Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

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Marcus
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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#61

Post by Marcus » 04 Jan 2015, 18:40

A post containing little but personal remarks was removed. Get back on topic and drop the personal remarks.

/Marcus

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#62

Post by paspartoo » 04 Jan 2015, 18:52

Ifor wrote:Apart from the Luftwaffe aspect, why was the intelligence son inaccurate?
What's 'inaccurate'?
A simple economist with an unhealthy interest in military and intelligence history.....
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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#63

Post by paspartoo » 04 Jan 2015, 19:51

I’ve been writing down some comments from ‘The rise and fall of the German air force 1933-45’ and ‘The German air force versus Russia’ on LW recon operations. I’ll post them probably tomorrow. I think the relevant passages will show that LW recon was an integral part of the German war effort both in the East and in the West. Obviously WWII aircraft flying at altitude and using WWII era photo equipment could not produce the same results as American KH-11 spy satellites. Even so LW recon operations were absolutely vital in monitoring enemy troops and forming German plans.
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steverodgers801
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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#64

Post by steverodgers801 » 05 Jan 2015, 06:22

As I stated yes the Germans were great at tactical, but even in 1941 when they had free reign in air recon they did not discover the 2nd echelon of Soviet troops.

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#65

Post by paspartoo » 05 Jan 2015, 10:56

Here is information for the period 1940-42:

From ‘The rise and fall of the German air force 1933-45’:
On prewar policy - p46:

Great stress was naturally laid on reconnaissance work in pre-war plans. Some of the Luftwaffe's leading Generals even went so far as to say that the military powers which had the most comprehensive reconnaissance would win a war. When one remembers that about 20 per cent. of Luftwaffe pre-war operational squadrons were equipped with reconnaissance and patrol types of aircraft, it will be realised that the German Air Ministry gave practical backing to its reconnaissance doctrines. The most important task was reconnaissance observation of the enemy air force, the complement to the Luftwaffe view that the first task of the bomber and fighter force was to gain air superiority by weakening the enemy air force. 62. The long-range strategic reconnaissance units were relied upon to obtain early indication of enemy plans and thus to provide a basis for German strategic decisions. The short-range tactical reconnaissance units were to watch over the employment and deployment of enemy land forces up to the point where contact was made between the two sides. ………... ……In the short-range tactical reconnaissance units, emphasis was laid on co-operation with mechanised ground forces, on undertaking artillery spotting and on photographic and visual reconnaissance of enemy movement.

Norway – p63:
A continuous daylight effort by German reconnaissance aircraft maintained a watch on the coastal areas of Norway as well as on the North Sea, so that interference by British naval units could be held at a minimum. Such reconnaissance had established that British transports were heading in the direction of Norway for the landings which took place on April 15th at Narvik and between the 16th and 19th at Namsos and at Andalsnes. From this time the main effort of the operational units at the disposal of Fliegerkorps X was turned to the bombing of British landing points and of the sea transports and their naval escort. Considerable heavy bomber and Stuka forces were thrown into attacks on shipping, whilst sorties by bombers, Stukas and heavy fighters against British and Norwegian ground forces, their supply points and communications, were maintained at a high level. Attempts by the British to establish landing grounds for fighters on frozen lakes were detected by air reconnaissance and the surfaces made useless by bombing.

Battle of France - p69:
In Belgium the German armies had meanwhile been pressing forward, and in the Ardennes had been feeling the way for their main armoured thrust. Day and night air reconnaissance was maintained on an enormous scale, so that the German High Command had a continuous picture of enemy positions, movements and weaknesses. This reconnaissance, undertaken by long-range and tactical units, ranged from the front-line areas to the Channel and Atlantic coasts of France, the North Sea and eastern and south-eastern England. Sifting of these reconnaissance reports, many of which overlapped, gave the Germans an accurate view of the Allied dispositions, and on May 13th their main armoured spearhead struck from Charleville and Sedan across the Meuse towards the West.

Battle of Britain – p81:
The short-range reconnaissance aircraft, which had been used with such success in France, could not be employed over England owing to the fighter opposition, and the long-range reconnaissance units were unable for the same reason to produce a picture comparable with that which had kept the German High Command so well informed in previous campaigns. Nevertheless, reconnaissance showed the landing areas and installations of many of the airfields vital to Fighter Command to be heavily damaged. In spite of this physical damage, however, the R.A.F. was still able to offer considerable and effective opposition, and by the 19th of the month, when bad weather forced a five-day break in operations, the Luftwaffe seemed to be no nearer to forcing a decision.

Eastern front - summer 1941 - p167:
The rapid advance of the German ground forces through Poland into White Russia called for the highest degree of mobility on the part of the close-support forces, and ground organisation of the German Air Force in the field proved itself fully capable of maintaining the serviceability and operational efficiency of units under these conditions. The German Air Force was in fact being employed on the now classic lines evolved by pre-war theory and confirmed with such striking success in practice in previous campaigns ; in particular it will have been noted that the tactical and long-range reconnaissance elements comprised over 700 aircraft, and the extent to which air reconnaissance was carried out was one of the outstanding features. Reconnaissance extended deep into the Russian back areas as well as covering the fighting zones, and the German headquarters were constantly able to form a clear picture, not only of Russian movements and of troop and tank concentrations, but also of the general situation on an extensive front, where the fighting was often extremely confused.

Eastern front - Crimea 1942 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1942’, p20:
Aerial reconnaissance in the fortress area was, for all practical purposes, completed by 1 June 1942. All that then remained to be done was to maintain current surveillance of the entire area of operations by aerial photography, in order to detect any improvements or reinforcements of the existing systems of fortifications and to observe the effects of German fire in the designated target areas.
Stereoscopic air photos proved to be particularly valuable. These were reproduced and distributed to army units, where they greatly facilitated the negotiation by German ground forces of gorges, antitank ditches, and similar natural and man-made obstacles. Reconnaissance was faithfully maintained, and air units participating in such missions gave concise and current reports on changes in the situation and on the effects of German action against targets.


Eastern front - Stalingrad 1942 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1942’, p234
Every single building had been identified on the aerial photos of the city, and every German pilot was assigned his specific target, marked with red arrows on the picture. Each pilot approached his target with the city map in hand, and no one was permitted to drop a bomb until the target had been positively identified and the position of German ground targets ascertained. Yet, despite these hotly contested points, some parts of the city continued to function as if no war were taking place.

Eastern front - Stalingrad 1942 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1942’,p246-8
Early in November, Luftwaffe reconnaissance photos showed that the Russians were constantly increasing the number of bridges being thrown up over the Don River in front of the Rumanian Third Army. The Fuehrer therefore ordered the Luftwaffe to make additional heavy air strikes upon all of these bridge sites and Russian troop assembly areas in the wooded tracts along the northern banks of the Don River. In most cases these very urgent missions could not be carried out because all of the available units of the VIII Air Corps were being utilized in support of the Sixth Army's drive to take Stalingrad. Yet the VIII Air Corps committed elements from time to time, especially after early November, and as soon as weather and ground conditions permitted, against reported Russian assembly areas.
…………………….
Aerial photographs made by reconnaissance units of the Fourth Air Fleet gave increasingly strong reasons for supporting the idea of an intended large-scale Soviet attack, and these developments were followed with considerable anxiety by the air fleet.
…………………….
Surveillance of the entire Kletskaya-Logovskiy-Frolovo area by the Luftwaffe was difficult and risky because of the extremely heavy concentrations of Soviet antiaircraft guns, yet from October 1942 on, recon-naissance results presented an increasingly clear picture of enemy assembly movements north of the Don River. The Soviet rail route from the north through Frolovo to Stalingrad was soon operating at full capacity, and German flyers saw large numbers of Russian troops detraining at every suitable point north and south of Frolovo, sometimes along open stretches of track where little concealment was possible. These Red Army units then moved toward the Don, traveling mostly at night, and approached their bridgeheads on a widely extended front. Night reconnaissance detected enemy vehicular movements, including tank columns, traveling at night with full headlights on.


I'll post more for 1943-44 within the week. As you can imagine checking these books and copying these passages take alot of time.
A simple economist with an unhealthy interest in military and intelligence history.....
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/

steverodgers801
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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#66

Post by steverodgers801 » 08 Jan 2015, 06:49

I believe it was Glantz that said one reason the Germans were surprised is that the 6th army command assumed the Soviets would keep attacking the immediate flanks and did not consider that the Soviets could exploit an attack on the allies. This is how the failure of the German army to respect what intelligence could mean

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#67

Post by paspartoo » 08 Jan 2015, 14:04

Here is information for 1943 from ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ by Hermann Plocher (USAF historical studies). The years 1944-45 were not covered is such detail due to: 'General Plocher's studies of GAF operations in the Eastern Theater of Operations were originally intended to cover the years 1944 and 1945, but his recall in March of 1957 to duty in the new Bundeswehr prevented the realization of the complete project. Consequently, only the years 1941, 1942, and 1943 are covered in the Plocher series.'

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ Kursk intel, p56-7

Early in April German photo-reconnaissance units received orders to carry out reconnaissance missions over the Soviet bulge at Kursk. In spite of strong enemy ground and fighter defenses, two Luftwaffe planes executed this operation, obtaining excellent 20 x 30 cm panorama photos (scale 1:25,000) from an altitude of 17,000 feet. The sector covered in this mission was approximately 7, 200 square miles, the largest tract ever taken in a single sweep by the squadron.
On 22 April Soviet bombers attacked the German airfield at Orsha, destroying aircraft of the 4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron of the 121st Reconnaissance Wing and the 1st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron of the 100th Reconnaissance Wing. Because of this raid, the only operational strategic reconnaissance squadron available to Army Group Center was the 4th (the "Muenchhauseners") of the 14th Wing. Since this unit lacked manpower, it could only assist with reserve aircraft.
On the following day, crews from the two destroyed squadrons arrived and thereafter flew their missions from the same airfield. The additional aircraft servicing and the photo-processing work were handled smoothly by technical service personnel and the Photographic Section of the 4th Squadron, 14th Wing. Through the success of its aerial reconnaissance operations, Luftwaffe Command East made a considerable contribution to all of the German ground defenses in Army Group Center, especially in the winter battles around Orel in the Second Panzer Army sector, where fighting lasted for many weeks.


Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ Kursk AGC, p96

On the afternoon of 8 July 1943 the Russians opened their expected attack from the vast forested sector. VIII Air Corps Headquarters had ordered a constant air surveillance of the area and was informed of this event very soon after the enemy armored, motorized, and infantry units got under way. It had prepared for such a contingency by making certain that it could send all available dive-bomber and antitank air units into action there on short notice.
Before the SS Panzer Corps or Fourth Panzer Army Headquarters even knew what was happening, and before the weak German holding force in the area could deploy for the defense, VIII Air Corps units were already on their way to battle the oncoming Soviet forces.
……………………………..
If the air corps had not made aerial reconnaissance and thereby detected the dangerous menace, and if the antitank air units had not been held ready for action, the Soviet armored drive would undoubtedly have had such a grave effect upon German ground operations that the offensive must have been broken off, perhaps for some time to come.



Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ AGC operations, p119

An extraordinarily large share of the credit for the individual defensive successes achieved in Combat Zone Center was due to the operations of the Sixth Air Fleet. This force, commanded by General-oberst Ritter von Greim, supported the operations of Army Group Center, even under difficult situations. When the Sixth Air Fleet was at its maximum strength for the year (1943), it had only 3 fighter, 3 dive-bomber, and 5 bomber groups. At full strength--these units never actually reached this level--the air fleet would have represented a force of more than 300 aircraft. The badly understrength but extremely active units by their tireless operations, many of which involved combat missions in widely separated areas of crisis on the same day, provided the desperate ground forces with the vital support needed to withstand the enemy attacks. This air support, indeed, helped them to master many a seemingly hopeless situation.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ Kursk Southern area, p127

Although reconnaissance units were tireless in carrying out their missions to provide the necessary data for Army and Luftwaffe forces, the few available fighter units of the 52nd Fighter Wing had a formidable task in combating the rapidly increasing number of enemy fighter and ground-attack forces.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ withdrawal to Dnieper river, p132-3

During all of the withdrawal battles the Fourth Air Fleet closely supported Army Groups "A" and South, especially the latter, sending its squadrons again and again into action against targets on the battlefield, particularly tanks. Operations of this sort became known as fire-fighting tactics and air units which carried them out were called fire brigades.
……………………..
For the command staffs at air fleet, air corps, and air division level, the most important function during these circumstances, apart from the distribution of forces, was to insure continuous aerial surveillance of the entire area in order to obtain as precise a picture as possible of both the air and ground situation.


Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ withdrawal to Dnieper River, p136

About 10 October a night reconnaissance unit of the VIII Air Corps detected a large Soviet force east of Kiev moving from south to north. Since these vehicles were traveling with headlights on, it was easy for German observers to ascertain the size and direction of the movement. News of this regrouping movement was naturally of decisive importance to the Fourth Panzer Army, which was thus able to withdraw forces from its main defensive concentration south of Kiev for commitment elsewhere.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’, p143

The VIII Air Corps did its utmost to insure that the Fourth Panzer Army would have reliable air reconnaissance information. Strategic reconnaissance missions were carried out by the 2nd Squadron of the 11th Strategic Reconnaissance Group from Berdichev, and by tactical reconnaissance units operating out of Kalinovka. The airfield at the latter location had been used as a transshipping center during the time when the German front was still far east of the Volga River and later had been developed as a good air base.


Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ Allied northern convoys, p196-9

Just the problem of regular and timely relief of the aircraft maintaining contact with the convoys was in itself an immense task. The distances involved were usually about 600 miles, and there was a constant shortage of personnel and materiel required for the purpose. But, despite these great difficulties, air and ground teams of the reconnaissance units mastered the problems with almost sportlike enthusiasm. Air reconnaissance and submarine units supplemented each other almost to perfection in the difficult task of locating and keeping under surveillance Allied convoys, and it was rare indeed when contact, once established, was lost for more than six or seven hours. The reports received from the contact aircraft provided the data for the most appropriate use of the available attack forces. The Navy usually posted its submarines in successive lines across the convoy's expected route, while the air units had to wait until the convoy was within their striking range, which was approximately 480 miles. The air forces available for the attack included He-111, and later Ju-88 torpedo and Ju-88 bomber, units. There were just enough airfields available from which these units could operate.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ conclusions, p248

The number of reconnaissance units which were available in the East in 1943 were usually adequate. Unit strengths were generally successfully maintained by the replacement of aircraft, although the types most commonly used for combat and other tactical reconnaissance (Hs-126 and Fw-189) were obsolete. Reconnaissance units submitted frequent urgent requests to have their aircraft replaced by later models. The only two types which had proven to be completely satisfactory were the Me-109 (for tactical reconnaissance) and the Do-217 (for night reconnaissance). The Ju-88, which was used in daylight strategic reconnaissance missions, needed immediate improvements or, if this could not be done, should have been replaced by better aircraft models. Twenty unit leaders were lost during 1943, largely because of the continued use of obsolete aircraft models. It was therefore essential to have reequipped these reconnaissance units so that they could have continued to perform their missions in a satisfactory manner.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ conclusions, p265

In the Black Sea areas land-based planes and seaplanes kept the Soviet naval bases and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet under constant surveillance. This alone enabled the weak German naval security units to operate in the area. In the Baltic, Luftwaffe operations were restricted to reconnaissance over the Gulf of Finland, since the forces available to the First Air Fleet were too weak to eliminate Allied forces at sea or Soviet naval forces by offensive operations. In northern waters the cooperation between Luftwaffe and Navy forces was generally good, and, at intermediate and lower command levels, even very good, a fact which was reflected in the successful achievements in operations against single vessels and formations of Allied ships, and in providing cover for friendly convoys.

Eastern front - 1943 - ‘The German air force versus Russia 1943’ 1944-45 period, p268

Note by the Chief, USAF Historical Division: This closing section is contributed by the editor, Mr. Harry R. Fletcher. General Plocher's studies of GAF operations in the Eastern Theater of Operations were originally intended to cover the years 1944 and 1945, but his recall in March of 1957 to duty in the new Bundeswehr prevented the realization of the complete project. Consequently, only the years 1941, 1942, and 1943 are covered in the Plocher series. Unfortunately, the German Air Force Monograph Project had to be brought to an end before a new author could be found to write the story for 1944 and 1945. Mr. Fletcher's contribution, together with other studies in the GAF Monograph Project which deal with the Eastern Front, helps to fill this gap.
A simple economist with an unhealthy interest in military and intelligence history.....
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steverodgers801
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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#68

Post by steverodgers801 » 08 Jan 2015, 17:12

The problem with data is unless it is assessed properly and sent to the right people it is useless. Assessing data was the German weakness

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#69

Post by Konig_pilsner » 22 Jan 2015, 11:52

The problem with data is unless it is assessed properly and sent to the right people it is useless. Assessing data was the German weakness
Care to elaborate?

KP

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#70

Post by steverodgers801 » 22 Jan 2015, 21:44

The Germans failed to anticipate the Soviets attack against the Rumanian armies on the flanks of 6th army, they failed to anticipate the ability of the Soviets to attack while defending Kursk, they failed to anticipate the massive attack on AGC in 1944

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#71

Post by ljadw » 22 Jan 2015, 22:08

And the US failed to anticipate the Japanese attack against PH,and Britain and France failed to anticipate the attack at Sedan,and the SU failed to anticipate Barbarossa,etc,etc.

Besides,the results of the German failures were not important.The same for the failures of the other nations .

If all had anticipated what they failed to anticipate,the result would be the same .

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#72

Post by stg 44 » 23 Jan 2015, 00:59

steverodgers801 wrote:The Germans failed to anticipate the Soviets attack against the Rumanian armies on the flanks of 6th army, they failed to anticipate the ability of the Soviets to attack while defending Kursk, they failed to anticipate the massive attack on AGC in 1944
AFAIK they did anticipate the attacks, but high command dismissed the reports coming in. It was very hard to hide that sort of build up.

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#73

Post by steverodgers801 » 23 Jan 2015, 21:15

Even 6th army was expecting attacks on its immediate flanks and not how large the would be against the Rumanians.

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#74

Post by Knouterer » 11 Jun 2015, 11:27

As noted before, the "organized chaos of the Third Reich" severely hampered intelligence efforts; David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, has many examples.

For instance, the Forschungsamt, part of Göring's personal empire, intercepted and decoded diplomatic cables, and so did "Pers Z" of the Foreign Office. Needless to say, there was no coordination or communication between the two.

According to Kahn (p. 193), "in view of the extreme rarity of good cryptanalysts, this duplication of the work of Pers Z and the Forschungsamt stands out as the most wasteful operation of the entire German intelligence effort."
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

#75

Post by Knouterer » 11 Jun 2015, 11:35

Another factor in favour of the Allies was that they could count on the cooperation of large numbers of people - in occupied countries and elsewhere - who really wanted to bring about the downfall of Nazi Germany, and often were willing to risk their lives in that cause.

In contrast, people spying for the Germans did so out of mercenary motives, by and large, and were often quite willing to cheat and mislead their spymasters, or to change sides if that seemed to their advantage. Towards the end of the war, many refused German money, which they suspected would soon be worthless, and demanded payment in gold, diamonds or drugs.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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