Lost Victories - Missing Chapter

[ravensclaw]

Hi everyone

<it has been a long time since my last post >


I have purchased an English version of Lost Victories by Erich Von Manstein. It is an excellent book that drills into many details of each famous battle Manstein was involved in.

Sadly the chapter on Operation Citadel was removed by the publisher and replaced with an essay by Manstein that only covered the battle broadly. The excuse by the publisher was that the volume was too big and it needed to be trimmed.

Is there an english pdf (or similar) covering this chapter and if so does anyone have any suggestions how I could acquire it?


Regards

[Dann Falk]

I too would like to read the "Lost Chapter" on Kursk...if found.

[Mori]

The lost chapter is a pretty interesting point. There is just no excuse for the translator to drop it - he saved something like 15 pages of work out of 400... There is also little excuse for the publisher(s) not to have fixed it over the years.

Interestingly, this removed section includes the only statement of the book where Manstein admits he "may have been wrong". (That's about the decision to launch Citadel). As far as I remember, there are also some harsh words against Model that did not make it to the English version. Manstein, of course, would not dare criticize any still alive general...

The original French translation has the full text. (The recent French re-issue is a shameful translation from the English).

[JC]

Yes it is interesting! Do you have the original French version that you could post?

[Mori]

Unfortunately not... When I investigated the matter, I read it at the BnF (equivalent to Library of Congress).

[Mori]

I found my notes from 10 years ago, about the missing chapter.
(It also makes me realize I'm much more knowledgeable now than I used to be...)

***

The original text includes a 40 pages chapter about Kursk against a mere 10 pages in English. The (very wrong) map is the same.

First, Manstein explains that, after his succesful counter stroke of winter 43 that stopped the advancing Russians and took back Kharkov, he proposed Hitler more of the same. His idea was to retreat from advanced areas (Orel, Donetz salients) in order to create a reserve, then to let Russian attack and to hit them on their flank after they had exhausted some of their momentum. This was of course dangerous, but OTOH there was, according to Manstein, little of interest to be kept between Kiev and Kharkov and plenty of space for such a manoeuvre.

The idea was turned down by Hitler who argued about key manganese mines in the Donetz salient and would always give up territory reluctantly. Moreover, there was the risk that the Russian attack would simply not happen, or only happen after Western Allies had opened a second front.

Secondly, the non-translated chapter includes interesting comments about Model. In his book, Manstein is reluctant to give names of other German commanders, esp. when there was some friction with them. For example, he never mentions the name of the Army Group A (Caucasus) commander when that guy refuses to transfer him some troops during the Stalingrad battle. The Army Group Center commander (von Kluge) does not appear either. To me, the most striking fact was he would not say a word about the AGC commander who was stopped cold in the northern part of the Kursk battle - that is Model.

But the truth is he actually speaks a lot of Model in the original book. Mansteins even gives Model one of the very few complete portraits of his book. So we all know that Kursk is said to have failed because if was delayed for months (Glantz destroys that belief with convincing arguments, but that's not the point). What Manstein says, though, is that Citadel was delayed because of Model!

During a conference held on 04 May 1943 with Hitler, Manstein, Kluge, Guderian and a couple more, dicussion focused on a memo from Model (Model was not high enough to be invited to this conference but he had a special link to Hitler that would short-circuit v.Kluge). Model explains that the Russian defense is already so strong, with lots of AT guns and new weapons better than panzer type IV armor, that the battle could not be any blitzkrieg. Although Manstein and Kluge minimize Russian fortifications, Hitler, much impressed by Model's comments, decides to postpone Citadel until new Tigers & Panthers have arrived.

It is very interesting, also, to learn that Germans were from the start informed that Russians had built formidable fortifications. And at not point did Manstein oppose to Citadel itself. Although the German ofensive had the big flaw of being obvious (which Manstein forgets), Manstein and all the others did not seriously consider it could fail. (Glantz is convincing about this, but that's also what you read in vintage Manstein). Manstein admits he may have done a mistake there. It probably the only sentence of his book when he does so -and it was not translated in English.

Manstein also says that he considered the "big picture" of the European front. He insisted on attacking early not only to prevent Russians from reinforcing too much but also not to be handicaped by an Anglo-American landing in the West. Difficult to say how strong was his point back then. It's definitively easier to justify oneself after the action.

Finaly, a detail. On 03 July, Manstein flies to Bucarest to give a medal to Antonescu to celebrate Sebastopol fall's aniversary. This is a deception measure not to warn Russian the D-Day is on the 05th. It was completely useless.

[krichter33]

Well, it appears Model was right. Also according to Newton's biography of him, Model was very much against the attack, and tried to delay as long as possible...hoping for an eventual cancellation, since Model was more concerned about the Orel salient. Interesting that Manstein indirectly confirms this!