Tiger B wrote: ...
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... -mine.html
A newspaper article that lists mostly anonymous sources hardly makes a strong case.
Agreed, in this instance, the DailyMail uses the term 'Nazi Bomb' without specific reference to whom the 'Asse Boss' was and ignoring the site's later use by the post war German atomic energy program.
However;
Alwin Urff no longer alive, unfortunately. The man worked until the end of the eighties in the line of Lower Saxony atom bearing Asse II , deputy manager was there and today would be a good witness in his own cause.
The nuclear waste storage aces at Remlingen (Wolfenbüttel). "When we started with the incorporation in 1967, our company has sunk as the first radioactive waste from the last war, those uranium waste that were incurred in the preparation of the German atomic bomb." This quote by the former head of the Asse II, Alwin Urff, causes quite a stir.
(Photo: Reuters)
Urff had in fact leave 37 years ago, amazingly open to today's standards in the Hannover Allgemeine Zeitung (HAZ) quote: "When we started in 1967 with the storage," it says in its issue of July 29, 1974 at the end of a report about the time of the Society for Radiological Protection (GfS) powered aces, "our society has sunk as the first radioactive waste from the last war, those uranium waste produced during the preparation of the German atomic bomb were incurred.
http://translate.google.com/translate?h ... %26noj%3D1
They are not alone in their coverage or their use of the term Nazi Bomb.
I would suggest that the fomer manager of the facility would be more knowedgable than you as to the origins of the material in that storage site. What are your qualifications to refute him?
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“Our previous hopes that an implosion type of bomb might be developed in the late spring of 1945 have now been dissipated by scientific difficulties. . . .
“While our plan of operations is based on the more certain, more powerful, gun type bomb, it also provides for the use of the implosion type bombs as soon as they become available. The target is and was always expected to be Japan. A composite group of the 20th Air Force has been organized and specially trained and equipped.” [2]
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http://ieer.org/resource/disarmamentpea ... he-target/
I'm not even sure how this was relevant, all though it does also contain the following quotes:
Then you are not qualified to discuss what is or is not relevant for want of contextual obviousness.
We didn't have a means to fuse a plutonium bomb because our electromechanical detonators were inadequate to the task of a 1/3,000th second co-synchronous detonation. Schlicke's IR fuses made this possible by flooding the bomb chamber, simultaneously, with reflected light at effectively zero time lag delay.
And yet, while a first generation uranium bomb doesn't require such complexity (and is indeed, perhaps the simplest of weapons to create, if you can afford the fuel waste) it's possession as an implosion system method by the Germans signals that the 'no separation + no reactor = no U235 or Pu239 = no bomb' argument is an outright lie. Because a plutonium weapon will ONLY function with implosion and a uranium bomb has a minimum crit of about 20KG.
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From August 1939, when Albert Einstein alerted President Roosevelt to the possibility that atomic bombs could be built, to late 1944, when it became entirely apparent that Germany was not an atomic threat, the focus of U.S. bomb makers was Germany.
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Rotblat seems to have been the exception to that. He left the Manhattan Project in December 1944, after it became clear to him that Germany was no longer a nuclear threat.
Some basic questions need to obviously be answered here:
1. If we didn't fear the German bomb, why were specific cities (Hamburg, source of centrifuge development, Dresden, key component manufacturer, Frantic Joe, shuttle attacks in Poland and Czechoslovakia) targeted at key points in the war when their contribution to an atomic arms effort was necessary?
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Even before rumors of the Holocaust started circulating, the Jewish expat physicists hated Germany for dispossessing them from home, life and career. Einsten was a dove only in the sense that you know how vicious such a bird can be (he was a rabid Zionist and unapologetic pro-Jewish supremacy freak among other things) and yet for all this, Einstein's wisdom, when confronted by the reality of possible weaponization of the atom?
"Gee, I never thought of that..."
Do not point towards the reality of a man who was qualified to know what Germany was capable of because he didn't even comprehend (to that moment when Szilard and Company informed him) how the atom bomb worked.
Thus, one should not regard post-facto justifications of morality as "In retrospect, backing the atomic bomb was my worst decision, ever!" by Einstein as being a principle motivation for his hatred of Germany or his competence (as your witness) to judge Germany's potential to develop atomic ordnance.
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Perhaps because they were in range and important for other reasons?
2. What was the classification level of the German atomic project overall? There is a classification point where all documents have to be collected, signed for and delivered, hand to hand, using couriers. If there was no such system then the 'fish code', aided by Collosus,
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Why exactly is this important.
Because if the atomic secrets are collected, by hand, and delivered to a signature list of recipients (as they were in our country) using a courier system, then a _multiplicity_ of German programs could have been hidden in plain sight, by simple dispersion amongst the many small labs and companies that populated the country and it's surrounds (the Austrian program comes to mind here, with it's particle separators 'that never existed').
OTOH, if the atomic program had it's day to day correspondence: "Wire money to this account for these materials" then it becomes subject to Ultra Intercept and type-association with atomic program relevant materials.
Which is why assumptions about German nuclear progress, the rapid and wholesale reduction of key atomic research targets (Hamburg) and staging centers (Dresden) as well as the monumentally overblown for it's nominal usefulness Frantic Joe shuttle raids can be equally the explanation for why the Allies did not in fact think that Germany had any program of note at all.
Until they were slapped in the face with it via insider intel or some other means (my personal preference being the cargo sub manifests).
That the 'ignorant Allies' therefore concentrated their efforts on the Japanese when the latter displayed a sadistic occupational policy as a wilfullness to commit to last-man suicidal defenses rather than give ground for nominally unimportant peripheral islands also makes sense as something we knew from both China, Malaysia and Singapore, even before we were a part of the conflict. We had this obviously reinforced on Corregidor and further emphasized by the actions at Guadalcanal and Saipan.
All early enough in the war to inform an opinion that it would be better to avoid direct contestment with the Japanese when Main Force could do the same.
Again, THE SHOCK of the Dulles Brothers discovering the SS Atomic Project, through SS General Karl Wolf, Fritz Houtermans, Wilhelm Voss or even Hans Kammler himself, would change all of this and drive the Frantic Joe reachout to the Polish and Czech nuclear facilities in particular.
While the work of Manfred Von Arden with his boosting process (Fritz Houtermans was in his lab working simultaneously on fusion weapon theory) and the likely transmutation of Thorium into small quantities of Plutonium via Gerlach's early work and his own Ardenne Source high energy capacitor arrays would all provide for sufficient amounts of plutonium (100-200 grams) for a subcritical yield which could be enhanced to full yields of less than 10KT _as a trigger_ for 'real' secondaries.
This would not have to be obvious to the Allies as a function of 'how' so much as what-with as the lading lists of the submarines moving to Japan though Japan having remote sites in Korea where Monzanite could provide baseline thorium might have been a clue.
It would only take Gerlach one slip of the tongue with his 'good friend' Paul Rosbaud with whom he had lunch several times a week for the latter, as the notorious 'Griffin' source, to pass the data on a new player (Von Ardenne) out to his MI6 Handler, Frank Foley.
The First War Of Physics (Search 'Rosabaud, Gerlach, Lunch)
http://books.google.com/books?id=QQSGaA ... ch&f=false
Now _supposedly_ Rosbaud 'reassured the Allies' that nothing untoward was going on in the nuclear research program, and yet...
The Allies moved with increasing fervor and desperation to destroy the Norsk Hydro plants as 1943 came to a close and official intelligence reports stated that the renewed produciton of heavy water was both minimal and unlikely to be increased to 50KG/month for another year?
Why?
Why bomb Saheim, Vemork and Ryukan with daily attacks at maximum range if you you know the Germans no longer have access to -enough- heavy water to even -start- a reactor?
There are two answers:
1. Someone had leaked the work on boosting. Which doesn't need a reactor pool worth of deuterium.
2. Someone had made it clear that if we could do the trick with graphite and PWRs the Germans could too.
IMO, that particular data could only have come from Rosbaud. Because once the SS got hold of the atomic program, all outside contacts would have been shut down and the use of conventional radio-teletype communications would cease, due to the nature of their superior security experience.
Page 225 onwards
http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books_ ... sHouse.pdf
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would have been providing decryption of internal radio teletype communications detailing the extent and location of German atomic bomb production.
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This rather assumes there was such production facilitites.
Show me photos of the inside of Buna 102.
Explain to me why the architect of the Warsaw uprising liquidation and the Auschwitz expanded killing program has had _any reference to him_ removed from the Nuremberg transcripts, excepting one oblique callout by Dornberger. Why is Kammler, an SS General high up in the End Kampf jet, rocket and atomics effort _not even charged in-absentia_ when so many others were convicted or captured and turned?
Tell me what the Japanese want the following material:
(Naval Section Ultra/ZIP/SJA/1443)
1. Diamond Dies (used to draw wire for very precise voltage measurements in a radiation
contaminated environment).
2. Metallic Zirconium Oxide (500 kg of a standard not less than 99..6 pure).
3. Metallic Lithium, 500kg.
4. Neon Gas (as much as possible).
5. Insulating material for ultra high frequencies.
6. 2,000 or more Haspekenre (radiation proof core clamps for securing piping in a reactor)
7. Bosch Fuel pumps Models 10 and 6, as many as possible (high pressure, coolant relays)
8. Polarizing Microscope (useful for running material purity and crystal grain uniformity tests in cast parts without damaging the optics on radio isotopes)
9. 10 cam shaft grinders (precision machining of component parts at sub-mil accuracies for the pit)
10. 10 Maag Gear Wheel Grinders (see above).
Tell me why another ULTRA list (communique #1809), this time for U-873s manifest, records the delivery of 1,402 bars of Beryllium Alloy (2.5 tons)?
These are not materials which have a lot of uses outside of the nuclear industry. Germany, without a functioning reactor, has no need for them. Japan, with only a basic separation program, even less.
But _Nuclear Axis_ by Phillip Henshall, on pages 54-57 records them as part of the valid history of WWII.
Having read your 'contributions' to this thread, I think it's time you do a bit of explaining yourself as to your qualifications to laugh off the idea that there was a massive nuclear effort in Germany.
Targeting which was so specific that less than a week after Heisenberg and Gerlach visited Manfred Von Arden and Gerlach had his weekly luncheon with a known mole for British intelligence, Von Arden was on his back, looking at the sky as Mosquitoes bombed the small machinist plant he had designated to build a component in his own atomic laboratory.
Sources please.
_Blunder_ by Agoston I think. I no longer own the title.
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If there was such a controlled system in place, Groves may not have known about the extent of the German bomb program and specifically it's potential with the much higher efficiency betatrons, sluice and centrifuge technology to separate U235 faster than we could. Nor would he have known about the potential use of a 'photo chemical method' mentioned at Farm Hall, which likely involved direct transmutation in a tokomak type PDC device.
Again sources please.
_Reich of the Black Sun_ by Farrell for the various efficiencies of the German sourced separation methods. _Critical Mass_ for the fact that there were, at least three, Betatrons in the Reich as opposed to the one (At the Curie institute) which the Allied Myth acknowledges.
The Farm Hall translations at David Irving's site for the Photo Chemical Method mention by Hahn I think it was and the GreyFalcon site for an explanation for what 'Photochemical' (material transmutation by the application of high intensity gamma photon emissions from energized source elements as mercury) means.
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3. We all but admitted to the Germans and to history that we had the Ultra Secret when we began a protracted campaign to destroy cargo submarines moving between The Reich and Japan. According to _Nuclear Axis_ by Henshall, there were over 20 subs involved in this and we were so desperate that we began using -other- submarines to hunt them as they set sail from their Norwegian bases (U-864 for example). Again, our targeting of these submarines and the perceived need to do so, as far away as Madagascar in the IO, suggests that we were worried about something.
Or not. In any case the fact that German submarines sunk allied ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as the Atlantic was reason enough to go after each and every one of them.
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No. Because even when the Germans switched to delayed signal buoy transmitters to relay their daily reports and target sightings, they were still making High Frequency Emissions which could be triangulated and tracked back to a general (10-12hrs @ 6 knots submerged = 72nm) source location by any Huff Duff receiver in rough alignment, between or beyond, the sender and the Brest/LeHavre and later Kiel Kriegsmarine HQs.
In order to attack shipping, the Grey Wolves also had to be in the commercial sealanes and make further coordination signals with other pack members. Cargo subs did _none of these things_, proceeding under radio listening silence.
And yet they were hunted down, explicitly,
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The cargo-submarine traffic between Germany and Japan from 1944 to 1945 had become well established, and we know from a German report that for 1944 nineteen boats were dispatched to the Far East, of which at least eight reached their destination, six were missing and five were enroute. For the return trip, twelve boats were dispatched, of which four were missing, five had to return to port and three had arrived at the time the report was written, 5 January 1945.
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Pg. 163 _The Nuclear Axis_, Philip Henshall.
From the same source, the Germans had only 1,000 tons remaining of some 3,000 tons after the occupation, stored in Stassfurt, awaiting refinement and metalicization by Auer. Diebner at Stadtilm and Heisenberg at Haigerloch each had 5-10 tons of heavy water. And multiple tons of Beryllium, Zirconium, Thallium, Boron and Neon left thos programs to go to the Japanese.
Why? Why does that equipment and that amount of material exist if these are the only _listed_ programs of merit? The ALSOS description of the cave at Haigerloch is that of a basic pile experiment to confirm criticality, little better than that of the Chicage squash court equivalent.
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That is at least debateable. Hitler seemed to like multiple sources as it prevented any one from building too big of a power base. It's not clear that tech tree redundancy played a role in any of these much less all.
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No. Because no matter what the motive, it happened and with half the Reich's nuclear effort vested 'out of country' in Czechoslovakia and Austria, I'm sure that Hitler preferred to keep his hand in with direct control over at least one weapons program.
Beyond which, after 1943 when the successful V-2 flights were quickly followed by the attacks on Peenemunde` and again after July 20th 1944 and the Valkyrie attack, Hitler became a driven man, realizing that his Reich was crumbling around his ears, not trusting his Army Staff, he looked to the S.S. Who, 'ever so conveniently' had a secret weapons program in hand which included facilities at Pilsen and Auschwitz for which NO PHOTOS are known to exist from any archive.
Which is mighty damn strange considering the importance of these sites to the Nazi Forschungwaffen and particularly for Buna 102 which was also one of the most expensive projects of the war.
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Not really and at least some who did had their own political or egotistical reasons for saying so.
'Sources Please.'
Japan had been under blockade for more than a few weeks as it was. Furthermore it is clear that the bombs pushed the decision to surrender and even then there was an aborted coup that tried to prevent it. Substitute months for weeks and you may be correct but in that case the casualties on both sides would have been even higher.
From what? The Japanese had no oil with which to sortie a sunk-at-pier Navy in Japanese homeports and were all but helpless to B-29s blowing up city after city from under 5,000ft, almost every night. They could not source material or manpower from China. They had lost 3/4s of their Maru fleet -and- the East Indies territories whose oil they were so dependent upon that even when they had the islands, they could only sortie the IJN intermittently as stocks built up.
No.
There is no excuse for butchering civilians but that the civilian administration of the U.S. either had a desire to cause Japanese mazcats 'as a lesson in the consequences of sneak attack'. Or that they had another reason to suspect Japan's ability to prolong the war might be imminently improved if it was not forced to a conclusion, more rapidly.
This quote alone calls to question the entire article. The atomic bomb was highly classified right up to the point where it was dropped. So here is a quote supposedly made before the bombs were dropped in public mentioning them. Also talking about them in the past tense. Again though how relevant is this to the topic at hand?
The atomic weapons projects were well known to the period public, in both Europe and the U.S., throughout the war. WHERE, who, how exactly they were being developed was held secret but not that atom bombs could be built.
But _15 Minutes_ reinforces LeMay's vision of a Japan already in ashes and unable to continue a cohesive war strategy as we strangled her internal communications and food distribution networks because we were frankly out of industrial targets.
Or not. Take a mantle for a Coleman lantern and crumble it into a 55 gallon drum of liquid and you have 55 gallons of "atomic waste". Much low grade wastes has far less in it actually. If you are using water to cool a reactor the water becomes "atomic or nuclear waste" in short order depending on how frequently you change it and how much it uses it is possible to produce large quantities quite quickly.
Read above, according to Henshall, Diebner and Heisenberg each had 5-10 tons of heavy water. There was 3,000 tons of Uranium and maybe another 300-500 tons of Thorium in play after the Nazi conquest of Europe. Either there is a real development program or there isn't but if there isn't, then there should not be a huge quantity of material missing without cause.
Again, I was being conservative, to allow for the very real possibility of clothing, paper and assorted other material waste being part of the waste.
You however are like a little kid trying to brush the shattered vase under the rug to go with the pet elephant that crushed it. I see the mound sir. I see 1,500 tons of Uranium unaccounted for.
Exactly. However the one you propose is not likely.
Actually it is internally consistent. If Japan had nuclear arms or the potential for creating them in the short term as a prospect whose discovery scared the living daylights out of U.S. military commanders because we only discovered it very late in the conflict, and only confirmed the method /how/ it might be done, sub-crit, with small amounts of radio isomers at the very end, then we had just cause to be worried about the exposure of large area targets like fleet task groups and invasion anchorages/beachheads when any one one or more Kamikaze might be carrying an nuclear 'near miss = good enough' weapon in a flight of several dozen if not hundred launched simultaneously to stop an invasion, at the surfzone.
On the other hand, we only have it second hand that the messages through Moscow and Switzerland were in fact placing the Emperor's safety as a condition of surrender or even that there -was- a surrender offer, with certainty, on the table from Hirohito's hand.
In any case, we accepted this, 'conditional' outcome, after the use of Atomic Weapons made unconditional surrender a given.
Why?
Nobody gave a hoot if the Germans would be 'heartbroken' when we hung Hitler and his cronies. Hirohito knew what his uncle was doing with Unit 731. Everything done in China, from Nanking onwards, was done in his name. The rest of WWII he is at least tangentially responsible for as the designated national executive.
These indisputable facts alone make The Emperor a Class A war criminal as guilty of crimes against humanity as Himmler or Goering ever were.
OTOH, 'threatening Russia' (the other excuse commonly given) by displaying a willingness to nuke another racial group who attacked us first makes damn little sense.
First because Russia was our ally, never attacked the West perse` and would remain at least a working partner for the better part of another two years, through the Nuremberg trials and early occupation of Germany.
Secondly, because we had _never shown restraint before_!!
Hannover, Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin, Tokyo, it's not like we suddenly needed to prove our ruthless willingness to murder tens of thousands of helpless victims in a single go.
Including both Axis partners, the list of civilian targets which we struck, repeatedly, in direct contravention of the Hague Treaty articles on civilian targets is at least 20 urban areas long and over a million dead. What did we have to prove, especially since we were not and are not today signatories to the LOLW conventions?
It's not like the Atomic Weapons would remain 'secret option' after the first combatant detonation anyway.
No.
What makes sense is that a racist America wanted to get back at the sneaky Japanese who thought they could bushwack us. Which means Truman, who wasn't even in office when the December 7th attack occured, was grinding that axe, hard, for no real political gain because the power and unity inherent to the office of CINC during Wartime only continued so long as there was a war on, not by hastening it's conclusion.
Reject this and you are left with but one alternative.
We had scent of an ill-wind, sometime in 1944, from the nature of the sub runs.
Remember the 'practice capture' of U-505 which the USN cussed out the commander of the HK group for blowing the cover off Ultra? Remember U-544 which was 'sunk with all hands' in the same area by the same ship, a year later?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Guadalcanal_(CVE-60)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-544
Ever wondered why that missed coordination happened?
I'm betting that we got a cargo converted IXc or IXd with enough goodies onboard to make it clear this wasn't a bluffing game.
Which brought on the extreme countermeasures to the cargo U-Boats with such desperation of that it likely cost us early warning of The Bulge attack.
And from there, particularly given the vicious manner in which U-873's captain was murdered and given the nature of U-234s cargo manifest (which would put IAEA inspectors on the next flight to The North Pole if it was discovered that Santa's Workshop was the enduser certificate), it becomes a very short hop to the obvious conclusion:
Do it to them before they do it to us.
Half of Tokyo was already in ruins and of course someone needed to be able to sign on the dotted line saying it was over. But if the coup had worked, Hirohito's value as a human shield means nothing. And the next target is the capital because now you're only hope of stopping this is to cut the spine on the chain of command and remove the command linkage authorization to use the weapons.
Again your conclusions are not well supported by either facts or logic.
Better than yours sir. You argue for the sake of arguing, bring no proof or counterpoint to the debate and only shut up when people who know how subcritical nuclear weapons work drive you into a corner with the certainty of hard math.
I'm not an atomic physicist. I know just enough of the theory behind the weapons to have a general idea how they work. I therefore prefer to instead look at things from outside the misdirection and lies we call 'Official Histories' and look at things like motives, logistics and personalities as effects generators.
And there is nothing bigger than boatloads of nuclear material leaving an embattled Reich looking for a way out whose only use can be in a nuclear program which _does not involve_ the top players of the Uranverein.
There was something big going on in the Reich. Every matchstick which holds up the tent of the Allied Myth is readily swept aside by the simple reality that:
NOBODY WHO HAS NO NUCLEAR PROGRAM NEEDS OR POSSESSES THE KINDS AND QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR INDUSTRY RESTRICTIVE MATERIAL GERMANY _GAVE AWAY_ TO JAPAN.
NOBODY WHO HAS NO PROGRAM GENERATES THAT MUCH WASTE ON 'MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS' AND AN UNFINISHED TEST PILE.
NOBODY WHO HAS NO PROGRAM EATS 1,500 TONS OF URANIUM ORE WHICH CANNOT OTHERWISE BE ACCOUNTED FOR.
NOBODY SHIPS 'URANIUM OXIDE' IN GOLD LINED SHIPPING CASKS.
Clearly the Allies believed this because they put every effort they could into finding these subs, even though it almost certainly meant compromising the Ultra Secret which was otherwise unimpeachable by every other operational need (convoys sunk because we couldn't find a way to 'prove' the U-Boats were hunting them but that we were reading their naval cyphers etc.).
This one fact: it's our data collected without the Germans knowing it, by itself overrides everything. And it is sourceable to U.S. Archived Ultra Traffic and the U-234 Manifest. Not to some fantasy German End Kampf Wunderwaffen Story.
