The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[favedave]

Thanks for the link John. I've read most of the actual memo and draft interations as well as some of the commentary, and intend to read the rest now before doing any further posting. Sorry I missed it when you posted it Peter. As you know I do not routinely pooh-pooh sources you have provided as support for your positions, especially when I disagree with you. It is not fair to either of us, or the other members of the discussion board to do that. In this instance, I cannot agree that Germany did not have a predetermined battle plan. Liege was planned and prepared for to the last detail by Col Erick Ludendorff and his staff under the direction of von Moltke the Younger. And I hate to disagree with Hew Strachan, but he was a little short on Hoffmann's background. Aside from the credentials Strachan presented, Hoffmann was Ludendorff's counterpart in the east and personally supervised all of the defensive arrangements, including the building of the military rail systems used so effectively to transfer troops from north to south to meet the two Russian Armies in succession at the best possible terrain on their only possible routes of entry into East Prussia. Work finished he was given a billet in Coblenz as a reward for a job well done. When war was declared against Russia, he was the only German soldier 'mobilized' to East Prussia. His carefully laid plans were nearly derailled by Francois who, against orders decided to fight the Russian 1st Army rather than yield another an inch of sacred soil. Fortunately the First Russian army decided to stay put and lick its wounds until after the Second Russian Army was routed, when the Germans were able to concentrate all of their available forces and chase the First Russian Army into the Masurian lakes. Neither Liege or Tannenberg were inflexible in dealing with tactical problems and opportunities, but the strategies of both were worked out well in advance with the mechanisms built in to assure their quick success. Hoffmann's statement that the battle of Tannenberg developed by itself was a staff colonel's way of saving the face of officers senior to himself who made the operation nearly fail. Since it succeeded beyond all expectations (it is possibly the greatest victory in German military history) there was no reason to find scapegoats like Francois.

[glenn239]

The issue was that you continued to promote a marginal theory about the Schlieffen Plan being some sort of German plot to trick Russia and France into attacking Germany. We're all about new theories and such around here, but ones that are inherently silly but are also promoted over and over again, these become offensive. For example, it might be silly of me to propose Schlieffen was thinking of an alliance war against France to explain his missing 24 divisions. But I didn't go on and on about it. It was offered, a bit of discussion followed, then it ended and we moved on.

[favedave]

[favedave]

The issue is that this thread is all about the Origin of the Schlieffen Plan. What I've proposed is neither marginal, nor silly. Rather it is what military strategists do in times of peace to deal with likely contingencies. Germany, due to Wilhelm II's "anything but what Bismarck would do" approach to German foreign policy, was in the uncomfortable position of having two powerful enemies on either side. Put yourself in Schlieffen's shoes. How are you going to win any war against France and Russia, which is very likely to come about?

The answer is you force the enemy to fight on ground and at a time of your chosing under conditions which marginalize any advantages he has while maximizing yours.

So, what's the Canadian take on all the anomalies we've uncovered here regarding the 1905 Memo?

[peterhof]

Germany, due to Wilhelm II's "anything but what Bismarck would do" approach to German foreign policy, was in the uncomfortable position of having two powerful enemies on either side.

Just for the record: Kaiser Wilhelm makes it very clear in his memoirs that he greatly admired Bismarck and considered him among the greatest of German statesmen. Certainly, Kaiser Wilhelm and Bismarck had their differences. With regard to Social Democrats in the Reichstag, Bismarck favored firmness, while the Kaiser favored accommodation. The reinsurance treaty with Russia was more complex than it appeared on the surface and Kaiser Wilhelm had good reason for allowing it to lapse due to its conflicting aims with the Triple Alliance - especially Austria-Hungary.

[favedave]

Regardless of how it came about, the Kaiser's foreign policy put Russia and France together. This was the problem which all of Germany's Chiefs of Staff had to come to grips with.

[peterhof]

Regardless of how it came about, the Kaiser's foreign policy put Russia and France together. This was the problem which all of Germany's Chiefs of Staff had to come to grips with.

It was the French policy of revanche - not Germany's - that "put Russia and France together" and ultimately triggered the Schlieffen Plan.

[favedave]

Wilhelm's casting away the reassurance treaty with Russia accompanied by what Nicholas perceived as direct insults to himself is what drove republican France and the absolute monarchy of the Russian Empire together.

French desires for revenge are understandable, but impossible to achieve because Bismarck had isolated France diplomatically from everyone. Wilhelm immediately undid that. Austria-Hungary and Franz Josef would not have bolted from the alliance with Germany. Austria-Hungary did not have any other friends. At least the Dri Kaiserin kept Russia at bey.

But none of this changes the fact that Germany had two powerful nations at the eastern and western borders. As solid as the Austria-Hungarian alliance was, the Dual Monarchy's armed forces could not really help against France, (that's why Italy was invited to join the alliance) and due to Russia's manpower reserves, could only cut the odds for Germany down by at most half.

The German General Staff had 20 years to devise a plan which gave them a fair shot at winning a two front war. They were guided by a past they wanted to surpass. They were faced with what appeared on the surface to be insurmountable obsticles,
They chose to have the essential battles take place on territory which they controlled, East Prussia and Alsace and Lorraine, where they could fight on interior lines, be readily supplied, and blunt any advantage the two enemies had through their skillful use of terrain and their mobility. The 1905 Memo's plan offers none of these advantages. It portrays as you have often noted a desparation which is far in excess of Germany's actual military situation. It is also full of falsehoods about troop strengths and deployments. It vaguely proposes to deal with Russia's huge army in East Prussia a month and a half after war was declared. It proposes to send three quarters of Germany's total troop strength against Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium and France, with England's small field army and huge Navy joining the other four nations in resisting in the West. The plan is so outlandish with its haymaker right wing brushing the Channel before turning south to march on Paris nobody in their right mind would propose it.

[glenn239]

French desires for revenge are understandable, but impossible to achieve because Bismarck had isolated France diplomatically from everyone.

France alienated Russia in 1854 by invading the Crimea. France alienated Austria by fighting it in Italy in 1859. France was Power #1 in Britain’s Two Power Standard throughout the entire period. And France declared war on Prussia in 1870.

So, that's France isolating itself by being hostile to all the Great Powers of Europe, correct?

[favedave]

Excellent point, Glenn. From Napoleon through the beginning of the 20th century the regimes, both republican and monarchical did nothing to win the favor of the major powers in either hemisphere. But Bismarck is generally credited with arranging a ring of alliances around France that was hostile. This Wilhelm II ended when he showed the Pilot the door in 1890.

Still how Germany came to be in this position did not change the nature of the challenge the German General Staff faced. I think it was a challenge most officers in the German Army relished.

[Terry Duncan]

So, that's France isolating itself by being hostile to all the Great Powers of Europe, correct?

No. Bismarck's foreign policy was to construct a series of alliances within Europe to keep France isolated in the future, it had nothing to do with French actions as such. Even a cursory reading on the subject of German foreign policy under Bismarck will reveal such a direction.

However, you do need to remember that Germany, or Prussia, had iteslf alienated a lot of Europe in a shorter period, being at war with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870) in this same period and all on issues Prussia under Bismarck had sought. Pretending France was the only power in Europe disturbing the peace is a gross misrepresentation of events, or that Germany/Prussia was somehow seen as a better option by everyone else ignores that Austria was conducting talks with France in 1866 and 1870 about an alliance - ideas of Germanic bonds came only far later once Austria knew she had no ability to challenge Prussia.

However, this is not really pertinant to the topic as Bismarck's alliance system was allowed to fail when the Germans refused the Russian request to renew it. That event led to the France-Russian Alliance, Germany already being allied to Austria, Italy, and Romania by that point.

[peterhof]

Bismarck's foreign policy was to construct a series of alliances within Europe to keep France isolated in the future, it had nothing to do with French actions as such.

Wrong! Bismarck's various incarnations of the Triple Alliance were the direct result of the war-scare of 1875. On that occasion, Berlin informed Paris that if it persisted in its attitude of overt hostility, Germany might not leave it to France to choose the time and place to settle their affairs. After this warning, France climbed down and assumed an attitude of icy correctness while Bismarck constructed the Triple Alliance system for the specific purpose of isolating an implacably hostile France. Please note that it was the French desire for revanche that necessitated Bismarck's diplomacy. On the occasion of the 1904 Entente Cordiale, Kaiser Wilhelm sent another warning to France (delivered personally by Prince Donnersmarck) that Germany would not tolerate an Anglo-French alliance on top of the Franco-Russian alliance.

Please remember that these German actions were defensive against the explicitly anti-German Franco-Russian alliance - as proven by the authors - and the equally anti-German Entente Cordiale - as proven by Grey's military agreements and "conversations" with France.

Again: Kaiser Wilhelm allowed the reinsurance treaty with Russia to lapse because he felt it was incompatible with the treaty provisions with Austria-Hungary.

[Terry Duncan]

Wrong! Bismarck's various incarnations of the Triple Alliances were the direct result of the war-scare of 1875. On that occasion, Berlin informed Paris that if it persisted in its attitude of overt hostility, Germany might not leave it to France to choose the time and place to settle their affairs.

Not at all wrong and other than making the strange proclamations 'wrong' your post does nothing to suggest I was wrong and is even in agreement as the objective. Your own post says;

Bismarck constructed the Triple Alliance system for the specific purpose of isolating an implacably hostile France.

I know you feel some strange compulsion to disagree with me but this attempt is really rather silly.

Bismarck himself said the purpose of his web of treaties was to keep France isolated, you are simply trying to make the claim that Germany somehow needed alliances in order to defeat France in a war, despite the rather decisive nature of her victory in 1870.

Bismarck's various incarnations of the Triple Alliance were the direct result of the war-scare of 1875.

Given the date of the Austro-German Alliance is 1879, we can safely conclude it came about as a reaction to something other than the 1875 issue between Germany and France, especially as it specifically names Russia as its objective. France is not even mentioned!

The Dual Alliance Between Austria-Hungary and Germany - October 7, 1879

ARTICLE 1.

Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.
ARTICLE 2.

Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high Ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, the attacking party in such a case be supported by Russia, either by an active cooperation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article 1 of this Treaty, for reciprocal assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.
ARTICLE 3.

The duration of this Treaty shall be provisionally fixed at five years from the day of ratification. One year before the expiration of this period the two High Contracting Parties shall consult together concerning the question whether the conditions serving as the basis of the Treaty still prevail, and reach an agreement in regard to the further continuance or possible modification of certain details. If in the course of the first month of the last year of the Treaty no invitation has been received from either side to open these negotiations, the Treaty shall be considered as renewed for a further period of three years.
ARTICLE 4.

This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretation, be kept secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special Agreement.

The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrovo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication at present; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectations, prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.
ARTICLE 5.

This Treaty shall derive its validity from the approbation of the two Exalted Sovereigns and shall be ratified within fourteen days after this approbation has been granted by Their Most Exalted Majesties. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their own hands and affixed their arms.

Done at Vienna, October 7, 1879

(L.S.) ANDRASSY

(L.S.) H. VII v. REUSS

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dualalli.asp

On the occasion of the 1904 Entente Cordiale, Kaiser Wilhelm sent another warning to France (delivered personally by Prince Donnersmarck) that Germany would not tolerate an Anglo-French alliance on top of the Franco-Russian alliance.

France was not subject to German dictatorship over who she could ally to, so the Kaiser was acting in a high handed and rude manner towards other states again.

Again: Kaiser Wilhelm allowed the reinsurance treaty with Russia to lapse because he felt it was incompatible with the treaty provisions with Austria-Hungary.

Then he can have no complaint when Russia and France ally themselves so as to not both be isolated by Bismarck's web of treaties covering central Europe. He decided to drop Russia when she was willing to remain an ally, thinking it impossible she would come to terms with France, in just the same way he felt it impossible for Britain and France to reach agreement some years later. He and his ministers had very bad judgement.

Now, please end this discussion that has nothing whatsoever to do with German military planning or I will have to either delete off topic posts or lock the thread. I would rather not have to do this, but I will if the discussion does not return to topic. It is always possible to start a new topic in the correct forum if you wish to discuss other matters, only those topics already locked by senior moderators should be considered unsuitable until such time the moderator locking the thread agrees to reopen the original thread.

[favedave]

The situation which caused the German General Staff to develope its two-front strategy can be rightly viewed as action and reaction to diplomatic events in the four decades from 1870. But these events did not change the geography or military realities with which Germany's General Staff had to deal. In trying to understand what Schlieffen and then Moltke were attempting, guilt or innocence is not part of the calculation. In fact a large part of the problem is that historians have decried the Schlieffen Plan as immoral, when it was from a military perspective nothing of the kind.

[Terry Duncan]

The situation which caused the German General Staff to develope its two-front strategy can be rightly viewed as action and reaction to diplomatic events in the four decades from 1870.

Yes, but that does not mean we need to spend post after post with Peter on his personal quest to exonerate German foreign policy of every possible problem during this period. The situation that existed between the two alliances is well know and who to blame over how it came about has no real place in how planning developed, as both sides considered themselves to be right - and it is not like people here will agree on who to blame or change their minds on this matter as we are all too aware.

In trying to understand what Schlieffen and then Moltke were attempting, guilt or innocence is not part of the calculation. In fact a large part of the problem is that historians have decried the Schlieffen Plan as immoral, when it was from a military perspective nothing of the kind.

The immoral aspects of the plan were to invade nations Germany had agreed were perpetually neutral, not the invasion of France itself per se, though attacking France because Russia has caused offence can be seen by some as a dubious response. Guilt has little place in the planning aspect as the side that won would have decided it acted correctly anyhow, and would have likewise highlighted any dubious actions taken by the other.