The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[Terry Duncan]

So Col. Huguet "is known to be inaccurate" but Smith-Dorrien is gospel. Who knew?

The facts are obvious as the BEF did take its place in the line and in the advance to the Aisne too, something that Huguet's report suggests as impossible.

"On the same day the British chiefs were hurrying the BEF southward with such urgency that the soldiers were deprived of the rest they needed far more than they needed distance from the enemy. On that day, August 28, a day when von Kluck's columns gave them no trouble, Sir John French and Wilson were in such anxiety to hasten the retreat that they ordered transport wagons to 'throw overboard all ammunition and other impediments not absolutely required' and carry men instead.'

The need to get out of the precarious situation on the French left wing should be obvious, a force as small as the BEF in comparison to the forces of the enemy nearby has little option but to gain as much separation as possible and seek secure flanks with its more numerous allied armies. Sir John French did very much panic, though his mind was changed instantly after Kitchener met him, but he did turn the BEF and put it into the fight despite his earlier protestations it was not possible. This is all rather well documented, selective quotes from books will not alter reality though they do call into question the objectivity of the person presenting them.

If Smith-Dorrien's assessment was accurate, perhaps so was von Kluck's.

So why are you deliberately dodging the points I have raised? I will try to reword my points as you failed to respond to my request you answer, in the hope that you will reply now.

1. If the Entente forces were as beaten and incapable of resisting the German forces as reported by the generals of the German right wing, how did they turn and fight at the Marne?

2. If the Entente armies were not as badly defeated as the above mentioned reports suggested, why were such reports submitted, and why is it Moltke's fault for accepting his generals assessments of the situation?

3. If the Entente forces really were in such a poor condition as your recent selection of quotes suggest, and as the German generals had been telling Moltke, how is the transfer of three corps to the east in any way a poor decision?

4. The timing of Moltke ordering the three corps to the east matches that of Schlieffen in his exercises, do not forget Schlieffen sent between six and eleven corps east at this time, so this is clearly something the Germans expected to do at this time. At this point it could well be that Moltke was following Schlieffen too closely and not to the actual situation at hand, but why did the commanders at the front raise any objections to the transfer if they felt it critical at the time?

5. Your argument here at present seems to be one where you claim the Entente armies were incapable of resistance, but also one where Moltke shifting any troops from this victorious advance - the troops were not in the front line of the advance on the far right when withdrawn - somehow instantly reverses everything, but even then the Germans were victorious but decided to retreat by mistake. Moltke is to blame for his generals misjudging the situation, for them not objecting to the troop movement, and even for Kluck not following orders, but also gets no credit for coming so close to victory in a two front war, as close or closer than Schlieffen's exercises managed to achieve. Can you tell me if this is a correct understanding of what you are saying?

If you are unwilling to answer questions there would seem little point in your posting on a discussion forum, you would do better surely to just create your own blog somewhere and just post polemics there?

[peterhof]

The facts are obvious as the BEF did take its place in the line and in the advance to the Aisne too, something that Huguet's report suggests as impossible.

The BEF did take its place in the line only AFTER Joffre had traveled to John French's headquarters and personally scolded him that "I cannot believe the British Army will refuse to do its share in this supreme crisis . . . history would severely judge your absence." And then: "Monsieur le Marchechal, the honor of England is at stake!" Tuchman wrote: "At these words Sir John French, who had been listening with 'passionate attention' suddenly reddened." Only then did the British commander agree to "do all we can possibly can."

1. If the Entente forces were as beaten and incapable of resisting the German forces as reported by the generals of the German right wing, how did they turn and fight at the Marne?

Poincare, Gallieni, and Joffre's Chief of Operations all agreed with the assessment of OHL. "The generals of the German right wing" were fare more pessimistic

2. If the Entente armies were not as badly defeated as the above mentioned reports suggested, why were such reports submitted, and why is it Moltke's fault for accepting his generals assessments of the situation?

Obviously Moltke did NOT accept their assessment because he ordered the first retrograde movement of the right wing.

3. If the Entente forces really were in such a poor condition as your recent selection of quotes suggest, and as the German generals had been telling Moltke, how is the transfer of three corps to the east in any way a poor decision?

Tuchman explains: ". . . It was no miracle but the inherent ifs, errors, committments of the final month that determined the issue at the Marne. Kluck notwithstanding, faults of German command contributed as much as the verve of the French soldier to the outcome. If the Germans had not withdrawn two corps to send against the Russians, one of the two would have been on Bulow's right and might have filled the gap between him and Kluck; the other would have been with Hausen and might have provided the extra strength to overwhelm Foch."

4. The timing of Moltke ordering the three corps to the east matches that of Schlieffen in his exercises, do not forget Schlieffen sent between six and eleven corps east at this time, so this is clearly something the Germans expected to do at this time. At this point it could well be that Moltke was following Schlieffen too closely and not to the actual situation at hand, but why did the commanders at the front raise any objections to the transfer if they felt it critical at the time?

Kluck did protest Moltke's failure to reinforce the right wing. Exercises never comport with actual war.

5. Your argument here at present seems to be one where you claim the Entente armies were incapable of resistance, but also one where Moltke shifting any troops from this victorious advance - the troops were not in the front line of the advance on the far right when withdrawn - somehow instantly reverses everything, but even then the Germans were victorious but decided to retreat by mistake. Moltke is to blame for his generals misjudging the situation, for them not objecting to the troop movement, and even for Kluck not following orders, but also gets no credit for coming so close to victory in a two front war, as close or closer than Schlieffen's exercises managed to achieve. Can you tell me if this is a correct understanding of what you are saying?

Rephrase your muddled question. I "claim" nothing. I have cited the assesments of Poincare, John French, Gallieni, and Joffre's Chief of Operations, which were in agreement with that of OHL.

(all quotes above are from The Guns of August.)

[Terry Duncan]

The BEF did take its place in the line only AFTER Joffre had traveled to John French's headquarters

Joffre did not scold French, he had no authority over him to do any more than ask. Regardless of who ou wish to claim persuaded Sir John French to move forwards to join the French line, if his force was incapable as you like to think, this would not have been possible would it. This proves Huguet, cited by you, was incorrect in his assessment.

Poincare, Gallieni, and Joffre's Chief of Operations all agreed with the assessment of OHL.

No they did not, they were talking of the timing of a counterstroke, their disagreement was when this was to happen not that resistance was not possible.

"The generals of the German right wing" were fare more pessimistic

The quote you posted was;

German chances of victory looked promising. By the latter third of August, the Entente armies were retreating on every front. On August 27, the German High Command issued this announcement: “The German Armies have entered France from Cambrai to the Vosges after a series of continually victorious combats . . . The enemy, beaten all along the line, is in full retreat and is not capable of offering serious resistance to the German advance.”

If that it the Germans being pessimistic you are deluding yourself.

Obviously Moltke did NOT accept their assessment because he ordered the first retrograde movement of the right wing.

Moltke only ordered this after the French defeated him at the Marne. The right wing was unable to continue the fight with the huge gaps between its armies and needed to correct this.

Kluck did protest Moltke's failure to reinforce the right wing.

Where did Kluck object to the transfer of troops to the east? This 'protest' you mention, please cite when it was made and with respect to what? Please can I have more troops to invest Antwerp is not the same as please can I have troops to plug the huge gap between 1st and 2nd Army, so we need to see exactly what form this protest took.

Exercises never comport with actual war.

No, but you are the one to fault Moltke for not following Schlieffen's plans, even when you cannot say precisely what the plans were.

Rephrase your muddled question.

It is rather difficult as it tries to understand your muddled claims during this post. You are running in circles at present in an attempt to deny the French actually won at the Marne, even trying to skip the entire Aisne and Race to the Sea periods to claim;

Moltke's mistakes had reached critical mass and resulted in stalemate at the Marne.

The stalemate occurred later, after the Germans retreated and started to dig in.

(all quotes above are from The Guns of August.)

Yes. It is strange you decide to use a writer who is not a military historian and then treat her words as accurate. I will ask you now, is Tuchman a reliable source on WWI and is The Guns Of August an accurate account of events?

[peterhof]

It is strange you decide to use a writer who is not a military historian and then treat her words as accurate. I will ask you now, is Tuchman a reliable source on WWI and is The Guns Of August an accurate account of events?

Yes. That's why her book won the 1963 Pulitzer prize for non-fiction. Tuchman served on the staff of The Nation and the The New Statesman, and served on the Far Eastern desk of the Office of War Information. No competent military historian has refuted her conclusions. (Please don't mention Zuber.)

Tuchman (p. 442): "Moltke was bothered by the gaps in his battle line, especially between the armies of the right wing. There was one of twenty miles between Kluck and Bulow, another twenty miles between Bulow and Hausen, and a third almost as wide between Hausen and the Duke of Wurttemberg. Moltke was uncomfortably conscious that the thinning spaces should have been filled by reinforcements drawn from the left wing which he now committed to total involvement in the battle for Moselle. He thought guiltily of Schlieffen's insistence that the proper course was to leave the left wing on the defensive with minimum forces and send every division that he could spare to the 1st and 2nd Armies. (my underline) But the vision of a breakthrough of the French fortress line still lured OHL . . . von Kluck resented the failure to reinforce the marching wing at this critical time."

[Terry Duncan]

No competent military historian has refuted her conclusions. (Please don't mention Zuber.)

Historians tend not to bother refuting things, there is no need to do so as the inaccurate and poorly researched books tend to not sell and are forgotten. I belive if you check Zuber's qualifications he is at least as well qualified as Tuchman, though i was not going to quote him anyhow as he deals with matters almost exclusively from a German perspective. Strachan, Stevenson, Sheldon, Terraine etc would be far better sources on military matters, as would the official histories.

The Pulitzer Prize is not even an historical award, it is a literary award. However, now you have said The Guns Of August is accurate, I presume you have no objection to my quoting sections from it as facts you will agree with 100% as being accurate, so I will find my copy and we can see what else Tuchman says.

[peterhof]

The Pulitzer Prize is not even an historical award, it is a literary award. However, now you have said The Guns Of August is accurate, I presume you have no objection to my quoting sections from it as facts you will agree with 100% as being accurate, so I will find my copy and we can see what else Tuchman says.

I can hardly wait. No one is 100% accurate.

[Terry Duncan]

Tuchman (p. 442): "Moltke was bothered by the gaps in his battle line, especially between the armies of the right wing. There was one of twenty miles between Kluck and Bulow, another twenty miles between Bulow and Hausen, and a third almost as wide between Hausen and the Duke of Wurttemberg. Moltke was uncomfortably conscious that the thinning spaces should have been filled by reinforcements drawn from the left wing which he now committed to total involvement in the battle for Moselle. He thought guiltily of Schlieffen's insistence that the proper course was to leave the left wing on the defensive with minimum forces and send every division that he could spare to the 1st and 2nd Armies. (my underline) But the vision of a breakthrough of the French fortress line still lured OHL . . . von Kluck resented the failure to reinforce the marching wing at this critical time."

Why go back to an already answered post to add this? As you posted a reply to my comments about the initial content of your post, do you not think this would have been better included with your last post rather than putting it in a post that was already answered?

"Moltke was bothered by the gaps in his battle line, especially between the armies of the right wing. There was one of twenty miles between Kluck and Bulow, another twenty miles between Bulow and Hausen, and a third almost as wide between Hausen and the Duke of Wurttemberg.

Rather huge gaps, yet people claim Schlieffen wished to march around to the west of Paris? Maybe the 50 miles of gaps will help you understand quite why the right wing was in serious trouble before Hentsch went off to visit the army headquarters.

Moltke was uncomfortably conscious that the thinning spaces should have been filled by reinforcements drawn from the left wing which he now committed to total involvement in the battle for Moselle.

Now this is of course very important. Please cite the source of this information? Where does Tuchman get her information about what Moltke was thinking about these 'thinning spaces'? Am I correct in saying that she doesnt mention a source but is instead simply using her own thoughts on what Moltke might have been thinking?

He thought guiltily of Schlieffen's insistence that the proper course was to leave the left wing on the defensive with minimum forces and send every division that he could spare to the 1st and 2nd Armies.

Again, any particular source for this? Tuchman knew what Moltke was thinking? Tuchman has based this statement upon what documents? Writing to create an impression without evidence is not good or accurate history.

But the vision of a breakthrough of the French fortress line still lured OHL . . . von Kluck resented the failure to reinforce the marching wing at this critical time."

Do we have an actual reference from 1914 to support Kluck was resentful over right wing reinforcements, rather than simply relying on what he claims afterwards when he blamed others to divert attention from his own poor performance? The single that that seems to have cause Kluck most resentment at the time (from his actions) was to be placed under control of Bulow to act as flank guard to 2nd army - the logical role for 1st Army.

[peterhof]

Please cite the source of this information? Where does Tuchman get her information about what Moltke was thinking about these 'thinning spaces'? Am I correct in saying that she doesnt mention a source but is instead simply using her own thoughts on what Moltke might have been thinking?

The Guns of August ends with seven pages of "Sources," followed by twenty-one pages of "Notes," and concluding with a fifteen-page "Index." Tuchman did not pull her quotations from thin air, nor did she suck them out of her thumb. Clearly, she did her homework. As you have as copy, please do your own by simply consulting hers.

The Pulitzer Prize is not even an historical award, it is a literary award.

Tuchman's book received rave reviews from the Atlantic; Clifton Fadiman, Book-of-the-month Club News; The New Yorker; The New York Times, to name just a few.

However, now you have said The Guns Of August is accurate, I presume you have no objection to my quoting sections from it as facts you will agree with 100% as being accurate, so I will find my copy and we can see what else Tuchman says.

I'm still waiting.

[dcmatkins]

I am probably going over what has already been written on this thread.

If you were in the German High Command in the late 1890 to 1914.
Where would you have planned your attack if you were Moltke ?
What would you consider as your main objective. Defeat the enemy in the field quickly. Or take strategic ground to stop your enemy having the ability to wage war .

Having read the book Guns of August. I think the Germans were hopeful of breakthrough further south. To bring a pincer movement around Paris. Stubborn French resistance held them back, though.

I think the Shlieffen Plan was fatally flawed in its concept. It was expecting too much of the troops to march and fight over long distances.
As to its origins , what lessons were learned from previous European Wars ?

Where were the main French forts supposedly to hold up the German attack. Certainly not against the Belgian frontier.
Liege was supposed to be impregnable but quickly fell like other forts to the big German guns.

Im always a bit suspect as quoting books as they are written with the benefit of hindsight. They can be objective and subjective equally.

[Terry Duncan]

dcmatkins

If you were in the German High Command in the late 1890 to 1914.
Where would you have planned your attack if you were Moltke ?

A lot depends on what you wish to achieve and if it is possible. Given Schlieffen considered 96 divisions would be needed in a single front war as the 1906 memo suggests, it appears Germany did not have the strength to achieve a knockout blow even after the army increases of 1912/13. Was what they attempted in 1914 a blow designed to cripple the French or something more?

Having read the book Guns of August. I think the Germans were hopeful of breakthrough further south.

The Guns Of August is a very colourful work, but it is far from comprehensive and uses many myths and unsourced claims to produce a very readable but not totally accurate work. The idea of a breakthough near the Charmes 'gap' is quite possibly one of the things that the Germans expected to achieve, Tappen and Falkenhayn had favoured such a strategy as far back as Schlieffen's time.

I think the Shlieffen Plan was fatally flawed in its concept. It was expecting too much of the troops to march and fight over long distances.

The Shlieffen Plan as often put forward in books is indeed fatally flawed, it cannot work if the French respond and the German army has too few men to even come close to being able to march around Paris - which was at the time the largest fortress city in the world complete with its own garrison army.

Peterhof,

The Guns of August ends with seven pages of "Sources," followed by twenty-one pages of "Notes," and concluding with a fifteen-page "Index." Tuchman did not pull her quotations from thin air, nor did she suck them out of her thumb. Clearly, she did her homework. As you have as copy, please do your own by simply consulting hers.

Oh but she did make some parts up and does not source them. Notably she has no sources for what Moltke was thinking as I asked you to provide support for as you posted that segment. There are no notes to cover them at all, it is simply a claim put forward with nothing to support it at all. That is of course why you have not managed to produce any citation here is it not, despite the seven pages of sources you mention.

My copy provides no notes or citations at all for her views on Moltke's thoughts, so please post the required details from your copy or admit it is an unsourced opinion of the author and nothing more.

Tuchman's book received rave reviews from the Atlantic; Clifton Fadiman, Book-of-the-month Club News; The New Yorker; The New York Times, to name just a few.

So what? Lady Chatterley's Lover, Lolita, and The Metamorphosis have all received rave reviews, as have many of Daniken's, would you cite them as accurate or authoritative simply because they had good reviews?

[Paul_G_Baker]

Gentlemen,

Could someone enlighten me as to the logic (ordinary or military) of spending umpty-million Goldmarks on fortresses and then electing to fight a war with them far in the rear?

Shouldn't the GGS have learned the lessons of Port Arthur that well-built forifications act as a force-multiplier and can cost an attacker a vastly disproportionate number of casualties, particularly when there is a field-army is in close support?

Certainly there can still be an attack (even a wide, outflanking, right-hook) once the enemy has been well weakened.

[peterhof]

So what? Lady Chatterley's Lover, Lolita, and The Metamorphosis have all received rave reviews, as have many of Daniken's, would you cite them as accurate or authoritative simply because they had good reviews?

Didn't you notice? These are works of fiction and fantasy which are not at all required to be "accurate" or "authoritative" and require no Sources, or Notes, or an Index. They are in entirely different categories and are judged by wholly different standards. It's hard to believe you actually wrote this.

[Terry Duncan]

These were works of fiction and fantasy which are not required to be "accurate" or "authoritative" and require no Sources, or Notes, or an Index.

Nor does much of The Guns Of August. Tuchman often makes claims that are not supported by any evidence, such as the example you posted about what Molkte thought etc. Much of what Tuchman wrote was to add colour in order to make her book stand out, but that does not make it at less fictional than the books I mentioned. Unless you can actually supply a source for Tuchman's quoting what Moltke thought then all you are doing is citing the fiction she supplied to colour her account of events. I do not suppose you will do so and I have now requested you to do so three times.

Please answer the following also, otherwise we can conclude you have nothing more to say in this thread as evasion is not the purpose of this forum.

My copy provides no notes or citations at all for her views on Moltke's thoughts, so please post the required details from your copy or admit it is an unsourced opinion of the author and nothing more.

[peterhof]

Unless you can actually supply a source for Tuchman's quoting what Moltke thought . . .

Rudolf Steiner actually zapped Moltke's thoughts directly into Tuchman's brain. No, really.

See his book, Anthroposophy: Scientific basis, for the grim details. It is heavily sourced and footnoted so I'm sure you'll love it.

[Terry Duncan]

So you concede that the words are simply Tuchman's invention and not derived from any writing left by Moltke or anyone he confided such thinking to. Maybe you can now return to the actual topic of German planning itself?