Defense of Austria

[christopher nelson]

If the Austrian government had deceided to resist a german invasion what capscity had it to resist?
Next would Czechoslovkia have come to Austria's aid if it had deceided to oppose Hitlers attempt to Annex the country?

[maxxx]

czechoslavakia would never attack germany. she relied on her strong defenses against an enemy superior in numbers.
austria could (and maybe should) have shown some resistance; yet it would little more than symbolic. Even in the austrian bundesheer there were nazi sympatizers and enough ilegal nazis just waited for another uprising. Had dollfuss and schuschnigg not alienated and suppressed the pro-socialist working class, maybe a qualified defence would have been more possible.

[christopher nelson]

But once the Nazi's seized Austria they had the ability to attack Czechoslovkia in the flank. I would have thought that a mutual defense pact would have made an invasion of Austria unlikely. A question is in my mind would the Austrian Military have fought for the defense of their homeland if the order was given. Otto Von Hapsburg stood a great chance of being restored to the throne and would have given the austran people someone to rally around.

[Karl]

Austria make a defense (on its own ) - don't think very realistic.

If anyone, it was Italy's call...

Karl

[Bernaschek]

The army had it's share of Nazis, but it would have fought, given the order. Kohesion of units might have been questionable so.
General Jansas Plans of a fighting retreat with the rivers as strongpoints was sound, considering the means available.
But to what end - Italy wouldn't gurantee Austrias "freedom" any more, and anyway, it wasn't 1934 anymore. Nobody would come, no matter how long the army held.
Maybe one of the reasons Schuschnigg gave in

[Grisu]

christopher, one of your questions is:

If the Austrian government had deceided to resist a german invasion what capscity had it to resist?

In this respect, an extract from an article by Alexander N. Lassner on "The Invasion of Austria in March 1938" may be of interest for those researching the military dimension of the "Anschluss".

(Any typos or spelling mistakes are most probably mine.)

The Austrian Bundesheer, consisting of seven infantry divisions, one independent brigade and one armored division, was a developing army in March 1938. As such, it faced shortages that would have compromised a sustained Austrian resistance of more than several weeks. The most egregious of these was the lack of artillery ammunition both in the infantry divisions and in the independent artillery regiment, which amounted to approximately a ten to twelve day supply. This might have been extended through the careful conservation of shells as practiced by all armies when short of ammunition; nevertheless, after the ammunition was depleted it would have had a highly negative effect upon the defensive capabilities of the Bundeshher. The Austrian army was also not as well trained as the Wehrmacht.

Although the Bundesheer’s artillery regiments were still equipped with large numbers of World War I vintage artillery, these had been modernized though the use of new ammunition and technical refinements that together had extended both lethality and range. The equipment had also been lightened for use in the mountainous terrain of Austria. Here, for example, the 80 mm field cannon (World War I vintage) proved very effective. Since the Wehrmacht was experiencing problems moving its artillery into Austria exactly because it had not considered the problems that mountainous terrain might pose, it is possible that the first days of the invasion would have actually given Austria an important, if temporary, advantage in artillery.

Most important for defense against German armor was the Austrian-made 47 mm anti-tank cannon which could easily penetrate the armor of any German tank at that time at over 1000 m. By March 1938, the Bundesheer deployed 270 of these guns with more than enough ammunition to decimate the armor of the Eigth Army. […]

Austrian defense plans, as set down in the “Jansa Plan”, anticipated a German assault and had been begun in the fall of 1935 by Austrian Chief of the General Staff Alfred Jansa together with his divisional commanders. They provided not only for the mobilization and deployment of the entire Bundesheer and auxiliary formations against the Wehrmacht, but also for the creation of street blockades and the destruction fo bridges and roads in order to hamper the advance of the German army. The mobilization required a minimum of four days for the active army. […]

Source:
Alexander N. Lassner, “The Invasion of Austria in March 1938: Blitzkrieg or Pfusch?”, in Günter Bischof / Anton Pelinka / Günter Stiefel (eds.), The Marshall Plan in Austria (Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 8), New Brunswick et al. 2000, p. 447-486, extract quoted from p. 463f.

[christopher nelson]

From what I have read Otto von Hapsburg had been mobilizing French support for Austria. Thus if Austria had resisted the invasion the French were prpared to take action agasinst Germany and even shame the British into doing something also. This might have verywell have got the Cechs and Poles to act also. that would have brobaly resulted in the German army acting against Hitler to thus save the Reich.

[mellenthin]

As the austrians are germans,the motivation to fight would have been very limited.

[Grisu]

mellenthin, what exactly should your contribution tell us about the defensive potential in Austria pre-1938? You were asked in another threads to provide sources for your contributions that are otherwise considered mere opinion posts.

The army had it's share of Nazis, but it would have fought, given the order. Kohesion of units might have been questionable so.

One example illustrating cohesion of troops and morale: On the evening of 11 March (!), the illegal NSDAP Gauleiter of Salzburg, Anton Wintersteiger, lead a SA-Sturm to the seat of the regional government in Salzburg. Of course, the office of the governor was guarded by Austrian Armed Forces (not sure whether it was Bundesheer). But these troops greeted with "Heil Hitler", stepped aside when Wintersteiger approached them, and let the SA-Sturm pass without any incident. Wintersteiger literally walked up to the desk of the governor (who was present), threw the man out and used his phone to report that he has taken over power (cf. Hanisch, op. cit., p. 26).

Otto Von Hapsburg stood a great chance of being restored to the throne and would have given the austran people someone to rally around.

I sincerely doubt that. The 1923 as well as the 1930 elections both indicate that there was extremely little overall support for a restoration. Check the votes of the monarchists, the so-called "Legitimisten" (here, p. 2). Sure, there was some potential among followers of other political parties (notably in conservative circles), but without doubt this potential was far too small to make Austrians "rally around" Otto von Habsburg in early 1938.

From what I have read Otto von Hapsburg had been mobilizing French support for Austria. Thus if Austria had resisted the invasion the French were prpared to take action agasinst Germany and even shame the British into doing something also. This might have verywell have got the Cechs and Poles to act also. that would have brobaly resulted in the German army acting against Hitler to thus save the Reich.

Interesting point – could you please state your source? And could you please sketch 1) how far the preparations of this intention/plan of Otto Habsburg were developed by the end of 1937/beginning of 1938; and 2) what reasoning (in your source) is behind the assumption that Great Britain would have joined France in fighting back German troops in Austria.

As recently stated in the journal of the Austrian Armed Forces (cf. Angetter, op. cit.), the defensive concept Head of General Staff Alfred Jansa had elaborated by 1935 was known to German military command as soon as in 1936. Moreover, Jansa was retired prior to the "Anschluss", namely in February 1938 (as required by Hitler in the Berchtesgaden Agreement). His successor, General Wilhelm Zehner, a declared opponent of National Socialism, was set to carry out the plan, but was put on hold by Schuschnigg. The author comes to the conclusion that the Austrian Bundesheer would not have had the capacity to resist the Wehrmacht but would have been dependent on help from outside the country.

References:
Daniela C. Angetter, "Kommentar: Wehrfähigkeit - Wehrwilligkeit in Österreich 1938", in Truppendienst 302 (2/2008), URL.

Ernst Hanisch, Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in der Provinz: Salzburg im Dritten Reich, Salzburg 1983.

[Bernaschek]

The author comes to the conclusion that the Austrian Bundesheer would not have had the capacity to resist the Wehrmacht but would have been dependent on help from outside the country.

What does "capacity to resist" mean ? like I wrote - complete speculation - that the complete futility of resistance might have been one of the factors to make Schuschnigg cave in. Nobody would come and in the end the Nazis would win anyway.
How long whould they have resistet ?
Hours , days, even weeks ?
I think they were capable -and ready - to resist a few days.

During my army time I also had met a few veterans of the 1st republiks army - those would have fought (and it was in Salzburg) -
From Roland Girtlers books I also know that some platoons went into deployment area without their rifles bolts.
Would be interesting to know, if the security services had a plan to deal with nazi infected units in case of need.

In a thread about Estland an Eesti had written something like "if the artillery had fired (in 1939), there would be no dicussion about voluntary integration into the USSR".

the Bundesheer had the capacity and I think enough personnel willing to make a point - it could never have been more

[Grisu]

What does "capacity to resist" mean ? like I wrote - complete speculation - that the complete futility of resistance might have been one of the factors to make Schuschnigg cave in. Nobody would come and in the end the Nazis would win anyway.
How long whould they have resistet ?
Hours , days, even weeks ?
I think they were capable -and ready - to resist a few days.

I share your view that the Bundesheer would have been capable of resisting for a few days at most. In any case, equipment and armament would not have been good enough to resist any longer. It would be interesting to read especially about the potential of the Austrian Armed Forces in anti-aircraft battle (planes, flak). I would assume that this (crucial) potential was comparatively low. All in all, I think we should bear in mind that Jansa's plan strongly focussed on keeping the (north-) eastern part of Austria, especially the area Vienna. While he knew that the West (especially the province of Vorarlberg) could hardly be held against German troops, he planned for massive deployment of Austrian forces in the region of the river Traun (going right through the province of Upper Austria). This concentration of troops (4 divisions, if memory serves) would have posed the toughest military resistance for the Wehrmacht.

In a thread about Estland an Eesti had written something like "if the artillery had fired (in 1939), there would be no dicussion about voluntary integration into the USSR".

I also agree that one can make very similar "what if"-speculations about the Austrian military response to the so-called "Anschluss" in 1938... "If they had fought, this would have strengthened the position of Austria as 'first victim' post-1945." Gladly, AHF has its own "what if"-section.

[Kar43]

I have an email correspondent who is a former Viennese who was 12 years old in March 1938. I asked him what would have happened if there had been resistance. He answered:

"There was no way the Austrian army could have prevailed. The Bundesheer would have fired a few shots which would have been of symbolic value but this would have been negated by an uprising of Nazis in Styria and Salzburg where they were reasonably strong. So it would have been a very mixed picture with unnecessary loss of life; Austria would have disappeared from the map anyway. Schuschnigg was right to order the army to stand down."

[Dave Bender]

http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1938.htm
March 1, 1938 Revolution in Styria
Political demonstrations in support of the National Socialists broke out in Graz and soon spread across Styria, resulting in a state of revolution. The Austrian government proved incapable of dealing with the revolution for fear of offending the German government. Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg was unable to negotiate a reconciliation with the Socialist working classes to ease the political crisis

March 9, 1938
Austrian Plebiscite Plan Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg announced that the Austrian government would hold a national plebiscite within a few days to determine the future of Austrian independence. The government would distribute only Yes ballots, while opposition groups would have to supply their own No ballots, following a specified form. This announcement drove the National Socialists to extremes and plunged the republic into chaos.

March 11, 1938
German Ultimatum to Austria In response to the Austrian government's plebiscite plan, Chancellor Adolf Hitler issued an ultimatum to the Austrian government. The German government demanded the cancellation of the plebiscite and the resignation of Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg. Simultaneously, the German government mobilized on the Austrian border. With no other options, Chancellor Schuschnigg resigned and Arthur Seyss-Inquart became the new Austrian prime minister.

March 12-13, 1938
German Annexation of Austria The German army marched into Austrian unopposed and seized control of the country.

April 10, 1938
Austrian National Plebiscite Austrian voters registered a 99.75 percent tally in favor of union with Germany in a national plebiscite. As a result, Austria became part of the Reich as a new state, divided into seven districts (Gaue).

Apparently 99% of the Austrian population was in favor of union with Germany. So who is going to offer this resistance?

[Bernaschek]

You really mean this "classic" 99% tally doesn't remind you of something ?

[Alexander N. Lassner]

I thought that I would join the conversation given that this is a subject about which I have researched, written and published for the last sixteen years, and given that I was cited (though apparently without subsequent posters reading the article in question).

NOTE: I have not always included cites below, since I am on vacation in southern Italy right now, and do not have access to my library.

Just to make some initial responses to some of the post that have been made here (and I’ll be happy to elaborate subsequently):

@ Christopher Nelson. Your initial question is interesting, if often discussed. One of the most popular assertions of the last sixty years of Anschluß literature has been the notion of an Austrian/Czechoslovakian alliance as solution (or partial solution) to the issue of Nazi German aggression 1934-1938. This assessment initially came out of the contemporary pre-Anschluß political environment, most especially from socialist critiques of the corporate (read: authoritarian) Austrian government after the Austrian socialist revolt in early 1934. Beginning in 1935, but especially after the 11 July 1936 Austro-German Abkommen was signed, Austrian socialists in exile such as Karl Renner and Otto Bauer made the argument that Austria was going to find itself “abandoned” by democratic states like France and Czechoslovakia and, as a consequence, fall victim to Nazi Germany. The same critics read the events of 1938 as proof of their assertion, and it thereafter steadily became part of the literature. Indeed, the notion that an Austro-Czechoslovakian alliance was a *partial* solution to Nazi German aggression vis-à-vis Austria has been repeated so often in the intervening sixty years, that the merits of such an alliance have evaded any real strategic examination (that, and perhaps the arguments repetition reflects the shortcomings of historians as strategists).

The key strategic problem here with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia was that neither were in a position, either politically or militarily to help the other, and most certainly not with any form of operational military support.

In order to have any chance to have survived against German forces, such that French aid might have been forthcoming before collapse, the Czechoslovak government and military had adopted – and for good reason – an entirely defensive strategic and operational posture. Despite this, pre-Anschluß, most British and French government and military leaders did not feel that the Czechoslovakia could hold out against Nazi Germany for more than about four weeks – even with Czechoslovak fortifications on the Czechoslovak-German border (mostly completed by 1938), and the favorable mountainous terrain. Czechoslovak assessments were hardly any better. The most recent literature indicates that Germany would not have had a cakewalk in an invasion of Czechoslovakia. But without a strategic corridor in the Mediterranean and in southern Europe to move French troops directly into Czechoslovakia, nobody believed that the latter country could survive very long. This was one of the reasons that the French had been so concerned with maintaining good relations with the Italians 1934-1936, and also one of the reasons that they had come so close in 1935 to becoming co-guarantors with Italy of Austrian independence.

With respect to Austria, as was noted above (Alexander N. Lassner, “The Invasion of Austria in March 1938: Blitzkrieg or Pfusch?”, in Günter Bischof / Anton Pelinka / Günter Stiefel (eds.), The Marshall Plan in Austria (Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 8), New Brunswick et al. 2000, p. 447-486, the issue of an Austrian defense from a strict operational standpoint has also been debated quite a lot, and it is a *highly* politicized subject in Austria to this day. Suffice to say for my first post here, the defense by the Bundesheer would probably have lasted about two to three weeks (and perhaps even four weeks). This has to do with numerous factors.

To paraphrase from my article, from the first moment of the invasion of Austria, frictions arose for the Wehrmacht that mounted one on top of another. Officers and men arrived late to their posts and were mis-assigned or simply untrained for their duties. Wagons and motorized vehicles were frequently missing, inadequate for their tasks or unusable. Indeed, the German VII Army Corps alone described its supplementary motorized vehicle situation as “nahezu katastrophal” (almost catastrophic), with approximately 2,800 motorized vehicles which were either missing or unusable. Nor was the situation any better regarding horses, the prime mover of the Wehrmacht. Once inside Austria, the difficulties were aggravated through a completely inadequate road and rail network and the huge numbers of men and materiel attempting to push through. Poor discipline, lack of training, and outright incompetence worsened matters, as did mechanical breakdowns and lack of fuel. The result was that divisions, regiments, and battalions were completely torn asunder; they ceased to be combat units. Like some great malfunctioning clockwork, the Wehrmacht lurched and shuddered towards the Austrian capital. Only a few parts of it finally grated to a halt in the suburbs of Vienna one week later. Even this dismal performance was only possible due to vital and essential assistance rendered to the Wehrmacht by Austrian gas stations, and shipping and rail services. Without this help, Hitler’s victory parade on the Ringstraße would have been conspicuously devoid of German troops and armor. Nevertheless, as with the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive thirty years later, operational disaster does not equal military disaster. The Nazi propaganda machine, parts of which were busy running down German soldiers in their rush to get to Vienna on 12 and 13 March, would prove as successful as it had ever been.

@ Christopher Nelson Although it is true that Otto v. Hapsburg was a possible rallying point for an Austrian defense domestically, it is not true that he or anyone else would have brought the French to Austria’s aid in March 1938.

The French left-wing government *was* very sympathetic to the Schuschnigg government as the end drew near (despite their ideological separation), and over the course of 1937 the French were increasingly desperate about the deterioration of the strategic situation that an Anschluß would have brought about. Nonetheless, and for good reason, key French government and military officials were of the view that nothing could be done in central Europe without the aid of additional great powers: Great Britain first and foremost. Without a firm commitment by Great Britain to the defense of France and without the geo-strategic positioning afforded by Italy (now correctly believed by the French to be firmly in bed with the Nazi German), the French believed the fate of Austria was sealed as early as January 1938. Nothing Otto might have said would have changed that reasoning, which was widespread in France and which reflected an existential fear of Nazi Germany.

@mellenthin, Grisu, Bernaschek, kar43, and Dave Bender. There are a number of issue that you are raising which are interesting and yet highly problematic to judge. The first is the degree to which Austrians as a whole were Nazi, pro-Nazi, mildly sympathetic to the Nazis, anti-Nazi etc. and willing to do something about their feelings. This is made difficult due to the lack of polling at the time in any sense similar to what we use today. Looking at the Nazi led post Anschluß “vote” of 99% is worthless in telling us who was and was not a Nazi. The best scholarship today suggests that the native Austrian Nazis were somewhere around 10% of the population, with sympathizers adding another 10%. So it was significant number, but hardly decisive, depending upon how brutally one dealt with the Nazis, as both chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg had shown from 1932 onwards.

On top of this there is the problem of German Nazi sponsored propaganda backed by German Nazi sponsored terrorism in Austria, which had been going on for years. So simply looking at the events of 1-12 March 1938 (popular enthusiasm in the streets and Nazis marching into political officials offices to “take control”) does not really tell us much, since people had been living half scared to death at the prospect of a German military invasion of Austria, and a subsequent Nazi takeover. As the Schuschnigg government began to lose control of the situation in Austria over the course of February 1938, Austrian citizens began casting about trying to determine what was going to happen.

After 1 March 1938 Austrian behavior ends up looking similar to the behavior of citizens in other countries that ended up on the defeated side (e.g., the behavior of the Chiang Kai-shek’s abandoned allies after his loss on the mainland). The reasons for the actions that non-Nazi Austrians took from 1-12 March were manifold and defy simple categorization: men and women corralled by Goebbels’ propaganda agents (and other Nazis) and told to cheer at local rallies; a desire to pretend that one had not really been part of the resistance to the Nazis; relief that years of conflict and tension had not led to actual war; a mix of self-deception and desperate hope that the Nazis would not be as brutal as might be expected; base opportunism to ingratiate oneself with the victors; and, for some, real enthusiasm for the conquering heroes. For many, those illusions would be stripped away within months. Unfortunately, all too many Austrians would make the transition from victim to collaborator and, as well, to perpetrator.

As to the question of military resistance by the Bundesheer as a function of its penetration by the Nazis, the best scholarship on the matter, by Erwin Steinböck, Erwin Schmidl and myself indicates that the Nationalsozialistische Soldatenring (the name of the Nazi organization which attempted to penetrate and undermine the Bundesheer) never amounted to more than 5% of the rank and file, and perhaps half of that among the officer corps. This was, in no small part, due to the ruthless suppression of the Nazis by the Schuschnigg government 1934-1938. The evidence I have examined in Vienna shows fairly clearly that the army would have fought, and that any discovered traitors would have been purged quickly. Might that have lessened the BH’s effectiveness? The best answer is “perhaps”; but given the nature of the military and the broader issues of national defense, I doubt that the Nationalsozialistische Soldatenring would have amounted to much in the case of the Austrian state mounting a military defense against a Nazi German invasion.

I am free for further discussion, so please do post.

Alexander N. Lassner