Barbarossa Derailed series, Glantz

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This thread is a discussion about the Barbarossa Derailed series:

Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941

Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941

Volume 2: The German Offensives on the Flanks and the Third Soviet Counteroffensive, 25 August-10 September 1941

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This is definitely not an easy read but good things rarely are. It requires one to gather all their prior learning on mechanized warfare, and provide an interpretation. I find myself looking at the maps constantly. Minus notes, the text is around 1,000 pages. It's a slow but very revealing read from the Army Group/Front level.

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I think that review raises some points, but overall it has only little value- the series is meant to be overly detailed.

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notes: It looks like a key failing in the execution of Smolensk operation was the dispersal of effort; the divisions were quite scattered in their advances and not shoulder to shoulder, thus dissipating their strength.

Smolensk: Guderian has much to blame?

There are a large number of maps in the book- about 100- and it looks like Guderian's performance in executing the double envelopment was much worse than Hoth's. The drive to Yel'yna in particular was very wasteful.

I believe that the Battle of Smolensk and its aftermath can be seen as a very costly operational victory and a strategic disaster. Vital opportunities were thrown away, never to return. 760,000 soviet casualties were inflicted but only 480,000 were permanent. Of these permanent losses, 180,000 Soviets had to be killed in action, which required great efforts.

The main costs:

1. The Greatest one: Time (2 months of stalling)

2. Wear and tear, and losses of 60% of German Armor. Much of this was permanent loss, and never repaired and replaced back up to original strength.

3. Enormous expenditure of supplies that adversely effected future operations by dulling them. Most critical of all were ammunition and fuel. There were incremental losses of aircraft, trucks, cars, and other vehicles.

4. Casualties: Around 20-25% of the combat manpower in AGC, but half of this shortfall was replaced after the battle. A total of 115,000 casualties for AGC until Sept. 10, 1941.

It looks to me that the only way Smolensk can be seen as a clear operational victory is if the Smolensk pocket was efficiently made, and then cleared in two weeks maximum just like the B-Minsk pocket. Another prerequisite is that there would be no substantial commitment of mobile divisions in defensive operations. Timoshenko and Zhukov's counteroffensives must be pre-empted.

The result would free AGC in mid-July and give it enough residual capacity to jump into a second encirclement battle towards Moscow. The flanks of AGC would still have to be cleared. von Bock was facing an epically high hurdle to qualify "successes". They had to be near flawless, and at the same operational standard as Minsk.

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I finished reading book 1. This series is head and shoulders better and more detailed than other books on Barbarossa.

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Finished #2. Again, excellent.