glenn239 wrote:I would add that if Germany negotiated after mobilization, then it would have broken its own principle that mobilization meant war. It’s legal case for not being the aggressor evaporates the moment Russia mobilizes and then Germany proceeds to talk.
Yes. I would further add that this was Russia's policy as well:
"In a Russian secret order approved by the Tsar on March 12, 1912, at the moment Russia helped to secure the signing of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty which was to lead to the Balkan Wars, it was expressly stated that 'the telegram announcing mobilization is also at the same time to be effective as the Tsar's order for the opening of hostilities against Germany and Austria"' (quoted by Frantz, pp 46, 234). Thought this order, for technical and political reasons, was later canceled, and the telegrams for mobilization and the opening of hostilities were to be issued separately, it still represented the conception of military that mobilization means war" (The Origins of the World War, Fay, p. 480).
The Chief of the Mobilization Division of the Russian General Staff, Sergei Dobrorolski confirmed: "[Mobilization] determines mechanically the beginning of war" (Dobrorolski, p. 92, German ed., p. 9f.).
Finally, there was this:
“Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshaling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by clever, pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days, they absolutely must be taken!”
Russian Military Protocol, November 8, 1912
Germany "talk" to Russia after July 30th? Don't make me laugh!