Reliability of Paul Carell
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Carell writes on page 226 of 'Invasion' that British losses in taking Caen were greater than 'those expected for the 'entire campaign to Berlin'.
He also says in the 1994 intro (page 8)that the invasion that the Allies expected to be 'a quick victorious raid' did not work and that the Germans 'foiled the Allied timetable'. Carell is cleary talking from his nether regions because he seems completely unaware the Allies did not expect to reach Germany until D+330 May 1945. They in fact got there in September 1944 some 8 months ahead of schedule.
Reality is that despite claims the Germans 'slowed' the Allies the victory was far easier than they planned. They were never slowed down at all. I believe the Germans were finally beaten a full year ahead of the expected date.
He also says in the 1994 intro (page 8)that the invasion that the Allies expected to be 'a quick victorious raid' did not work and that the Germans 'foiled the Allied timetable'. Carell is cleary talking from his nether regions because he seems completely unaware the Allies did not expect to reach Germany until D+330 May 1945. They in fact got there in September 1944 some 8 months ahead of schedule.
Reality is that despite claims the Germans 'slowed' the Allies the victory was far easier than they planned. They were never slowed down at all. I believe the Germans were finally beaten a full year ahead of the expected date.
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:Sheldrake wrote:Marcus Wendel wrote:maarten swarts wrote:What a complete useless discussion. Of course was Carell everything for what you blame him.The problem is that his books are still easily available and if read by someone without knowledge of the background (as you explained it) they will get wrong information and get the wrong understanding as we have seen examples of here in the forum.maarten swarts wrote:Nowadays there is not a serious historian that uses his books as a reference.
/Marcus
I think this illustrates why the discipline of history matters. The public should be taught to ask questions about the reliability and bias of sources. Approached from this angle Paul Carell is clearly biased and was imaginative in his sources.
I use his account of Omaha beach as an example of a highly coloured but very unreliable source. He quotes dialogue which can at best have been reconstructed from Serveloh alone.
Which dialogue pl? Anything which is of material value to history? Anything which changes facts? "Are we not going to have any breakfast today?" Or maybe "The big one is coming inshore" ...How about "hold your fire till the enemy is coming up to the waterline.."
Which part of his account of Omaha is "highly coloured" or "unreliable"?
Well written journalese. But did the incidents occur take place as written? The dialogue sounds plausible, but was this Serveloh's recollections ten years after the event or Carell's imagination? Is this history or historical fiction?Lance-Corporal Hein Severloh, a farmer from Metzingen, near Celle, was standing in the personnel trench of strongpoint WN62, scanning the dark, hazy sea in front of the dunes of Colleville through his battery commander's field-glasses. Sergeant Krone was sitting in the entrance to the bunker that housed the observation-post of 1st Battery, 352nd Artillery Regiment. "See anything, Hein?" asked Krone. "Nothing's happening. Not a thing. The big one is still hove to, absolutely motionless. But there are more ships coming up now. And our naval gunners from Port-en-Bessin are firing light signals—two red and two green. Maybe they want to make quite sure. But the ships aren't replying. So perhaps our boys in Port-en-Bessin are now convinced that those fellows out at sea belong to the other side." Every word of Hein Severloh's running commentary was passed on by Erroné through the open bunker entrance to Lieutenant Frerking. The lieutenant was sitting inside the bunker at the telephone, waiting for his moment. The moment when he would give the four 105-millimetre howitzers of his 1st Battery, back in positions near Houtteville, the target indication and fire order. "They're taking their time," remarked Second Lieutenant Grass, the observation officer. "Maybe we aren't on their list," the battery commander said, laughing. On getting the alarm from Major Pluskat they had immediately driven up from their comfortable billet in Monsieur Fernand Le Grand's farmhouse at Houtteville. The strongpoint, under Sergeant Pieh with about nineteen men of 726th Grenadier Regiment, was already on the alert. "Bombers above the clouds," Sergeant Krone called out. They listened. The air above them was vibrant with the noise. And then began the inferno of bomb bursts. They ducked their heads. But only two bombs fell within the position of the strongpoint. Everything else came down on the open ground behind them. Paul Carrell:” Invasion! They're Coming!' New York: Dutton, 1963
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Sheldrake wrote:
Well written journalese. But did the incidents occur take place as written? The dialogue sounds plausible, but was this Serveloh's recollections ten years after the event or Carell's imagination? Is this history or historical fiction?
Which part of the narrative seems to be fictionalised? Whatever has been described actually happened..it all ties up in the end...unless there is other evidence to the contrary.
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Michael Kenny wrote:Carell writes on page 226 of 'Invasion' that British losses in taking Caen were greater than 'those expected for the 'entire campaign to Berlin'.
He also says in the 1994 intro (page 8)that the invasion that the Allies expected to be 'a quick victorious raid' did not work and that the Germans 'foiled the Allied timetable'. Carell is cleary talking from his nether regions because he seems completely unaware the Allies did not expect to reach Germany until D+330 May 1945. They in fact got there in September 1944 some 8 months ahead of schedule.
Reality is that despite claims the Germans 'slowed' the Allies the victory was far easier than they planned. They were never slowed down at all. I believe the Germans were finally beaten a full year ahead of the expected date.
Cant locate this on pg 226 of my copy. Pl name the chapter etc,
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
It is page 227 and proof positive Carell has not got a clue about Normandy.
Even you will have to admit that is one of the silliest claims ever made.
Even you will have to admit that is one of the silliest claims ever made.
Last edited by Michael Kenny on 17 Feb 2015, 21:16, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
The best that can be said about Carell is he is not as bad as Kurowski-if we judge by output!sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:
Which part of the narrative seems to be fictionalised? Whatever has been described actually happened..it all ties up in the end...unless there is other evidence to the contrary.
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Paul Carell his real name or a nom de plume?
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Real name : Paul-Karl Schmidt,former SS Obersturmbannführer and self-declared historian
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Hmm potentially all of it. "Paul Carell" has quoted named individuals with words that they may or may not have spoken. He was not there and because he does not list his sources, we don't what information he used to reconstruct the scene. We do not know how much of this is true. it is not a primary source. This is journslism not history.sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:Sheldrake wrote:
Well written journalese. But did the incidents occur take place as written? The dialogue sounds plausible, but was this Serveloh's recollections ten years after the event or Carell's imagination? Is this history or historical fiction?
Which part of the narrative seems to be fictionalised? Whatever has been described actually happened..it all ties up in the end...unless there is other evidence to the contrary.
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
I recall from reading his various books in English translations conversations among soldiers would frequently start with "Man,.." Do not know if common practice among German young males of the era or not.
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
It's possible Carell/Schmidt's statement about British casualty estimates for Normandy/NW Europe may actually be the truth, or close to it.
According to C.P.Stacy and subsequent Normandy historians like d'Este, British planning for Overlord and the NW European campaign included casualty estimates for 21 Army Group which were far too low. The Imperial General Staff/War Office based their projected casualties for the NW European campaign on casualty rates taken during the North African campaign. Presumably, they assumed that combat conditions across France would closely resemble mobile, fluid desert warfare.
Obviously, the sheer density of Allied forces after landing and NW European terrain created combat conditions quite unlike the open desert, and for the first 2 months combat was more like trench warfare and led to casualties which approached WWI levels, far higher than those originally estimated by the War Office.
I've been unable so far to determine whether the losses from June 6 to the first week of July (the taking of Caen) totaled more than the War Office's projections for the entire NW campaign, as Carell seems to be saying. My guess is that Carell sourced this claim from a reading of Stacey's work, but Carell either exaggerated or misunderstood exactly what was said. I don't think he'd just make such a statement up without a kernel of truth to it - even journalists have at least some scruples!
According to C.P.Stacy and subsequent Normandy historians like d'Este, British planning for Overlord and the NW European campaign included casualty estimates for 21 Army Group which were far too low. The Imperial General Staff/War Office based their projected casualties for the NW European campaign on casualty rates taken during the North African campaign. Presumably, they assumed that combat conditions across France would closely resemble mobile, fluid desert warfare.
Obviously, the sheer density of Allied forces after landing and NW European terrain created combat conditions quite unlike the open desert, and for the first 2 months combat was more like trench warfare and led to casualties which approached WWI levels, far higher than those originally estimated by the War Office.
I've been unable so far to determine whether the losses from June 6 to the first week of July (the taking of Caen) totaled more than the War Office's projections for the entire NW campaign, as Carell seems to be saying. My guess is that Carell sourced this claim from a reading of Stacey's work, but Carell either exaggerated or misunderstood exactly what was said. I don't think he'd just make such a statement up without a kernel of truth to it - even journalists have at least some scruples!
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Sean, Stacey and d'Este are actually incorrect in that. The initial estimate for D-Day was 10,000 casualties, which included a large percentage assumed drowned in ships and craft expected to be mined. The problem with that projection and the later ones is that they failed to account for the pulse-like nature of the campaign adequately. Furthermore, the estimates were continually revised - they weren't static - and by the end were more or less what was "expected". The data set used was also continually expanded by ORS groups and eventually encompassed experience in Italy and Greece as well as NWE, which then became the basis for the postwar rates used by the UK (and in modified form by the U.S.)Sean Oliver wrote:It's possible Carell/Schmidt's statement about British casualty estimates for Normandy/NW Europe may actually be the truth, or close to it.
According to C.P.Stacy and subsequent Normandy historians like d'Este, British planning for Overlord and the NW European campaign included casualty estimates for 21 Army Group which were far too low. The Imperial General Staff/War Office based their projected casualties for the NW European campaign on casualty rates taken during the North African campaign. Presumably, they assumed that combat conditions across France would closely resemble mobile, fluid desert warfare.
Obviously, the sheer density of Allied forces after landing and NW European terrain created combat conditions quite unlike the open desert, and for the first 2 months combat was more like trench warfare and led to casualties which approached WWI levels, far higher than those originally estimated by the War Office.
I've been unable so far to determine whether the losses from June 6 to the first week of July (the taking of Caen) totaled more than the War Office's projections for the entire NW campaign, as Carell seems to be saying. My guess is that Carell sourced this claim from a reading of Stacey's work, but Carell either exaggerated or misunderstood exactly what was said. I don't think he'd just make such a statement up without a kernel of truth to it - even journalists have at least some scruples!
The rates - the Evett Rates - were based on Great War experience modified to account for the "modern" nature of warfare, which meant the experience from North Africa. The rate used a low, medium, and high intensity assumption, and a "double-high" rate was presumed for Normandy. The American Army adopted them as well for NWE, but the real problem wasn't the rates; it was the breakdown of the rates by type of unit. The rates badly undercounted infantry casualties, while overcounting casualties to armor and artillery.
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Thanks, Rich: I was guilty of over-simplifying D'Este's claims in my earlier post. He actually described things much as you do, but he also seemed to smell a rat somewhere in the 'official records'.
His suspicion was that during planning for Overlord, the Gen Staff and/or War Office based 21 Army Group's future manpower needs on casualty estimates which they should've known ahead of time were too low, thus contributing to Britain's already serious manpower 'crisis' later, once the campaign was underway. Naturally, these estimates were adjusted according to the situation, as you say, but these things required planning months in advance because of time needed for training, equipping transportation etc. That's why the low estimates were a potential problem. I think.
Unfortunately D'Este's evidence of Pre-Overlord-British-casualty-underestimation wasn't that clear to begin with. He basically ends up describing exactly what you did; infantry losses were far more than expected, when compared as a percentage to the other arms. Big deal. It's the total number that is more important here.
He never quotes an actual planning figure that enables us to say "Before Overlord, the WO estimated 50,000 UK casualties to defeat Germany, but it turned out to be 200,000".
D'Este says he couldn't get the full picture from the necessary archives because they told him all 160 boxes of the Army Adjutant General's WW2 records went missing!
This is swerving dangerously off topic...
His suspicion was that during planning for Overlord, the Gen Staff and/or War Office based 21 Army Group's future manpower needs on casualty estimates which they should've known ahead of time were too low, thus contributing to Britain's already serious manpower 'crisis' later, once the campaign was underway. Naturally, these estimates were adjusted according to the situation, as you say, but these things required planning months in advance because of time needed for training, equipping transportation etc. That's why the low estimates were a potential problem. I think.
Unfortunately D'Este's evidence of Pre-Overlord-British-casualty-underestimation wasn't that clear to begin with. He basically ends up describing exactly what you did; infantry losses were far more than expected, when compared as a percentage to the other arms. Big deal. It's the total number that is more important here.
He never quotes an actual planning figure that enables us to say "Before Overlord, the WO estimated 50,000 UK casualties to defeat Germany, but it turned out to be 200,000".
D'Este says he couldn't get the full picture from the necessary archives because they told him all 160 boxes of the Army Adjutant General's WW2 records went missing!
This is swerving dangerously off topic...
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Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
Colossal Cracks give the estimated 21st AG casualties for the first 6 months as 61,255 Infantry or all arms of 171,855 v the reality of 109,396 all arms.
Re: Reliability of Paul Carell
No wholly off topic as D'Este's interest in British infantry replacements is an illustration of the bias.Sean Oliver wrote:Thanks, Rich: I was guilty of over-simplifying D'Este's claims in my earlier post. He actually described things much as you do, but he also seemed to smell a rat somewhere in the 'official records'.
His suspicion was that during planning for Overlord, the Gen Staff and/or War Office based 21 Army Group's future manpower needs on casualty estimates which they should've known ahead of time were too low, thus contributing to Britain's already serious manpower 'crisis' later, once the campaign was underway. Naturally, these estimates were adjusted according to the situation, as you say, but these things required planning months in advance because of time needed for training, equipping transportation etc. That's why the low estimates were a potential problem. I think.
Unfortunately D'Este's evidence of Pre-Overlord-British-casualty-underestimation wasn't that clear to begin with. He basically ends up describing exactly what you did; infantry losses were far more than expected, when compared as a percentage to the other arms. Big deal. It's the total number that is more important here.
He never quotes an actual planning figure that enables us to say "Before Overlord, the WO estimated 50,000 UK casualties to defeat Germany, but it turned out to be 200,000".
D'Este says he couldn't get the full picture from the necessary archives because they told him all 160 boxes of the Army Adjutant General's WW2 records went missing!
This is swerving dangerously off topic...
D'Este is an american solider and historian.
At the back of the relations between the Anglo-American relations was the American suspicion that the British were not pulling their weight. There was Churchill and Alanbrooke's reluctance to charge across the channel in 1942 and 43 and their predilection for dalliances on the Mediterranean periphery. Having accepted a commitment to Op Overlord, the British announce that they cannot find enough infantrymen among the 300m population of their empire to maintain ten infantry divisions in the field for a year on the decisive front.
D'Este was a serious historian and his uses of sources cannot be compated to the propaganda writer Carell. However, he had a bias. He was far happier looking for dirt on allied planners and commanders than analysing what happened on the battlefield. All to often he simply ignores the Germans even though they had a big say in whether a particular allied plan worked out!
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