Why was German intelligence so inefficient?

[Ifor]

Where does Gehlen fit in this? How did other Axis intelligence units compare?

[ljadw]

Where is the proof that German intelligence was so inefficient ?

[Knouterer]

On the subject of aerial reconnaissance: Nigel J. Clarke has published a few collections of Luftwaffe photographs and notes in his comments:

“The planes flew to 37,000 feet, observing and photographing targets. The film was then taken back to their bases, developed and collated. The Germans used the photographs in conjunction with British Ordnance Survey maps (one inch to one mile). Extracts of the map and copies of the target photographs were then supplied to the bomber crews. (…) After the war, the allies had the chance to examine the records of the Luftwaffe reconnaissance section. The allies were surprised to discover errors in the interpretation of the photographic material. The interpreters were of low status, and did not conduct systematic research on the photographs. (…) Underground and semi-sunken buildings were missed. The interpreters did not use stereoscopic viewers, which would have increased their analytical interpretation. Many of the important strategic targets lacked a coherent policy of on-going reconnaissance. The Germans often relied on old photographs and intelligence gathered shortly before the war …”

Richard Hough and Denis Richards note in “The Battle of Britain” (1989, p. 214-215) that by August the Luftwaffe had found that the cost in men and machines of low-level reconnaissance was too high, and had switched to using Ju 86P with special supercharged engines and pressurised cabins, which could not be intercepted (until special high-altitude Spitfires became available later in the war):

“On the other hand, at these altitudes, even superb German optical equipment was unable to reveal detail with any accuracy; and that was the reason why Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3 had been informed by intelligence that the Coastal Command airfield at Thorney Island, and the naval air stations at Ford and Gosport, were important front-line Fighter Command airfields: the parked aircraft appeared to confirm it.”

The attacks on these airfields, and the many attacks on RAF Eastchurch, which also was not a Fighter Command base (even if fighter squadrons did operate from there at various times), certainly point to a serious failure of Luftwaffe reconnaissance/intelligence.

[steverodgers801]

The Soviets were masters of hiding from aerial recon which is why the Germans usually failed to discover Soviet dispositions

[Ifor]

I realise Gehlen's reputation has been questioned in the last few years, but weren't his reports quite accurate?
Is there any info on other Axis intelligence services?

[paspartoo]

Why was German intelligence so inefficient? Hmmm... well I’m not mr Nigel J. Clarke or Knouterer or steverodgers801 so I guess my opinion doesn’t count for much but maybe the reality was the exact opposite? Then again intelligence/sigint/codebreaking hasn’t been covered well by researchers/authors due to several reasons. Most important being that from the 1970’s GCHQ and NSA have published their version of history (good for their budgets) while the files of the German agencies were declassified (in part) only in the 2000’s. The second problem is that people haven’t read the official histories ‘British intelligence in the second world war’. Those volumes don’t exaggerate like authors do.
Thats my two cents, based on my very limited knowledge of WWII intelligence operations.

[ljadw]

I realise Gehlen's reputation has been questioned in the last few years, but weren't his reports quite accurate?

No,they weren't quite accurate,not that it made much difference .

[stg 44]

The Soviets were masters of hiding from aerial recon which is why the Germans usually failed to discover Soviet dispositions

Not to hard to hide when it was none existent from 1942 over AGs Center and North and then in much of AG South after Kursk. By the time Bagration happened AG Center had 30 fighters, effectively meaning they couldn't launch recon unless the Soviets wanted to let them, which they sometimes did to spread disinformation. I've heard this trope constantly on several sites now about the 'magical' Soviet Maskirovka when in reality from 1942 on most of the Eastern Front was deprived of aerial recon abilities, which only got worse as time went on to the point it was virtually nonexistent by 1944. In that case its very easy to hide things from aerial recon.

[paspartoo]

At any given time more than 10% of Luftwaffe aircraft were recon planes. Field commanders constantly received information from Luftwaffe recon planes, especially during mobile operations. Short range units flew in areas clode to the front, while long range units flew multi-hour missions in the enemy rear. A good article about the Luftwaffe is The Luftwaffe’s Agility: An Assessment of Relevant Concepts and Practices by Dr Joel Hayward

http://www.joelhayward.org/AgileAirForce.pdf

For the recon units there are a couple of books from 'Luftwaffe Colours: Aufklarer'.

[stg 44]

I am aware of LW recon capabilities. Hayward also has many papers about the 1942 Eastern Front campaign in the south, which concentrated most LW aircraft with AG-South. AG-North had 300 aircraft and AG-Center had 600, which if your point holds means 30 and 60 recon aircraft respectively. Given the fronts they operated on that was no where near sufficient given the ~60 operational rating of aircraft on static fronts in the East, leaving ~20 and ~40 aircraft for recon in those two AGs in much of 1942. Later things varied, but overall aircraft numbers in the East went down even as aircraft numbers were rebalanced between the various AGs. It was pretty clear that the LW was not providing sufficient intelligence due to the lack of numbers in the East, not to mention the issues with interpretation of aerial recon data. 1941 was the high water mark for the whole Eastern front in terms of aerial recon, with every year thereafter being a slow slide into impotence.

[paspartoo]

I am aware of LW recon capabilities.

Friend, why do you keep posting about things that you don’t know much about? The way it works in a forum is that if you know about a particular topic you can make sweeping statements. If you don’t you need to ask people who know more than you.

AG-North had 300 aircraft and AG-Center had 600, which if your point holds means 30 and 60 recon aircraft respectively. Given the fronts they operated on that was no where near sufficient given the ~60 operational rating of aircraft on static fronts in the East, leaving ~20 and ~40 aircraft for recon in those two AGs in much of 1942.

From the ‘Luftwaffe data book’ I have for July ’42 – Luft 1: 58 recon , 39 operational , Lw Kd Ost: 84 recon – 56 operational. For Luft 4 – 298 recon, 191 operational. Seems that they had enough to cover static fronts and a lot for the drive South.

Later things varied, but overall aircraft numbers in the East went down even as aircraft numbers were rebalanced between the various AGs. It was pretty clear that the LW was not providing sufficient intelligence due to the lack of numbers in the East, not to mention the issues with interpretation of aerial recon data. 1941 was the high water mark for the whole Eastern front in terms of aerial recon, with every year thereafter being a slow slide into impotence

If you say so… This is turning into comedy . I’ll try to find the quote from 1943 on the value of aerial reconnaissance for the German victory in the Ukraine in early 1943. This is when the LW was incapable of any recon according to you.
As I said before recon both short range and long range was one of the main commitments of the LW and provided a constant stream of intelligence to field commanders (through the developed German communications system). Photo reconnaissance together with communications intelligence was used successfully by the Germans throughout the war.

[stg 44]

Thank you self appoint expert of all for pointing out your opinions. I was making rough calculations based on your percentage, so thanks for providing the exact numbers. Now that we have those for July, what is sufficient recon capability? In August AG-North was surprised by the Soviet offensive to relieve Leningrad and later in 1942 AG-Center was surprised by the Rzhev offensive, so clearly what aerial recon capabilities they had were not sufficient; plus reading ER Hooton's book on the LW among others does repeatedly mention the lack of sufficient aerial recon capabilities on the Eastern Front, with the starting phase of Case Blue being an exception due to the vast majority of LW power being concentrated for that offensive.

As to your last jab I didn't say the LW had no recon capabilities, rathe they were insufficient for the majority of the Eastern Front barring some local exceptions; Ukraine in 1943 was only a portion of the front and was the main focus of operations, so they got the lions share of aerial resources, enabling them some detection capabilities. There were aerial recon successes throughout the war of course, no one is claiming otherwise, but it was a degrading capability after Barbarossa started and casualties stacked up.

[paspartoo]

Thank you self appoint expert of all for pointing out your opinions.

I don’t know if I’m an expert or not but I certainly know more than you on this subject.

I was making rough calculations based on your percentage, so thanks for providing the exact numbers. Now that we have those for July, what is sufficient recon capability? In August AG-North was surprised by the Soviet offensive to relieve Leningrad and later in 1942 AG-Center was surprised by the Rzhev offensive, so clearly what aerial recon capabilities they had were not sufficient;

You mean the offensive that even Gehlen got right? Yeah the Germans were definitely surprised. Great research there mate.

plus reading ER Hooton's book on the LW among others does repeatedly mention the lack of sufficient aerial recon capabilities on the Eastern Front, with the starting phase of Case Blue being an exception due to the vast majority of LW power being concentrated for that offensive.

I’m sorry that the LW didn’t have several thousand recon planes flying around 24/7 in order to cover 100% of the huge distances of the SU. They did however invest significant resources in the recon arm and with the numbers available flew every day and monitored enemy activities both at the front and at long distances in the enemy rear. This information was used in order to attack enemy concentrations and evaluate enemy moves. Accurate intelligence from photo reconnaissance was one of the standard ‘tools’ for German commanders (the other was signals intelligence). I don’t know why it’s so difficult for you to understand this (and I can’t say I really care).
My advice is to read more on the subject and especially on the LW.

[stg 44]

Again you are misrepresenting what I am saying here: the LW was a declining asset from 1941 on on the Eastern Front. It was weaker every year and thus didn't have the same capacities it did previously, so wasn't able to collect the same level of intelligence, which in turn made Soviet deception operations work better because of declining aerial recon information to work off of and potentially spot Soviet troop movements and concentrations. It wasn't that the LW didn't try to do its job or that aerial recon was the only tool at their disposal, but it was one that was decreasingly available. I don't know what about that concept is so hard for you to accept, perhaps that its coming from me? My entire point was the Soviet Maskivorka worked better the less the LW as able to do recon work in the East as its numbers dropped off due to attrition and demands on other fronts.

As to Rzhev and surprise, I was not talking about Mars, instead the July offensive at Rzhev in 1942:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0 ... 0%B8%D1%8F

[Ifor]

Apart from the Luftwaffe aspect, why was the intelligence son inaccurate?