Thoughts on Belgium and the defence of the Ardennes

[daveh]

Belgium and the defence of the Ardennes

Reading about the German May 1940 Western offensive it is possible to get the idea that it was "obvious" that the Germans would attack with massive mechanised forces through the Ardennes. Hence it was “obvious” that the Belgians should have committed more forces to a more active defence of the Ardennes area. The potential for delaying the German advance can be seen in such actions as that at Bodange and this example is used to “prove“ how such an approach would perhaps have helped delay the Germans sufficiently for an effective Allied defence to have been created.

However this is being wise after the event.

Points we can consider regarding the defence of the Ardennes :

1) Pre WW1
The problem of defending the Ardennes did not first arise just prior to WW2. In the years before WW1 the problem had been looked at. At that time an advance into the Ardennes looked a possible strategy for both the French and the German armies.

De Selliers de Moranville, Chief of Staff since 25 May 1914, proposed centring the whole army on Antwerp, leaving Liege and Namur only as a delaying screen.

De Ryckel, Adjutant-General, favoured a forward policy of strongly manning the borders, especially in front of Liege, snuffing out the intruders as they appeared, and only falling back on Antwerp if necessary.

(sound familiar?)

King Albert settled it : the army would concentrate on the left bank of the Meuse, prepare a second line along the Gette, and be based on Antwerp. The final decisions were taken on the 2nd of August, as the Germans were rolling into Luxemburg.

Similar discussions happened in the 1930s with perhaps greater political influence. In the end the idea of concentrating the Belgian Army won out over border defence with consequences discussed in other posts on here.

2) Operations in the Ardennes 1914

The outbreak of war saw the Germans advance through Luxembourg and move into the Ardennes. Extensive scouting by French cavalry during the first half of August 1914 failed to detect German units in the Ardennes. This led to French orders for an attack through the Ardennes against the southern flank of the major German sweep through northern Belgium. Unfortunately the difficulties of controlling such an advance and the lack of effective reconnaissance led to French units marching into effective German defences.
Advancing 3rd Army troops were heavily hit by artillery and the 3rd Army had to fight hard just to maintain its position and coherence. The 4th Army advance suffered also, especially the 3rd colonial division which lost 11,000 of its 15,000men. With their offensive stalled and key elements of both armies badly mauled the French were forced to withdraw. On 24 August both armies pulled back to the line of the Meuse.

A study of these events suggested that it was possible to move forces through the Ardennes to undertake significant offensives but it required careful planning, close control, and a good knowledge of any enemy forces present. It proved difficult to advance or control movement against the grain of the country especially once units left the roads and any such attempts led to many delays and surprise encounters. The results of the Fench efforts in late August 1914 show how difficult an advanc ein the Ardennes could be.

3) Ardennes 1944

As an example of what forces might be needed to effectively defend the Ardennes we can look at the Americans in December 1944. The 1940 German attack in this region was obviously known and another such attack was therefore a possibility to be considered seriously. However the Americans were unable to be strong every where and the Allies judged that the Germans lacked the strength to repeat such a major strategic attack. Furthermore it was felt that there were no targets of strategic importance that would invite a smaller attack. In the light of this and the demands of other areas the Americans defended the Ardennes area with a few infantry divisions and a small armoured reserve relying on the rough defensible terrain to strengthen their defences.
The First US army deployed some 6 infantry and one armoured division to cover there line from c. Eupen to W of Luxembourg, roughly equivalent to the Belgian Ardennes defence line of 1940. This force was looked on as being comparatively weak given the length of the line to be defended (at least 50 miles) but the lack of any important strategic target in the area and the benefit of good defensive terrain was felt to offset this weakness.

Even this comparatively small defensive force was equivalent to over 25% of the total Belgian infantry force and virtually all the Belgian AFVs of 1940. The Belgians could not afford to "waste" a quarter of their army in defending an area of no real strategic importance to the Belgians and which was (apparently) unlikely to face a major German attack.

4) Belgian planning in the 1930s

see http://niehorster.orbat.com/021_belgium ... art_03.htm
As a result of studies concerning the creation of fortifications to defend Belgium, the Belgians built, in the Ardennes region, 309 MG bunkers (equipped with 1 heavy MG) and 12 medium type bunkers which were concentrated in Libramont and Neufchateau . The MG bunkers were arranged in centres de resistance (CR) and were designed to defend a town, important cross country roads and valleys. They were often placed to give flanking fire rather than forward fire to make them harder to detect. These bunkers formed 2 "lines"

Vielsalm-Gouvy – Houffalize – Bastogne – Arlon on the border with Luxembourg

Lienne valley– Baraque Fraiture – Western Ourthe

These lines were not continuous but rather were designed to provide support for Belgian units as they withdrew having performed their delaying (by obstruction) function.

Delays were based on c.325 planned demolitions and obstructions of roads, bridges, route junctions and communication lines. The basic concept was always for Belgian forces to ensure these demolitions occurred and for them then to withdraw to the defence line between Namur and Liege, for the 1st Chasseur Ardennais division, and the R Gette for the 1st Cavalry division. It was never intended for these forces to cover the obstructions with fire. The lines of bunkers were built to ensure withdrawing units were not overtaken by enemy units operating along roads.

These bunkers were built as part of the “defend the borders strategy” advanced in the mid 1930s.
see
http://abl1914to1940.aceboard.fr/213798 ... -belge.htm
for a map showing the areas of these bunkers, line of the PFL defences and the extent of the areas defended by the 3 Chasseur Ardennais regiments of the 1st ChA division.

This "defend the border" strategy also led to the creation of the Chasseur Ardennais
see viewtopic.php?f=85&t=137839
Note that originally the Chasseur Ardennais units were all professional long term (comparatively) service soldiers, the only full time professional units in the Belgian Army. However the expense of this led to these units becoming conscript units though many of the professionals kept on to create a well trained effective elite unit.

In the end it was realised that given the economic constraints and the population of Belgium it would never be possible to create an army sufficiently large to defend everything. Due to this it was decided to effectively abandon the Ardennes as a defensive zone and concentrate on using the Albert canal - PFL - PFN line as a delaying defence line to allow the Allies to advance to the planned KW line so that the Belgians, British and French forces could form a continuous effective defence covering the more important parts of Belgium and all of France. The mobile elite ChA division would over see the demolitions and slip away to join the rest of the Army.

5) Defence of the Ardennes in fact

In the end the defence of the Ardennes was undertaken by Group K, a small corps commanded by General Keyaerts and consisting of:

1e Division de Chasseurs Ardennais (including 3 T15 and 48 T13 at full strength)
1e Division de Cavalerie (including 8 T15 and 18 T13 at full strength)

Cavalry regiments (mechanised units, no horses):
1e Guides
2e Lanciers
3e Chasseurs à Cheval

1 motorcycle battalion from VIIth Army Corps

3rd cycle regiment

These units were all mechanised, using bicycles, motorbikes and trucks, and had a total of 11 T15 light tanks and 66 T13 self-propelled AT guns.
The use of only mechanised units in the relatively rough Ardennes shows that the Belgians regarded the terrain as not being impassable to small mechanised units, including AFVs. However the primary use of mechanisation was to enable the rapid and effective withdrawal of units to the main defence lines. There these mechanised units could supply an effective reserve to support the relatively static infantry divisions that formed 18 of the 22 divisions of the Belgian army.
The AFVs were typically used in very small units typically of 2 to 4 vehicles. Given the 85km or so that the 1st ChA was to cover most of its sub units operated at no more than company strength. Therefore although the Belgians used mechanised units in the Ardennes, these units were small in size and consequently suffered less from the difficulties of moving through the rugged terrain than would say a complete mechanised division.

To provide engineer support the partly motorised 3rd GHQ engineer battalion was stationed in the Ardennes as was 1st Cavalry division's fully motorised 25th engineer battalion. It should be noted that most Belgian engineer units were not motorised. The Ardennes was also under the 1re Directions du Genie et des fortifications (DGnF), Namur. I assume it was under the direction of the 1re DGnF that most of the c 325 planned demolitions were created.

6) To attack France via the Ardennes

By the outbreak of war to get from Germany into France beyond the Meuse involved an attack through 6 obstacle lines:

a) the obstacles at the Luxembourg border
Luxembourg had effectively no army so this line represented merely whatever obstacles would be in place prior to a German advance.

b) the first Belgian fortification line just behind the border in the area of Martelange,
c) the second Belgian fortification line between Libramont – Neufchateau – Rulles
these lines consisted of bunkers concentrated at towns and villages on roads through the Ardennes. Generally these bunkers would be manned only to cover a withdrawal.

d) the Semois valley in the area of Bouillon
to be defended by French units advancing to this line after a German invasion of Belgium. Cavalry units would advance ahead of the infantry to provide warning of and to help delay any German advance. Meanwhile the infantry would establish themselves in new defensive positions.

e) the French border fortifications, formed by bunkers which were camouflaged as normal houses, the so called “ligne des maisons fortes”,
already established defences created in the late 1930s and added to during the phoney war.

f) then the most difficult task: to cross the 70 meter broad River Meuse at Sedan, which was defended by French troops in a line of bunkers and pillboxes of the extended Maginot Line.
already established defences created in the late 1930s and added to during the phoney war.

Note that the movement of French units for training and as detachments moved to different areas meant that the defneders of these 2 lines were not as well established in them as the 8 months of war available prior to the May 1940 attack might suggest.

These defences, the difficulty of the terrain, the apparent lack of strategic targets in the Ardennes all led to the defence of the Ardennes being low on the list of Belgian priorities. The example of the problems of advancing through the Ardennes seen in WW1 suggested that the planned demolitions would delay any German advance.

If the Germans advanced through the Ardennes against the French Meuse it was felt that the delays caused by the Belgian demolitions would give enough time for French forces to establish defences in depth based on the R Semois and backed by border defences and French pre war defences on the R Meuse.
Meanwhile the Belgian army could concentrate its forces on the Albert canal - PFL - PFN line covering the main defence line, the KW line where the Belgians would hold with the British and French armies.

If the Germans entered the Ardennes and then turned to the north west to flank the defences at Namur, again demolitions would delay their advance sufficiently for the French to establish a line south of Namur on the R. Meuse.

Thus the Belgian plan of delays and demolitions was thought sufficient to establish defences against any major German attack while allowing the Belgians to concentrate its army, and make best use of its mechanised units.

7) Franco Belgian co operation

the map at
http://abl1914to1940.aceboard.fr/213798 ... -belge.htm
shows a line dividing the area of Belgian operations (including the French 1st Army) and the French area of operations including the Belgian Chasseur Ardennnais as agreed on 15-5-36. The line runs from south of Namur on the Meuse - Havelange - just S. of Sougne Remouchamps.

This shows that some pre war discussions and agreements had occurred. However the Belgians severed treaty links to France in the next year and so further detailed discussions did not happen. A common Franco-Belgian defence of the Ardennes would only have been possible if there had been a prior, minutely prepared preliminary agreement. The lack of such an agreement meant

a) The Belgians undertaking their planned demolitions irrespective of the effect on French units. This led to situations where demolitions happened behind advancing French units.
b) The French being unaware of the Belgian plan to withdraw all their units to the Namur - Liege line leaving the Ardennes essentially undefended by Belgian units.
c) The French being unaware of any planned Belgian defences that had been constructed in the Ardennes and elsewhere. This was especially significant in the KW line and defences in the Gembloux gap.

8) Air Power and the Ardennes

As regards the possibilities of Allied air power stopping the German attack through the Ardennes we only have the example of air power used in the 1944 German attack in the Ardennes. Obviously if the Allies had turned their air forces against the German advance through the Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe would have responded by concentrating its fighters in the region. The effectiveness of AA units to defend columns in the Ardennes would be decreased to some extent by the terrain and the forests. However these same features would also help limit the effectiveness of any allied attacks. During the Battle of the Bulge the extensive bombing of route centres such as St Vith achieved little in the way of delaying German movements. For example an RAF carpet bombing raid dropping over 1000 tons on St. Vith, far beyond anything possible in May 1940, and this created maximum delays of one day. However if bottle necks such as La Roche were successfully attacked this might have caused delays, c 150 tons of bombs over 2 days caused significant delays.

Conclusions

In the light of "conventional wisdom" there was no reason to expect a major mechanised force attacking through the Ardennes. The examples of 1914, study of the Schlieffen plan, considerations of between the war studies and indeed the Germans own plans until October 1939 all avoided any such advance.
Given the (comparatively) small size of the Belgian Army and the extensive area of the Ardennes it was not possible to provide sufficient forces to defend the Ardennes effectively. It did not appear prudent to allocate c 25% of the army to the defence of an area which was unlikely to be attacked in strength and which in any case was of sufficient interest to the French that they were likely to advance into the region to establish a defence in depth for their frontier. This type of move had been agreed in the mid 1930s and there was no reason for the Belgians to believe that this type of move would not be undertaken by the French if Germany ever did attack Belgium.

The only sensible alternative seemed to be to try and delay any advance by the use of obstructions and demolitions while withdrawing any units stationed in the Ardennes for more productive use elsewhere.

The experiences of operating in the Ardennes suggested that infantry and small mechanised units could move through the area given careful planning. However the delays imposed on such moves by demolitions was thought sufficient to allow the French to establish themselves in suitable defensive positions. in addition the French planned to move cavalry units into the Ardennes to provide a covering force to the infantry's advance. This would provide the possibility of a more active delay for the Germans than just Belgian demolitions.

Thus any German units that succeeded in moving through the Ardennes would face sufficiently strong well established units in defensible terrain that they would achieve little if anything.

or so it was thought.....


Sources

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/ba ... _1914.html)
pre WW1 studies and 1914 actions in the Ardennes

http://niehorster.orbat.com/021_belgium ... art_01.htm
http://www.fortiff.be/ifb/index.php?p=720
http://www.fortiff.be/ifb/index.php?p=80
examples and plans of bunkers on the Meuse and in the Ardennes

http://www.arrc.nato.int/journal/summer04/opstory.htm

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/031026.shtml
review of and extracts from
Rommel and Guderian against the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais: The Combats at Chabrehez and Bodange.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_25.htm
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE by Hugh M. Cole

http://users.skynet.be/frat.royale.cha/
Chasseur Ardennais

http://niehorster.orbat.com/021_belgium/corps_k.html
OOB Group Keyaerts

any comments on these musing is most welcome

[Michael Emrys]

Excellent post, dave. Two more books you might want to add to your bibliogrphy:

The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West by Karl-heinz Frieser and John T. Greenwood

The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 by Robert A. Doughty

The former analyzes the battle mostly from the German POV and the latter mostly from the Allied POV. Thus they are pretty complimentary accounts.

Michael

[peter u]

Hello Daveh,

In 1937 the chasseur ardennais wanted to replace their old lightly armoured Mg vehicles by a more modern and also tracked combat vehicle.
During a training exercise in the Ardennes forest in August 1937 the Chasseur ardennais tested the T13 and also an ACG1 tank.
After that exercise the commander of the corps chasseur ardennais came to the conclusion that tanks like the ACG1 were to heavy to operate in the Ardennes forests and that small & light armoured/tracked vehicles like the T13 were the only armoured/tracked vehicles that could operate in the Ardennes.
That report that was written after that exercise by the commander of the chasseur ardennais gave the Belgian army HQ the information that the ACG1 tank was going to be an useless tool for the chasseur Ardennais, the Belgian army HQ also came to the conclusion that it was impossible to manoevre heavy tanks and other armoured vehicles bigger then a T13 light tank, certainly in large groups, through the Ardennes.
- Did the German Panzer commanders proof them wrong on 10 May 1940!
That report written in August 1937 was very important for the further Belgian defence strategy.

Cheers,
Peter

[daveh]

many thanks for that peter..fascinating stuff exactly what I hoped to discover

[peter u]

Hi Daveh,

No problem, I even have found more detailed information about that exercise.

- The ACG1 tank was tested from 23 till 26 August 1937 in an area between the rivers Salm & Lierre.
After the exercise the commander of the chasseur ardennais, Lt Gen Pire, writes to his superior Lt Gen Van Overstraeten that the ACG1 tank that they tested was to heavy and couldn't be used in the Ardennes.
The Belgian army leadership wanted to equip the chasseur ardennais with the twelve ACG1 tanks they bought from Renault, but after the test in August 1937 Lt Gen Pire actually prefers double or triple the amount of light T13 tanks, it doesn't bother him that the T13 is slower and insufficiently armoured.

Cheers,
Peter

[daveh]

Examples of delays imposed by the Chasseur Ardennais 10-5-40

Martelange

Belgians: 4th Co 1st ChA Regt
Germans: elements 1st Panzer Division:1st Shutzen and 1st Motorcycle Bns
Delay imposed: Martelange held from 06.30 to 10.30
Links
http://chrito.users1.50megs.com/1940/ma ... 40west.htm
http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.as ... =&#1385045

Bodange

Belgians: 2nd and 3rd platoons, 5th Co, 1st ChA Regt
Germans: Elements 1st Panzer
Delay imposed: Fighting lasted from 10.30 to 18.00
Links
http://users.skynet.be/frat.royale.cha/ click on link Bodange
http://www.freebelgians.net/pages/sujet ... fb1&su=136
viewtopic.php?t=84561

Strainchamps

Belgians: 1st platoon 5th Co, 1st ChA Regt
Germans: Elements 2nd Panzer Division
Delay imposed: Holds off the Germans from 10.00 to 16.00. Its T13 hold off German tanks during this engagement

Mabombre

Belgians: 9th Co 2d ChA Regt
Germans: lead elements 3rd Infantry division
Delay imposed: 9th Co withdraws c 18.30

Mont Le Ban
Belgians: part of a motorcycle Co, 3rd ChA regt
Germans: Elements of 7th Panzer Division
Delay imposed: Defence lasting c 2 hours

Chabrehez

Belgians: 3rd Company 3rd ChA Regt
Germans: vanguard 7th Panzer division
Delay imposed: 18.15 to 21.00 .
Links
http://users.skynet.be/frat.royale.cha/ click on link Chabrehez
http://www.freebelgians.net/pages/sujet ... fb1&su=136

The links above give good details on these combats, especially in the case of Bodange. The references I have to those combats which have no links above simply mention the fact they happened. Further information about these fights would be very welcome.

[daveh]

Engineers in the Ardennes

In the operation zone of the Groupement K.

25th Engineers Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division.
HQ in Ampsin (on the Meuse)
1st Company in Hotton
2nd Company in Barvaux

1/19th Engineers Battalion of the 1st ChA. Division
Fauvillers (near Bodange)

33rd Engineers Battalion , temporarily detached from the GHQ Command
HQ (and probably 3rd Company) in Marche-en-Famenne
1st Company in Durbuy (1 platoon near Vielsalm until may 9th,
midnight)
2nd Company in Werbomont
4th Company in Amay (on the Meuse)

Main tasks
Destroy bridges.
Create obstructions

Special `destruction detachments' of 3-5 men were formed at platoon level in order to
operate planned border destructions in case of German attack. There were 5 main
destruction zones covering the border.

Almost all destructions went according to plans in a very short time.

from
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/France1940/message/7368

[daveh]

An interesting article on the political discussions and background to plans for the defence of Belgium in regard to the "defend the borders" and "defend what we can" concepts.
http://www.flwi.ugent.be/btng-rbhc/pdf/ ... 41-269.pdf

[JBbelgium]

I am reading the book "Mei 1940 De achttiendaagse veldtocht in België" by Peter Taghon (in Dutch). Here are some translated parts on the destructions in the Ardennes:
"composition Groepering K: 1st division Ardeense Jagers, 3 cavalryregiments (1st Gidsen, 2nd Lansiers, 2th Jagers te Paard) 3th Cyclistregiment and the motorcyclebattalion of the VII armycorps [I guess the Chass Ard motorcycle Batt???]. The 1st CH AR division held a front of 85km. The chasseurs occupied concrete bunkers from the river Salm onwards. Some of the other bunkers built in 1935 were not occupied because they didn’t fit in the new plans anymore. Their mission was to execute the planned destructions and then fall back on the position Hoyoux-Ourthe, the 3 cav regiments and 2 chasseurs battalions were already there.”
“The area between the border and the Ourthe was full of obstructions (cut trees, permanent barricades, minefields, anti-tankditches,anti-tankwalls, flooded areas). This area was divided in 2 zones A & B. Zone A started in Losheimergraben, followed the Our and the Salm, laid east of St-Vith up to the border with Luxemburg. 10km west laid zone B, doubling the total depth.
Zone A and B were in finished across the entire border but they were only 200m deep. In May it was agreed to make 2 more zones C & D. The Germans were surprised that the works were so extensive but the obstructions were not defended. It costed them time and effort but didn’t really slow the advance. [I think the author means the advance of lighter troops like Aufklärungs Abteilungen and Schützenregiments here.]
[Note the difference between destructions, bridges etc that still needed to be blown up, and obstructions, roadblocks & flooded terrain etc, already in place. ]
“All the bridges over the river Ourthe were destroyed. The German engineers needed to build their own bridges.”
[There a picture in this book of an AT-wall, probably along the line Vesdre-Manaihant. It looks like 2m high or a bit more. There is a small gap were the road is. This gap was filled with cut trees and stones. It is hard to see but the wall looks pretty thick, maybe 10m.]
“325 road destructions were planned. All of them were executed except the destruction of the railwaybridge at St. Vith-Thommen. “ [In a different book by Luc de Vos I read this: all bridges were blown up except the viaduct and the dam wall at Butgenbach. Commandos of the Heimattreue Front, German speaking citizens of Belgium, killed the Belgian officer and his men before they could blow them. These commandos had gotten a special training and were part of the Brandenburgerregiment. They often wore a civilian coat over their uniform.]
There are some other pictures of damaged roads. These are pretty deep holes. A panzer III got stuck in one of them. The railroad Libramont-Neufchâteau was blown up and the photo shows a hole of 30-40m deep. The text says that the Germans were still not finished with repairing all off the destructions on the 19th of May. They used French POW’s for that.

[daveh]

motorcyclebattalion of the VII armycorps [I guess the Chass Ard motorcycle Batt???]

It is, see le Bataillon Motos ChA
http://www.fraternellechasseursardennai ... oscha.html

[Carl Schwamberger]

I've been thinking over this same question for Many years, and hoped to some day test it on the game board. My take at this point is the Belgian army as it existed historically could have delayed the Germans in the eastern Ardennes for a extra 24 hours. This does not seem like much, but it would have allowed the French cavalry to reach their initial objective line and deploy before the Germans arrive. As opposed to finding the Germans before the columns could deploy. that could result in the German advance slowed by another 24 hours, & a better delaying action back to the Meuse river. If the Germans do not arrive on the east bank of the Meuse until the 14th May vs the historical afternoon of the 12th May then the French have had a extra 48 hours for their infantry & artillery to properly deploy. More important the French senior leaders have had a extra 48 hours to asorb the correct information, understand, and react. Where all that might lead I cant say at this point.

[JBbelgium]

More from the same book:
"Rommels 7th Panzer reached zone A at 7:30 on 10 May. 2 breakthroughsattempts failed. The third attempt along the road Dürler-Espeler under command of Rommel himself was succesfull. Kradsch. Batt. 7 was stopped at 16:00 by 10th company 3th reg Chass Ard. Rommel ordered a succesfull out-flanking move. The same occured at Chabrehez, which fell in German hands at 21:00. Next morning (11 May) 7th panzer crossed the Ourtheriver at Marcourt and Beffe. Heavy fighting occurred near Marche against 4th R.A.M. (french). 5th panzer could not keep up except for Vorausgrüppe Werner. Werner reached the Ourthe at Hotton in the afternoon (11th May). French troops quickly withdrew. Werner infantry crossed over a halfdestroyed bridge. The tanks drove through the river. Werners grüppe was attached to 7th panzer on 12 May around 12:00 because the main force of 5th panzer was very far behind."

"5th panzer got stuck in the 200m deep zone A east of St-Vith. It took them 4 hours to remove mines, obstructions, to fill up the 3 AT-ditches and tow away the sawn of trees. The heavy trees had to be pulled away by tanks."
"3AT-ditches, 8m wide and 4m deep, blocked the road. The road was blocked by sawn off trees between the ditches. Two AT-fences, anchored to concrete blocks sealed off both exits. Minefields were lain out between these obstructions. This costed 5th panzer a lot of time."

"Junkers 52 had to parachute in supplies including ammo, fuel, medecines etc. (+ pictures of 5th panzer receiving supplies by parachute at Hotton). [Bridges were almost allways destroyed but the smaller streams were shallow enough to drive tanks through. Roadsigns had been painted white to confuse the Germans.]

[JBbelgium]

More from the same book, this time about Panzergrüppe Kleist.
"German armor crossed the border at 6:30 (10 May). About 100 Fieseler 156 landed between Nives-Witry to drop of 3th battalion from the Gross-Deutschland regiment behind the Belgian troops. At Martelange 4th Comp 1st Ch Ard reg halted 1st panzerdiv for 2 hours. The panzers started moving again at 10:30. At Bodange and Strainchamps the 1st panzer was halted again by 5th Comp 1st Ch Ard reg. The chasseurs withdrew at 18:00 when they were almost completely encircled. Mines, obstructions and the blown up bridges across the Sauer caused further delay. 1st panzer resumed their advance at 20:00. 2nd panzer only at 3:00 the next morning (11 May). On the end of the first day, Guderian was over 10 hours behind on schedule."

"The next day was not better. Incorrect intelligence caused 10th panzer to use the roads reserved for 1st panzer. As such 1st panzer used the roads reserved for 2nd panzer who had fallen behind. This caused major traffic jams. The French cavalry withdrew behind the Meuse in the night of 11-12 May. Panzergrüppe Kleist was delayed and not at full strenght yet but this did not stop them from crossing the Meuse at Sedan and Monthermé on 13 May."

[JBbelgium]

Hello Carl, interesting subject. I would just like to make some remarks.
The only things delaying the Germans south of Liège on 10 May were permanent Belgian obstructions, 1st Chasseurs Ardennais, Battalion Moto Chass Ard and 1st Cavalry (minus 1 of the cyclistregiments and 2nd lanciers was send to 1 Corps d'Armée on 10 May).

German frontline troops south of Liège: 5th, 7th, 2nd, 1st and 10th panzer (6th and 8th panzer in reserve???) + 14 Infantry divisions. (from map Guy Stassin cavalérie motorisée Vol2)

On 11 May most of the delay was caused by French light troops and destroyed bridges. The French light troops pulled back behind the Meuse in the night of 11-12 May. Correct? The Germans reached the Meuse in the afternoon of 12 May. So 1 day by the Belgians and 1 for the French. However French 9th armée Corap, 2nd armée Huntziger, 3th armée (Across Luxembourg) had 5 divisions légère de cavalérie, and 3 cavalry brigades. So more than the Belgians.

It is clear that the Groupement K was outnumbered by the Germans. Prolonged fighting could have destroyed 2 of the best Belgian divisions. These represent about half of the Belgian mobile units. Mobile units crucial to cover the retreat to the KW-line.

I think that the Germans had enough strenght to rapidly cross the Meuse even if the French were fully established. + The Belgian army could have been crippled very badly. So maybe the 7th armée wouldn't have been able send its units south.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
I think that the Germans had enough strenght to rapidly cross the Meuse even if the French were fully established. + The Belgian army could have been crippled very badly. So maybe the 7th armée wouldn't have been able send its units south.

I agree there, where I see the difference is in the French ability to resist a attack on its Meuse River position. 48 hours allows things like the 18th Inf Div to be present in full strength and to be fully entrenched, the 21st Corps to be in place behind Sedan & ready to counter attack, or the 53rd ID settled in. In each of these cases the French unit was just arriving when the crisis came, incomplete in strength, its command suprised by the speed the crisis came at. None of that prevents the German assualts from succeeding, but the cost in blood would be far higher and the pace slower - which of course buys the French still more precious time.