automatic arrest" and internment of most SS men down to SS-Untersturmführer and arrest of ANY officials of the Gestapo, Kripo and SD. Some kept in internment in the British Zone until spring 1948 when practically all remaining prisoners were released.

Certainly Werwolf activities continued sporadically - I think even to 1947 - but then died away. Allied military police were keen to trackdown any such resistance. There are many trials in the British Zone of persons found in possession of weapons and usually resulted in imprisonment. No doubt it was the same in the US Zone.