The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan

[peterhof]

I would add that if Germany negotiated after mobilization, then it would have broken its own principle that mobilization meant war. It’s legal case for not being the aggressor evaporates the moment Russia mobilizes and then Germany proceeds to talk.

Yes. I would further add that this was Russia's policy as well:

"In a Russian secret order approved by the Tsar on March 12, 1912, at the moment Russia helped to secure the signing of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty which was to lead to the Balkan Wars, it was expressly stated that 'the telegram announcing mobilization is also at the same time to be effective as the Tsar's order for the opening of hostilities against Germany and Austria"' (quoted by Frantz, pp 46, 234). Thought this order, for technical and political reasons, was later canceled, and the telegrams for mobilization and the opening of hostilities were to be issued separately, it still represented the conception of military that mobilization means war" (The Origins of the World War, Fay, p. 480).

The Chief of the Mobilization Division of the Russian General Staff, Sergei Dobrorolski confirmed: "[Mobilization] determines mechanically the beginning of war" (Dobrorolski, p. 92, German ed., p. 9f.).

Finally, there was this:

“Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshaling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by clever, pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days, they absolutely must be taken!”

Russian Military Protocol, November 8, 1912

Germany "talk" to Russia after July 30th? Don't make me laugh!

[favedave]

Mobilization means (there is a high degree of probability of) war. But it doesn't actually mean war. Neither do declarations of war. Only war means war. War is the organized killing of one social group by another. Serbia and Austria-Hungary were at war because the armed forces of Austria-Hungary were shelling the capital of Serbia on the 28th of July. The murders in Sarajevo, the ultimatum and its rejection and even the declaration of war by the Dual Monarchy did not mean war. Attempting to kill the citizens of another country did. Russia's mobilization did not force Germany to declare war, except that the Kaiser said he would and the German General Staff had a prepared plan of hostile actions they would take in the event Germany declared war on Russia. In the absence of any real military threat they, in the person of the von Moltke demanded that the plan be put into motion without modification regardless of the actual political circumstances.

Even after German troops marched into Luxembourg, the two days until they attacked Belgium offered plenty of opportunity for cooler heads to prevail and back away from the general European war which had not yet begun.

[Mad Zeppelin]

Mobilization means (there is a high degree of probability of) war. But it doesn't actually mean war.

Generally speaking, you're right. - As long as Schlieffen was chief of staff, there was almost no automatism - no violation of any border during mobilisation (with the exception of Luxemburg: if the responsible 16th Division commander became aware that the French were entering L., he was allowed to have his units move in as well without asking OHL).
But this changed under Moltke. Thus, in 1914 (and ever so since 1909) German mobilisation meant immediate war.

[peterhof]

Mobilization means (there is a high degree of probability of) war. But it doesn't actually mean war.

This is incorrect. Fay:

"'Mobilization means war.' This was a political maxim which for years had been widely accepted by military men on the Continent everywhere . . . This was also clearly understood by Sasonov and the Tsar, as appears from Schilling's account of their conversation at Peterhof and the Tsar's long hesitation to assume the terrible responsibility." (The Origins of the World War, Fay, p. 479)

As I have previously noted above, this fully comports with official Russian policy.

[favedave]

What it meant to military men is exactly the reason military men generally don't head the civil governments. Nor did military men head France or Great Britain. Were there any constraits other than self-imposed on the heads of Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Serbia? Had the actuality of war been imposed on any of them except Serbia? What other nations might do, and perhaps had even sworn to do is no guarantee they will do them when the time comes. Germany did not have to carry out its military plans for the two-front war. Germany's leader merely consciously decided this was the best time to execute it.

[peterhof]

What it meant to military men is exactly the reason military men generally don't head the civil governments. Nor did military men head France or Great Britain. Were there any constraits other than self-imposed on the heads of Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Serbia?

Was there any compelling need for Sasonov and Czar Nicholas to order general mobilization? No! Could Sasonov and Czar Nicholas have declined to order general mobilization? Yes!

[Terry Duncan]

Peterhof,

As I have previously noted above, this fully comports with official Russian policy.

The quote on Russian policy you posted above actually says something very different;

Though this order, for technical and political reasons, was later canceled, and the telegrams for mobilization and the opening of hostilities were to be issued separately, it still represented the conception of the military that mobilization means war" (The Origins of the World War, Fay, p. 480).

The order was cancelled. Fay's opinion is that it represented a 'conception' by the military, not the political heads of state, nor that it had any acceptance by anyone outside the military. So, this directly contradicts official Russian policy even in the qoutes provided.

I would add that if Germany negotiated after mobilization, then it would have broken its own principle that mobilization meant war.

Glenn,

I would add that if Germany negotiated after mobilization, then it would have broken its own principle that mobilization meant war.

As this was not a principle that Germany had informed others of, this is hardly important, especially as the German leadership itself was far from decided on this doctrine.

It’s legal case for not being the aggressor evaporates the moment Russia mobilizes and then Germany proceeds to talk.

There was no legal case that 'mobilization meant war' and no nation had ever cited mobilization as casus belli. If you wish to follow this line please post the relevent legal convention which supports this claim.

Additionally, the German policy on war measures was an attempt at deterrence by way of automatic action after the Russians took a particular step.

This only works if you make your policy very clear to all potential enemies. Germany did not do so in 1914 and the diplomats continued to talk of mobilizing and still talking while fully mobilized armies held at their war stations. Even if you think it impossible for the armies to hold in such a position you cannot deny that the politicians did not think they were handing automatic control of events to the military.

It is also interesting that you now think Germany should not have talked and delayed the declaration of war as you have previously been critical of the historical German action as taking place prior to the time it was necessary.

Can people please stick to the topic of events within Germany and its military with regards to planning and timing.

[Andy H]

Hi All

I haven't read the whole thread and I make no excuses for that, but just to say that the last 8pages have given me enough of a flavour to make a few comments.

Any thread that has such a length as this one is bound to revisit certain aspects over and over again. Now that's acceptable if its pertinent to the discussion or a specific post (especially if its a new poster). However returning to the same aspects out of any other motive or agenda isn't. This just leads to a ever decreasing circle of interest and discussion.
Most people are mature enough to know when one side or view has won the arguement over another, without the 'victor' labouring the point or trying to be smart with it.
If anyone feels the urge to re-fight battles from other threads or forums, then I URGE you most strongly not to follow them, because the consequences wont be to your liking or the benefit of this thread.

I haven't edited any posts yet or removed any either, but if after this post you find your posts subject to either, then don't expect a explanation. Because if that happens then you plainly haven't read this post.

Regards to all

Andy H

[favedave]

Andy H.

While I certainly commend the idea of "Staying on Topic", i.e. Wilhelmine Germany's military preparations, these did not happen in vacuum without the influences of the economic and social changes of the recently born modern age. This topic incidently was created out of another long running topic which had a bit wider latitude by the forum rather than a private poster. Rather than read the last eight pages to get a flavor, I've been involved and reading every post from the beginning.

What I've learned from the debate is fascinating. There are in all likelihood no clear victors for one view point or another, except that the version of history which begins virtually every English language history of the Fiirst World War written in the 20th century, (examples include: Tuchman,Stokesbury, Keegan, APJ Taylor, SLA Marshal, Terraine, etc.), may have not been the whole story of why 9,000,000 young men died for their countries from August 1914 to November 1918. We certainly have partisans for a number of different scenarios (mine is the only correct one!) which is very good since much of the actual evidence is tainted by the bias of the various participants, or conviniently lost in the Allied bombings of World War II, or never really examined in the first place due to the bias of each historian writing in the field. Much of this material has to be gone over again and again because interpretation is everything. We all have a tendency to find what we are looking for in the sources we read. Lucky thing for those of us with graduate degrees in history, since that is the only way to write a thesis well supported by documentary evidence. But it is all selective based on our own preconceived ideas.

Has this thread changed my mind? Yes and no. Certainly I am grateful for the link which allowed me to read the Schlieffen Plan (a translation which presents its own difficulties of translation) in all of its draft forms (I skipped most of the annotations since I was trying to get a fresh take on what it was really saying) . And I was genuinely glad to see that the 1905 memo had other practical uses such as getting the Reichstag to increase military spending and the Army's manpower strength. This came from one of the slightly off topic posts which dealt with the diplomatic atmosphere swirling about Europe at the time the memo was written. As a result I hate to see a discussion I've found so illuminating closed down. The arguments maybe the same, but like Trench warfare their always bringing up fresh ammunition to fight it.

Dave

P.S. I thought the discussion of the last 8 pages brings up some extremely interesting factors I'd not considered before. If we all weren't a little obsessive about this history we would not be here.

[Terry Duncan]

Dave,

The problem is when the topic is diverted into yet another discussion of Russian mobilization in 1914. No matter how important people consider this act or even who said what at the time (there are already two threads here on this that were going in circles), Russian actions of 28th July 1914 - 1st August 1914 cannot have had any place in what Germany had in place as its war plan a that date, nor for what Germany had been planning from 1890 - 1914. I am perfectly aware that value can be found from going off topic at times, but attempting to drag almost every topic onto a single issue is not productive at all.

Terry

[favedave]

I grant you that the subject of Russia's mobilization has been covered rather extensively. But there really is no denying that Russia's speed of deployment was a central factor in Germany's war plans and that Russia's mobilization was the pretext upon which the Kaiser ordered the launching of the invasion of Luxembourg, his declaration of war on France and the invasion of Belgium under what has been historically called the Schlieffen Plan. Having a firm advocate of the Kaiser's has spurred many of us to scramble for sources and carry on these debates for 35 pages in this thread alone. Have we changed any minds? I think everyone has at least modified their thoughts on this subject.

[glenn239]

and that Russia's mobilization was the pretext upon which the Kaiser ordered the launching of the invasion of Luxembourg, his declaration of war on France and the invasion of Belgium under what has been historically called the Schlieffen Plan

You’re use of the term ‘pretext’ is wrong, presumably stemming from a pattern of placing everything in as anti-German a light as possible. A pretext is,

fictitious reason given in order to conceal the real one

German doctrine that mobilization meant war preceded 1914, preceded the Ententes, preceded the Dual Alliance – it was about 30 years old. As I have explained, no pretext can exist for 30 years, or already be in existence even before the alliances that fought the war!

[peterhof]

It is difficult (if not impossible) to steer a middle course between discussing a topic in a vacuum, and letting the topic spiral into a haze of barely related topics. This dilemma comes on top of biases and prejudices of individual posters. I do not know the answer. Perhaps a given thread has a useful life - say a maximum number of posts - at the conclusion of which it should be closed. Meanwhile, this thread and others have been extremely informative to me personally and note that many individual posts are "found" by various search engines and thus serve to inform others.

My own take-away from this discussion is that the Schlieffen Plan - however it is finally defined - was so perilous and dangerous an undertaking that Germany would never have chosen to embark upon it voluntarily. It therefore constitutes strong evidence of German innocence.

[favedave]

You’re use of the term ‘pretext’ is wrong, presumably stemming from a pattern of placing everything in as anti-German a light as possible.

One of the values of this thread is that it points out our own bias in word choice. I could have chosen 'reason' which is semantically neutral. However, I purposefully chose pretext since the events which led to Russia's mobilization and Germany's hostile aggressions against Luxembourg and Belgium had nothing to do with each other. Or are you claiming that for the preceding 30 years any time a country bordering but not formally allied to Germany mobilized its armed forces that German foreign and military policy was to invade the Benelux?

[peterhof]

. . . events which led to Russia's mobilization and Germany's hostile aggressions against Luxembourg and Belgium had nothing to do with each other.

This the most astonishing statement yet - especially in view of the numerous posts pointing out the obvious connection.