Was it a mistake for the victorious Allies to expel millions of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II?

[Karelia]

Hi Sid!

Indeed so. Thanks for the new info.

I was not aware of that earlier demographic situation in some parts of Russia.

[michael mills]

Sid/Karelia,

It seems to me that when you talk about the "russification" of Ukraine, you are making the error of assuming that "Russians" and "Ukrainians" are strongly differentiated ethnic identities, as different from each other as Russians are from central Asians or Caucasians.

In fact, the distinction between Russians and Ukrainians is very fluid, and it is quite easy for members of either ethnicity to switch their personal ethnic identity from one to the other. Within the Ukrainian ethnic group, there is enormous variation in the degree of differentiation from the Russian ethnic group, with some Ukrainians seeing themselves as members of a broader Russian nation, while at the other extreme there are those who see themselves as having no relationship to the Russian people at all.

The Ukrainians who see themselves most strongly as "non-Russian" are those of West Ukraine, the area around Lviv, which for 600 years was not part of a Russian political entity. That area, roughly co-terminous with the medieval Principality of Halych-Volyn, one of the successor states to Kievan Rus, was annexed by Poland in the middle of the 14th Century and remained under Polish rule until 1772, when it was annexed by the Habsburg Monarchy; in 1918 it returned to Poland, and only became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939.

Ukrainian ethnic identity is also fairly strong in Central Ukraine, the territory that came under Polish rule in 1569, by the Union of Lublin. That territory broke away from Poland in the middle of the 17th Century and formed a state ruled by the Cossacks, a military aristocracy, the so-called Hetmanate. The part of that state west of the Dnieper soon returned to Polish rule, under which it remained until the Polish Partitions at the end of the 18th Century; the part east of the Dnieper entered into an alliance with Muscovy while retaining its autonomy, and was gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th Century.

Thus, Ukrainian separate identity is strongest in those parts of the present Ukrainian state that were for the longest period not part of a Russian polity. The situation is different in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, which were historically not part of either a Russian or Ukrainian polity until the late 18th Century, and in fact were not inhabited by either Ukrainians or Russians, being largely uninhabited except for a small number of nomadic Tatars. The agricultural settlement of those areas was carried out in the 19th Century as an organised colonisation process directed by the Russian Imperial Government, which brought in State peasants both from the core Russian area to the north and from the former Polish and Hetmanate areas to the west. Thus, from the very beginning of the settlement of the east and south of Ukraine, those areas had a mixed population, including large numbers of colonists from outside the Russian Empire, Germans, Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldavians, Greeks.

Cities such as Odessa, Donetsk and Lugansk are situated on territory that was originally neither Russian nor Ukrainian. Odessa was founded in 1794 on the site of a small Tatar settlement in territory conquered from the Ottoman Empire in 1789; its first settlers were actually Moldavians. Donetsk was founded in 1869 by a Welsh businessman, John Hughes, who built a steel plant on the site and opened up several coal mines; Lugansk was founded in 1795 by the English industrialist Charles Gascoigne who built a metal factory there. Thus, both Donetsk and Lugansk were industrial centres from the very beginning of their existence.

The present Ukrainian nationality was created by the Bolshevik rulers very soon after they came to power at the end of 1917, as part of their aim to assign all the inhabitants of the former Russian Empire to ethnically-based nationalities, some of which were quite artificial. Essentially, all persons who spoke the dialects which had previously been called "Little Russian" and regarded as variants of a wider Russian language, were arbitrarily assigned "Ukrainian" nationality, regardless of how they actually identified themselves.

Previous to that, there had been no "Ukrainian" identity, except in the minds of a small number of ukrainophile intellectuals. In the 17th and 18th Centuries there had existed a separate local identity in the Hetmanate, but that was a class identity based on the Cossack Estate rather than a strictly ethnic one, since the peasants who constituted the majority of the population of the Hetmanate and did not have a Cossack status, were not regarded as having a specific ethnic identity. In the areas that remained under Polish rule, the self-identity of the local population was primarily religious rather than ethnic, ie they identified themselves as Orthodox in contrast to the catholic Poles, an identification which aligned them with the Orthodox Russians.

Furthermore, the present Ukrainian state as a geographic entity is essentially artificial, as it does not correspond with any ethnic or historical entity. Essentially, the present border between Ukraine and Russia was set by Lenin after the end of the Russian Civil War, when he decided that the new Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic should comprise all the territory previously claimed by the defeated Ukrainian nationalists so as not to offend Ukrainian national feeling.

That was in contrast to the stance taken by the Russian Provisional Government in 1917. The Ukrainian nationalists who had created the Ukrainian Central Rada as the prospective government of an autonomous Ukrainian polity within the Russian State had asked the Provisional Government to recognise it as having authority over eight Governorates of the Russian Empire, which according to the 1897 census had substantial populations of "Little Russian" speakers; they were Zhitomir, Podolia, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Kherson. However, the Provisional Government recognised its authority only over the first five, since the remaining three had mixed populations and were not overwhelmingly "Little Russian" or Ukrainian.

It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian nationalists had not claimed the Tavrida Governorate, which included the Crimea, nor was that territory included in the Ukrainian SSR by Lenin; that was because its population was mainly Russian and Tatar, with very few Ukrainians.

The concept of the "russianisation" of Ukraine by swarms of Russians pouring into Ukrainian territory, particularly after the Second World War, is essentially a myth invented by Ukrainian extreme nationalists. In fact, the fluctuation since 1920 in the relative sizes of the populations identifying as ethnic Ukrainian or ethnic Russian, as revealed in successive censuses, is not primarily the result of immigration, but rather of individuals changing their declared nationality in the census, depending on changes in circumstance. Thus, when Ukrainian identity was being promoted in the early 1920s by the Bolshevik rulers of the new Ukrainian SSR, only a small part of the population insisted on identifying itself as "Russian" rather than "Ukrainian" in the census. Later on, when Ukrainian separatism was being crushed and an insistence on Ukrainian identity was suspect, a much larger part of the population chose a "Russian" identity in the census. Since Ukraine gained its independence and the growth of hostility toward Russia, the percentage of the population identifying as Russian has begun to decline.

As I wrote earlier in this post, the distinction between "Russian" and "Ukrainian" is quite fluid, particularly in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, so it is easy for individuals to change their choice of nationality in the census, especially as an individual's nationality recorded in the census, both in Soviet times and now, is based entirely on personal declaration. Such a change of ethnic identity is made easier by the fact that the Russian language is used by the majority of the population of Ukraine, and most persons who choose to identify as ethnically Ukrainian speak it, and often prefer it to Ukrainian.

In summary, the present troubles in eastern Ukraine are not the result of some mass immigration of "foreigners" into Ukrainian territory. Rather they are a result of Lenin's decision to include in the Ukrainian SSR regions that were and are not overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainian. If the territory of the Ukrainian SSR had been limited to the five Governorates recognised as Ukrainian by the Russian Provisional Government in 1917, the present troubles would not have occurred, since the disputed territories would have remained part of Russia.

[wm]

The switching of ethnic identity from one to the other is easy for those exposed to both identities in their youths.
A "non-exposed" Russian will have lots of trouble to understand spoken colloquial Ukrainian, and he will not be able to speak it correctly. An Ukrainian will have the same problem.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

I spend a lot of time talking to Russian sailors as part of my job. Many of the more nationalist ones do not even recognize that a distinct Ukrainian national identity exists. To them, Ukrainians (and Belorussians) are just a variant of Russians. Ukrainians do not have this particular bigotry as they make no claim on Russians being a mere variant of Ukrainians. This particular problem is essentially a Russian one.

Indeed, cities such as Odessa, Lugansk and Donetsk were founded by outsiders, but in areas that linguistically were certainly defined as Ukrainian in the 1926 Soviet census. This doesn't look like "arbitrary assignment".

The current border between Ukraine and Russia is certainly artificial in that, when it was decided by the Bolsheviks, the Russian SSR contained Ukrainian-speaking majority areas immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian SSR proper, whereas the Ukrainian SSR did not contain equivalent Russian-speaking majority areas adjacent to the Russian SSR. Again, see the 1926 Census. This border was itself something of a land grab by Russia.

The Russian-speaking (though not necessarily ethnic Russian) immigration to expanding industrial areas is clear enough, (i.e. Transdnestr) but it need not account for everything. You write, "the fluctuation since 1920 in the relative sizes of the populations identifying as ethnic Ukrainian or ethnic Russian, as revealed in successive censuses, is not primarily the result of immigration, but rather of individuals changing their declared nationality in the census, depending on changes in circumstance." This is theoretically possible. What is the evidence?

Cheers,

Sid.

[michael mills]

Ukrainians do not have this particular bigotry as they make no claim on Russians being a mere variant of Ukrainians. This particular problem is essentially a Russian one.

Again you are lumping all Ukrainians together, in terms of their attitudes.

There are some Ukrainians, particularly in the West, who regard themselves as an entirely separate people from the Russians, with no relationship to the latter at all. Indeed, the more extreme nationalists among them regard the Russians as racially alien, as being in origin a non-Slavic people descended from the Mongols, and having no connection to Kievan Rus whatever.

Other more moderate Ukrainians admit that they and Russians have a common origin in Kievan Rus, but that they have evolved into separate peoples that are very different from each other and have little in common.

On the other hand, there are many Ukrainians, particularly in the East and South, who regard themselves and the Russians as two branches of a larger East Slavonic people that has a common history and culture based on Orthodox Christianity.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

Yes I am.

I know of no Ukrainians who do not recognize the existence of a Russian people or state.

Sid.

[Gorque]

An interesting discussion of late but a tad off topic.

[michael mills]

Sid,

It seems to me that you are being a wee bit precious here. The issue is not whether Ukrainians recognise the existence of a Russian people or state. The issue is whether all territory where Ukrainians live should be part of a Ukrainian state.

That begs the question of what exactly is meant by "Ukrainian". I will define that term to mean anyone who speaks as a native language one of the dialects that since the Bolshevik assumption of power in 1917 have been officially termed "Ukrainian", but for centuries before that were traditionally known as "Little Russian" (Malorusskii). I will include in that definition members of families which retain a memory of having once spoken one of the Little Russian dialects.

In your posts on this issue, you have made the point that in 1926 parts of the RSFSR contained populations that were linguistically Ukrainian, and even suggested that the non-inclusion of those areas in the Ukrainian SSR constituted a "land grab" of Ukrainian territory by Russia. That implies that all Ukrainian-speakers living in those areas wanted to be part of a Ukrainian state rather than remain with Russia.

However, the historical fact is that Ukrainian separatism was limited to the western and central parts of the present Ukraine, ie the regions that had been under Polish rule and later became a separate Cossack-ruled state in the middle of the 17th Century. As I wrote previously, those areas, in particular the central part of present-day Ukraine, had a tradition of an independent state, the Cossack Hetmanate, that was absorbed by the Russian Empire in the 18th Century.

But the Cossack Hetmanate was not co-extensive with the regions inhabited by speakers of Little Russian dialects. The so-called Sloboda Ukraina ( which means "borderland of free villages"), the region around Kharkiv, settled in the 17th Century by Little-Russian-speaking colonists from west of the Dnieper, was never part of the Cossack Hetmanate, and was under the rule of Muscovy; indeed it was the Muscovite rulers who conquered that area from the Tatars and settled Little Russians on it as military colonists organised in regiments.

As I wrote previously, the east and south of present-day Ukraine had never been part of any "Ukrainian" state, and were settled in the 19th Century at the initiative of the Russian Imperial Government, which brought in both Great Russian and Little Russian colonists.

Since Ukrainian independence in 191, election results have clearly mirrored the divide between the people of western and central Ukraine and those of the east and south, with the former voting consistently for national candidates supporting the greatest possible separation from Russia, and the latter voting for candidates supporting a closer relationship with Russia. That pattern vindicates the decision of the Russian Provisional Government in 1917 to grant autonomy only to the five Governorates with overwhelmingly Little Russian populations, and to exclude from the autonomous Ukraine the three Governorates with mixed populations, which today constitute eastern and southern Ukraine.

A good example is provided by the Kuban Cossacks of the North Caucasus region. They originated with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Little Russian military colonists settled on the lower Dnieper region in the 16th Century by Polish magnates. In the late 18th Century the Zaporozhians were conquered by the Russian Empire, and were removed to the Kuban region to act as border guards against the Caucasian tribes. In that function they became very loyal to the Russian Imperial Government, and never showed any sign of wanting to become part of a separate Ukrainian state, despite the fact that they were linguistically Little Russian. After the Russian Revolution, the Kuban Cossacks firmly resisted calls by Ukrainian nationalists to support Ukrainian independence and to join their territory to a Ukrainian state; instead they allied themselves with the Great Russian Don Cossacks. That shows that not all Ukrainian-speakers wanted to be part of a Ukrainian state rather than remaining part of Russia.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

You write, "The issue is not whether Ukrainians recognise the existence of a Russian people or state. The issue is whether all territory where Ukrainians live should be part of a Ukrainian state."

I disagree. Firstly, the Ukraine's borders, including Crimea, were recognized by an independent Russia after 1991. So there is a question of international law as well. Russia is in flagrant violation of this.

The question of "whether Ukrainians recognise the existence of a Russian people or state" is, indeed, a non-issue. As far as I am aware, all do. However, it is not irrelevant, because the reverse is not so. Russian nationalists, who are currently in the ascendant, appear not to recognise the existence of a Ukrainian people or state.

And that shows that the nub of the problem lies in Moscow, not Kiev. Russian nationalists would happily absorb all of Ukraine, Transdnestr, Belarus and much of Kazakhstan. Therefore, just as there has been creeping homogenization of non-Russians in Russia since 1926, so there is probably more cross-border interference to come in "defence" of Russian-speakers in neighbouring countries, to prevent them being subsumed in the local national identities.

Regarding the attitudes of the population of majority Ukrainian-speaking areas inside Russia in 1926, I do not know if all "all Ukrainian-speakers living in those areas wanted to be part of a Ukrainian state rather than remain with Russia." However, as I rather doubt they were ever consulted, we are rather left with their language as a primary indicator of potential aleigance. In any event, this is now a dead issue as the USSR created new "facts" there by making Russian the primary language of instruction and homgenizing the population.

Incidentally, the reverse of this is one of the main Russian complaints in Lugansk and Donetsk - that Ukraine is trying to make the children local Russian-speakers receive instruction in the Ukrainian language.

As regards these particular Russian speakers, I would repeat my earlier unanswered question:

"The Russian-speaking (though not necessarily ethnic Russian) immigration to expanding industrial areas is clear enough, (i.e. Transdnestr) but it need not account for everything. You write, "the fluctuation since 1920 in the relative sizes of the populations identifying as ethnic Ukrainian or ethnic Russian, as revealed in successive censuses, is not primarily the result of immigration, but rather of individuals changing their declared nationality in the census, depending on changes in circumstance." This is theoretically possible. What is the evidence?"

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. Some Russians are also biddable as far identity concerned. One sailor from the Crimea told me he preferred Russian rule because Ukraine was even more corrupt and disorganized.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

When talking about expulsions we should note that those events must be divided into 4 phases - evacuation, flight, expulsion, and organized deportation - with most of the Germans leaving already during the first two phases (evacuation and flight), which took place in last months of 1944 and first months of 1945. Christopher Duffy estimated the number of those German civilian refugees as being ca. 7 million.

From page 276 (or page 289 of my Polish language edition), the beginning of chapter "The Experience of the Catastrophe" (link):

Link to Duffy's book: https://archive.org/stream/Red_Storm_on ... 0/mode/2up

"(...) As early as 28 January 1945, the Wehrmacht calculated that 3.5 million German civilians were on the move in the East. By the end of the war the number of German non-combatants fleeing from the Russians had nearly doubled to about 7 million. Most of those who tried to stay in their homes were evicted after the war, a process which by 1950 brought the number of Germans displaced by the Russians and their clients to a final total of 11 million. (...)"

Polish historian Piotr Eberhardt estimates the number of refugees - either German citizens (but not only ethnic Germans) or Volksdeutsche - escaping or evacuated (not expelled) from lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse line in late 1944 and early 1945 as 7.5 million.

See Tables III.19. and III.20. (pp. 109-111) and Table III.21. (pp. 117-118) in this 2011 book (which is 225 pages long):

http://rcin.org.pl/Content/15652/WA51_1 ... grafie.pdf

However, out of those who escaped on their own or were evacuated, ca. 30% later tried to return. But still, when the Polish administration took over those areas from the Soviets in mid-1945, most regions were already very depopulated (compared to pre-1939 situation).

Eberhardt's 7.5 million is his adjusted estimate from 2011 book. In his earlier 2006 publication the number was a bit smaller.

Here is the link to the 2006 (shorter - 72 pages) publication: http://www5.zippyshare.com/v/sbDoTwxu/file.html